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ABSTRACT 
The thesis is structured around a three-paper format. These papers examine 
three distinct but interrelated aspects of corporate gender diversity. It provides; (1) a 
comprehensive review of corporate gender diversity (theories, studies, and 
regulation); (2) examines impact of, nomination committee existence and attributes, 
one of the key internal determinants of gender diverse board, on board gender 
diversity; and (3) the impact of gender diverse board on firm’s earnings quality. 
Despite significant regulatory attention and considerable (Psychology, Sociology, and 
Management) research on gender traits and female leadership skills, accounting, 
finance and economic fields are far behind in terms of significant corporate gender 
diversity research. Opponents of corporate gender diversity still argue females’ 
representation on top does not add any real value to the organisation and key 
motivational factors behind appointing female corporate leaders are still ambiguous. 
Hence, this thesis aims to shed light on global corporate gender diversity condition 
along with one key determinant (nomination committee) and consequence (earnings 
quality) of having a gender diverse board.  
This study simultaneously explores one of the key internal determinants, 
nomination committee, and largely unexplored firm output, earnings quality, of gender 
diverse board in Australian context. It provides a comprehensive view of current 
global corporate gender diversity condition along with detailed exploration of 
corporate gender diversity condition in Australia. The thesis contributes to accounting 
and corporate governance literature on these topics. The results provide several 
implications for the regulators, policy makers, investors and general public.   
The 1st essay aims to provide a complete review of five significant elements of 
corporate gender diversity: (1) The evolution of corporate gender diversity studies. 
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This section synthesises the journey of corporate female representation studies from 
1950 onwards. (2) A synthesis of theories utilised to describe female characteristics 
(in general and as corporate leaders) and to rationalize female corporates’ 
contributions towards diverse firm outputs. (3) A synthesis and analysis of “women in 
business” studies. This section focuses on the studies conducted on the impact of 
female directors, sub-committee members, senior executives, and auditors. (4) A 
review of worldwide gender regulations. (5) A detailed analysis of Australian 
corporate gender diversity research (academic and non-academic), facts and statistics.   
The 2nd essay investigates the influence of nomination committee existence 
and its attributes (size, independence, gender diversity, and meeting frequency) on 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed companies’ board gender diversity 
during the voluntary period (prior implication of gender diversity regulation on ASX 
listed firms in 2011). 
The 3rd essay examines the impact of board gender diversity on accruals quality 
during both voluntary period (prior implication of gender diversity regulation on ASX 
listed firms in 2011) and self-regulatory period (after the implication of gender 
diversity regulation on ASX listed firms in 2011). 
After the recent global financial crisis and collapse of well-known U.S. and 
Australian firms, Australian regulators followed the footstep of Europe and 
implemented self-regulatory gender quota in 2011. However, recent statistics show 
that despite the regulatory intervention and numerous international studies (mostly 
U.S and Europe based) to advocate top female corporates’ positive attributes, the 
female representation at the board of ASX listed firms is still not satisfactory. Female 
directors are still being considered as mere tokens and their capabilities are still being 
questioned due to their meagre representation at the top. It is quite evident that 
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regulatory intervention through soft gender quota struggling to achieve its desired 
purpose. Further, the existing Australian research on corporate gender diversity are 
also insufficient compare to U.S and Europe based research. Therefore, this study has 
been conducted in Australian context for the following reasons, (a) Recent 
implementation of self-regulatory gender quota; (b) The slow progress of female 
representation at the top despite implementation of gender quota; (c) Insignificant 
number of prior literatures on the determining factors of board gender diversity; and 
(d) Narrowly explored contributions of female directors towards firm output.   
The initial sample of this study consists of all Australian publicly listed firms 
registered on the ASX and a random sample is pooled each year using stratified-
random sampling. The data of the sample firms is collected from secondary data 
sources for the period of 2008-2014 (excluding 2011). In order to test the study’s 
testable hypotheses, multiple regression analysis is utilized as the primary multivariate 
statistical technique to analyse approximately 3600 firm-year observations. 
All three papers of the thesis highlight diverse aspects and significance of 
corporate female leadership. Specifically, essay 1 provides a complete view (academic 
studies, organisations involved, theories utilised, regulations, and statistics) of 
corporate gender diversity. Essay 2 suggests nomination committee independence and 
gender diversity demonstrates highly significant and positive relationship with board 
gender diversity. Essay 3 provides evidence that higher number of female members 
on boards can better constrain earnings management and improve earnings quality 
compared to one female member on board.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Board gender diversity has received regulatory and academic attention in the 
last two decades (approx.).  The proponents (KPMG 2014, Mckinsey 2013, Tyson 
2003) of corporate gender balance at the top believe organisational performance can 
be improved by having a gender diverse board and have been asking for the 
incorporation of more female directors on boards. Years of research on “Glass 
Ceiling” has demonstrated that it is a tough and prevalent phenomenon (Ryan et al. 
2016) and eliminating “Glass Ceiling” barrier is a mystifying task. However, women 
representation on boards has escalated after the implication of mandatory and self-
regulatory gender balance regulation in diverse countries. Recent studies conducted 
on the impact of board gender diversity regulation have shown conflicting views. 
Some studies (Reguera-Alvarado, de Fuentes, and Laffarga 2017, Klettner, Clarke, 
and Boersma 2016, Sojo et al. 2016) claim gender diversity regulation can positively 
contribute towards female representation at the top while others (Shimeld et al. 2017, 
Adams and Kirchmaier 2016) argue gender diversity regulation is only capable of 
superficial enhancement of female members on boards. Nevertheless, European 
countries are the pioneers in adopting board gender diversity regulations and are the 
current world leaders in female representation on boards. Besides, countries under no 
stringent regulatory pressure also experiencing increased percentage of female 
representation on their corporate boards. For instance, in the past few years U.S. 
companies have seen significant voluntary increase of female participation on 
corporate boards. Particularly, this trend of adding more female directors on boards 
has accelerated after the big corporate collapse (e.g. WorldCom, Enron) and global 
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financial crisis of 2008. Recent data by Catalyst (2017) shows, corporate board seats 
held by women in Norway is 46.7%, Sweden 33.6% and France 34%, UK 23.6%, U.S. 
19.9.9%, Australia 23.4% and Canada 21.6%. 
To date business academics have explored key external determining factors 
(e.g. industry, firm, and board characteristics) and examined diverse outputs of having 
reasonable female representation at the top corporate positions (e.g. director, chair, 
chief executive officer, chief financial officer). Considerable number of existing 
academic evidence supports the fact that female corporate leaders are vital for the 
overall wellbeing of the firms. Representation of female in top corporate positions 
have been linked to better risk management and lower firm riskiness (Chen, Ni, and 
Tong 2016, Khan and Vieito 2013); higher trustworthiness from bank in case of loan 
contracting (Francis, Hasan, and Wu 2013); less bid premium paid by shareholders 
(Levi, Li, and Zhang 2014); enhanced shareholder value (Kim and Starks 2016, Toumi 
et al. 2016, Levi, Li, and Zhang 2014); higher announcement return on acquisitions 
and debt issuance (Huang and Kisgen 2013); better corporate governance (Carter et 
al. 2010, Adams and Ferreira 2009, Singh and Vinnicombe 2004, Carter, Simkins, and 
Simpson 2003, Singh, Vinnicombe, and Johnson 2001); board effectiveness (Ben-
Amar, Chang, and McIlkenny 2017, Terjesen, Couto, and Francisco 2016); better firm 
financial performance  (Horak and Cui 2017, Bo, Li, and Sun 2016, Khan and Vieito 
2013, Liu, Wei, and Xie 2013, Pathan and Faff 2013, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 
2008, Farrell and Hersch 2005, Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003, Erhardt, Werbel, 
and Shrader 2003); and higher earnings quality (Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2017, Khlif and 
Achek 2017, Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011, Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui 2008, Krishnan and 
Parsons 2008). Carter et al. (2007) claim, although several studies failed to establish 
positive link between representation of female directors on corporate boards and firm 
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performance, only negligible amount of study managed to show a negative 
relationship. However, market still reacts negatively towards female representation at 
the top (Ahern and Dittmar 2012, Adams and Ferreira 2003).  The mixed evidence of 
corporate female leadership studies and recent regulatory attention towards enhancing 
female representation on corporate boards have motivated me to investigate 
three distinct but interrelated elements of female representation at the leading 
corporate positions that are centred around board gender diversity. 
A gender diverse board is comprised of both male and female directors and 
thus enriched with diverse experience and skills. Singh, Terjesen, and Vinnicombe 
(2008) claim, newly appointed female directors possess similar and, in some cases, 
additional human capital compare to their male peers. Thus, a gender diverse board 
compare to an all-male board performs better due to its diverse managerial 
competencies, skills, professional experience and knowledge (Hillman, Cannella, and 
Harris 2002). The two key advantages of gender diverse board are, first it is more 
enriched in terms of human capital and second it can lead to better corporate 
governance (Carter et al. 2010).  
Resource dependency theory provides a better lens compare to other theories 
for understanding the board (Hillman, Withers, and Collins 2009). Resource 
dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) addresses firm as an open system, 
which depends on its environment for its survival. An effective and efficient board 
can aid the organisation by providing, (1) legitimacy, (2) advice and counsel, and (3) 
proper networking with inside and outside the firm. Board of directors can play 
resource dependence roles to help reduce organisational dependency on its external 
environment in two ways: Firstly, by providing vital resources to the board and 
secondly, by securing resources for the firm through linkages to the external 
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environment (Hillman, Cannella, and Harris 2002). A proper gender balance on 
board can bring diverse views to the board that better reflects the population served. 
Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella (2007) claim a gender diverse board is enriched 
with diverse perspectives, knowledge, experience, skills, and alternative solutions to 
the problem. Additionally, a gender diverse board better reflects a firm’s diverse 
customer base and employee base compare to an all-male board and can lead to better 
linkage with outside environment. Further, the presence of female directors on boards 
can enhance the boards networking capability since female directors hold more 
multiple directorship compare to their male counterparts (Hillman, Cannella, and 
Harris 2002). 
Agency theory is the predominant theory used in research of board of directors 
(Hillman, Withers, and Collins 2009). According to this theory board of directors can 
reduce agency conflict by ensuring better monitoring of the managers. Board is 
responsible for monitoring managers on behalf of the shareholders and reduce agency 
cost (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) claim that a 
diverse board is more independent and can ensure better oversight of management. 
Past empirical studies show that women directors demand for more audit efforts (Gul, 
Srinidhi, and Tsui 2008) and managerial accountability (Adams and Ferreira 2009). 
Further, female directors are not part of the “Old boys’ network”, their presence on 
board can bring diverse views, arguments and different perception to risk, leading 
towards more independent decisions and stronger oversight of managers. This in turn 
can lead to legitimate organisational outcomes. 
 Kang, Cheng, and Gray (2007, 194) state that, “Australia has one of the most 
developed stock markets in the Asia-Pacific region. With the collapse of several well-
known public companies such as Ansett, OneTel and HIH, there is an increasing 
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demand to evaluate the corporate governance practices of Australian companies, 
including the composition of boards”. Australian regulators have adopted a “best 
practice” approach by implementing gender diversity recommendations and 
disclosure requirements from 1 January, 2011.
 
Australian Securities Exchange 
(2010) claims that the reason behind implementing diversity recommendations is 
to enhance the positive impact of board gender diversity on firm performance 
(Chapple and Humphrey 2014). Since the implementation of the Australian 
Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council (ASX CGC) diversity 
recommendations the ASX 200 listed firms have achieved considerable success in 
terms of the percentage of women on boards and the proportion of women 
comprising new appointments (AICD 2013).
 
Further, the Australian government 
boards exceeded the targeted percentage of female representation in 2013.
 
As per 
KPMG (2014), under the third edition of ASX CGC recommendations, diversity 
recommendations have been relocated from the former Principle 3 (Ethical and 
responsible decision-making) to Principle 1 (Lay solid foundations for management 
and oversight). Further, Australia might even adopt mandatory quota system in 
the future if the self-regulatory approach cannot achieve its targeted goal (AHRC 
2010). All these facts demonstrate the significant attention board gender diversity 
receiving from Australian regulators and policy makers. Despite this fact only a 
handful of studies have been conducted on this topic in Australian context so far. 
Australian studies on board gender diversity that are conducted during the 
voluntary period (Wang and Clift 2009, Nguyen and Faff 2007, Bonn 2004)  
and self-regulatory period (Chapple and Humphrey 2014, Adams, Gray, and 
Nowland 2011, Galbreath 2011), mostly focused on the impact of board gender 
diversity on firms’ financial performances. Furthermore, most of these past studies 
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are constrained by either sample size and/or sample per iod .1
 
Hence, Chapple and 
Humphrey (2014, 11) claim that, “The change in regulation and consequent 
increase in female director participation justifies a re-examination of the Australian 
market”. 
Despite global regulatory pressure and significant empirical evidence of 
female corporate leaders’ positive contribution towards diverse firm outputs, their 
representation is not satisfactory. Why external regulatory enforcement is still the key 
motivating factor for female inclusion at the top? Do corporations genuinely not 
realize the necessity to have a more demographically balanced and diverse board?  
From an economic perspective, underrepresentation of female at the board level is not 
only a waste of human capital but also a loss of talent and efficiency for firms. Fair 
representation of female members at the very top level can ensure better utilisation of 
female talent pool (CESifo DIC 2013) and lead to several firm benefits.2 External 
regulatory pressure might rapidly accomplish board gender diversity to a certain level; 
however, it might result in token female member(s) on board. Kaczmarek, Kimino, 
and Pye (2012) claim that noticeable change in board gender diversity cannot be 
achieved by regulation alone. Hence, it is essential that both regulators and 
corporations work in collaboration to achieve board gender diversity in a true sense. 
However, there is still lack of significant desire among corporations to utilise 
necessary mechanism to ensure fair recruitment process of female board members and 
break the “Glass Ceiling”.3 An accumulated knowledge of history of gender diversity 
studies, theories, empirical evidence from recent business studies, and review of global 
                                                          
1 The past Australian studies that have considered voluntary sample period (prior implementation of board gender diversity 
regulation) are constrained by sample size due to the poor representation of   female on board during that period. The studies 
conducted in the self-regulatory period (after implementation of board gender diversity regulation) also limited their firm-year 
observations up to 2011. 
2 Please refer to Appendix 1. 
3 An intangible barrier within a hierarchy that prevents women or minorities from obtaining upper-level positions. 
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gender regulation and its impact can provide significant rationale behind the scarce 
representation of female corporate leaders. Surprisingly, no study till date has done a 
collective review of above mentioned aspects of corporate gender diversity. In order 
to reveal the facts behind the current poor representation of global female corporate 
leaders, the 1st essay aims to provide a comprehensive review of five significant 
elements of corporate gender diversity: (1) The evolution of gender diversity studies 
since 1950 onwards; (2) Theories utilised in gender diversity studies; (3) A synthesis 
of women in business studies; (4) An overview of worldwide gender regulation; and 
(5) A comprehensive exploration of corporate gender diversity condition in Australia. 
Women contribution in business is one of the most debated topics in academia and 
requires a strong review of above mentioned elements of corporate gender diversity. 
This study establishes a strong foundation for current and future corporate gender 
diversity research. 
So far only a handful of studies have investigated the factors that explain why 
some enterprises hire women on their boards while others do not (Hillman, Shropshire, 
and Cannella 2007). Female representation at the top can be influenced by diverse 
elements; corporate ownership structure and internationalization (Saeed et al. 2017); 
family, education, economy, and government influence (Brammer, Rayton, and 
Grosvold 2016); societal influence (Gregorič et al. 2017); environmental requirements 
(Ben-Amar, Chang, and McIlkenny 2017); shareholder activism (Marquardt and 
Wiedman 2016); work life practices (Kalysh, Kulik, and Perera 2016); and 
cooperation from current corporate leaders (Fitzsimmons and Callan 2016). Past 
empirical researches mostly focused on key determinants like, industry characteristics 
(Chapple and Humphrey 2014, Brammer, Millington, and Pavelin 2007), firm 
characteristics (Terjesen, Couto, and Francisco 2016, Adams and Ferreira 2009, 
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Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003) and board characteristics (Farag and Mallin 2016, 
Strøm, D’Espallier, and Mersland 2014, de Cabo, Gimeno, and Nieto 2012, Brammer, 
Millington, and Pavelin 2007). However, despite being the primary board sub-
committee for recruiting corporate board members, nomination committee has been 
largely overlooked in the board gender diversity related studies. Past empirical studies 
on nomination committee (Clune et al. 2014, Ruigrok et al. 2006) claim that 
nomination committee can play a major role in determining board characteristics 
through ensuring a transparent and unbiased selection process. Hence, the 2nd essay 
attempts to fill this void in the literature by investigate the contribution of nomination 
committee towards board gender diversity without the external regulatory pressure. 
Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow (2014) conducted the only Australian study 
on board gender diversity and nomination committee attributes. They have 
investigated the impact of two nomination committee attributes (existence and gender 
diversity) on board gender diversity and utilized two sample periods, 2007 (prior 
implementation of self-regulatory gender quota) and 2011 (after implementation of 
self-regulatory gender quota). This study explores five nomination committee 
attributes (existence, gender diversity independence, size and meeting frequency) and 
focus only on voluntary period (prior implementation of self-regulatory gender quota) 
to examine the sole impact of nomination committee attributes on board gender 
diversity. This allows to provide more in-depth understanding of the nomination 
committee attributes towards board gender diversity in Australian context. 
Recently female representation in top corporate positions has become a 
significant topic among regulators, academics and many other related parties. 
Particularly, after the recent global financial crisis of 2008 and collapse of well-known 
corporations (e.g. Enron (U.S.), WorldCom (U.S.), OneTel (Australia), HIH 
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(Australia) and so on), questions have been raised regarding the demographic diversity 
of corporate board members, sub-committee members and other top corporate 
positions (e.g. CEO, CFO, manager, and senior executives). Board gender diversity is 
a new and less explored contributing factor of earnings quality and good empirical 
evidence is required to support this argument. Further the extant research on female 
contribution in constraining earnings management and improving earnings quality is 
limited and conducted on U.S., UK and EU context.  
Australian context is ideal for this investigation as it has recently adopted the 
self-regulatory approach for board gender diversity and till date no research have 
been conducted on female corporate leaders’ contribution towards earnings quality. 
Although, few significant prior international studies (Barua et al. 2010, Krishnan and 
Parsons 2008, Peni and Vähämaa 2010, Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011) have already 
proven top female corporates’ positive contributions towards financial reporting 
quality. However, whether female directors in ASX listed boards can exert similar 
positive impact on financial reporting quality is yet to be explored. Hence, the 3rd 
essay in this thesis aims to explore whether achieving a certain level of female 
representation on board can have stronger impact on financial reporting quality 
through investigating this relationship under both voluntary and self-regulatory 
periods. 
1.2 Structure of Thesis and Summary of Findings 
The thesis is structured around a three-paper format. These papers examine 
three distinct but interrelated aspects of corporate gender diversity. As a whole, the 
thesis consists of five chapters including this chapter. The rest of the thesis is 
structured as follows: 
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Chapter 2 presents the first essay of  this thesis which aims to provide a 
complete review of five significant elements of corporate gender diversity: (1) The 
evolution of corporate gender diversity studies. This section synthesises the journey 
of corporate female representation studies from 1950 onwards. (2) A synthesis of 
theories utilised to describe female characteristics (in general and as corporate leaders) 
and to rationalize female corporates’ contributions towards diverse firm outputs. (3) 
A synthesis and analysis of “women in business” studies. This section focus on the 
studies conducted on the impact of female directors, sub-committee members, senior 
executives, and auditors. (4) A review of worldwide gender regulations. This section, 
1st segregates discussion as per gender regulation type (gender quotas and 
recommendations), 2nd each type of gender regulation is further segregated as per 
geographical region, and 3rd those sections explore the respective countries’ gender 
regulation strategies, facts and statistics of corporate gender diversity, the detail of 
government/private organisations working to promote corporate gender diversity and 
the academic research conducted on corporate gender diversity. (5) A detailed analysis 
of Australian corporate gender diversity research (academic and non-academic), facts 
and statistics.  
Chapter 3 presents the second essay of the thesis, the key objective of this 
study is to investigate the influence of nomination committee existence and its 
attributes (size, independence, gender diversity, and meeting frequency) on ASX listed 
companies’ board gender diversity during the voluntary period. External regulatory 
pressure alone is not sufficient to achieve adequate representation of female members 
on boards. Corporations require significant and strong internal mechanisms to ensure 
fair recruitment process of female board members and break the “Glass Ceiling”. 
Nomination committee existence, composition and activities are considered as one of 
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the key internal determining factors of female representation on boards (Hutchinson, 
Mack, and Plastow 2014, Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye 2012). Past empirical studies 
on nomination committee (Clune et al. 2014, Ruigrok et al. 2006) claim that 
nomination committee can play a major role in determining board characteristics 
through ensuring a transparent and unbiased selection process. Therefore, it is vital to 
explore the impact of nomination committee existence and its attributes on fair 
representation of female members on board. This study has randomly selected 600 
ASX listed firms between 2008 and 2010 to investigate the impact of nomination 
committee existence and its attributes on representation of female directors on boards. 
Chapter 4 presents the third essay of this thesis; this study investigates the 
impact of board gender diversity on accruals quality. The key internal elements to 
control earnings management and enhance earnings quality are strong corporate 
governance, internal control, audit committee, and external audit. Significant number 
of past studies (Jiang, Lee, and Anandarajan 2008, Klein 2002, Marrakchi Chtourou, 
Bedard, and Courteau 2001, Becker et al. 1998, McMullen 1996, Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney 1996) have established positive link between these key elements and 
earnings quality. Board gender diversity is comparatively a new and much debated 
contributing element of earnings quality. The existing accounting studies on female 
corporates’ contributions towards corporate accounting decision-making are scarce 
and demonstrate mixed results (Francis et al. 2015). Hence, Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 
(2011) claim that gender influence on accounting decision-making is still an open 
question, and require more research. As to my best knowledge no previous study has 
been conducted on board gender diversity and earnings quality in Australian context. 
Using a sample of 600 ASX listed companies between 2008 and 2014 (excluding 
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2011), this study examines whether, board gender diversity significantly and positively 
impacts earnings quality pre and post gender regulatory implementation in 2011.  
Chapter 5 provides a summary of major findings from the empirical analyses 
in this thesis. The chapter also presents overall conclusions and contributions. In 
addition, it discusses directions for future research. 
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Table 1.1: Summary of the Findings 
Chapter Type Hypotheses Findings 
2 Review and 
Synthesis 
NA A comprehensive 
review of gender 
diversity studies, 
theories and global 
gender regulations. 
3 Quantitative H1: There is an association 
between nomination committee 
existence and board gender 
diversity. 
H2: There is an association 
between the size of nomination 
committee and board gender 
diversity. 
H3: There is a positive association 
between the independence of 
nomination committee and board 
gender diversity. 
H4: There is a positive association 
between nomination committee 
gender diversity and board gender 
diversity. 
H5: There is an association 
between the meeting frequency of 
nomination committee and board 
gender diversity. 
Nomination 
committee 
independence and 
gender diversity 
demonstrates a 
highly significant 
and positive 
relationship with 
board gender 
diversity. 
4 Quantitative H1: There is a positive association 
between a gender diverse board 
and earnings Quality. 
Compare to an all-
male board, a 
gender diverse 
board can better 
constrain earnings 
management and 
positively 
contribute to 
accruals quality. 
 
1.3 Contribution of the Study 
The thesis provides a comprehensive review of global corporate gender 
diversity, investigates the impact of nomination committee existence and attributes 
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on female representation on boards, and the contribution of board gender diversity 
towards earnings quality. The contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
The contributions of Essay 1 (Chapter 2): (1) The review of the past 65 years’ 
(1950 onwards) gender literature will not only represent a comprehensive view of 
corporate females’ positions and their struggle in the last 65 years, but also provide 
logic behind their still very insignificant representation at the top. (2) A concise but 
comprehensive review of underlying theories of gender studies will justify the 
contributions of corporate female members and provide reason behind “why” they are 
usually being treated and perceived differently from their male peers. (3) An 
exploration of “women in business” studies will strengthen the logic behind 
incorporating more female corporates at the top. (4) A complete review of the global 
gender regulation followed by an exclusive review of Australian corporate gender 
diversity condition will provide a comprehensive view of the most current corporate 
gender diversity situation in Australia.  
The contributions of Essay 2 (Chapter 3): (1) This study will add to the scarce 
nomination committee-gender diverse board relationship literature. (2) Nomination 
committee establishment and board gender diversity of Australian listed corporations 
have received considerable regulatory attention. Hence, there is a vital requirement for 
good empirical research on the relationship of nomination committee attributes and 
board gender diversity. (3) Unlike most prior research on this topic, this study looks 
at the association of nomination committee attributes with board gender diversity in 
voluntary period. This will help to detect the true impact of nomination committee on 
board gender diversity without external regulatory pressure. (4) This study will assist 
Australian regulators to ascertain whether ASX CGC recommendations on nomination 
committee structure and responsibilities sincerely contribute towards the unbiased 
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selection process of female directors on board. (5) This study will encourage 
Australian regulators to consider nomination committee structure as one of the key 
internal determinants of board gender diversity and incorporate nomination committee 
structure related recommendations as part of board gender diversity recommendations.  
The contributions of Essay 3 (Chapter 4): (1) Till date, only few international 
empirical studies have been conducted on the relationship of board gender diversity 
and earnings quality. Further, these studies provide mixed results and thus female 
board members’ contribution towards financial reporting quality is still an open 
question. Hence, this essay will meaningfully contribute to the scarce board gender 
diversity and earnings quality literature.  In particular, the relationship between female 
member(s)’ representation on boards and financial reporting quality in Australian 
context has not been investigated in the past. Hence, there is a vital requirement for 
good empirical research on this topic in Australian context. (3) Unlike previous board 
gender diversity and earnings quality studies this study will not only focus on top 
firms. The sample firms of this study include ASX listed firms of all sizes. Hence, this 
study will provide a comprehensive scenario of female directors’ contribution towards 
earnings quality. (4) This study looks at the association of board gender diversity and 
earnings quality in both self-regulatory period and voluntary period.4 This will 
demonstrate the board gender diversity and earnings quality relationship before and 
after the implementation of board gender balance regulation. (5) This study will 
explicitly contribute to board governance, financial reporting quality and overall 
gender diversity literature in business by adding timely empirical evidence from 
Australia. 
                                                          
4 Self-regulatory period: After the implementation of ASX CGC gender diversity recommendations Voluntary period: Prior the 
implementation of ASX CGC gender diversity recommendations. 
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In summary, this study will benefit a number of key stakeholders. Firstly, 2nd 
essay provides evidence on the fact that nomination committee independence and 
gender diversity make meaningful contribution towards female directors’ recruitment 
during voluntary period (prior to the implementation of gender quota in 2011). Hence, 
it implies that satisfactory female representation on board can be achieved through 
further strengthening and reforming current ASX CGC recommendations on existence 
and structure of nomination committee. Second, in conjunction with other U.S. based 
studies such as Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui (2011), Peni and Vähämaa (2010), Krishnan and 
Parsons (2008) the results of the 3rd essay suggest that female board participation 
increases earnings quality by improving the oversight function of the board. The overall 
implication is that in situations where greater board oversight is desired and better 
earnings quality is demanded by Australian investors, inclusion of female directors is a 
plausible way for the board to achieve these objectives. Considering these findings, 
policy makers and regulators are able to determine the effectiveness of legislation to 
improve earnings quality through strengthening ASXCGC’s nomination committee and 
gender quota recommendations. This benefits the capital market participants by having 
a flow on effect of minimizing poor corporate reporting and, potentially, subsequent 
corporate failure.  
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CHAPTER 2: A SYNTHESIS OF WORLDWIDE CORPORATE GENDER 
DIVERSITY AND AUSTRALIA 
2.1 Introduction  
2.1.1 Motivation and Objectives  
This study aims to provide a complete review of five significant elements of 
corporate gender diversity: (1) The evolution of gender diversity studies since 1950 
onwards; (2) Theories utilised in gender diversity studies; (3) A synthesis of women 
in business studies; (4) An overview of worldwide gender regulation; and (5) A 
comprehensive exploration of corporate gender diversity condition in Australia. 
Women contribution in business is one of the most debated topics in academia and 
requires a strong review of above mentioned elements of corporate gender diversity. 
This study establishes a strong foundation for current and future corporate gender 
diversity research.  
 
Figure 1: Introduction Discussion Flow Outline  
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Figure 1 demonstrates the outline of the discussion of this section. The 
following discussion briefly highlights the perspectives of both opponents and 
supporters of corporate gender equality. Followed by brief discussion on evolution of 
corporate gender diversity studies, theories used in gender diversity studies in 
business, women in business studies and finally worldwide gender diversity 
regulation. 
Does presence of women at the top level of corporations make any significant 
difference? In particular, does presence of female directors, subcommittee members, 
CFOs, CEOs, managers and other senior executives make considerable contributions 
to the firm performance? The opponents of corporate gender diversity cannot find any 
significant logic behind incorporating and enhancing the number of female members 
in corporate boards, sub-committees, and in other senior executive positions (e.g. 
CEO, CFO, and manager). Eagly and Heilman (2016, 352) state that “Optimistic 
myths about the positive effects of women's leadership have gained considerable 
currency, especially the “business case” that women's participation in high-level 
corporate leadership enhances corporate performance. This claim is simply not in line 
with existing social science evidence”. The key arguments behind this mindset are: 
Female corporates lack of corporate knowledge and experience; their lack of influence 
on major organisational decisions; their differential views and perspectives from their 
male peers; and their still very unsatisfactory representation at the top.  Hence, forced 
incorporation and rapid enhancement of female members at the top corporate positions 
might give rise to unpleasant consequences like inefficient board (Bøhren and Staubo 
2013), negative market reaction (Ahern and Dittmar 2012, Adams and Ferreira 2003), 
and insignificant firm performance (Rose 2007).  
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On the contrary, from an economic perspective, underrepresentation of female 
members at the board level is not only a waste of human capital but also a loss of 
available talent and skills. A decent representation of female representation at the very 
top level can ensure better utilisation of female talent pool (CESifo DIC 2013).5 
Further, EC (2012) argue a fair and equal female representation on board can improve 
corporate governance and ethics, ensure better quality decision-making, enhance 
creativity and innovation, reflect the market better, and boost both organisational and 
financial performance of the companies.6 Hence, the quality of top corporate 
executives might be compromised if female, half of the talent pool, is being ignored 
for leadership positions. 
Recent collapse of well-known corporations (e.g. Enron (U.S.), WorldCom 
(U.S.), OneTel (Australia), HIH (Australia)) and global financial crisis are indicating 
the urgency of altering male dominated corporate culture.7 The sole leadership of 
authoritative and risk prone male corporates (Rosener 2011) is being questioned by 
scholars and regulators. Liu, Wei, and Xie (2013, 169) state, “After recent corporate 
scandals and financial crises, an important question has been raised: would things have 
been different if more women were running the corporations in the U.S. and around 
the world (Adams and Funk 2012)?” Thus, it has become essential to have a 
comprehensive knowledge of the evolution of corporate gender diversity literature 
history, theories utilised to support female representation at the top, the findings of 
women in business studies and overview of worldwide gender regulation.  
                                                          
5
https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/facts/DICE/Labour-Market-and-Migration/Labour-Market/Anti-discrimination-
Gender/gender-quota-boardroom-representation_report/fileBinary/gender-quotas-boardroom-representation_dicereport313-
db3.pdf 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gendere-quality/files/womenonboards/impact_assesment_quotas_en.pdf 
7 Please refer to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_corporate_collapses_and_scandals for a list of recent corporate 
collapse and the key reasons. 
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At present, female representation in top corporate positions is a significant 
topic among business academics. Psychology and Sociology scholars are the pioneers 
in terms of exploring gender related traits. However, the scholars in the business arena 
started to show significant interest after 2000. Particularly, this academic attention 
enhanced after the “gender diversity regulation” came into play. Women entered the 
middle and top level of corporate management long after men and they are still 
struggling to secure significant number of positions at the top. Despite the 
implementation of mandatory and self-regulatory gender regulations, female 
representation on boards and senior management is unsatisfactory. Although number 
of gender diverse boards increased but female ratio compare to their male colleagues 
is still inadequate. Female directors are still being perceived and treated as mere 
tokens. The “Glass Ceiling” issue (section 2.4.1.3) play a key role in constraining 
potential female corporate leaders (e.g. chief executive officers, chief financial 
officers, chairs, directors, and managers) success. Nonetheless, potential female 
corporates are steadily climbing to the upper half of the corporate pyramid and have 
started to demonstrate their capabilities as corporate players.  
Till date business scholars have investigated diverse motivating factors and 
outcomes of corporate gender diversity. Determinants of corporate gender diversity 
are less explored compare to its consequences.8 Further the studies conducted on the 
outcomes of female representation on top demonstrate mixed results.9 Hence, 
contribution of female corporate leaders towards positive firm outcomes is still an 
open debate. The key objective of this study is to shed light on the current global 
corporate gender diversity condition by reviewing global gender diversity regulations   
                                                          
8 Please refer to chapter 3 literature review section for detailed discussion of diverse determinants of corporate gender diversity. 
9 Please refer to chapter 4 literature review section for detailed discussion of diverse consequences of corporate gender 
diversity. 
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and its impact on current female representation at the top. It is followed by a more 
detailed exploration of corporate gender diversity condition in Australia.  The 
supporting objectives of this study is to explore the history and evolution of corporate 
gender diversity related studies; the theories utilised so far in the gender diversity 
studies; and a synthesis of women in business studies.  
The 1st supporting objective of this study is to provide a complete review of 
the evolution of women in business studies from 1950 onwards. The advancement of 
women in the corporate world and the evolution of gender literature are interrelated. 
Gender studies started its journey from Sociology and Psychology literature and 
slowly made its way to business (Management, Finance/Economics, Accounting, and 
Marketing) literature. It took women more than half a century to finally enter the top 
level of corporate management. Female representation in corporate management came 
a long way since the 1950s. During this journey they faced significant discrimination 
and corporate strategic barriers. Gradually they have secured their positions in top 
level management as senior executives, managers, directors, subcommittee members, 
CEOs, and CFOs, and making significant contributions to organisational outcomes. 
The same pattern can be seen in the evolution of gender literature. Gender related 
studies evolved from sociology and psychology to accounting, finance and economics 
field. The gradual progress of corporate females and worldwide regulatory attention 
towards corporate gender diversity led towards escalated corporate gender diversity 
studies in the business field. However, the female representation on boards is still not 
satisfactory and the research on this topic still demonstrating mixed evidence. More 
business studies are required to further explore the significant determinants and 
consequences of female representation on corporate boards.  
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The 2nd supporting objective of this study is to provide a synthesis of theories 
utilised in corporate gender diversity studies till date. Theory provides the key 
argument to establish a link between two aspects. Theories are significantly being 
incorporated in gender studies from 1990s onwards. Gender literature is mostly 
descriptive (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009) and thus its theoretical background is 
diverse and not explicit. Gender literature in Psychology and Sociology primarily 
focuses on gender traits’ differences and thus mostly utilise theories to support male 
vs female characteristics variances. Gender literature in business arena (Management, 
Finance, Accounting/Finance, and Marketing) primarily uses theories to establish 
positive/negative link between presence of female corporates and diverse firm 
outcomes.  
The 3rd supporting objective of this study is to explore studies conducted on 
the contributions of significant female corporates, like, board members, sub-
committee members, senior executives, and auditors. This section synthesizes and 
analyse the results of significant studies conducted so far on the contribution of female 
corporates to build rationale behind female incorporation in significant corporate 
leadership positions. 
Finally, the key objective of this study is to shed light on the current global 
corporate gender diversity condition by reviewing global gender diversity regulations 
and its impact on current female representation at the top. It is followed by a more 
detailed exploration of corporate gender diversity condition in Australia. Since 2000 
onwards regulators of significant number of countries adopted gender diversity 
regulations. Gender diversity regulation is segregated into two sections: mandatory 
gender quota (with or without penalty) and self-regulatory / voluntary gender quota 
(comply or explain). Significant changes occurred in terms of female representation at  
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the top corporate positions after the implementation of gender diversity regulations in 
the respective countries.10 This study attempts to provide a comprehensive review of 
global corporate gender diversity condition along with significant focus on Australian 
corporate gender diversity condition through analysing Australian gender diversity 
research by academics and other organisations, facts and statistics, and details on 
government/private organisations supporting and promoting corporate gender 
diversity.  
2.1.2 Significance of the Study 
The significance of the supporting objectives: (1) The review of the past 65 
years’ (1950 onwards) gender literature not only represents a comprehensive view of 
corporate females’ positions and their struggle in the last 65 years, but also provide 
logic behind their still very insignificant representation at the top. (2) A concise but 
comprehensive review of underlying theories of gender studies justifies the 
contributions of corporate female members and provides reason behind “why” they 
are usually being treated and perceived differently from their male peers. (3) An 
exploration of “women in business” studies strengthen the logic behind incorporating 
more female corporates at the top. (4) The key objective of this paper is to conduct a 
complete review of the global gender regulation followed by a comprehensive review 
Australian corporate gender diversity condition. First, this helps to shed light on the 
causes and motivation behind the mandatory and self- regulatory gender regulations 
adopted by different countries. Second, this reports current rules, recommendations 
and strategies adopted by the regulators. Third the facts and statistics show the level 
of success achieved by gender regulations till date. Finally, academic research and 
diverse reports and projects adopted by different government/ private organisations  
                                                          
10 Please refer to section 2.5 for details. 
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provide evidence of success/ failure of gender regulations. The regulators, academics, 
opponents/proponents of corporate gender diversity receive a comprehensive view of 
the most current corporate gender diversity situation in the world. This in turn 
motivates regulators to come up with more innovative and effective strategies to 
motivate top corporate gender diversity, and encourage gender researchers to adopt 
innovative research path to further explore the causes and outcomes of corporate 
gender diversity. 
2.1.3 Structure 
The following sections are organised as follows, (1) The evolution of corporate 
gender diversity studies. This section synthesises the journey of corporate female 
representation studies from 1950 onwards. (2) A synthesis of theories utilised to 
describe female characteristics in general and as corporate leaders, and to rationalize 
female corporates’ contributions to diverse firm outputs. (3) A synthesis and analysis 
of “women in business” studies. This section focuses on the studies conducted on the 
impact of female directors, sub-committee members, senior executives, and auditors. 
(4) A review of worldwide gender regulations. This section, 1st segregates discussion 
as per gender regulation type (gender quotas and recommendations), 2nd each type of 
gender regulation is further segregated as per geographical region, and 3rd those 
sections explore the respective countries’ gender regulation strategies, facts and 
statistics of corporate gender diversity, the detail of government/private organisations 
working to promote corporate gender diversity and the academic research conducted 
on corporate gender diversity. (6) A detailed analysis of Australian corporate gender 
diversity research (academic and non-academic), facts and statistics. (7) Conclusion.  
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2.1.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the global regulators and corporations recently realised this 
valuable truth and have started to take diverse measures. At this stage a comprehensive 
review of diverse gender regulations and its economic impact has become essential 
along with a review of the last sixty years of gender study evolution, theoretical 
support, and “women in business” studies. This study will not only provide a clear 
perspective of global gender regulation impact but also help the regulators to come up 
with new strategies and innovative ideas to motivate female representation at the top.  
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2.2 Evolution of Gender Diversity Studies 
This section provides a synthesis of significant business and gender related 
studies since 1950s to till date. It demonstrates the progression of professional women 
in the corporate world through the evolution of gender diversity studies in the 
academia.  
 
Figure 2: An Outline of the Evolution of Corporate Female Representation Studies (1950 -2000 
Onwards) 
During the 1950s “Gender” was primarily an influential topic for academics in 
the sociology arena (See, Daric 1955; White 1955; Guilbert and Isambert-Jamati 1954) 
and presence of female members at the top corporate levels was non-existent. Hence, 
most gender studies (Daric 1955, White 1955, Guilbert and Isambert-Jamati 1954) 
focused on sociological and organisational discrimination towards female labours.  
During the 1960s “corporate board” related studies (Koontz 1967, Zald 1969, 
Vance 1964) started to emerge in management literature. In particular, corporate board 
structure, composition, and size got consideration. However, board gender diversity  
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failed to receive considerable academic contemplation, given that the presence of 
women was still insignificant in corporate boards during this time. However, few 
studies (e.g. Choo 1969, Moore 1961, Babchuk, Marsey, and Gordon 1960) showed 
that women were slowly entering the boards of hospitals, schools/universities, 
voluntary and non-profit organisations, and community/social agencies. However, 
their representation was poor and they had little command over the board decisions.  
During the 1970s academics paid special attention to the board composition 
and addressed “board demographical composition” as an integral factor of 
organisational success. Scholars (Vance 1978, Pfeffer 1973, Heller Jr 1972, Pfeffer 
1972) pointed out the fact that board composition should be balanced and should 
reflect the composition of employee base, customers and other stakeholders. The 
increasing female participation in middle and upper level of management was quite 
evident from the studies of this period. Researchers (Terborg 1977, Acker and Van 
Houten 1974, Shaw 1972) were particularly attentive towards the issues like gender 
role stereotype and gender discrimination in the workplace. However, due to poor 
representation of women at the top, the number of top corporate gender diversity 
studies was still very low. Very few studies were conducted on female directors’ 
presence on board, some had positive tone (Schwartz 1979, Orr 1977), while others 
had negative (Cooney and Esposito 1978). During this time significant number of 
studies (Dipboye, Fromkin, and Wiback 1975, Rosen and Jerdee 1974b, Acker and 
Van Houten 1974, Day and Stogdill 1972, Shaw 1972) shed light on discrimination 
towards female corporates.  
During 1980s gender studies were still a key topic in sociology and psychology 
journals (Heilman et al. 1989, Estes and Hosseini 1988, Hudgens and Fatkin 1985, 
Jago and Vroom 1982). Common female characteristics like, risk averseness and   
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confidence level were being highlighted in these studies. Further, gender 
discrimination issues like, gender pay gap (Major 1989, Jackson 1989, Jackson and 
Grabski 1988), work assignment biasness; and recruiting/ promoting discrimination 
(Magee-Egan 1987, de Jong 1986, England 1985) got much attention. The 
advancement of female entrepreneurs and mangers was quite apparent from the studies 
(Bowen and Hisrich 1986, Hisrich and Brush 1984, Hisrich and Brush 1983) of this 
decade. On a positive note, scholars (Forbes and Piercy 1983, Vance 1983, Herman 
1981) started to show optimism regarding slow rise of corporate female members at 
the top and addressed female directors’ expertise, skills and knowledge to be qualified 
as effective board members.  
During 1990s characteristics differences between male and female corporate 
leaders, managers and top executives grasped academic attention. Several studies 
(Yammarino et al. 1997, Eagly, Karau, and Makhijani 1995, Eagly and Johnson 1990) 
focused on corporate female leadership style and their unique managerial capabilities. 
Women on board studies (Shrader, Blackburn, and Iles 1997, Bradshaw, Murray, and 
Wolpin 1996, Siciliano 1996) accelerated, these studies mostly focused on female 
directors’ characteristics, their lower representation on boards and gender  
discrimination (Burke 1997, Conyon and Mallin 1997a, Bilimoria and Piderit 1994). 
Female directors’ presence on board was mostly being associated with board 
effectiveness (Bradshaw, Murray, and Wolpin 1996) and corporate social performance 
(Stanwick and Stanwick 1998, Siciliano 1996, Coffey and Fryxell 1991). Very few 
studies linked presence of women on board with firm’s financial performance 
(Shrader, Blackburn, and Iles 1997) and other significant corporate outcomes (e.g. 
financial reporting quality, stock value, corporate transparency).   
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From 1950s-1980s gender related studies were mostly conducted in the 
Sociology, Psychology and Management area, during the 1990s scholars from 
accounting, finance, and economics field also started to show interest towards women 
in business phenomenon. However, these studies (Lampe 1996, Sweeney 1995, Shaub 
1995) mostly focused on the gender of top executives, accountants and auditors rather 
the gender of corporate directors. From 2000 onwards, the board gender diversity 
studies accelerated at a very fast pace. The primary reason behind this was the 
implementation and adoption of mandatory/self-regulatory quotas by several 
countries. During this period business literature focused on the impact of gender quota 
(Reguera-Alvarado, de Fuentes, and Laffarga 2017, Shimeld et al. 2017, Adams and 
Kirchmaier 2016, Chandler 2016, Klettner, Clarke, and Boersma 2016, Sojo et al. 
2016, Bøhren and Staubo 2014, Ahern and Dittmar 2012, Bøhren and Strøm 2010, 
Campbell and Vera 2010, Grosvold, Brammer, and Rayton 2007), the determinants of 
female presence on board (Ben-Amar, Chang, and McIlkenny 2017, Fitzsimmons and 
Callan 2016, Grosvold, Rayton, and Brammer 2016, Farag and Mallin 2016, Terjesen, 
Couto, and Francisco 2016, Chapple and Humphrey 2014, Strøm, D’Espallier, and 
Mersland 2014, de Cabo, Gimeno, and Nieto 2012, Adams and Ferreira 2009, 
Brammer, Millington, and Pavelin 2007, Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003), and the  
outcomes of board gender diversity (Khlif and Achek 2017, Ben-Amar, Chang, and 
McIlkenny 2017, Horak and Cui 2017, Bo, Li, and Sun 2016, Byron and Post 2016, 
Terjesen, Couto, and Francisco 2016, Gavious, Segev, and Yosef 2012, Gul, Srinidhi, 
and Ng 2011, Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011, Nguyen and Faff 2007). In particular, top 
female corporates’ contributions towards corporate governance effectiveness, board 
effectiveness and most importantly significant firm outcomes (like, financial 
performance, firm value, financial reporting quality, and corporate transparency) got  
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significant attention in these studies. Some studies (Kramaric and Miletic 2017, Khlif 
and Achek 2017, Chen, Ni, and Tong 2016, Glass, Cook, and Ingersoll 2016, Levi, Li, 
and Zhang 2014, Colaco, Myers, and Nitkin 2011, Miller and del Carmen Triana 2009, 
Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui 2008, Krishnan and Parsons 2008, Erhardt, Werbel, and 
Shrader 2003) successfully established positive link between top corporate gender 
diversity and these outcomes, others failed to demonstrate any link or found a negative 
relation (Amran et al. 2016), (Bøhren and Strøm 2010, Carter et al. 2010, Adams and 
Ferreira 2009, Rose 2007, Smith, Smith, and Verner 2006). Overall studies conducted 
in this period showed mixed results regarding female representation on boards. A key 
reason behind this mixed evidence is the lower representation of the female members 
at the top. Hence, with the increasing number of female corporates at the top, more 
studies need to be conducted to explore the true impact of female presence in top 
corporate positions.  
2.2.1 1950s and 1960s 
During 1950s studies related to corporate gender diversity were non-existent. 
Women were mostly homemakers, worked as labours or lower management level 
employees. Studies during this period highlighted the importance of proper utilisation 
of human capital in the workforce. For instance, a study conducted by Smiddy and  
Naum (1954) show that efficient and proper utilisation of the human resource is the 
key to a successful organisation. However, contribution of demographically diverse 
workforce remained unexplored. Studies in sociology and psychology fields focused 
on gender related issues. Discrimination towards women as labours or society 
members in general was the highlight of these studies. A study conducted by Guilbert 
and Isambert-Jamati (1954) on 300 French women labours highlighted the fact that 
women were treated as cheap labours at that time. The authors claimed that society’s   
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stereotypical mindset and attitude towards women were the key reason behind the poor 
condition of female labours in France. During this period women hugely struggled to 
manage a strong professional career alongside being a homemaker. They were seen as 
homemakers first and then professional individuals. Daric (1955) shed light on the 
industry wise gender pay gap and salary discrimination between males and females’ 
employees. In contrast, based on U.S data White (1955) demonstrated women were 
progressing in terms of educational qualification, mindset, and career. The author 
argued that women were becoming more career oriented and job discrimination was 
also reduced due to mechanization. During the end of this period women in workplace 
and their characteristics started to grasp more academic attention.  McKee and 
Sherriffs (1959) showed that women can bring much required diversity to the 
corporation as their values, principles, and self-concept differ from their male 
counterparts. 
During 1960s academics started to focus on the structure and composition of 
boards. For instance, Zald (1969) showed that the demographic compositions of 24 
Chicago based YMCA boards were influenced by the socioeconomic composition of 
the area they served. Further, studies (Koontz 1967, Vance 1964, Sommer and Plice 
1963) were also conducted on the impact of board of directors on board and 
organisational effectiveness. Studies (Choo 1969, Moore 1961, Babchuk, Marsey, and 
Gordon 1960) showed that women were gradually entering the boards of hospitals, 
schools/universities, non-profit organisations, and community/social agencies. 
Despite securing positions as board members in these respective organisations women 
had little command over the board decisions due to their lower representation. A study 
conducted by Choo (1969) on Singaporean community centres showed that the 
representation of female board members was very poor. Babchuk, Marsey, and   
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Gordon (1960) added that women were mostly part of the boards of small and less 
important organisations compare to big voluntary organisations like hospitals and 
universities. Further, Zald (1969) claimed that female board members mostly played 
a passive role and had less grasp over external resources. In contrast, Abrams (1963) 
argued that after the Second World War women started to access important 
government boards. Overall, during this period only a handful of board gender 
diversity studies were conducted and the studies had a pessimistic tone towards female 
representation on boards and their contributions.  
2.2.2 1970s 
During 1970s scholars started to focus more on the composition of corporate 
boards. For instance, Heller Jr (1972) showed that majority of the sample firms’ boards 
were not composed of capable members. They were often chosen based on their status 
and connection despite their lack of proper skills and knowledge. The author further 
stretched, board composition should be balanced and board members should be 
representative of the employee base, workforce, customers, shareholders, and other 
stakeholders. An impressive number of studies also started to emerge on the well-
structured boards’ contribution towards better organisational outcomes. Vance (1978) 
argued that the corporate boards were no longer secretive entities and slowly started 
to open doors to the public. He further added that stakeholders’ involvement in 
determining board structure and performance will increase as the organisational 
diversity enhances. (Pfeffer 1973, 1972) correlated the composition of corporate 
boards and directorate dimensions with organisational effectiveness. Although these 
studies did not specifically focus on lack of gender diversity among board members 
but it opened the door for gender diverse board related studies for the future.  
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Researchers (Murray Jr 1978, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) also started shed light 
on the fact that organisations need to abide by the rules and regulations of its external 
environment while making strategic decisions and determining human resources. Or 
in other words the resource dependency perspective started to receive special 
consideration during this period. This later became one of the key theoretical bases for 
board gender diversity related studies. 
During this period numerous studies have been conducted on workplace sex 
discrimination and sex-role stereotype faced by women. Terborg (1977) demonstrated 
women face obstacles and discrimination during most of their occupational career. 
(Rosen and Jerdee 1974b, a) showed female employees face discrimination from their 
male managers while being promoted and supervised.  Studies conducted by Acker 
and Van Houten (1974) and Day and Stogdill (1972) also supported this view. Further, 
Shaw (1972) and Dipboye, Fromkin, and Wiback (1975) claimed that discrimination 
starts from the very beginning of the recruitment process and continues while being 
promoted. Rosen and Jerdee (1974a) and Friend, Kalin, and Giles (1979) added, for 
challenging top management positions females are intentionally given poor evaluation 
rate. Further Terborg and Ilgen (1975) demonstrated, females are assigned less 
challenging tasks in traditionally male dominated jobs and despite holding the same 
qualification they were being offered significantly lower salary compare to their male 
peers. Although, these highlighted occupational barriers faced by female employees 
during the 1970s, the rationality and arguments of these studies can still be utilised by 
the current board gender diversity studies for justifying the lower representation of 
female members on corporate boards. 
Due to lower percentage of female members’ presence on boards, only a 
handful of studies were conducted on board gender diversity and its contributions   
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during this time. Cooney and Esposito (1978) shed light on the gender stereotype faced 
by female directors in the board. She claimed that female board members are not being 
treated as equals despite holding equal qualification and skills as their male peers. She 
further added that playing a director role is not a challenge for female directors, the 
real challenge is to dispel the female stereotype. In contrast, Orr (1977) and Schwartz 
(1979) optimistically addressed the female members’ presence on U.S corporate 
boards. According to these studies female presence on boards were gradually 
escalating and helping to break the corporate gender stereotype. Further, Scwartz 
(1979) addressed female directors as “invisible resources” and claimed that there are 
proficient women candidates out there ready to serve the corporate boards. 
During this decade board gender studies were still limited, however significant 
number of conducted on the corporate board structure, organisational dependence on 
the external environment (resource dependence perspective) and organisational 
discrimination faced by corporate females established the foundation for the upcoming 
board gender diversity studies.  
2.2.3 1980s 
During this period several studies (Kesner, Victor, and Lamont 1986, Norburn 
1986, Baysinger and Butler 1985, Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma 1985, Cochran, 
Wood, and Jones 1985, Mattar and Ball 1985, Waldo 1985, Vance 1983) have been  
conducted on corporate board structure and its composition (Kesner 1988). Studies 
have correlated the size and composition of board with the corporate governance 
effectiveness and board effectiveness (Kesner, Victor, and Lamont 1986). Fama and 
Jensen (1983a) claimed that the advancement in economic theory supports the fact that 
corporate board directors are integral part of good corporate governance and better 
organisational outcomes.   
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Gender related studies mostly published in sociology and psychology journal 
(Heilman et al. 1989, Estes and Hosseini 1988, Hudgens and Fatkin 1985). Common 
female characteristics like, risk averseness and confidence level were highlighted in 
these studies. Further, gender discrimination issues like, gender pay gap (Major 1989, 
Jackson and Grabski 1988); work assignment biasness and recruiting/ promoting 
discrimination (Magee-Egan 1987, de Jong 1986, England 1985) received undivided 
attention. 
Some studies (Bowen and Hisrich 1986, Hisrich and Brush 1985, Hisrich and 
Brush 1983) emerged on female entrepreneurs. This implies women were gradually 
entering the business field as independent entrepreneurs. Bowen and Hisrich (1986) 
claimed female entrepreneurs have strong focus, control, values and they are very 
career focused. These facts show that during this period professional women in general 
steadily started to become quite ambitious and career motivated. 
Few studies were also conducted on female representation on boards (Elgart 
1983; Harrigan 1981). While some of these studies were quite optimistic about the 
enhancement of female representation on boards (Vance 1983, Herman 1981) while 
others expressed pessimistic views (Elgart 1983, Harrigan 1981). Harrigan (1981) 
argued, although female incorporation in the publicly traded firms’ boards marginally 
increased during the 1970s, but their role was very limited and they were perceived as 
the agents of special elite groups. They were mostly outsiders who played the role 
model character for female executives and managers. Further, Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
added studies (Zahra and Stanton 1988) conducted during this period failed to 
positively associate female board members with firm performance due to lower female 
representation on boards. In contrast, Forbes and Piercy (1983) investigated 1000 U.S   
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female executives and showed that the younger female executives have strong 
background and capacity to reach to the very top and become future female CEOs. 
Studies during this period also focused on the discrimination towards corporate 
women holding executive, managerial, and/or board positions. Mai-Dalton and 
Sullivan (1981) demonstrated that female executives faced gender discrimination in 
terms of job assignment by the male managers. They were offered less challenging 
tasks by their male supervisors. Elgart (1983) claimed that despite steady increase of 
female representation on corporate boards, boards of major companies were still 
“men’s club”. The author further stated, “It will take about 200 years for women to 
attain equal representation on top corporate boardrooms in or about the year 2180” 
(Elgart 1983, 126). He argued the reasons behind lower representation of female board 
members are limited opportunity, negative corporate mindset and lack of supply of 
qualified female candidates. Despite all the odds handful of talented and skilled female 
members successfully managed to hold top executive positions (Harrigan 1981). 
Finally, Kesner (1988) first shed light on the gender role discrimination in board 
committee membership. The author argued that the reason behind low female member 
representation in the key board committees was gender stereotype and discrimination.  
All in all, during this period the board of directors’ characteristics and their 
contribution towards effective corporate governance and organisational outcomes 
received significant attention from the scholars. Although the advancement of 
professional women as entrepreneurs and corporate executives is quite evident, the 
strategic barriers and discrimination towards female corporates are also quite apparent 
from the studies emerged in this decade.   
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2.2.4 1990s 
During this period “women in management” research got undivided attention 
from the scholars. Studies were conducted on contributions of female senior 
executives, managers, auditors and accountants. Hence, Burke (1997) argued 
incorporation of female in management is not only ethical but also the smart thing to 
do. Firms were missing out on half of their available human resources by not utilising 
qualified and skilled female candidates. During this decade many studies (Yammarino 
et al. 1997, Eagly, Karau, and Makhijani 1995, Rosener 1990) documented unique 
female leadership style and managerial capabilities. While some scholars (Mattis 
2000, Morrison, White, and Van Velsor 1994) spoke optimistically about the 
enhancement of female representation in top management level while others expressed 
(Burke 1996) a pessimistic view. 
Numerous studies were conducted to investigate the key factors behind the 
scarcity of women in higher managerial positions despite the availability of large pool 
of talented and qualified female candidates. During this decade “Glass Ceiling” studies 
started to emerge in full force. (Burke 1997) addressed the “Glass Ceiling” issue as a 
global phenomenon. Studies showed that lack of female representation on board were 
due to “Old boys’ network”, lack of proper career opportunity and sex-role stereotype 
(Oakley 2000); gender discrimination during recruitment and promotion (Burke 1997, 
Conyon and Mallin 1997a); negative attitude of male CEOs/ Chairs towards women 
candidates (Burke 1996); sex-based bias during appointing and assigning board 
committee membership (Bilimoria and Piderit 1994). In contrast, some studies 
(Oakley 2000, Wentling 1996, 1992) also blamed females’ lack of experience and 
career plan as obstacles.  
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A good number of studies also emerged on the differences between male and 
female managers’ characteristics. These studies shed light on the risk attitudes, moral 
and confidence level differences of the female managers compare to their male 
counterparts. Most of these studies (Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998, Powell and Ansic 
1997) claimed that female managers are more risk averse when it comes to investment 
and other financial decisions. In contrast, some studies (Johnson and Powell 1994) 
demonstrated that female managers do not differ from their male colleagues in terms 
of risk propensity and in decision making quality. Female managers’ strategic decision 
plan (Powell and Ansic 1997) and ethical values (Bernardi and Arnold Sr 1997) were 
also being compared to their male counterparts. The emergence of these studies 
indicates that during this period a fair number of female executives held managerial 
positions and they were on the verge of entering the very top level of the corporation.  
The scholars from the accounting arena started to show some interest in gender 
diversity during this decade. Most of these studies were restricted to female 
participation in the accounting and auditing professions. These studies (Lampe 1996, 
Sweeney 1995, Shaub 1995) mostly highlighted the moral and ethical values of female 
accountants and auditors. Joy Maupin (1993) argued that females are underutilised 
asset in the accounting profession and motivated and skilled female candidates are 
urgently need to be incorporated like other professions. Collins (1993) and Hunton 
and Wier (1996) suggested, with proper professional support and positive corporate 
mindset females can become valuable resource for accounting profession and other 
private sectors.  
During this period the impact of top female executives and directors on firm 
performance began to draw academics attention as well. However, most of these 
studies shed light on the link between female presence in top management/board and   
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corporate social performance (CSP)/ corporate social responsibility (CSR). For 
instance, female presence on board has been positively associated with CSR (Coffey 
and Fryxell 1991) and CSP (Siciliano 1996). Stanwick and Stanwick (1998) claimed 
that female presence in top level of management can positively influence the CSP, 
however due to their lack of influential power their presence on board do not influence 
CSP. Few studies (Shrader, Blackburn, and Iles 1997, Bradshaw, Murray, and Wolpin 
1996) found positive link between female presence on boards and board effectiveness.  
During this decade very, few studies were conducted on the association of 
female presence on boards and firms’ financial performance. Shrader, Blackburn, and 
Iles (1997) positively linked presence of female managers with financial performance 
(measured by ROS, ROA, ROI and ROE). However, could not find a positive relation 
between female directors and these proxies of firm’s financial performance. Scholars 
praised female executives as effective managers, valuable organisational resource, and 
competitive secret of an organisation (Rosener1990). However, due to lower 
representation of female directors’ contribution towards firms’ financial performance 
and other significant outputs (e.g. financial reporting quality, shareholders’ value, and 
so on) remained unexplored during this period. 
2.2.5 2000 Onwards 
Board gender diversity studies accelerated from 2000 onwards. A major reason 
behind this is the adoption of mandatory or self-regulatory gender quotas by different 
countries. Since then numerous studies have been conducted on the “impact” of gender 
quota legislation on firm outputs. Some studies opposed the mandatory incorporation  
of female members on boards while others argued in favour of this much debatable 
legislation. For instance, (Bøhren and Staubo 2014, 2013) showed that mandatory 
incorporation of certain percentage of female on boards can lead towards   
40 
 
organisational ineffectiveness and board inefficiency. Further, Ahern and Dittmar 
(2012) and Bøhren and Strøm (2010) supported this argument by showing a negative 
link between sudden increases of gender diversity on board with firm value. In 
contrast, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) and Grosvold, Brammer, and Rayton 
(2007) argued that sudden increase of female representation on the corporate boards 
does not lead to a negative impact on firm’s image and value. Further, increase in 
corporate board gender diversity has been associated with positive abnormal returns 
(Nygaard 2011); higher financial gains (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 2008); and 
enhanced knowledge diversity within the board (Adams and Flynn 2005). All in all 
mixed academic evidence can be observed towards the impact of gender regulation. 
Discrimination and biasness towards female top executives are still quite 
evident in this period and thus “Glass Ceiling” studies continued to emerge. Arfken, 
Bellar, and Helms (2004) argued that despite being a critical resource women 
representation on board is not satisfactory. Over the years strategic barriers have been 
imposed to forbid females to climb corporate hierarchy and reach the top level of the 
corporation (Branson 2007). In particular, they struggle to hold important board 
committee memberships and CEO/Chair positions (Wearing and Wearing 2004). 
Despite holding necessary qualification and financial expertise (Wilson 2010) female 
candidates have been significantly doubted in terms of their capability to hold 
important board positions (Adams 2016, Hoyt and Murphy 2016, Rosette et al. 2016, 
de Cabo, Gimeno, and Nieto 2012, De Cabo, Gimeno, and Escot 2011).   Women have 
been seen to be appointed in the boards of riskier and loss-making firms (Mulcahy and  
Linehan 2014, Ryan et al. 2011, Ryan, Haslam, and Kulich 2010, Ryan and Alexander 
Haslam 2009, Ryan and Haslam 2007, Ryan, Haslam, and Postmes 2007, Ryan and 
Haslam 2005). Women still need to demonstrate their capacities and capabilities more  
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than their male counterparts to hold important board positions (Vial, Napier, and 
Brescoll 2016, Brescoll 2016). 
Several studies (Gary Simpson, Carter, and D'Souza 2010, Terjesen, Sealy, and 
Singh 2009, Burgess and Fallon 2003, Burgess and Tharenou 2002, Burgess and 
Tharenou 2000) have been conducted to explore female directors’ characteristics 
during this period. These studies attempted to explore female board members 
qualification, managerial skills, networking capabilities and many other traits. For 
instance, studies during this period showed female directors are generally younger 
compare to their male counterparts (Ross-Smith and Bridge 2008, Sealy, Singh, and 
Vinnicombe 2007, McGregor 2003); hold strong network ties with other female 
directors (Sheridan 2001); possess higher educational qualification (Singh, Terjesen, 
and Vinnicombe 2008, Peterson and Philpot 2007, Hillman, Cannella, and Harris 
2002); hold multiple directorship (Sealy, Singh, and Vinnicombe 2007, Farrell and 
Hersch 2005) and so on. Further, studies have shown that female directors are less 
overconfident (Dowling and Aribi 2013, 2012, Barber and Odean 2001); more risk 
averse; possess less board experiences (Singh, Terjesen, and Vinnicombe 2008) and 
hold mostly outside director’s title compare to their male counterparts. Female 
CEO/CFO characteristics also received significant attention. Martin, Nishikawa, and 
Williams (2009) showed that female CEOs are more risk averse and thus their 
presence can lead to lower firm risk (Khan and Vieito 2013). Further, (Palvia, Peni, 
and Vähämaa 2009) demonstrated, during financial crisis female CEOs/chairs can 
ensure lower failure rate and their presence can also ensure stronger capital ratios. 
Further, female CFOs have been linked with lower earnings management (Peni and 
Vähämaa 2010); lower accrual estimation error (Barua et al. 2010) and more 
conservative financial reporting policies (Francis, Hasan, and Wu 2013).  
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Many studies have also shed light on the female directors’ contribution as 
board members. Sheridan (2002) argued female members of Australian boards hold 
their prestigious positions based on their strong business background, educational 
qualification, and network ties. Presence of female directors on boards have been 
positively linked with board effectiveness (Adams and Ferreira 2004); strong 
monitoring of management (Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui 2008; Adams and Ferreira 2009); 
improved strategic decision (Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003); continued and 
effective governance activities (Colaco, Myers, and Nitkin 2011); and firm innovation 
(Torchia, Calabro, and Huse 2011, Miller and del Carmen Triana 2009). 
From 2000 onwards both the determining factors and consequences of board 
gender diversity have been investigated by the scholars in business filed. Researchers 
tried to identify “why” some company boards have higher percentage of female 
members compare to others or in other words “what” factors really determine the 
percentage of women on boards. Although, some studies (Nekhili and Gatfaoui 2013; 
de Cabo et al. 2012) claimed that women get appointed on boards based on their own 
qualification, network ties, skills, and other valuable resources they bring to the 
boards. However, there are certain external and internal organisational characteristics 
that also play important role to determine gender diversity on boards. Hillman, 
Shropshire, and Cannella (2007, 941) stated, “Organisational size, industry type, firm 
diversification strategy, and network effects (linkages to other boards with women 
directors) significantly impact the likelihood of female representation on boards of 
directors”. External environmental factors like customer diversity (Brammer, 
Millington, and Pavelin 2007), societal influence (Gregorič et al. 2017), environmental 
requirements (Ben-Amar, Chang, and McIlkenny 2017), and industry type (Martin et 
al. 2008) have been affirmatively associated with board gender diversity. Further, firm   
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characteristics (Saeed et al. 2017, Terjesen, Couto, and Francisco 2016, Nekhili and 
Gatfaoui 2013, de Cabo, Gimeno, and Nieto 2012, Mínguez-Vera and Martin 2011, 
Adams and Ferreira 2009, Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003), board characteristics 
(Farag and Mallin 2016, Strøm, D’Espallier, and Mersland 2014, de Cabo, Gimeno, 
and Nieto 2012, Geiger and Marlin 2012, Mínguez-Vera and Martin 2011, Brammer, 
Millington, and Pavelin 2007, Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003), shareholder 
activism (Marquardt and Wiedman 2016), cooperation from current corporate leaders 
(Fitzsimmons and Callan 2016),.female representation in nomination committee (De 
Cabo, Gimeno, and Escot 2011) and in managerial positions (Skaggs, Stainback, and 
Duncan 2012) have also been positively associated with board gender diversity. 
Numerous studies have been conducted on the impact of boar gender diversity on firm 
financial performance and firm value. Studies during this period (Horak and Cui 2017, 
Bo, Li, and Sun 2016, Eduardo and Poole 2016, Kılıç et al. 2016, Kim and Starks 
2016, Toumi et al. 2016, Levi, Li, and Zhang 2014, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 
2008, Nguyen and Faff 2007, Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader 2003, Carter, Simkins, and 
Simpson 2003) demonstrated that a gender diverse board can upsurge firm’s financial 
performance and value. In contrast, Farrell and Hersch (2005) and Rose (2007) did not 
find any significant evidence of positive impact of board gender diversity on firm 
performance. Further, Ahern and Dittmar (2009) and Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
demonstrated board gender diversity can have a negative impact on firm’s market 
value. On the contrary, female presence on top corporate positions have been 
associated with lower earnings management (Liu, Wei, and Xie 2016, Gavious, Segev,  
and Yosef 2012, Krishnan and Parsons 2008); lower financial restatement (Abbott, 
Parker, and Presley 2012) and higher earnings quality (Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2017, 
Khlif and Achek 2017, Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011, Krishnan and Parsons 2008).  
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Studies have also demonstrated positive impact of GDB on Stock price 
informativeness (Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng 2011); analyst earning forecast (Gul, Wu, and 
Yang 2013); positive investors’ reaction (Kang, Ding, and Charoenwong 2010, Lee 
and James 2007); better board effectiveness (Ben-Amar, Chang, and McIlkenny 2017, 
Terjesen, Couto, and Francisco 2016) and corporate social responsibility (Ben-Amar, 
Chang, and McIlkenny 2017, Byron and Post 2016). 
.  
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2.3 Gender Diversity Studies and Theories 
This section sheds light on the theories utilised by scholars of gender diversity 
studies. Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh (2009, 4) argue “Academic literature on women 
on corporate board’s women on corporate board (WOCB) does not explicitly develop 
a theoretical framework. Indeed, the majority of WOCB literature is descriptive”. 
However, considerable number of theories is being used to support corporate female 
members’ (as individuals and team players) contributions towards firm outputs. 
    
Figure 3: A Synthesis of Theories Utilized in Gender Studies in Sociology, Psychology and 
Business Fields. 
Although business literature got rich in gender related studies in the last two 
decades, Psychology and Sociology fields are the pioneers of gender literature. Hence, 
gender studies in Management, Accounting, Finance/Economics, and Marketing often 
utilise theories used by Sociology and Psychology literature (e.g. Gender Self-schema, 
Social Cohesion theory, Social Identity theory).  The key theories utilised in business 
gender literature can be segregated as follows, some theories (e.g. Human capital   
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theory and Social Capital theory) are utilised to support  female corporates individual 
contributions (e.g. human and social capital) towards firm; some theories (Social 
Identity theory, Social Network theory, Social Cohesion theory, Tokenism theory, 
Critical mass theory) to rationalize female corporates’  contributions as team players; 
and some theories (e.g. Resource Dependency theory, Institutional theory, Agency 
theory, Stewardship theory, Stakeholder theory, and Organisational theory) to justify 
female corporates’ contribution towards the firm as a whole. Further, theories like 
Status characteristics and Gender Self-schema provide explanation for biased 
perception and negative corporate attitudes towards female corporate members. 
The following sections discuss the above-mentioned theories, followed by 
brief discussion of theories used to define female directors’ performance at different 
organisational levels (individual, board, firm, and industry/ external environment) and 
theories used in “Board Gender Diversity” studies as per subject area (Management, 
Finance/Economics, Marketing, Accounting, and Sociology/Psychology).  
2.3.1 Theories to Define Individual Female Director’s Characteristics 
The following theories are frequently used in gender diversity studies to 
support individual female member’s contribution to the board and other corporate 
positions.  
2.3.1.1 Human Capital Theory 
Human Capital Theory (Becker 1964) addresses the role of a person’s stock of 
education, experience, knowledge, and skills which are essential for the efficiency and 
effectiveness of an organisation. Directors bring their experience, skills, views, and 
knowledge to the boards which are critical resources for the effective operation of the 
boards. Board’s performance is highly influenced by the quality of its human capital 
because directors’ know-hows and competences impact their decisions (Joecks, Pull,   
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and Vetter 2012). Hence, firms follow specific norms to appoint right candidate for 
the board with proper skills, experience and knowledge (Dunn 2012). In order to utilise 
the maximum benefit of the talent pool, firms need to equally consider both male and 
female candidates for the board.  
As per the current statistics females are not only outperforming males in terms 
of educational qualification but also constitute a significant portion of the workforce. 
Female directors can bring unique traits (e.g. cautiousness, risk averseness, strong 
monitoring capability, and strong ethical values) to the board which complement their 
male peers’ traits (e.g. risk takers, profit oriented). Singh, Terjesen, and Vinnicombe 
(2008) claim a male director can bring more experience and a female director’s 
presence offer better educational qualification, strong network and diverse 
international profiles to the board. Further, a female director can bring diverse 
professional experiences; skills and Knowledge (Singh, Terjesen, and Vinnicombe 
2008, Peterson and Philpot 2007) and views (Zelechowski and Bilimoria 2004) to the 
board. Sheridan and Milgate (2005) show that a female board member equally inherits 
strong business knowledge and track record like their male counterparts. Further, 
Singh, Terjesen, and Vinnicombe (2008) claim that a female director has the necessary 
human capital for the boards and due to “Glass Ceiling” issue she might even possess 
more human capital compare to her male colleagues. Carter et al. (2010) argue that 
human capital theory significantly supports the positive relationship between board 
gender   diversity and firm performance. Therefore, appointing a female member on 
board is advantageous from the human capital perspective.  
2.3.1.2 Social Capital Theory 
Corporate boards appointing members with necessary social capital can add 
value to its governance task (Carpenter and Westphal 2001). A board’s performance   
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depends on its members’ social network to a large extent. Hence, boards strategically 
select group of members who can draw necessary social capital to the board. Johnson, 
Schnatterly, and Hill (2012) claim a director can bring social capital to the board 
through his/her link to other corporations, their relationships with peers, and social 
standing that can send positive signal to the shareholders. A board with diverse 
members can provide better linkages with the internal (e.g. employees) and external 
(e.g. shareholders and other stakeholders) groups of the business. For instance, a 
minority director with previous board experience might diminish out-group prejudices 
through their network ties (Westphal and Milton 2000).  
Singh and Vinnicombe (2004, 485) claim, “Examination of the backgrounds 
of women who have succeeded indicates that as well as their often-outstanding career 
capital, they bring social capital to the network of directors, by interlocking 
directorships, by contacts from previous employment, by contacts through voluntary 
work, and for some titled women as wives of prominent males, by evidence of social 
relationships within powerful networks”. Hence, corporate boards with proper 
demographical diversity are more likely to bring social capital to the board (Adams 
and Flynn 2005, Van der Walt and Ingley 2003, Fondas 2000). Due to “Glass Ceiling” 
issue female board members are not only required to bring strong human capital but 
also need to offer strong network ties. Several past studies have discussed the reasons 
“why” and “how” the inclusion of female director(s) brings significant social capital 
to the board. For instance, Mattis (2000) and Burke (2003) argue a female director can 
be role model for other corporate female members and help them to crack the “Glass 
Ceiling” through solving employment and progression issues and this in turn enhances 
female directors’ network ties with their female peers. Further, studies have shown 
that, a female board member has comparatively more outside experience and more   
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influence on the community (Hillman, Cannella, and Harris 2002); they are more 
charitable (Williams 2003); can ensure better unity within the workforce (Bernardi, 
Bosco, and Vassill 2006); increase board network ties (Beckman and Haunschild 
2002); and lead to higher corporate social responsibility (Post, Rahman, and Rubow 
2011, Bear, Rahman, and Post 2010).  
 2.3.2 Theories to Define Female Directors’ as Group Players/ Board Members 
The following theories have been frequently used in the past gender diversity 
studies to support female’s contribution to the board and organisation as team players.  
2.3.2.1 Social Identity, Social Network, and Social Cohesion Theories 
Social Identity, Social Network, and Social Cohesion theories provide 
rationale for scarcity of female members on boards and strategic barriers they face to 
be appointed or promoted as board members. According to Social Identity theory 
(Tajfel and Turner 1986) individuals feel a certain level of comfort while surrounded 
by people of same demographic traits. Within a homogeneous group an individual 
with different demographic traits is considered to be an outsider (tokenism 
perspective). Hence, female directors within male dominated boards are being treated 
as out-group entities. This is also the key reason behind the struggle of female 
directors’ not being recruited while the CEO is a male. A male CEO usually prefers to 
select board members who are of the same demographic characteristics (Daily and 
Dalton 1995). According to Social Network and Social Cohesion theories the members 
in a group with same social identity form their own network. This elite group not only 
think alike but they also have their own set of rules (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009). 
Further these individuals have a strong level of interconnection among themselves and 
they use this cohesion to promote, endorse and support each other. Therefore, in a 
board with majority of the seats being occupied by male executive members may not   
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be a pleasant environment for a female director to share her perspectives and exert her 
influence on the rest of the board. 
 
2.3.2.2 Tokenism Theory 
Minorities are seen as token or symbol due to their poor representation in a 
group and easily dominated by the majority. According to Kanter (1977) the minority 
group or token faces three consequences: they face performance pressure all the time; 
the dominant group tries to outcast them; and they are pushed into “stereotypical roles” 
and not being appreciated for their qualities. Adams and Flynn (2005) claim that men 
usually prefer to form their own social and professional network (referred as the “Old 
boys’ network”) and female corporate members find it challenging to break into that 
loop. The cultural, behavioural and organisational obstacles behind the poor 
representation of women at the top are “Old boys’ network” and gender pay gap 
(Oakley 2000); gender labelling of leadership (Schein and Mueller 1992); biased 
promotion process (Alimo-Metcalfe 1995); and so on. Hence, despite being highly 
qualified female directors can be seen as tokens due to their poor ratio among a group 
largely dominated by male members. Boards are still dominated by men and qualified 
women are not only facing hard time while being recruited, retained and promoted but 
also need to perform far better than their male counterparts to prove their credibility 
as directors (Sheridan and Milgate 2005). Bilimoria and Piderit (1994, 1457) argue, 
“Token women become subject to excessive scrutiny, their differences from men are 
highlighted and exaggerated, and their attributes are distorted so that they become 
trapped in stereotypical roles”. Being a minority on board women not only being 
perceived negatively but also faces barriers, like, they are not being trusted, their 
decisions are often doubted (Oakley 2000), and faces hard time to influence the 
dominant group (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009). Further, as female board members   
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are not part of the “Old boys’ network”, they do not receive necessary backup; become 
subject to gender bias; and not being recruited as members of important board 
committees (Bilimoria and Piderit 1994). Due to these barriers women experience 
their corporate life differently than their male counterparts. They are always concerned 
about their image and how they are being perceived by others (Singh, Vinnicombe, 
and Johnson 2001).  
Women are not less ambitious than men (Singh and Vinnicombe 2004), but 
their modest and ethical nature (Rudman 1998) and avoidance of organisational 
politics (Singh and Vinnicombe 2004) might hinder their upward mobility. Burgess 
and Tharenou (2002) point out numerous reasons “why” women need to be appointed 
to the board. For instance, Catalyst (1995) argue women on boards are not only “role-
models” for other women but also bring diversity within the boards; bring independent 
behaviour to the board (Fondas 2000); contributes in changing organisation’s strategic 
direction (Selby 2000); and improve boardroom behaviour and organisational 
perception among stakeholders (Burgess and Tharenou 2002). Further, on average 
women board members are younger than their male counterparts and hence can bring 
new ideas (Burke 1994) and economic advancement (Burton and Ryall 1995). 
 2.3.2.3 Critical Mass Theory 
Kanter (1977) show that in a group minority are easily consigned by the 
majority and thus the former is addressed as token. Previous studies (Nemeth 1986, 
Tanford and Penrod 1984) demonstrate that the presence of at least three members in 
a group can be considered as “critical mass”. When the minority reaches this respected 
threshold, the group becomes more diverse and a diverse group can offer better 
decision compare to homogeneous group.  Bear, Rahman, and Post (2010) argue, when 
the number of the minorities increases, the perception of the group members change   
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towards them. They are being heard, trusted, and can exert more influence on the rest 
of the group.  Hence, the number of female members on boards needs to reach a certain 
threshold or “critical mass” before their views and ideas are being respected and heard 
by the rest of the board members.  
Torchia, Calabro, and Huse (2011) claim that a homogeneous board is less 
innovative and productive compare to a heterogeneous board. They show that presence 
of at least three female directors on boards can successfully intervene in board strategic 
task and exert influence on the organisational innovation. Female representation on 
boards reaching a “critical mass” can ensure a better communication and collaboration 
with the dominant group and can result in high-quality decision (Torchia, Calabro, and 
Huse 2011). When women on boards are no longer considered as a token they are not 
likely to be cautious in presenting their divergent views. After reaching the magic 
number “Women feel more comfortable, less constrained about what the men think, 
and their interactions would become more positive” (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009, 
25). Female members reaching the “critical mass” is crucial in order for the rest of the 
board to recognise their unique skill sets (Joecks, Pull, and Vetter 2012, Erkut, 
Kramer, and Konrad 2009, Konrad, Kramer, and Erkut 2008, Konrad and Kramer 
2006). 
2.3.3 Theories, Female Directors, and Firm Outputs 
Till date business studies (management, accounting, finance, economics, and 
marketing) have utilised diverse theories to justify the link between female corporate 
members (senior executives, managers, auditors, directors, CEO and CFO) and 
different firm outputs (firm value, financial performance, reporting quality, 
transparency, shareholder value and so on). The most frequently utilised theories in 
the board gender diversity studies are discussed in the following section.  
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2.3.3.1 Resource Dependence Theory 
Board acts as a linking mechanism between firm and its external environment 
(Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold 2000). The external environment factors can 
significantly influence the board composition, because the board members deliver the 
necessary resources it requires to reflect the external environment factors at the top 
level of management (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). Resource dependency theory 
provides a better lens to support this argument compare to other theories (Hillman, 
Withers, and Collins 2009). Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) 
addresses firm as an open system, which depends on its environment for its survival. 
An effective and efficient board can aid the organisation by providing, (1) legitimacy, 
(2) advice and counsel, and (3) proper networking with elements inside and outside 
the firm. Hillman et al. (2002) argued, board of directors can play resource dependence 
roles to help reduce organisational dependency on its external environment in two 
ways: first, by providing vital resources to the board and second, by securing resources 
for the firm through linkages to the external environment.  
Female board members differ from their male counterparts in terms of basic 
traits and their presence on board can bring diverse proficiency, views, solutions to 
the problem, innovation, and stronger network ties with external organisational 
elements (Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 2007, Hillman, Cannella, and Harris 
2002). External environmental elements, like, customers, investors and other 
stakeholder prefer to have a board composition that better reflects them. A gender 
diverse board not only better reflects a firm’s diverse customer base and employee 
base but also sends a positive signal to the diverse labour pool, investors, and market 
(Carter et al. 2010). Further, diverse perspectives are crucial when it comes to a fruitful 
board decision and women participants can provide that by inputting their different   
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perspectives (Adams and Flynn 2005, Daily and Dalton 2003). Unlike their male 
counterparts, female take alternative routes to the board, where men occupy the board 
seats mostly as executive directors a majority of female members come from academic 
and consulting backgrounds (Adams and Flynn 2005). Hence, female members are 
more prone to offer diverse knowledge and skills, and stronger networking to the 
board. Several studies have demonstrated that presence of female directors on board 
can enhance the boards networking capability. For instance, Hillman, Cannella, and 
Harris (2002) claim that female directors hold more multiple directorship compare to 
their male counterparts. Further, Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella (2007) argue that 
one of the key reasons behind appointing more female to the board is their strong 
networking capability. Strong linkages with other players within the industry can aid 
an organisation to decrease uncertainty through reducing transaction costs and 
increase firm power (Hillman, Cannella, and Harris 2002). By using resource 
dependence lens, it can be argued that gender diversity on board better reflects the 
population served and reduces uncertainty through eliminating dependency on the 
external resources.  
2.3.3.2 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory and resource dependence theory both focus on firm’s 
legitimacy. A firm operates in an open system and in order to survive it requires 
resources from its external environment (resource dependence perspective). A firm’s 
corporate governance is highly influenced by its external environment (Aguilera et al. 
2008). Institutional theory posits a firm adopts strategies and policies to avoid 
questions from the society and to enhance its legitimacy perceived by the society 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Meyer and Rowan 1977). According to this theory a firm 
recruits its potential employees to increase its perceived legitimacy by the external   
55 
 
environment. Hence, the argument of institutional theory mirrors the resource 
dependence perspective.  
Board of directors in big corporations are more visible to the external 
environment and a gender diverse board can enhance the perceived legitimacy of the 
firm by the shareholders and stakeholders (Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 2007). 
Based on institutional theory Dunn (2012) argues women are being appointed on board 
to validate the board diversity rather than to enhance firm value. Further, firms with 
low or no female members on their boards tend to appoint more new female directors 
(Farrell and Hersch 2005). Based on this fact it can be argued that females are being 
added to the board to maintain diversity and play the role of a token or symbol to 
enhance firm’s social legitimacy. However, Dunn (2012) further added that the trend 
of adding female directors on boards as a sign of firm’s social legitimacy does not 
imply that female directors do not have necessary qualification and skills to serve the 
board.  
2.3.3.3 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is the predominant theory used in research of board of 
directors (Hillman, Withers, and Collins 2009). Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 
(2003, 37) state that “Agency theory is the theoretical framework most often used by 
investigators in finance and economics to understand the link between board 
characteristics and firm value”. According to this theory board is responsible for 
monitoring managers on behalf of the shareholders and reducing agency cost 
(Hillman and Dalziel 2003). A firm can ensure better shareholders value if the 
board members can reduce managerial opportunism and protect shareholders’ wealth 
trough stronger monitoring. Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) claim that a diverse 
board is more independent and can ensure better oversight of management.   
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Past empirical studies demonstrate that female directors are careful monitors 
(Adams and Ferreira 2009, Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 2007, Farrell and 
Hersch 2005); frequently demand for more audit efforts (Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui 
2008); and managerial accountability (Adams and Ferreira 2009). Further, female 
directors are not part of the “Old boys’ network”, their presence on boards can bring 
diverse views, arguments and different perception to risk, leading towards more 
independent decisions and stronger oversight of managers. This in turn can reduce 
firm opacity, enhance firm transparency and legitimacy, and lessen agency conflict. 
2.3.3.4 Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory contradicts the agency theory argument. According to this 
theory executive /insiders play the role of good agents or stewards and can bring 
positive outcomes for the shareholders and other stakeholders (Donaldson and Davis 
1991, Donaldson 1990). They desire more for acknowledgment, accomplishment and 
intrinsic satisfaction for their good deeds. Hence, they protect shareholders’ 
investment and do not have any self-interest to misappropriate company’s asset. 
However, Aguilera et al. (2008, 478) state, “Managers may act as stewards for the 
good of the organisation in situations where only relatively minor conflicts of interests 
exist”. Therefore, board of directors can play a major role to motivate the managers to 
carry on with their good stewardship role. Female directors’ strong monitoring 
capability and diverse perspectives allow the boards to provide better support, counsel 
and advice to the managers for being good agents of shareholders’ assets.  
2.3.3.5 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory (Freeman 1999) shifted the definition of organisational 
performance from a narrow to a broader perspective. According to this theory a firm 
is a part of an open system and in order to survive it needs to please its stakeholders.   
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 A firm cannot survive without its stakeholders and ignoring their interests and 
concerns can hinder its reputation (Fombrun 1996). Further, a firm value cannot be 
enhanced without taking into consideration the related stakeholders’ interest (Jensen 
2001).  Aguilera et al. (2008) linked corporate governance effectiveness with the 
creation and the distribution of wealth among stakeholders.  
A board is predominantly responsible for maximising its shareholders value 
and thus the board composition needs to adequately represent its stakeholders (Huse 
and Rindova 2001).  Board diversity can be a logical solution only when it properly 
reflects the society (Rose 2007). A gender diverse board reflects the stakeholders’ 
dynamics better than an all-male board. Thus, board gender diversity can enhance firm 
reputation by sending positive signal to the potential job applicants, employees, 
consumers, investors and other stakeholders (Rose 2007). Kang, Cheng, and Gray 
(2007, 198) suggest, “The emergence of stakeholder theory in board diversity was 
prompted by the growing recognition of the need to take account of the wider interests 
of society”. 
2.3.4 Implication of Theories as Per Organisation Level 
Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh (2009) segregated the most renowned theoretical 
perspectives used in gender related studies in four levels (individual level, board level, 
firm level, and industry/environment level). The following discussion briefly 
represents the four levels of segregated theories. 
Theories used at the individual level shed light on the characteristics of female 
board members. A gender diverse board is enriched with human and social capital. 
Female representation on boards not only bring diverse perspectives, knowledge and 
skill set (human capital) but also ensure better network ties or connection with the   
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external environment (social capital).11 Theories like “Status Characteristics” and 
“Gender Self-Schema” helps to explain the way female board members are perceived. 
Women on boards are seen as low status group compare to their male counterparts and 
thus need to prove their capability more (status characteristics theory). For instance, 
studies have shown that female board members are more educationally qualified 
(Hillman, Cannella, and Harris 2002) and brings stronger network connection compare 
to their male colleagues (Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 2007). Despite that 
potential female corporates face significant barriers while climbing the corporate 
ladder. Males and females grow up with a different psychological construction 
(Gender Self-Schema theory) and while getting appointed and promoted, male and 
female candidates are being perceived differently.  
According to Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh (2009) the common theoretical 
perspectives that are being used at the board or group level are as follows: Social 
Identity, Social Network and Social Cohesion theories. These theories provide 
explanation for the exclusion of female members from board. As per the “Social 
Identity” theory individuals can better identify themselves when they are surrounded 
by the people of same demographics. Further, dominant board members develop their 
own network. This so called “elite network” prefers to invite people in the group like 
themselves (in terms of gender, age, race etc) and further promote, and endorse them. 
This argument supports the view of the “Tokenism” and “Critical Mass” theories. Due 
to the male CEO power and “Old boys’ Network” female candidates find it 
challenging to enter the board.12  
Most frequently used theoretical perspectives at the firm level are resource 
dependence, institutional, and agency theories. A Firm operates in an open system and   
                                                          
11 Please refer to section 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 
12 Please refer to section 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. 
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hugely depends on its related stakeholders and external environment to survive. 
Hence, firm appoint members to its board who can bring diverse resources, network 
connection and legitimacy to the board (resource dependence theory); ensure stronger 
and better monitoring of the managers to reduce agency cost (agency theory); and send 
positive signal to the firm related actors and external environment (institutional 
theory). Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella (2007) argue, female representation on 
boards can fetch diverse and unique human and social capital to the board. Further, 
the strong monitoring capability of female directors can reduce managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour and reduce agency cost. Through appointing female directors 
on board, a firm represents its gender equality mindset to its related stakeholders.  
Gender related studies at the environment level mostly focused on the role of 
institutions towards the environment. Therefore, these studies took support from 
“Institutional” and “Critical Management” theories (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009).   
2.3.5 Implication of Theories as Per Subject Area 
For the last decade, several corporate gender related studies have been conducted 
in business. In particular, Management, Finance/Economics, Marketing, and 
Accounting area have a reasonable collection of gender diversity studies. These 
respective studies have utilised different theoretical perspectives to support their 
arguments. 
Management field has the largest collection of gender diversity studies. The 
frequently used theories in these studies are Agency theory, Resource dependence 
theory, Stakeholder theory, Tokenism theory and Critical Mass theory. Agency theory 
is the most frequently used theory and it has mostly supported the link between female 
representation on board with stock portfolio performance (Chapple and Humphrey 
2014); firm’s financial performance (Carter et al. 2010, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera   
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2008); lower earnings management (Labelle, Gargouri, and Francoeur 2010); positive 
abnormal returns (Francoeur, Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagné 2008); social 
performance (Hafsi and Turgut 2013, Siciliano 1996) and Corporate social 
responsibility (Bear, Rahman, and Post 2010). Another popular theory is the Resource 
dependence theory, this theory has rationalised the link between gender diverse board 
and board benefits (Mathisen, Ogaard, and Marnburg 2013); firm’s financial 
performance (Carter et al. 2010); and social performance (Hafsi and Turgut 2013). 
Further, Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella (2007) explained the key predictors of 
female representation on board based on this theory. Studies have also taken support 
from Stakeholder theory linking gender diverse board with firm performance 
(Francoeur, Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagné 2008, Rose 2007). Further, Tokenism and 
Critical mass theory often utilised simultaneously in many gender related studies 
(Torchia, Calabro, and Huse 2011, Carter et al. 2010, Singh and Vinnicombe 2004, 
Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader 2003, Van der Walt and Ingley 2003). 
Finance/ Economics studies mostly focused on the relationship between gender 
diverse board and firm performance. Like management studies Agency theory has also 
ruled gender studies in this area. For instance, this theory has backed up the 
relationship between CEO gender and firm performance (Lam, McGuinness, and 
Vieito 2013); gender diverse board and firm performance (Liu, Wei, and Xie 2013); 
gender diverse board and firm value (Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003); and 
supported the link of gender diverse board with better corporate governance and board 
performance (Adams and Ferreira 2009). Tokenism and Critical Mass theories have 
also been utilised in studies (Liu, Wei, and Xie 2013, Adams and Ferreira 2009) to 
justify lower representation of female representation on board and the required female 
percentage on board to positively impact firm outcomes.   
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Very few significant gender studies have been conducted so far in the Accounting 
field. Further, these studies have utilised diverse theories or in other words no one 
particular theory ruled these studies. For instance, agency theory supported the 
positive relationship between gender diverse board and better stock price 
informativeness (Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng 2011); Organisational theory justified positive 
link between gender diverse board and analyst earning forecast (Gul, Hutchinson, and 
Lai 2013), and gender diverse board and earnings quality (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 
2011); Group thinking theory supported the negative relation between gender diverse 
board and the likelihood of financial restatement (Abbott, Parker, and Presley 2012); 
based on Gender theory  Gavious, Segev, and Yosef (2012) showed a negative link 
between female directors and earnings management, and a positive link with firm 
value. 
Gender diversity studies in the Marketing field, mostly rely on agency theory 
(Upadhyay and Zeng 2014, Jurkus, Park, and Woodard 2011); and resource 
dependence theory (Upadhyay and Zeng 2014, Dunn 2012b).  
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2.4 Women in Business 
This section discusses female representation in to corporate positions, like, 
female board members, sub-committee members, and senior executives (managers, 
CEO, and CFO). The following discussion shed light on the rationale for female 
representation at the top, the challenges faced by female corporates and their 
contributions as corporate leaders. 
 
 
Figure 4: Female in Corporate Positions- Rationale, Challenges, and Contributions. 
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2.4.1 Female Board Members 
As a member of the corporate board, a female director not only gets the 
authority to make significant contributions to the corporate performance but also better 
represent the interest of diverse investors, employees and customers. A diverse board 
in general is better than a homogeneous board. It is enriched with diverse perspectives, 
knowledge, skills, and experience (Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 2007). 
However, till date gender diverse board studies have received mixed evidence in terms 
of its contributions towards corporate performances. Further, the opponents of gender 
diverse board argue that the link between gender diverse board and corporate 
performances is highly endogenous. However, majority of the board gender diversity 
studies have supported the positive impact of female representation on boards on 
corporate governance and board effectiveness.13 Then “What factors are often 
prohibiting female directors from contributing to corporate performance?” A plausible 
explanation is still very insignificant representation of female members on board or 
the “Tokenism” issue. Walt and Ingley (2003, 232) claim, “The challenge for boards 
is to bring together in a cohesive manner the balance of expertise and perspectives 
required for effective functioning and decision-making”. Hence, in order to achieve 
the maximum corporate benefit of a gender diverse board the potential and qualified 
female members need to be strategically selected from the vast pool of available 
female candidates.  
Gender diversity regulations (section 2.5) playing vital role in sudden 
enhancement of corporations with female representation on their boards. However, 
female representation is still not significant compare to their male counterparts.   
                                                          
13 Please refer to chapter 4 literature review section (section 4.2.3) for detailed discussion of board gender diversity and diverse 
firm outputs.  
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Female board members are mostly non-executive or outsiders. The corporations need 
to ensure a friendly corporate culture and mindset for female executives to make 
progress and enter the corporate board. Only then percentage of female executive 
directors will escalate and female directors will not be addressed as “Tokens” 
anymore.   Gender diversity studies in business escalated after 2000 with the adoption 
of gender diversity studies by different countries. The following section shed light on 
these studies by organising the rest of the segment as followed: “Glass Ceiling” 
phenomenon; Women as leaders and role models; Female directors’ contributions 
towards diverse firm outputs; and Market responsiveness towards female directors. 
2.4.1.1 The “Glass Ceiling” Phenomenon 
Potential female corporates are struggling for ages to climb to the upper half 
of the corporate pyramid. The reasons behind their struggle have been collectively 
addressed as the “Glass Ceiling” phenomenon.  Numerous studies (Nekhili and 
Gatfaoui 2013, Haslam et al. 2010, Adams, Gupta, and Leeth 2009, Terjesen, Sealy, 
and Singh 2009, Broadridge and Hearn 2008, Ryan and Haslam 2007, 2005, Arfken, 
Bellar, and Helms 2004, Marshall 1995) have been conducted so far on this issue. 
Some of the common reasons behind this phenomenon are male dominated corporate 
culture, “Old boys’ network”, gender stereotype, lack of corporate support for women, 
gender pay gap and overall gender discrimination (Sealy and Vinnicombe 2013, Sealy, 
Singh, and Vinnicombe 2007). Based on the sample of UK firms, Martin et al. (2008) 
argue female directors are scares in the large UK firms due to male dominated 
corporate environment. Although, female presence in the board is improving but the 
percentage is not satisfactory. Female directors are still seen more in small firms and 
service industries. Female directors have long been appointment in more complex 
firms. Past studies have shown that female members are usually appointed in the   
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boards of poor performing firms (Haslam et al. 2010) and riskier firms (Mulcahy and 
Linehan 2014, Terjesen and Singh 2008). Further, as the top management positions 
are mostly held by males, potential female board candidates often become victim of 
biased and opaque recruitment process (Burke 1996). Due to strong male network at 
the top, potential female board members face higher scrutiny and stronger selection 
process (Singh, Terjesen, and Vinnicombe 2008, Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold 
2000). Another common proxy of the “Glass Ceiling” issue is the gender pay gap. 
Elkinawy and Stater (2011, 23) state, “Although women have become better 
represented in top executive jobs in recent decades, their relative salaries remain below 
those of men, possibly due in part to governance structures that remain male-
dominated”. However, academics (Stroh et al. 2004, Goodman, Fields, and Blum 
2003, Davidson and Cooper 1992) believe cracks have started to appear in the glass 
ceiling. Significant representation of women on boards can aid equality and 
advancement of corporate women. Terjesen and Singh (2008, 55) argue, “Countries 
with higher representation of women on boards are more likely to have women in 
senior management and more equal ratios of male to female pay”. The regulators, 
corporations, and investors need to put combined effort to alter male dominated 
corporate culture and stereotype mindset towards female corporates to break the 
“Glass Ceiling”. 
2.4.1.2 Women as Leaders and Role Models 
Female leadership and contributions are gradually being valued by the 
corporations (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011). Female corporate leader’s unique 
leadership traits are: cautiousness (Gold, Hunton, and Gomaa 2009, Powell and Ansic 
1997); risk averseness (Sunden and Surette 1998, Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner 1997, 
Powell and Ansic 1997, Riley Jr and Chow 1992); less overconfident (Dowling and   
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Aribi 2013, Lundeberg, Fox, and Punćcohaŕ 1994); strong monitoring capabilities 
(Adams and Ferreira 2009, Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui 2008); independent (Adams, Gray, 
and Nowland 2011, Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003); and high ethical values 
(Bilic and Sustic 2011, Bernardi and Arnold Sr 1997).14 Further, female board 
members are advanced in educational qualification and networking skills (Singh, 
Terjesen, and Vinnicombe 2008), and diverse views and perspectives (Hillman, 
Shropshire, and Cannella 2007, Peterson and Philpot 2007, Bilimoria 2000). Based on 
French large and mid-capitalized companies Nekhili and Gatfaoui (2013) show female 
directors get recruited for their professional services, valuable skills, and network 
links. Men entered and progressed in corporate world long before their female peers, 
however, female corporates have also gathered considerable experience and skills in 
the past two decades. Wilson Jr (2010, 9) claim, “The number of female financial 
experts had grown dramatically, with the percentage of female experts approaching 
the overall percentage of female directors”. The author further claims, “Gender 
diversity is not directly hampered by the specialized skills and experiences required 
of a financial expert” (Wilson 2010, 9). Based on past gender related studies, 
Thiruvadi and Huang (2011, 486) argue, “Gender differences affect conservatism, 
managerial opportunism and risk preference of the management”. Hence injecting 
more female corporate leadership at the top can be an essential mechanism to reduce 
corporate risk and enhance stability. 
Female corporate leaders’ more cooperative and communicative leadership 
style is finally being valued by corporations, particularly after the recent corporate 
collapse and global financial crisis. Female leaders are more supportive and 
interactive (Bernardi and Arnold Sr 1997, Betz, O'Connell, and Shepard 1989) and   
                                                          
14 Please refer to chapter 4 literature review (section 4.2) for detailed discussion of female corporate leadership traits. 
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place less importance on their convenience and self-interest (Arlow 1991). They are 
better communicators than their male peers (Broadbridge et al. 2006, Schubert 2006, 
Fondas 1997). Their trust building (Trinidad and Normore 2005, Klenke 2003, Cohen, 
Pant, and Sharp 1998, Jelinek and Adler 1988) and problem solving (Robinson and 
Dechant 1997) leadership style helps them to lower information asymmetry and 
corporate opacity. All these valuable traits qualify them to be great team players. 
Hence, more female leaders are finally being appointed on boards and governance 
related board committees (Peterson and Philpot 2007, Mattis 2000, Bilimoria and 
Piderit 1994).  
2.4.1.3 Contributions of Female Board Members 
An effective and efficient board requires independent, diverse and resourceful 
members. Majority of the past board gender diversity studies supported the fact that a 
gender diverse board is more resourceful than an all-male board. A gender diverse 
board can improve board planning, reduce board conflict and increase board 
development activities (Nielsen and Huse 2010a). Female representation on boards 
make significant contributions to boards’ effectiveness, for instance, more informed 
decisions by board (Rose 2007, Daily, Certo, and Dalton 2000); enhanced board 
innovative skills, network quality and legitimacy (Carter et al. 2007); more effective 
communication between board and investors (Joy 2008); and better overall board 
performance (Bilimoria 2000). A gender diverse board discuss tougher issues that are 
often considered unpalatable by all-male boards (McInerney-Lacombe, Bilimoria, and 
Salipante 2008, Broadbridge et al. 2006, Clarke 2005, Stephenson 2004). Hence, firms 
in precarious circumstance can significantly benefit from the representation of female 
members on boards (de Cabo, Gimeno, and Nieto 2012).   
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A strong corporate governance is crucial for lower corporate information 
asymmetry, lower earnings management, higher earnings quality and better overall 
firm reputation. Lucas-Pérez et al. (2015, 278) claim, “The current economic crisis, in 
which top managers have continued to receive high pay that is independent of 
corporate profits has rekindled the debate about good governance practices and 
promoted consideration of the possibility that gender diversity can help to monitor and 
even strengthen the monitoring effectiveness of the board over top managers”. Proper 
monitoring and counselling by corporate board members can ensure stronger corporate 
governance. Past studies have supported the fact that female directors are strong 
monitors (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009) and their presence on board can enhance 
board’s monitoring capability (Adams, Gray, and Nowland 2010, Thomas and Ely 
1996). Prior literature (Krishnan and Parsons 2008, Thorne, Massey, and Magnan 
2003, Ambrose and Schminke 1999, Bernardi and Arnold Sr 1997, Schminke and 
Ambrose 1997) has shown that women exhibit lower tolerance towards opportunism, 
ask for higher audit effort when the corporate opacity is high (Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui 
2008), and asks for higher CEO accountability (Adams and Ferreira 2009). Hence, 
female directors often secure more positions in auditing and corporate governance 
committees (Adams and Ferreira 2009). Further, majority of the female directors are 
independent board members and they have a higher motive to maintain their reputation 
(Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011). Hence, female representation on boards can improve 
monitoring and advising of management, and improve the overall corporate 
governance.   
Studies conducted on board gender diversity and overall firm performance 
provide mixed evidence. The proponents of gender diverse board claim that female 
representation on boards has real economic benefit or there is a “business case” for   
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women on boards. On the contrary the opponents argue that link between board gender 
diversity and firm performance is endogenous. A gender-diverse group can lessen 
corporate failure (Burgess and Tharenou 2002); ensure greater benefit for stakeholders 
(Grosvold, Brammer, and Rayton 2007); and enhance corporate reputation (Bernardi, 
Bosco, and Columb 2009).  
The relation between gender diverse board and firm financial performance is 
complicated and can be affected by several factors. Triana, Miller, and Trzebiatowski 
(2013, 1) state, “Diversity is double-edged because it can propel or impede strategic 
change depending on firm performance and the power of women directors”. In the 
past literature board gender diversity or female representation on board has been 
positively associated with growth in stock price (Welbourne 1999); higher firm value 
(Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003); greater shareholders’ value and profitability 
(Stephenson 2004, Walt and Ingley 2003, Robinson and Dechant 1997); higher 
Tobin’s q (Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003, Adams and Ferreira 2004); and greater 
return on asset and equity (Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader 2003). Besides financial 
performance female representation on board has also been associated with less 
corporate information opacity (Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng 2011); higher earnings quality 
(Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011); more accurate accounting estimation (Clatworthy and 
Peel 2013); and better analyst earning forecast (Gul, Hutchinson, and Lai 2013). In 
contrast, few studies failed to establish any relation between board gender diversity 
and firm performance (Gregory‐Smith, Main, and O'Reilly 2014, Hagendorff and 
Keasey 2012, Farrell and Hersch 2005, Ellis and Keys 2003, Shrader, Blackburn, and 
Iles 1997). Carter et al. (2007) claim that although few studies failed to demonstrate a 
positive link but negligible amount of study managed to show a negative impact of 
board gender diversity on firm financial performance.   
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2.4.1.4 Market Responsiveness towards Female Board Members 
Female directors’ participation to board is relatively new and related 
stakeholders are still acting in diverse way towards this situation. Usually, factors like, 
gender stereotype and wrong perception about female leadership style forbid the 
stakeholders to realise female leader contributions at the beginning of their 
incorporation in board and senior management. Gregory‐Smith, Main, and O'Reilly 
(2014) argue, although female executives’ performances are underestimated by the 
stakeholders initially, but in the long run it is valued. Female members’ presence on 
board can assist to build better relation between the shareholders and board. And their 
stronger application of ethical conduct and monitoring can increase shareholders 
return (Galbreath 2011). Female presence on board can enhance shareholders’ trust in 
the firm, as their presence on board is related to board’s contributory, social, and 
ethical legitimacy (Perrault 2015). Several academics have argued that investors do 
appreciate the strong monitoring capabilities and autonomous thinking of female 
directors. They do value the addition of female directors on board (Adams, Gray, and 
Nowland 2010, Campbell and Vera 2010). Adams, Gray, and Nowland (2010) find 
that shareholders value appointment of female board members more than male 
members and value-decreasing stakeholder conflicts can be reduced through 
appointing more female candidates on board. In contrast, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) 
argue enforcement of gender quota led more inexperience female members on board 
and this in turn result in sudden drop of investors’ perception and stock price. Further, 
Haslam et al. (2010) claim that investors might devalue firms due to female 
representation on board.  
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2.4.2 Female Sub-Committee Members 
After the implication of mandatory and self-regulatory gender quota system, 
the percentage of female representation on corporate boards escalated. However, the 
presence of female members in important board committees is not satisfactory. The 
significant strategic and governance related decisions are usually taken by the different 
board committees. Hence, female corporate members can really contribute to the 
corporate outcomes by being part of diverse board committees. The following section 
has been organised as follows: the significance of corporate board committees; the 
reason behind lower representation of women on board committees; the significance 
of female representation on board committees; the contributions of female members; 
and gender diversity of audit committee and auditors. 
2.4.2.1 The Significance of Board Committee  
Compare to the corporate board the board committees are smaller groups 
where significant corporate decisions are taken (Kesner 1988). Hence, being part of 
the board committees may allow the directors to exert more impact on corporate 
performance. The six common board committees responsible for the majority of the 
corporate decisions are, executive committee, nomination committee, compensation 
committee, audit committee, financial committee, and public affair committee. 
Among these six committees, executive committee, nomination committee, 
compensation committee, and audit committee have the most impact on corporate 
outputs (Braiotta and Sommer 1987, Vance 1983). Carter et al. (2007, 15) state, 
“Directors have a stronger and more direct impact on executive compensation, new 
director selection, strategic managerial decisions, and other actions that significantly 
affect corporate performance if they serve on board committees with primary 
responsibility for these functions”. The effectiveness of corporate boards itself depend  
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 on board committees to a large extent (Jiraporn, Singh, and Lee 2009). Hence, through 
being a member of the above-mentioned board committees, directors can be more 
involved in corporate activities and decisions (Klein 1998, Kesner 1988).  
2.4.2.2 Lower Representation of Female Members on Board Committees 
Important board committees like, executive committee, nomination 
committee, compensation committee and finance committee are mostly served by the 
male members and females mostly sit on the public affair committees (Peterson and 
Philpot 2007, Bilimoria and Piderit 1994, Kesner 1988). The two key reasons behind 
lower female members’ representation in these respective sub-committees are, they 
are appointed on boards as mostly outsiders and their lack of corporate experience 
(Bilimoria and Piderit 1994, Powell 1990, Kesner 1988). Although female corporates 
have overcome the “lack of experience” issue to a large extent (Peterson and Philpot 
2007), the “Glass Ceiling” issue still persist and holding female directors back from 
board committee membership.  
Female directors are victims of systematic bias during the appointment process 
of major board committees (Peterson and Philpot 2007, Mattis 2000, Burke 1996). 
The major reasons behind this unjust headhunting are, unwillingness of male CEO to 
appoint female board committee members (Mattis 2000) and reluctance of male 
members to work with female peers in the top management position (Shrader, 
Blackburn, and Iles 1997, Bily and Manoochehri 1995, Fisher 1992). Further, women 
corporate board members are mostly outsiders and hence struggle to enter the 
important board committees. The key factors contribute to the lack of female senior 
executives and inside directors on the corporate boards are, female managers’ 
performance are being evaluated differently from their male peers (Heilman et al. 
2004, Jago and Vroom 1982); male candidates receive more preference compare to   
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equally qualified female members while getting appointed and promoted in senior 
executive roles (Hitt and Barr 1989, Williams 1988); and women are being deprived 
from the assignment of important corporate tasks (Kesner 1988).  
2.4.2.3 The Significance of Female Representation on Board Committees 
Strategic and governance decisions taken by board sub-committee members 
can get influenced by their gender. Corporate performance can be positively 
influenced by ensuring the diversity of corporate board committees rather the 
corporate board itself (Carter et al. 2007). Numerous past psychology and sociology 
literature (Schmitt et al. 2008, Nettle 2007, Dwyer, Gilkeson, and List 2002, Costa Jr, 
Terracciano, and McCrae 2001, Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer 1999, Feingold 1994) 
have highlighted psychological and behavioural difference between men and women. 
Further, financial and accounting studies (Watson and McNaughton 2007, Schubert 
2006, Bliss and Potter 2002, Dwyer, Gilkeson, and List 2002, Barber and Odean 2001, 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998, Sunden and Surette 1998, Bernardi and Arnold Sr 
1997, Eynon, Hills, and Stevens 1997, Johnson and Powell 1994, Ruegger and King 
1992, Khazanchi 1995) have also claim that women are more risk averse, less 
overconfident and have high ethical values. These traits allow the female sub-
committee members to be more cautious and analytical while making important 
corporate decisions. Further, as female corporate board members are mostly 
nonexecutive or outside directors, they can bring diverse knowledge and experience 
to the board committees (Kesner 1988).  However, in many corporations’ female board 
members are still being perceived as “token” director and hence not being appointed 
in the major board committees. Kesner (1988) argue female directors are mostly 
outside directors and their lower representation on important board committees can 
adversely impact shareholders’ interest. Hence there should be a proper gender  
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balance among the sub-committee members to ensure a better sub-committee 
decisions and planning. Peterson and Philpot (2007, 180) state that “A director’s 
appointment to a particular committee should be based on those characteristics and 
attributes that contribute to the duty of care owed by a director to the corporation and 
its shareholders”. 
2.4.2.4 The Contributions of Female Sub-Committee Members 
Gender diversity of board committees can have bigger impact on corporate 
performance compare to diversity of corporate boards (Carter et al. 2007). Carter et 
al. (2007) find that female presence in the compensation committee and the 
nomination committee can positively impact Tobin’s q. Significant corporate 
decisions regarding, corporate policy and procedures, recruitment of important 
corporate members, financial reporting quality, and executive compensation decisions 
all are being taken through major board committees. Hence the board members need 
to be independent, experienced, innovative, cautious, and have high ethical values. 
Female, board committee members are mostly non-executive or outside directors and 
highly unlikely to be a part of the “Old boys’ network. Numerous past studies have 
demonstrated that females are highly cooperative leaders, cautious, strong monitors, 
and have strong morals. Further, as they come from diverse background and mostly 
non-executive directors, their presence in the board committees can bring diverse 
perspectives and better represent shareholders’ interest. Hisrich and Brush (1984) and 
(Rosener 2011, 1990) argue females are more social and sympathetic. Their supportive 
and collaborating traits can influence other in the sub-committees to share their views 
better and be more cooperative. Further, they are good in idea generation, innovative 
and productive (Rosener 1990) and strong monitors (Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui 2008). 
The opponents of gender diversity have always highlighted female corporate   
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members’ experience as an issue. Peterson and Philpot (2007) argue that in the past 
two decades, corporate females have gathered sufficient business knowledge and once 
their corporate contributions will be recognised, more women will be appointed in the 
board committees. Further, due to “Glass Ceiling” issue female corporates are highly 
eager to satisfy surrounding expectations through better than average skills and 
financial expertise (Kumar 2010, Green, Jegadeesh, and Tang 2009, Fondas and 
Sassalos 2000). Corporations have started to realise the resource dependence role of 
female members and gender diversity of major sub-committees have become essential 
(Peterson and Philpot 2007).  
2.4.3 Female Senior Executives 
Senior managers, CEOs and CFOs play significant roles in making important 
corporate decisions. Gender of these senior executives can play a major role in the 
way they act.  Due to corporate barriers, like, gender pay gap, “Old boys’ network”, 
gender stereotype mindset and male dominated corporate culture the representation of 
top female executives (CFOs, CEOs, Chairs, and managers) are significantly low. As 
a result, the number of studies on female top executives’ contribution towards 
corporate performance is also limited. This following section discusses the importance 
of female senior executives’ representation at the top, the rationale for female lower 
female senior executives’ representation at the top and contributions of female senior 
executives.
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2.4.3.1 Why Gender of Top Executives Require Attention? 
A CEO is responsible for meeting the needs of employees, customers, 
investors, communities, and the law. Further, they are expected to increase 
shareholders’ value and play quite influential role while recruiting corporate board 
members. Their job security and compensation depend on the financial performance 
of the company. Hence, they have also solid reason to take particular interest in 
accounting numbers. Male and female CEOs are quite different in terms of their basic 
traits and this in turn can impact their day to day decisions and actions. Mohan (2014) 
argue that CEO’s gender can influence corporate performance. Few significant studies 
that have been conducted so far on the gender of CEOs, mostly focused on the reasons 
behind the lower representation of female CEOs at the top. For instance, Oakley 
(2000) examine several reasons, like, insufficient line experience, lack of career 
opportunities, gender differences in basic traits and socialization, gender-based stereo- 
types, tokenism and so on. CFOs are primarily in charge of the accounting related 
decisions. They are significantly involved in making accounting adjustments and 
choosing accounting methods. Hence, a firm’s financial reporting quality significantly 
depends on a CFO’s basic traits like, ethics, attitude towards risk, confidence level and 
so on. And previous gender related studies have shown that men and women differ 
significantly in these basic traits. The corporate performance and earnings quality 
depend on the CEO and CFO of a firm to a large extent. Their basic traits and 
characteristics might be influenced by their genders and this in turn might influence 
their ultimate financial and accounting decisions. Hence, CEO/CFO gender requires 
more academics attention to explore how their gender might diversely influence 
corporate performance and accounting decisions.   
77 
 
2.4.3.2 Rationale for Lower Representation of Female at the Top Management 
Female representation at the top management position is increasing steadily 
but the representation is still significantly low. Past gender related studies have 
frequently mentioned few significant reasons behind this issue. The “Glass Ceiling” 
issue, gender pay gap, gender stereotype, male dominated culture and “Old boys’ 
network” are some of the primary obstacles that might prohibit potential female 
corporate members to reach to the very top. Further, due to lack of proper support and 
unfavourable corporate culture female often gets demotivated and prefer to pursue 
alternative career paths. 
Numerous “Glass Ceiling” studies that have conducted so far argue, potential 
female candidates face more obstacles compare to their male counterparts while 
climbing the corporate ladder. Even if they fight the obstacles and reach to the top they 
do not get proper appreciation and evaluation. Eagly, Makhijani, and Klonsky (1992) 
depict despite performing at the same level as their male counterparts, female 
managers receive higher inspection, criticism and negative evaluation. Besides a 
negative corporate culture, a male dominated corporate authority also play a major 
role to hinder female progress at the top. Smith (2002) argue majority of the top 
management positions are still occupied by men. And the majority of the corporate 
recruitment and promotional decisions are still dominated by male authorities. In a 
male dominated corporate environment current and potential female leaders get 
misjudged and receive detrimental evaluation (Eagly and Carli 2003). Even small 
repeated prejudices against female executives can be detrimental for them. Over time 
this can lead to greater misjudgement and hinder their progress to the top (Martell and 
DeSmet 2001, Martell et al. 1998, Martell, Lane, and Emrich 1996). Daily, Certo, and 
Dalton (1999) and (Lee and James 2007) claim female CEOs are under constant media   
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attention due to their lower representation. Further, female CEOs and executives face 
greater professional and personal scrutiny compare to their male counterparts. Dixon‐
Fowler, Ellstrand, and Johnson (2013) further added, discharge of one female CEO 
can be detrimental for other female CEOs due to gender-stereotype perception and 
negative media publicity.  
Besides the above-mentioned corporate obstacles “gender pay gap” is another 
discouragement factor for female corporates. This hinders their urge to reach to the 
top and occupy top executive positions. Numerous past studies have shown that female 
top executives face payment and compensation discrimination compare to their male 
counterparts. Mohan (2014) showed that in U.S average female CEOs receive 
payment 84% and compensation 88% of their male counterparts. They also argued 
female CFOs are paid less compare to male CFOs. This practice starts from the 
executive level. For instance, Bertrand and Hallock (2001) show that female receive 
45% less salary and Carter et al. (2013) found there is a difference of 25% between 
male and female compensation. On the contrary, Vieito and Khan (2012) argue that 
after 2000 the gender pay gap reduced among new firms. And after observing 291 U.S 
firms from 1998-2010 Bugeja, Matolcsy, and Spiropoulos (2012, 1) depict “Women 
who rise through the "Glass Ceiling" to the level of CEO are remunerated at similar 
levels to their male counterparts”. 
Female leadership styles, work ethics and basic traits might also act against 
their corporate progress. Unlike men women are not highly competitive. Their 
leadership style and ambition are quite different as well. Generally, women seek self-
satisfaction more than financial success. Their high ethics and modesty prohibit them 
to trade off their integrity to achieve monetary benefits. This might be another reason 
that demotivates them to choose a very competitive, male dominated and political   
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corporate lifestyle. Where, besides being a committed and responsible worker you also 
require to play the organisational or networking game to reach to the very top. Singh, 
Kumra, and Vinnicombe (2002) argue generally women do not prefer to play the 
“promotion game” or “the organisational game”. Hence, women often choose 
alternative career paths like, academics, consultant and so on. 
2.4.3.3 Contributions of Female Senior Executives 
Only a handful of studies have been conducted so far to establish relation 
between female presence in top management and firm performance. Further, these 
studies demonstrate mixed results. Few studies managed to establish positive link 
(Smith, Smith, and Verner 2006, Krishnan and Park 2005, Welbourne 1999) and 
handful of studies failed to establish any significant connection (Wolfers 2006, Mohan 
and Chen 2004, Moncrief et al. 2000). Dwyer, Richard, and Chadwick (2003) show 
female officers holding top management positions can positively impact firm 
performance if the firm can ensure a supportive corporate culture and environment for 
them. Beside this firm’s external and internal governance, competition level and 
growth stage might also have an influence on their contribution. For instance, 
Krishnan and Parsons (2008) and Dwyer, Gilkeson, and List (2002) argue female 
presence in top management can enhance firm performance for firms in their growing 
stage. Krishnan and Parsons (2008) find positive association between gender diversity 
in senior management and higher stock return; Welbourne (1999) establish positive 
link between women in top management and short-term performance (measured by 
Tobin’s Q); (Dezső and Ross 2008) report female presence in the  top management 
team is strongly related with better financial performance (measured by Tobin's  Q, 
ROA, and ROE); and Catalyst in their census of 1995-2000, 2002, and 2005 show that  
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 fortune 500 firms with higher percentage of female senior officers can result in higher 
ROE and shareholders return. 
Besides corporate financial performance firm’s reporting quality has also been 
associated with gender diversity at the top management level. Several past accounting 
literatures (Matsunaga and Yeung 2008, Cheng and Warfield 2005) have argue that 
earnings management can be affected by the characteristics and incentives of the 
firms’ executives. Past studies (Jiang, Petroni, and Wang 2010, Matsunaga and Yeung 
2008, Geiger and North 2006) have shown that CFO’s can significantly impact the 
quality of accounting information. CEOs have also incentive to put pressure on CFOs 
to manipulate earning report for their own financial benefit (Feng et al. 2011). 
Earnings management is associated with managers and accountants’ ethical values 
(Bruns and Merchant 1990). Hence, gender of these top executives might have impact 
on firm’s financial reporting quality, as senior executives’ characteristics might 
differentiate due to their gender. Past studies (Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata 2012, 
Arthaud-Day et al. 2006, Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins 2006) have demonstrate that 
majority of the CEO turnovers are related to aggressive accounting or accounting 
restatements. Aggressive accounting can be a result of lack of cautiousness, 
overconfidence and high risk-taking attitude. Huang and Kisgen (2013) show that 
male executives make riskier financial decisions compare to their female counterparts. 
Jurkus, Park, and Woodard (2011) show that firms lack of strong external governance 
can reduce their agency cost by incorporating more female officers. Or in other words, 
as females are stronger monitors, their greater presence in the management can ensure 
lower agency cost for firms with weak corporate governance. Very few significant 
studies (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011, Peni and Vähämaa 2010, Krishnan and Parsons 
2008, Shawver, Bancroft, and Sennetti 2005) have been conducted so far on the impact   
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of corporate gender diversity on earnings quality. Krishnan and Parsons (2008) find 
that firms with gender diversity in senior management is associated with higher 
earnings quality. Peni and Vahamaa (2010, 629) state that “It is widely recognized that 
the   quality   of financial reporting   may   depend   on   managerial   motives and 
characteristics, and moreover, that the opportunism of the firm’s executives tends to 
reduce earnings quality”. They provide significant evidence that female CFOs adopt 
more conservative approach when it comes to earnings management.  
Females are finally climbing the corporate ladder to the top and recently have 
started to occupy top management positions. Hence, compare to their male 
counterparts, female CFOs/CEOs are comparatively young. Davidson III et al. (2007) 
find older CEOs can be associated more with aggressive income-increasing earnings 
management. Further, (Geiger and North 2006) demonstrate appointment of a new 
CFO can significantly reduce earnings management. Therefore, it can be argued that 
young female CEOs/CFOs can ensure lower earnings management and higher 
earnings quality. Cooper and Cooper (2017) claim when firm performance 
deteriorates, male CEOs will have a higher chance of being replaced relative to female 
CEOs. Eduardo and Poole (2016) demonstrate female CEOs enhance shareholders’ 
return. Further, Palalic, Ramadani, and Dana (2017) show female CEOs outperform 
their male counterparts in innovativeness and proactiveness. Overall, female 
respondents scored better in entrepreneurial dimensions than did males. The 
cautiousness, stronger monitoring capabilities and conservativeness of female CFOs 
aid them to ensure a higher quality accounting statement (Wu, Francis, and Hasan 
2011). Wu, Francis, and Hasan (2011) demonstrate female led firms enjoy lower bank 
price due to their cautiousness and conservative accounting approach. Further, Liu,   
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Wei, and Xie (2016) and Barua et al. (2010) show that firms led by female CFOs have 
lower earnings management and higher earnings quality. 
Female presence in top and middle management has also been positively 
associated with better CSR performance (Boulouta 2013, Zhang, Zhu, and Ding 2013, 
Bear, Rahman, and Post 2010, Adams and Ferreira 2009). The demographic 
composition of management teams affects their strategic choices (Cannella, Park, and 
Lee 2008), and CSR is one of those choices. Female members’ presence in the 
management can provide a diverse perspective and ensure better representation of the 
interest of diverse groups. Their empathetic and caring nature enables them to put 
higher value to community wellbeing. Betz, O'Connell, and Shepard (1989) and 
Bernardi and Arnold Sr (1997) argue that women are more comfortable with activities 
related to helping people, while men are more comfortable with money-making 
activities. Hence, female managers can provide different perspectives on fairness, 
which may lead to different CSR approaches (Soares, Marquis, and Lee 2011). Studies 
(Post, Rahman, and Rubow 2011, Williams 2003, Dietz, Kalof, and Stern 2002, Wang 
and Coffey 1992) have also demonstrate that having women officers increases not 
only corporate philanthropy but also other areas of CSR such as attention to the 
environment  
2.4.4 Female Auditors and Audit Committee Members  
Gender diversity of audit committees and gender of auditors have received 
significant consideration in the academia. Females are more conservative (Watson and 
McNaughton 2007, Dwyer, Gilkeson, and List 2002, Barber and Odean 2001, 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998, Powell and Ansic 1997); comply with rules and 
regulations better (Pierce and Sweeney 2010, Beu, Buckley, and Harvey 2003, Fallan 
1999, Bernardi and Arnold Sr 1997); have high ethical values (O’Fallon and   
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Butterfield 2005), less bribed (Mocan 2008) and strict against fraudulent act (Whitley 
Jr 2001). Thus Hardies, Breesch, and Branson (2011) claim auditor’s gender can 
impact audit quality. Past studies (Gold, Hunton, and Gomaa 2009, Chung and Monroe 
2001) have shown that female audit partners are more effective information processors 
in complex audit tasks and show greater efficiency in audit judgments. The cautious 
and analytical nature of female auditors allows them to identify material misstatements 
more than their male colleagues (Hardies, Breesch, and Branson 2011). Based on the 
sample of three Nordic countries, Ittonen and Peni (2012) demonstrate that female 
auditors charge more fee as they take more preparation and exercise more diligence 
during the audit process. Based on a sample of Finish firms Ittonen, Vähämaa, and 
Vähämaa (2013) show that female audit partners show higher conservatism, constrain 
earnings management better and lead to smaller abnormal accruals. Niskanen et al. 
(2011) claim female auditors are less flexible when it comes to analysing income 
increasing/decreasing accruals.  
Sun, Liu, and Lan (2011) argue, whether an audit committee will be able to 
constrain earnings management depends on few characteristics of its members, for 
instance, independence, experience and strong monitoring capabilities. The above-
mentioned female auditor traits are equally applicable for female audit committee 
members. Their strong monitoring capability and conservative nature can ensure better 
monitoring of internal control process, financial reporting process and audit process. 
Klein (2002) demonstrates that audit committee independence or presence of outside 
directors is linked with lower earnings management. Female directors are mostly 
outsiders and hence it can be argued that presence of female audit committee members 
can ensure lower earnings management. Gul, Jaggi, and Krishnan (2007) find that 
presences of at least one female director on the audit committee can result in lower   
84 
 
earnings management and higher earnings quality. Sun, Liu, and Lan (2011) fail to 
establish a positive relation between gender diversity of audit committee and lower 
earnings management. However, they argue, “Female audit committee members are 
more ethical than male audit committee members but are unable to influence the 
remainder of the committee” (Sun, Liu, and Lan 2011, 369). 
2.5 Global Regulations on Gender Diversity 
This section shed light on the countries’ corporate gender diversity condition 
under gender quota legislation. Past literature has associated female presence at the 
board and other significant corporate positions with better corporate governance, 
board effectiveness, operating profit, firm value and earnings quality.15 However, 
surprisingly the female members’ representation at board level is not satisfactory. 
Terjesen, Aguilera, and Lorenz (2014, 235) claim, “Women have failed to attain equal 
representation on corporate boards of directors, a concern which has attracted 
considerable practitioner, policy, and scholarly interest”. 
 Since 2000 onwards regulators of diverse countries implemented gender 
quotas and several other countries are planning to adopt gender quota regulation. 
Gender quota is segregated into two sections: mandatory gender quota (with or without 
penalty) and self-regulatory gender quota. So far, approximately ten countries adopted 
mandatory gender quota system (with or without penalty) and fifteen countries 
implemented gender diversity recommendations with voluntary gender quotas 
(Terjesen, Aguilera, and Lorenz 2014). 
A mandatory gender quota obliges firms to comply with certain percentage of 
female representation at the top and non-compliance may cause more / less   severe 
penalties. Viviane Reding, the Justice Commissioner in the European Union claim,   
                                                          
15 Please refer to section 2.4 and chapter 4 literature review for details. 
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“Personally, I am not a great fan of quotas, but I like the results they bring. The 
mandates helped to increase the number of women in top posts in France, Belgium 
and the Netherlands in the past twelve months” (Forbes 2012).16 She supported the 
implementation of mandatory gender quota in the European Union countries by 
arguing that compulsory percentage of female representation at the top result in the 
“1st cracks in the glass ceiling”. The opponents criticise mandatory gender quota based 
on the fact that regulatory enforcement of female corporates at the top might sacrifice 
corporate leadership quality. However, proponents of gender equality argue, 
mandatory regulatory pressure can be the 1st step towards altering male dominated 
corporate culture and creating opportunity for qualified and talented female corporate 
leaders. 
Table 2.1 provides a list of countries under mandatory gender quota along with 
a summary of mandatory gender quota regulation details of individual listed countries. 
Table 2.1: Countries under Mandatory Gender Quota System  
Panel A: Europe 
 
 Countr
y 
Date Implemented Type of 
Companies 
Target 
Percentage 
Applicable Year to Achieve 
the Target Quota 
Greece 2000 Full or 
partially state-
owned 
company 
boards. 
33% All board positions 
(executives and 
non-executives). 
n/a 
Norway 2003 Public 
Limited 
Liability 
Companies 
40% Whole Board 2008 
Iceland 
 
2009 
(amendment 2010) 
Public 
limited firms 
and private 
limited firms 
(over 50 
employees) 
40% Whole Board 2013 (40%) 
France 
 
2010 Large listed 
and non-listed 
((employing 
at least 500 
workers and 
40% non-executives 2014 (20%) 
2017 (40%) 
                                                          
16 http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/03/05/gender-quotas-in-european-union-companies/#2f6ef21d303d 
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with revenues 
over euro 50 
million) 
Austria 
 
2011 Companies in 
which the 
state’s 
ownership 
equals or 
exceeds 50 
percent. 
35% Supervisory board 
members who are 
nominated by the 
ministry, and not to 
the entire board 
25% (by 2013) 
35% (by 2018 
Belgium 
 
2011 State-owned 
and listed 
33% Whole Board (Both 
executives and non-
executives) 
33% by, 
2012 (state owned 
companies) 
2017 (listed 
companies 
2019 (listed SMEs) 
Italy 2011 Listed 
companies 
and state-
owned 
companies. 
33% Management 
boards and 
supervisory boards 
(i.e. executives and 
non-executives). 
2015 
Germany 2015 Listed 
Companies 
30% non-executives 2016 (30%) 
2018 (50%) 
Panel B: Other Countries 
Israel 1999 
(amendment 2007) 
Government-
owned 
corporations 
At least one 
female 
director 
Whole Board (Both 
executives and non-
executives) 
Within two years of 
resolution’s date. 
Columbia 
 
2000 Public and 
government 
entities state-
owned 
companies 
and 
companies in 
which the 
government is 
the majority 
shareholder. 
30% Decision making 
positions (Boards 
and senior 
management) 
n/a 
Kenya  2010 State owned 
enterprises 
33% Whole board n/a 
Malaysia 
 
2011 Private, 
public and 
limited 
liability 
companies in 
which there 
are more than 
250 
employees 
30% Boards and senior 
management 
2016 
Canada 
 
 
2006 (legislation 
passed)  
2011 
(implemented) 
State-owned 
enterprises 
40% Whole board n/a 
UAE 2012 Corporations 
and 
At least one Whole board n/a 
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government 
agencies  
India 2013 Public and 
listed 
companies 
At least one 
female 
director 
Whole Board (Both 
executives and non-
executives) 
2015 
 Source:https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gx-ccg-women-in-the-boardroom-a-global-
perspective4.pdf 
Under self-regulatory gender quota system regulators implement 
recommendations (under guidelines for good corporate governance) to achieve gender 
diversity. This system is not binding like mandatory gender quota system but 
corporations are obliged to provide explanation for non-compliance. Table 2.2 
provides a list of countries under self-regulatory gender quota along with a summary 
of self-regulatory gender quota regulation details of individual listed countries. 
Table 2.2: Countries under Self-Regulatory Approach (Comply or Explain) 
Country Date 
Implemented 
Recommendation 
Panel A: Europe 
Sweden 2004 The Corporate Governance Code of 2004 has a voluntary goal of parity for listed companies – 
“comply or explain” mechanism. A number of revisions to rules in the Swedish corporate 
governance code came into force on January 1, 2015.This is a result of initiatives taken by the 
Swedish Corporate Governance Board to improve the gender balance of listed company boards 
of directors. Specifically: 
• The nomination committee should, in its assessment of the board and its proposals regarding 
board composition, consider breadth and versatility and should strive for gender balance (Rule 
2.1). 
• In its proposal to the shareholders’ meeting and at the shareholders’ meeting, the nomination 
committee should provide specific explanation of its proposals regarding the requirement to strive 
for gender balance (Rules 2.6 and 2.7). 
Spain 2007 In 2007, the Spanish parliament approved a law recommending that women should have a strong 
presence on every company’s board of directors, meaning that there should be an equal balance 
between female and male representatives. Companies were given until 2015 to comply with the 
measure. 40 % (both executives and non-executives) by 2015 (but no sanctions, thus rather a 
recommendation by nature) in state-owned companies with 250 or more employees. 
Finland 2008 State-owned companies are required to have an equitable proportion of women and men’. The 
Corporate Governance Code for listed companies contains recommendation that ‘boards shall 
consist of both sexes’. The Act on Equality between Women and Men requires government 
bodies or state-owned enterprises with boards of elected representatives to have both men and 
women equally represented, unless there are special reasons to the contrary. The Finnish 
corporate governance code recommends that both genders be represented on listed company 
boards. Companies not meeting this requirement must explain and disclose their reasons for 
noncompliance. 
Luxembourg 2009 The Corporate Code of 2009 recommends the board to have an appropriate representation of both 
genders. The rule is applicable to all board members. 
UK 2012 From 2012 on the basis of principles of UK Corporate Governance Code (following the Lord 
Davies’ recommendation). The recommended target for listed companies in FTSE 100: 25%, by 
2015 is applicable to all board members. FTSE 350 companies recommended setting their own 
aspirational targets to be achieved by 2013 and 2015. 
Turkey 2012 In Turkey, one-third of publicly listed company board seats must be occupied by independent 
directors, as introduced by the Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMBT) in 2012 through a 
change to the mandatory provisions of its corporate governance principles. The CMBT decree 
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2014 
(amendment) 
that mandated independent board members also introduced a new clause to the principles on 
gender diversity, allowing an opportunity to accelerate gender equality by the appointment of 
women to independent director positions. Although not mandatory, this ruling contained a 
provision for boards to have at least one-woman director on a “comply or explain” basis. This 
changed in 2014, partly as a result of the efforts of the Independent Women Directors project. 
Under a new ruling, listed companies are to set a target of at least 25 percent for women’s 
representation on boards, a target date, and a policy to reach these targets. The board is to evaluate 
progress against the established targets on an annual basis. 
Poland 2013 In 2010, the Warsaw Stock Exchange added a recommendation to the Rules of Corporate 
Governance for public companies regarding gender equality in management positions. The 
requirement to disclose the number of men and women working in managerial roles followed in 
2012. The Warsaw Stock Exchange amended the Code of Best Practices for listed companies, 
and conducted public consultations in this respect. Planned changes to the Code of Best  
Practices of the Warsaw Stock Exchange will introduce an obligation for publicly listed 
companies to report annually on the application of diversity policies. In 2013, the Minister of the 
State Treasury issued a recommendation that, for state-owned enterprises, women should occupy 
at least 30 percent of the supervisory board seats appointed by the Minister by 2015. 
Denmark 
 
2013 In Denmark, gender equality at the board and management levels continues to be a focus area. 
Since April 2013, legislation has required a broad group of companies to work actively toward 
gender equality.  
The boards of various Danish companies are required to set targets for the underrepresented 
gender in the boardroom and to adopt policies for increasing the underrepresented gender in 
management positions. These requirements apply to companies with publicly listed shares or 
debt, large non-listed companies, limited liability companies owned by the government, and 
governmental institutions. Since 2013, companies with an underrepresentation of one gender on 
their boards or in management positions are required, in their annual reports or on their websites, 
to provide the status of their progress toward achieving gender equality (at least 40 percent of 
each gender) on the board, as well as the policy adopted for achieving gender equality in the 
broader management structure. 
Netherlands 2013 On January 1, 2013, the Dutch Management and Supervision Act became effective. One of its 
main elements is the introduction of a gender quota, stating that executive and supervisory board 
members should be at least 30 percent male and 30 percent female by  
2016. The appointment of the remaining 40 percent is at the company’s discretion. The guidance 
applies to listed and non-listed companies that meet two out of the following three criteria1: 
• A balance sheet greater than €17.5 million. 
• Gross annual revenue larger than €35 million. 
• An average number of employees of at least 250. 
Although incorporated in the Dutch Civil Code, the quotas are not mandatory and there are no 
penalties for not meeting them. Instead, a “comply or explain” approach applies, with companies 
required to state in their annual reports whether the quota was met, why it was not met, and what 
actions are being taken to comply in the future. 
Panel B: America 
U.S. 2010 A 2009 SEC proxy disclosure rule requires companies to disclose if their nominating committees 
consider diversity in the director selection process, and if so, how. Companies must disclose how 
these board or nominating committee policies are implemented, and how the board or nominating 
committee assesses its effectiveness. Diversity is not defined by the rule, allowing companies to 
create their own definitions, which generally can include gender, background, race, and 
education. These rules were effective February 2010.Certain U.S. states have implemented their 
own measures to increase diversity on boards.  
Panel C: Asia 
Australia 
 
2011 ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 2010: The most prominent 
recommendation was that ASX-listed companies disclose in their annual reports the gender 
objectives set by their boards, as well as their progress against these objectives. They also need 
to disclose the proportion of women on the board and in senior management roles. While 
compliance with these recommendations is not mandatory, companies that choose not to comply 
must provide an explanation in each annual report as to why. 
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Source:https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gx-ccg-women-in-the-boardroom-a-global-
perspective4.pdf 
The following discussion focuses on the significant countries under mandatory 
or self-regulatory gender regulation. In particular, this section provides a detailed 
discussion of: (1) Current facts and statistics of corporate gender diversity; (2) 
Academic research; and (3) Government and private organisations working to promote 
corporate gender diversity  
South Africa 2011 South Africa introduced the recommendation for female representation on South African 
corporate boards in September 2011. The recommendation by King Code of Governance for 
South Africa requires every board to consider diversity to make it effective and diversity is 
defined as gender, race, age, and so on. 
New 
Zealand 
2012 New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) implemented changes for main board-listed issues 
regarding diversity reporting. Listed equity issuers must now disclose in their annual report: 
• A breakdown of the gender composition of their boards of directors and officers. 
• An evaluation of their performance with respect to any formal diversity policy they may have. 
Japan 2013 In 2013, the Tokyo Stock Exchange changed its disclosure rulings—listed companies are to 
disclose the number/percentage of women board members in their corporate governance reports. 
Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, has stated that many of his policies are intended to empower 
women and to promote higher participation rates in leadership positions. His goal is for Japan to 
have 30 percent of all leadership positions filled by women by 2020. 
Hong Kong 2013 The Hong Kong Stock Exchange has introduced amendments to its Corporate Governance Code 
requiring the board of each listed company to disclose whether it has adopted a diversity policy, 
and if not, to explain why. As part of the amendments, companies listed in Hong Kong must also 
disclose at least a summary of any diversity policies that are in place in its corporate governance 
report, as well as the progress they have made toward their objectives.  
Taiwan 2014 State-owned enterprises and legal foundations in Taiwan are required to have at least a one-third 
representation of females on their boards. 
Listed companies are required to focus on the topic of gender equality and to ensure that their 
directors possess the necessary knowledge and skills based on the Corporate Governance Best 
Practice Principles for TWSE/GTSM Listed Companies. Since 2014, the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
has also used the number of female board members as one of its corporate governance evaluation 
key performance indicators in an effort to implement the government’s gender equality policy 
and to increase women’s participation in board activities. 
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Figure 5: An overview of “Worldwide Corporate Gender Diversity”. 
 
Figure 5 outlines the structure of the following discussion; the key segregation 
criterion of the following discussion is the type of gender quota system implemented 
by the countries. First, countries have been segregated as, countries operating under 
mandatory gender quota system and self-regulatory system. Second, each segment 
further segregated in terms of geographic landmark (e.g. Europe, Asia, Africa, Middle 
East, and America). Third, each of these segments contains detailed discussion of facts 
and statistics, academic research, and public/private companies’ reports and studies. 
Lastly, Australian gender regulation and corporate gender diversity scenario is 
discussed in detail: Australian corporate female representation at the top, corporate 
females in Australia and challenges, and Australian professional females and 
qualification.   
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2.5.1 Gender Quota Regulations   
Countries under gender quota regulation can be primarily segregated into two 
groups, (1) European countries (e.g. Finland, Spain, France, Italy, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Germany and UK, Norway, and Iceland); and (2) Non-European 
countries (e.g. Canada, Malaysia, India, Israel, and Kenya). The following sections 
discuss the current gender equality condition, the percentage of female members in 
top corporate positions, academic and non-academic research conducted on significant 
countries under mandatory gender quotas.  
2.5.1.1 Europe  
European countries are the pioneers of adopting mandatory gender quota 
regulation and global leaders of corporate gender diversity.17 European companies, 
regulators and government/ private organisations working for gender equality, 
frequently highlight some of the common issues for underrepresentation of women at 
the decision-making level of corporations. These issues are segregated as supply side 
barrier and demand side barrier (EC (2012). Supply side barriers are, lack of 
enthusiasm among the potential female corporates and scarcity of eligible female 
candidates in the pipeline. Demand side barriers are, “Old boys’ network”, biased 
recruitment and promotion process, gender pay gap, and male dominated corporate 
culture.  
2.5.1.1a. Facts and Statistics  
As per CESifo DICE (2014) report, eight EU (European Union) countries 
along with two non-EU Northern European countries have already implemented or 
decided to adopt binding/non-binding quotas.18 Gender quota polices adopted by these   
                                                          
17 Please refer to Table 2.1 for list of European countries under mandatory gender quota regulation.  
18 Center for Economic Studies (CES) Institute for Economic Research (ifo) Database Comparison for Institutional Comparisons 
in Europe   
  (DICE).   
   EU countries: Finland, Spain, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Germany. Non- EU countries: Norway and Iceland. 
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respective countries deviate in terms of the introduction date, level of gender quota 
percentage, compliance date, level of sanctions and company types (SOEs: State 
Owned Enterprises and PTFs: Publicly Traded Firms). EC (European Commission) is 
trying to achieve a 40% female representation for all the EU countries boards by 
2020.19 
Norway first introduced the mandatory gender quota (19 Dec 2003), followed 
by Finland (April 15, 2005), Spain (March 22, 2007), Iceland (March 4, 2010), France 
(January 13, 2011), Italy (June 28, 2011), Belgium (June 30, 2011), Netherlands 
(2011) and the newest addition to this list is Germany.20 Norway, Finland, Spain, 
Iceland, and France implemented 40%; Belgium and Italy 33% or one third; and 
Netherlands and Germany went for 30% gender quotas. Norway, Iceland and Belgium 
implemented gender quotas on both SOEs and PTFs; Italy and Finland only on SOEs; 
and France and Spain only on PTFs (Terjesen, Aguilera, and Lorenz 2014). Among 
these countries Norway, France, Iceland, Belgium and Italy went for strict penalties 
for non-compliance of the gender quotas (CESifo DICE 2013).  
The issue of the scarcity of women in business leadership positions was put 
high on the political agenda in 2010 by the European Commission. Therefore, 
although the female representation was steadily increasing since 2003, the progress 
rate escalated after 2010. For instance, between 2003 and 2010, on average the 
percentage of female representation on EU corporate boards increased by 3.4% points 
(0.5 pp/year). But from 2010 to 2014, within 4years it escalated by 8.3% points (2.1 
pp/year), four times the previous rate of change (EC 2015). Hence, the average female   
                                                          
19 In 2012, European Commission made an announcement of a proposal for a directive of 40% binding female representation 
among the EU countries’ corporate boards by 2020 and in 2013 European Parliament supported the gender quotation. 
20 Norway targeted to achieve its targeted gender quota by 2006 for SOEs and 2008 for PTFs; Finland by June 1, 2005; Belgium 
by 2011– 2012 for SOEs and 2017–2018 for PTFs; Spain by March 1, 2015; France by January 1, 2017; and Iceland by 
January 1, 2017.  
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representation among EU 28 countries’ boards have more than doubled from 2003 
(9%) to 2014 (20.2%).  
Although female representation at board level has progressed but the 
percentage is not satisfactory compare to the percentage of female graduates, female 
consumers and female labour force the female representation at board level or 
decision-making level is still not satisfactory. On average only 20.2% women 
comprise the board seats of large EU publicly listed companies. Further the figures are 
more disappointing when it comes to female chairs and CEOs. In 2013, out of 587 EU 
companies (covered by the EC database) only 26 were chaired by a woman (4.4%) 
and even fewer 16 or 2.7% have a female CEO (EC 2013). 
As per the 2014 statistics of European Commission, Iceland led in terms of 
overall percentage of female representation on large publicly listed companies’ boards 
(45% in Oct 2014), followed by Norway (38%), France (32%), Finland (29%), Italy 
(24%), Belgium (22%), Slovenia (20%), and Spain (17%). Female comprised 
remarkable 31% of board chair in Iceland; followed by Belgium 11%; 9% in Norway 
and Spain; 7% in Germany; 6% in France; and only 5% in Finland, Slovenia and Italy. 
Iceland had only 8% female CEO; Belgium and Slovenia 5%; Spain 3%; and Norway, 
Finland, Italy, Germany and France 0%. Female board members were mostly 
nonexecutive directors (Iceland 45%; Norway 41%; France 33%; Finland and Italy 
29%; Belgium 24%; Slovenia 22%; Germany 21%; and Spain 20%) compare to 
executive directors (Iceland 15%; Norway 18%; France 11%; Finland 16%; Italy 8%; 
Belgium 13%; Slovenia 21%; Spain 10%; and Germany 7%). As per the above 
statistics, it can be summarised that the majority of the European countries under 
mandatory gender regulation demonstrated satisfactory results in terms of female   
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board representation on boards, however female board members were mostly non-
executives and could not secure significant positions as CEOs and chairs. 
Table 2.3 summarizes the statistics of female representation on boards, female 
chairs, female representation on board committees (AC: audit committee, GOV: 
governance committee, NC: nomination committee, and COM: compensation 
committee), and female representation as per industry. 
Table 2.3: Fact-Sheet - Countries under Gender Quota System 
Country Female Director CHAIR SUB-
COMMITTEE 
INDUSTRIES 
Greece 9.6% 0% AC:12.1%% 
GOV:33.3% 
NC:16.1% 
COM:14% 
Manufacturing (12%) 
Financial Services (11%) 
Consumer Business (10%) 
Energy & Resources (7%) 
Technology, Media, & 
Telecommunications (5%) 
Norway 36.7% 18.2% AC:40.7% 
GOV:17.1% 
NC:40% 
COM:35.8% 
Manufacturing (41%) 
Energy and Resources (40%) 
Consumer Business (37%) 
Financial Services (32%) 
Technology, Media, & 
Tele-communications (31%) 
France 29.9% 2.5% AC:32.3% 
GOV: na 
NC:25.8% 
COM:27.3% 
Manufacturing (30%) 
Technology, Media, & 
Telecommunications (28%) 
Consumer Business (27%) 
Financial Services (27%) 
Energy & 
Resources (26%) 
Austria 16.3% 9.1% AC:9.9% 
GOV: 0% 
NC:7.5% 
COM:4.6% 
Financial Services (22%) 
Technology, Media, & 
Telecommunications (19%) 
Consumer Business (19%) 
Energy & Resources (13%) 
Manufacturing (13%) 
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Belgium 18.3% 4.8% AC:16.5% 
GOV:16.1% 
NC:16.4% 
COM:17.6% 
Technology, Media, & 
Telecommunications (27%) 
Financial Services (21%) 
Energy & Resources (21%) 
Life Sciences & 
Health Care (14%) 
Manufacturing (12%) 
Italy 22.3% 22.2% AC:27.2% 
GOV:23.2% 
NC:15.9% 
COM:24.9% 
Energy & Resources (28%) 
Technology, Media, & Tele-
communications (23%)  
Life Sciences & Health Care 
(22%)  
Manufacturing (22%) 
Financial Services (21%) 
Germany 18.3% 4.4% AC:13.7%% 
GOV:13.6% 
NC:15% 
COM:15.6% 
Consumer Business (21%) 
Technology, Media, & 
Telecommunications (20%) 
Financial Services (18%) 
Manufacturing (17%) 
Life Sciences & 
Health Care (17%) 
Source:https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gx-ccg-women-in-the-boardroom-a-global-
perspective4.pdf; European Commission, database on women and men in decision-making, October 2014; Credit Suisse, 
The CS Gender 3000: Women in Senior Management, September 2014; ISS, Gender Diversity on Boards: A Review of 
Global Trends, September 2014 
Norway has more than 35% female representation on boards followed by 
France (29.9%), and Italy (22.3%). Italy has the highest representation of female board 
chairs (22.2%) followed by Norway (18.2%). Overall percentage of female board 
chairs is highly disappointing. Norway, France and Italy have considerable percentage 
of female members on board subcommittees. Audit committee and nomination 
committee have higher representation of female members compare to governance and 
compensation committees. In Norway, France, and Italy female representation does 
not highly deviate in terms of industry.  
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2.5.1.1b. Academic Research on Gender Diversity 
Among all the European countries under mandatory gender quota Norway has 
significant number of corporate gender diversity studies. Female representation on 
Norwegian boards have been positively associated with higher firm innovation 
(Torchia, Calabro, and Huse 2011); enhanced board strategic control (Nielsen and 
Huse 2010b); better corporate social responsibility (Huse, Nielsen, and Hagen 2009). 
In contrast, Bøhren and Staubo (2013) find mandatory incorporation of female board 
members may lead to inefficient boards and Ahern and Dittmar (2012) show 
mandatory gender quota may cause significant drop in the stock price and in Tobin’s 
Q over the following years. Norway achieved its 40% gender quota target within a 
very short span of time and might cause appointment of more younger and less 
experienced female members in Norweigan corporate boards. However, Grosvold, 
Brammer, and Rayton (2007) cannot find any negative consequences of rapid growth 
of female directors among 100 largest Norwegian firms. Table 2.4 (section A) 
summarizes significant board gender diversity studies conducted in Norweigan 
context. Nekhili and Gatfaoui (2013) demonstrate that women directors are being 
appointed on French boards for their professional services, valuable skills, and 
network links and Dang, Bender, and Scotto (2014) show that incorporating women 
on boards has a moderate impact on the human and social capital of French Boards. 
Gordini et al. (2017) demonstrate percentage of females on Italian boards have positive 
and significant impact on firms’ Tobin’s Q. Further, a study conducted on German 
boards by Joecks, Pull, and Vetter (2013) find that at least 30% female representation 
on boards can positively impact firm performance. However, despite positive impact 
of female directors’ presence on European firm outcomes, few studies claim that 
female board members still face certain level of discrimination. For instance, women   
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directors on French board still face double glass ceiling (Nekhili and Gatfaoui 2013) 
and German female board members still earn significantly less than their male 
counterparts (Koch and Stadtmann 2013) 
Table 2.4: Key Gender Diversity Studies of European Countries under Mandatory Gender Quota 
Title Authors 
and Date 
Journal Paper Type Before/After 
GQ 
implementation 
Sample 
And Period 
Key Findings 
A: Key Norweigan Gender Diversity Studies 
Board 
Diversity in 
the United 
Kingdom and 
Norway: An 
Exploratory 
Analysis 
 
Grosvold, 
Brammer, 
and 
Rayton 
(2007) 
Business 
Ethics: A 
European 
Review 
 
(B) 
Exploratory 
Analysis and 
Longitudinal 
Study 
 
After 100 largest 
Norway 
Companies 
(4-year 
period) and 
100 largest 
UK 
Companies 
(7-year 
period) 
The authors indicated: 
Board diversity has 
grown substantially in 
Norway and UK in 
recent years, it has 
done so considerably 
more rapidly in 
Norway than in the 
United Kingdom. The 
analysis highlights that 
the overall growth in 
board diversity is the 
result of changing firm 
behaviour rather than a 
sectoral shift in the 
United Kingdom or 
Norwegian economies. 
It also shows that as 
diversity has increased, 
there has been no fall 
in how experienced 
female directors are, or 
a corresponding rise in 
the number of boards 
that female directors 
sit on, suggesting that 
the rapid growth in 
board diversity has 
been achieved without 
any fall in the quality 
of female directors. 
Affirmative action 
programmes may have 
the potential to 
generate a radical 
growth in female 
representation in the 
boardroom. A more 
widespread adoption of 
such programmes 
would cement the 
position of women in 
the boardroom and 
within wider society 
and, absent evidence of 
harmful effects, could 
form the basis of good 
governance practice 
throughout western 
economies.  
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Women and 
Employee-
Elected Board 
Members, and 
their 
Contributions 
to Board 
Control Tasks 
Huse, 
Nielsen, 
and 
Hagen 
(2009) 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
Qualitative 
After 840 
Norwegian 
Firms 
 
(2006) 
The authors indicated: 
Women and employee-
elected board members 
may contribute to 
board effectiveness. 
The contribution of 
women and employee-
elected board members 
depended, however, on 
the use and existence 
of real diversity and 
not only demographic 
diversity. They may 
have particular 
contributions to CSR 
controls and strategic 
controls. 
Governance 
and Politics: 
Regulating 
Independence 
and Diversity 
in the Board 
Room 
Bøhren 
and 
Strøm 
(2010) 
Journal of 
Business 
Finance and 
Accounting 
 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
After All non-
financial 
firms listed 
on the Oslo 
Stock                                                                               
Exchange at 
least once 
by year-end 
over the 
period 
1989–2002. 
The authors indicated: 
The data provides no 
convincing economic 
reason for requiring by 
law or code that a
minimum fraction of 
the firm’s directors be 
employees, be 
independent, be of a 
certain gender, or only 
hold a few 
directorships. 
Mandating gender 
diversity in the board 
room should be 
considered an inherent 
part of a broader 
political program to 
ensure equal 
opportunities. 
Implementing such a 
program seems costly 
for stockholders, but 
may still be beneficial 
for society at large. 
The 
Contribution 
of Women on 
Boards of 
Directors: 
Going Beyond 
the Surface 
Nielsen 
and Huse 
(2010a) 
 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Qualitative 
Study) 
After CEOs of 
201 
Norwegian 
firms 
(having 
employees 
between 50 
and 5,000). 
(2003) 
The authors indicated: 
The ratio of women 
directors is positively 
associated with board 
strategic control. The 
positive effects of 
women directors on 
board effectiveness are 
mediated through 
increased board 
development activities 
and through decreased 
level of conflict.” 
Women 
Directors on 
Corporate 
Boards: From 
Tokenism to 
Critical Mass 
Torchia, 
Calabro, 
and Huse 
(2011) 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
(Qualitative 
Study) 
After 317 
Norwegian 
companies 
(Winter of 
2005/2006 
and the first 
half of 
2006) 
The authors indicated: 
Attaining critical mass 
– going from one or 
two women (a few 
tokens) to at least three 
women (consistent 
minority) – makes it 
possible to enhance the 
level of firm 
innovation. Moreover, 
the results show that 
the relationship 
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between the critical 
mass of women 
directors and the level 
of firm innovation is 
mediated by board 
strategic tasks. 
The Changing 
of the Boards: 
The Impact on 
Firm 
Valuation of 
Mandated 
Female Board 
Representation 
Ahern 
and 
Dittmar 
(2012) 
 
Quarterly 
Journal of 
Economics 
 
 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
After The sample 
consists of 
1,230 firm-
year 
observations 
over 2001 to 
2009 for 
248 unique 
Norwegian 
firms. 
The authors indicated: 
The constraint imposed 
by the quota caused a 
significant drop in the 
stock price at the 
announcement of the 
law and a large decline 
in Tobin’s Q over the 
following years. 
The Gender 
Quota and 
Female 
Leadership: 
Effects of the 
Norwegian 
Gender Quota 
on Board 
Chairs and 
CEOs 
Wang 
and 
Kelan 
(2013) 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
After Norwegian 
quoted 
companies 
in the period 
of 2001–
2010. 
 
The authors indicated: 
Gender quota and the 
resulting increased 
representation of 
female directors 
provide a fertile 
ground for women to 
take top leadership 
positions. Presence of 
female CEOs is 
positively related to 
the average 
qualification of female 
directors. Firms with 
older and better 
educated female 
directors are more 
likely to appoint 
female board chairs. 
The likelihood of 
female CEOs’ 
appointment increases 
with the percentage of 
independent directors 
and directors’ 
qualifications, 
especially those for 
female directors. 
Does Man-
Datory Gender 
Balance 
Work? 
Changing 
Organisational 
form to Avoid 
Board 
Upheaval 
Bøhren 
and 
Staubo 
(2014) 
Journal of 
Corporate 
Finance 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
After 274 
Norwegian 
ASA listed 
firms per 
year 
(2000-2009) 
The authors indicated: 
Mandatory gender 
balance may produce 
firms with inefficient 
organisational forms or 
inefficient boards. 
 
 
B: Other European Countries’ Gender Diversity Studies   
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Are 
Demographic 
Attributes and 
Firm 
Characteristics 
Drivers of 
Gender 
Diversity? 
Investigating 
Women's 
Positions on 
French Boards 
of Directors 
Nekhili 
and 
Gatfaoui 
(2013) 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
 
 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
After French 
large- and 
mid-
capitalized 
companies 
belonging to 
the SBF120 
stock 
market 
index 
 
(2000-2004) 
The authors indicated: 
The appointment of 
women directors is 
strongly related to 
family ownership and 
board or firm size. 
Further, appointment 
of women directors is 
related to their 
professional services, 
valuable skills, and 
network links. 
Furthermore, we show 
that women face a 
double glass-ceiling 
problem, and note that 
French firms rely more 
on the demographic 
attributes of their 
women directors when 
they are appointed to 
senior board positions. 
Gender 
Diversity in 
the 
Boardroom 
and Firm 
Performance: 
What Exactly 
Constitutes a 
“Critical 
Mass? 
Joecks, 
Pull, and 
Vetter 
(2013) 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
Before 151 listed 
German 
firms 
 
(2000-2005) 
The authors indicated: 
Gender diversity to at 
first negatively affect 
firm performance and 
only after a “critical 
mass” of about 30 % 
women has been 
reached—to be 
associated with higher 
firm performance than 
completely male 
boards. 
Women On 
French 
Corporate 
Board Of 
Directors: 
How Do They 
Differ From 
Their Male 
Counterparts? 
Dang, 
Bender, 
and 
Scotto 
(2014) 
Journal of 
Applied 
Business 
Research 
 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Qualitative 
Study) 
After French 
Index SBF 
120 
companies 
 
(2010) 
The authors indicated: 
Integrating women on 
boards has an impact 
on the Human and 
Social Capital of 
Boards but not as 
much as might have 
been expected. Men 
and women board 
members seem to build 
their human and social 
capital through the 
same educational 
process in France. 
Nonetheless, our work 
shows significant 
differences between 
men and women 
regarding professional 
experience and board 
member status.” 
Gender 
Diversity in 
the Italian 
Boardroom 
and Firm 
Financial 
Performance 
Gordini 
and 
Rancati 
(2017) 
Management 
Research 
Review 
 
(C) 
Empirical 
Study 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
After 918 Italian 
listed 
companies 
 
(2011-2014) 
The authors indicated: 
Percentage of women 
on a board has a 
positive and significant 
effect on Tobin’s Q, 
while the presence of 
one or more women on 
the board per se has an 
insignificant effect on 
firm financial 
performance. 
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2.5.1.1c. European Organisations Promoting Corporate Gender Equality  
The government and private organisations that are continuously working to 
support corporate gender equality are EC (European Commission), PWN 
(Professional Women’s network), leading European business schools and Mckensey 
& Company among others.21 The European parliament and several European countries 
(eg: Germany, Poland, Denmark) have taken different measures as well (EC 2013). 
Till date EC has published several fact sheets, database and reports to support gender 
equality. The leading business schools of Europe are not only contributing through 
research on gender equality but also working on the database of “Board Ready 
Women”. Further, Mckensey & company have issued several “Women Matter” (2007, 
2008, 2010 and 2012) studies which demonstrate that demographic challenges can be 
easily met by employing more female in the top and middle level management; 
Mckensey (2010) show higher female presentation at the top management can result 
in higher operating margin and ROE (Return on Equity); and McKensey (2012) and 
Mckensey (2013) reveal real reasons behind lower female representation on board and 
provide recommendations to overcome these challenges.   
2.5.1.2 Non-European Countries 
Besides European countries other significant countries adopted gender quota 
regulation are Canada, Malaysia, UAE, Israel, India, and Columbia. The following 
sections (2.5.1.2a and 2.5.1.2b) focus on the current corporate gender diversity 
statistics and academic research of these countries.  
  
                                                          
21 See, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/; http://www.pwnglobal.net/; http://www.mckinsey.com/global-
themes/europe 
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2.5.1.2a. Facts and Statistics  
Canada introduced mandatory gender quota on 1st Dec, 2006 and 50% 
mandatory quota was implemented from Dc14, 2011. The mandatory quota has only 
been implemented on SOEs but not PTFs. Currently women hold just over one in five 
board seats, which is approximately same as U.S but quite low compare to European 
companies. Women hold approximately 20.8% seats among 60 Canadian Stock Index 
companies (Catalyst 2015).  As per the new rules enforced by Ontario Securities 
Commission from 2015 the Canadian public companies will need to make proper 
disclosure of the policies and practices on recruiting women for boardroom and senior 
executive positions. And this might add some fuel to the progress of female 
representation on Canadian boards. 
Israel introduced mandatory gender quota on March 11, 2007. Israel requires 
at least 50% female representation on SOEs boards by 2010 and at least 1 women on 
PTFs boards (the compliance date has not fixed yet). In 2013, among the TA-100 
companies 31% managerial positions, 17.2% directorship, 19% women chair and 19% 
CEO positions were held by women. Approximately 38% of the companies had 25% 
of female representation on their boards. The companies with the highset 
representation of women on their boards range from 42% to 83%. 
Kenya introduced 33% mandatory gender quota on August 28, 2010 and it was 
implemented on the same day. Just like Canada the mandatory quota has only been 
implemented on SOEs but not PTFs. 
In June of 2011, in an effort to promote gender equality, the Malaysian Cabinet 
approved a policy where companies must achieve at least a 30 percent representation 
of women in decision-making positions in the private sector. They are targeting to 
achieve 30% women on board and management positions by 2016.   
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Table 2.5 summarizes the current statistics of female representation on boards, 
female chairs, female representation on board committees (AC: audit committee, 
GOV: Governance committee, NC: Nomination committee, and COM: Compensation 
committee), and female representation as per industry. 
Table 2.5: Fact-Sheet – Non-European Countries under Mandatory Gender Quota System   
Country FD CHAIR SUB-
COMMITTEE 
INDUSTRIES 
Israel 16.2% 5.1% AC:19.3% 
GOV:16.7% 
NC:16.7% 
COM:26% 
Consumer Business (20%) 
Financial Services (20%) 
Energy & Resources (13%) 
Life Sciences & Health Care (12%) 
Technology, Media, & Telecommunications 
(12%) 
Colombia 7% 0% AC: 0% 
GOV: na 
NC: na 
COM: 0% 
Manufacturing (13%) 
Consumer Business (11%) 
Energy & Resources (11%)  
Financial Services (2%) 
Malaysia 10.4% 
 
0% AC:11.9% 
GOV:7.7% 
NC:7.6% 
COM:10.2% 
Manufacturing (20%) 
Technology, Media, & Tele-communications 
(15%) 
Energy & Resources (10%) 
Life Sciences & Health Care (8%) 
Financial Services (8%) 
Canada 13.1% 
 
FP500 board seats: 
17.1% 
5.5% AC:14.9% 
GOV:13.6% 
NC:7.13.8% 
COM:15% 
Consumer Business (18%) 
Technology, Media, & Telecommunications 
(18%) 
Financial Services (17%) 
Life Sciences & Health Care (15%) 
Manufacturing (15%) 
India 
 
7.7% 
 
India S&P CNX Nifty 
50: 8.3% 
2.7% AC:6% 
GOV:5.1% 
NC:4.7% 
COM:4% 
Technology, Media, & Telecommunications 
(10%) 
 Manufacturing (9%) 
Consumer Business (9%) 
Financial Services (7%) 
Life Sciences & Health Care (7%) 
Source:https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gx-ccg-women-in-the-boardroom-a-global-
perspective4.pdf; Credit Suisse, The CS Gender 3000: Women in Senior Management, September 2014; 
http://www.transelca.com.co/SitePages/Composicion.aspx; Catalyst, Increasing Gender Diversity on Boards: Current 
Index of Formal  Approaches, August 2014; Canadian Board Diversity Council, 2014 Annual Report Card; The Globe 
and Mail Board Games, “Women on Boards: How Canadian Industries  Stack Up,” November 2014; ISS, Gender 
Diversity on Boards: A Review of Global Trends, September  2014;  Credit Suisse, The CS Gender 3000: Women in 
104 
 
Senior Management, September   2014;  National Stock Exchange, India and Prime Database, February 2015;  A report 
by Khaitan & Co in association with Biz Divas, a national network of professional women, August 2014 
Israel, Canada, and Malaysia are the top three in terms of female representation on 
boards. Israel has the highest representation of female members in sub-committees 
followed by Canada and Malaysia. Canada has the highest percentage of female chair, 
followed by Israel and India. Columbia has the lowest female representation in boards 
no female chair and sub-committee members. Despite adopting mandatory gender 
quota regulation India and Columbia fail to ensure reasonable representation of 
females on boards and sub-committees. 
2.5.1.2b. Academic Research on Gender Diversity 
Malaysia and Canada have considerable number of academic research on 
corporate gender diversity compare to other non-European countries under mandatory 
gender quota regulation. Alazzani, Hassanein, and Aljanadi (2017) has associated 
Malaysian corporations’ female directors with better social performance. A study by 
Abdullah and Ismail (2016) find no significant relation of female presence on boards 
and audit committees of Malaysian corporations with propensity of earnings 
management. Similarly, Amran et al. (2016) fails to establish any link between female 
directors and earnings quality. Further, Hassan, Marimuthu, and Johl (2017) and 
Shukeri, Shin, and Shaari (2012) fail to demonstrate any significant relation of board 
gender diversity with firm value and performance respectively. Besides, studies have 
been also conducted on causes of Malaysian firms’ gender diversity (Abdullah 2014) 
and “Glass Ceiling” barriers faced by Malaysian females in their career progression 
(Subramaniam et al. 2016). . Further, multiple studies have been conducted on female 
entrepreneurs (Mustapha and Punitha 2016, Al Mamun et al. 2016, Ming Yen Teoh 
and Choy Chong 2014) and workforce (Ali 2014) in Malaysia.  
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A study conducted on Canadian firms by (Burke 1999) demonstrate industry 
sectors, firm size, and board size are the key determinants of female representation on 
boards. Dunn (2012a) fined that female directors appointed in all-male board have 
specialized firm-specific knowledge and skills. Further Dunn (2012b) demonstrate 
newly appointed female board members are better utilised in the significant sub-
committees compare to their male counterparts. 
Table 2.6: Gender Diversity Studies of Non- European Countries under Mandatory Gender Quota 
Title Author(s) 
and Date 
Journal and 
Ranking 
Sample And 
Period 
Key Findings 
Women on Canadian 
Corporate Boards of 
Directors: Getting the 
Numbers Right! 
Burke 
(1999) 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Canadian 
Companies 
(1995) 
The authors indicated: Company size and 
board size are positively and significantly 
correlated with number of women board 
members. 
Breaking the 
Boardroom Gender 
Barrier: the Human 
Capital of Female 
Corporate Directors. 
Dunn 
 
(2012a) 
Journal of 
Management & 
Governance 
193 Canadian 
firms with 
women on their 
boards 
(1996-2004) 
The authors indicated: Women who are 
appointed to all-male boards have 
specialized knowledge skills; either they 
have firm-specific knowledge as insiders, 
or they are support specialists with a 
specific financial or legal expertise. 
The Role of Gender 
and Human Capital 
on the Appointment 
of New Corporate 
Directors to 
Boardroom 
Committees: 
Canadian Evidence. 
Dunn 
 
(2012b) 
International 
Business 
Research 
Newly 
appointed 318 
corporate 
director 
(1997-2004) 
The authors indicated: Female corporate 
directors are better utilized than their male 
counterparts. In their first year of joining 
a board, these re-appointed to both major 
and minor board committees, while the 
majority of the new male directors are 
appointed to no board committees. 
Does Board of 
Director's 
Characteristics Affect 
Firm Performance? 
Evidence from 
Malaysian Public 
Listed Companies. 
Shukeri, 
Norwahida, 
and Shaari. 
(2012) 
International 
Business 
Research 
300 Malaysian 
public listed 
companies 
(2011) 
The authors indicated: There is no 
significant relationship between gender 
diversity and firm performance. 
The Causes of 
Gender Diversity in 
Malaysian Large 
Firms. 
Abdullah 
(2014) 
Journal of 
Management & 
Governance 
Malaysian 
large firms 
The authors indicated: Gender diversity is 
positively associated with board size and 
the presence of family on the board. 
Women Directors, 
Family Ownership 
and Earnings 
Management in 
Malaysia. 
Abdullah and 
Ismail. 
(2016) 
Asian Review 
of Accounting 
Non-finance 
firms listed on 
Bursa Malaysia 
(2008-2011). 
The authors indicated: Women on board 
or audit committee is not associated with 
a propensity for earnings management. 
Further, women on boards are not 
associated with income-decreasing 
accruals, the presence of women on audit 
committees leads to income-reducing 
earnings management. 
"Are Malaysian 
Women Directors 
Associated with High 
Earnings Quality?" 
Amran, 
Manaf, 
Bahrain, and 
Ishak. 
Advanced 
Science Letters 
Companies 
listed on Bursa 
Malaysia 
(2001- 2012) 
The authors indicated: Women 
representations on boards do not enhance 
earnings quality. 
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(2016) 
"The Glass Ceiling 
Phenomenon-Does It 
Really Affect 
Women's Career 
Advancement in 
Malaysia? 
Subramaniam, 
Khadri, 
Maniam, and 
Ali. 
(2016) 
Journal of 
Organisational 
Culture, 
Communication 
and Conflict 
300 working 
women in the 
Klang Valley, 
the 
administrative 
and business 
hub of 
Malaysia. 
The authors indicated: Family 
commitment, organisational culture and 
career advancement opportunities are the 
main challenges which form the “Glass 
Ceiling” that hinder women’s career 
progression in Malaysia. Policy 
implications include a pertinent call for 
mindset change among the corporate 
sector and society at large. 
Bridging and 
Bonding: How 
Gender Diversity 
Influence 
Organisational 
Performance. 
Hassan, 
Marimuthu, 
and Johl. 
(2017) 
Global 
Business and 
Management 
Research 
60 top 
Malaysian 
listed 
companies 
(2009-2013). 
The authors indicated: Gender diversity 
has no significant impact on firm value. 
Impact of Gender 
Diversity on Social 
and Environmental 
Performance: 
Evidence from 
Malaysia. 
Alazzani, 
Hassanein, 
and Aljanadi. 
(2017) 
Corporate 
Governance: 
The 
International 
Journal of  
Business in 
Society 
Firms listed in 
Bursa Malaysia 
The authors indicated: There is a positive 
association between social performance 
and the presence of female directors on 
the board of directors of Malaysian firms. 
 
2.5.2 Gender Diversity Recommendations (Comply or Explain) 
 This section discusses the facts and statistics of gender diversity and academic 
research conducted on significant countries adopted gender diversity 
recommendations and voluntary gender quotas. The significant countries adopted 
gender diversity recommendations are several European Union countries, UK 
(European Union country), U.S, and Australia. The following sections provide a 
detailed discussion on corporate gender diversity of these countries. 
2.5.2.1 European Union Countries 
European Union countries implemented gender diversity recommendations are 
Sweden, Spain, Finland, Luxembourg, UK, Turkey, Poland, Denmark, and 
Netherlands. The following sections (2.5.2.1a and 2.5.2.1b) focus on the current 
corporate gender diversity statistics and academic research of these countries.   
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2.5.2.1a. Facts and Statistics 
EU countries, Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Poland, 
Ireland, and Luxembourg went for voluntary gender quotas and implemented gender 
diversity recommendations. Netherlands introduced the recommendations in 2008; 
followed by Luxembourg in 2009; Denmark, Germany, Poland and Sweden in 2010; 
and Ireland in 2012. 
As per the statistics of 2014, Sweden took the lead in female representation on 
boards (28% in Oct 2014) of large publicly listed companies, followed by Netherlands 
(25%), Denmark (24%), Germany (24%), Poland (15%), Luxembourg (12%) and 
Ireland (11%). Female comprised remarkable 26% of board chair in Poland; followed 
by 7% in Germany and Sweden; and 0% in Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg. 
Ireland had 6% female CEO, Netherlands 5%, Sweden 3%, and Denmark, Germany 
and Poland 0%. Despite having the third, fourth and fifth largest female representation 
on boards Denmark, Germany and Poland did not have any female CEO on their large 
publicly listed companies’ boards. Female directors were mostly nonexecutives 
(Sweden 29%, Netherlands 26%, Denmark 23%, Germany 21%, Poland 15%, 
Luxembourg 13%, and Ireland 13%) compare to executive directors (Sweden 23%, 
Netherlands 9%, Denmark 12%, Germany 7%, Poland 4%, Luxembourg 9%, and 
Ireland 6%). As per these statistics it can be summarised that in 2014 although Sweden 
was leading in female representation on boards, Poland had the highest percentage of 
female chairs. Overall representation of female CEOs was poor among all the 
countries. 
Table 2.7 summarizes the statistics of female representation on boards, female 
chairs, female representation on board committees (AC: audit committee, GOV: 
governance    
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 Table 2.7: Fact-Sheet – European Union Countries under Gender Diversity 
Recommendations  
Country FD CHAIR SUB-
COMMITTEE 
INDUSTRIES 
Sweden 24.4% 4.7% AC:32.9% 
GOV:9.1% 
NC:14.2% 
COM:18.7% 
Technology, Media, &Telecommunications (31%) 
Consumer Business (31%)  
Life Sciences & Health Care (28%) 
 Financial Services (22%) 
Manufacturing (20%) 
Spain 
  
12.5% 6.5% AC:12.9% 
GOV:15% 
NC:10.6% 
COM:11.8% 
Consumer Business (17%) 
Life Sciences & Health Care (15%) 
Financial Services (14%)  
Manufacturing (11%) 
Technology, Media, & Telecommunications (9%) 
Finland 22.1% 3.8% AC:34.1% 
GOV:0% 
NC:10.1% 
COM:19.5% 
Energy & Resources (29%) 
Technology, Media, & Telecommunications (23%) 
Manufacturing (22%) 
Financial Services (21%) 
Consumer Business (19%) 
Luxembourg 11.5% 0% AC:14.9% 
GOV:9.5% 
NC:6.3% 
COM:22.2% 
Consumer Business (16%) 
Manufacturing (14%) 
Technology, Media, & 
Tele-communications (14%) 
Financial Services (0%) 
Energy & Resources (0%) 
Turkey 10% 7.4% AC:7% 
GOV:5.8% 
NC:4.9% 
COM: 0% 
Manufacturing (15%) 
Financial Services (14%) 
Energy & Resources (9%) 
Consumer Business (4%) 
Technology, Media, & Telecommunications (0%) 
Denmark 21.8% 0% AC:18.7% 
GOV:5.0% 
NC:6.1% 
COM:16.4% 
Financial Services, (28%) 
Manufacturing (23%) 
Consumer Business (23%) 
Energy & Resources (22%) 
 Life Sciences & Health Care (18%) 
Netherland 17.3% 0% AC:22.6% 
GOV:17.1% 
NC:14.1% 
COM:17.7% 
Consumer Business (20%) 
Manufacturing (20%) 
Technology, Media, & 
Tele-communications (19%) 
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Life Sciences & Health Care (19%) 
Financial Services (13%) 
Source: https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gx-ccg-women-in-the-boardroom-a-global-
perspective4.pdf; European Commission, database on women and men in decision-making, October 2014; Credit 
Suisse, The CS Gender 3000: Women in Senior Management, September 2014; ISS, Gender Diversity on Boards: A 
Review of Global Trends, September 2014 
 
committee, NC: nomination committee, and COM: compensation committee), and 
female representation as per industry. 
Sweden (24.4%) takes the lead in terms of female representation on boards followed 
by Finland (22.1%), and Denmark (21.8%). Turkey and Spain have the highest 
representation of female board chair 7.4% and 6.5% respectively. Sweden, Finland, 
and Netherland have the highest overall female member representation in significant 
board sub-committees. Netherland, Denmark, and Luxembourg do not have any 
female board chairs. 
2.5.2.1b. Academic Research 
Several studies have been conducted on Danish corporate boards, for instance, 
Smith, Smith, and Verner (2006) find positive association between female 
representation on boards and Danish firms’ performance. In contrast, Marinova, 
Plantenga, and Remery (2016) and Rose (2007) cannot find any link between women 
on board and a sample of listed Danish firms’ financial performance. Studies 
conducted on Spanish corporations, positively associate female directors with better 
firm performance (Reguera-Alvarado, de Fuentes, and Laffarga 2017); economic 
efficiency (Lucas-Pérez et al. 2015); and positive stock market reactions (Campbell 
and Vera 2010). On the contrary, Mínguez-Vera and Martin (2011) find a negative 
link between board gender diversity and performances of Spanish SMEs. A study 
conducted by Jonnergård and Stafsudd (2011) on Swedish boards show that women 
presence can enhance board activities and involvement. Another study conducted by 
Adams and Funk (2012) claim that Swedish female directors differ from their male   
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counterparts in terms of risk attitudes and core values. They argue female are less 
power oriented and surprisingly more risk loving than the male directors. Kılıç et al. 
(2016) show inclusion of female directors on Turkish corporations’ boards can 
positively impact firms’ financial performance (measured by return on assets, the 
return on equity and the return on sales). 
Table 2.8: Key Gender Diversity Studies of European Countries under Recommendation 
Title Authors 
and Date 
Journal Paper Type Before/After 
GQ 
implementation 
Sample 
And 
Period 
Key Findings 
Do Women in 
Top 
Management 
Affect Firm 
Performance? 
A Panel Study 
of 2,500 
Danish Firms 
Smith, 
Smith, and 
Verner 
(2006) 
International 
Journal of 
Productivity 
and 
Performance 
Management 
(B) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
Before 2,500 
largest 
Danish 
firms 
 
(1993-
2001) 
The authors indicated: 
The proportion of women 
in top management jobs 
tends to have positive 
effects on firm 
performance. 
Does Female 
Board 
Representation 
Influence Firm 
Performance? 
The Danish 
Evidence 
Rose 
(2007) 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
Before Listed 
Danish 
 
(1998-
2001) 
The authors indicated: 
Despite that fact that 
Denmark has gone very 
far in the liberalisation of 
women, Danish board 
rooms are still to a large 
extent dominated by men. 
Contrary to a number of 
other studies, this article 
does not find any 
significant link between 
firm performance as 
measured by Tobin’s Q 
and female board 
representation. 
Female Board 
Appointments 
and Firm 
Valuation: 
Short and 
Long-Term 
Effects 
 
Campbell 
and Vera 
(2010) 
Journal of 
Management 
& 
Governance 
 
(C) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
After Spanish 
Firms 
 
(1989-
2001) 
The authors indicated: 
The stock market reacts 
positively in the short 
term to the announcement 
of female board 
appointments, suggesting 
that investors on average 
believe that female 
directors add value. This 
belief appears to be 
confirmed by our 
regression results which 
show that female board 
appointments are 
positively associated with 
firm value over a 
sustained period. These 
results suggest that the 
legislative changes in 
Spain make economic 
sense as well as 
advancing the cause of 
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women in Spanish 
boardrooms. 
Gender and 
Management 
on Spanish 
SMEs: An 
Empirical 
Analysis 
 
Mínguez-
Vera and 
Martin 
(2011) 
The 
International 
Journal of 
Human 
Resource 
Management 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
After Spanish 
small and 
medium 
enterprises 
The authors indicated: 
Family firms and firms 
with a financial 
institution as the main 
shareholder tend to have 
more women on the 
board. Firms with less 
debt, more assets, and 
larger boards have more 
women as directors. 
The Making of 
Active Boards 
in Swedish 
Public 
Companies 
Jonnergård 
and 
Stafsudd 
(2011) 
Journal of 
Management 
& 
Governance 
(C) 
Empirical 
Study 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
After Swedish 
Firms 
(1994-
2004) 
The authors indicated: 
Female directors’ 
presence on Swedish 
boards can enhance board 
activities and 
involvement. 
Beyond the 
Glass Ceiling: 
Does Gender 
Matter? 
Adams 
and Funk 
(2012) 
Management 
Science 
 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Qualitative 
Study) 
After 288 
publicly-
traded 
firms listed 
on the 
OMX (A& 
O list) and 
the NGM  
(Nordic 
Growth 
Market) 
(2005) 
The authors indicated: 
Female directors are more 
benevolent and 
universally concerned but 
less power oriented than 
male directors. However, 
in contrast, they are less 
tradition and security 
oriented than their male 
counterparts. They are 
also more risk loving than 
male directors. Thus, 
having a woman on the 
board need not lead to 
more risk-averse decision 
making. 
Women on the 
Board and 
Managers’ 
Pay: Evidence 
from Spain 
Lucas-
Pérez, 
Mínguez-
Vera, 
Baixauli-
Soler, 
Martín-
Ugedo, 
and 
Sánchez-
Marín 
(2015) 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
After 120 
companies 
listed on 
the Spanish 
stock 
market 
 
(2004-
2009) 
The authors indicated: 
Gender diversity 
positively affects the 
effectiveness of boards—
in terms of composition, 
structure, size and 
functioning—influencing 
a proper design of top 
managers compensation 
linked to company 
performance. Evidences 
suggest that legislative 
actions aimed at 
increasing the presence of 
women on boards of 
directors are justified not 
only for ethical reasons, 
but also for reasons of 
economic efficiency. 
Gender 
Diversity and 
Firm 
Performance: 
Evidence from 
Dutch and 
Danish 
Boardrooms. 
Marinova, 
Plantenga, 
and 
Remery 
(2016) 
The 
International 
Journal of 
Human 
Resource 
Management 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
After 186 
Netherlands 
and 
Denmark. 
listed firms 
(2007) 
The authors indicated: 
There is no relation 
between board diversity 
and firm performance. 
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Does Board 
Gender 
Diversity 
Influence 
Financial 
Performance? 
Evidence from 
Spain 
Reguera-
Alvarado, 
de 
Fuentes, 
and 
Laffarga 
(2017) 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
After 125 non-
financial 
firms listed 
on the 
Madrid 
Stock 
Exchange 
 
(2005-
2009) 
The authors indicated: 
Compulsory legislation 
offers an efficient 
framework to execute the 
recommendation of 
Spanish codes of good 
governance by means of 
the increase in the 
number of women in the 
boards of firms. 
Furthermore, we find that 
the increase in the 
number of women on the 
boards is positively 
related to higher 
economic results. 
Therefore, both results 
suggest that gender 
diversity in boardrooms 
should be incremented, 
mandatory laws being a 
key factor to do so. 
 
2.5.2.2 UK 
“Women make up over half of the UK population, account for nearly half of 
the working population, outperform men educationally and are responsible for the 
majority of household purchasing decisions. Women are as successful as their male 
counterparts at university and in their early careers, but attrition rates increase 
significantly as they progress through an organisation”- Lord Davies Report (2014, 3). 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission research report (2014) argues that the 
UK business appointing process needs to be changed and the executive search firms 
needs to step forward to increase gender diversity on UK corporate boards. This 
section discusses the facts and statistics of gender diversity in UK corporations, the 
UK private and government organisations working to promote corporate gender 
diversity, and academic gender diversity research conducted on UK corporations. 
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2.5.2.2a. Facts and Statistics 
UK introduced gender diversity recommendations in 2010 under the UK 
Corporate Governance Code and went for soft target.22 The voluntary targets first 
established in 2011 (by 2015 FTSE 100 boards need to be comprised of at least 25% 
female directors). Since UK adopted the “self-regulatory” approach the female 
representation on FTSE 100 boards have risen from 10.5% in 2010 to 22.8% in 2014 
(Earnest and Young 2014). 
By end of 2014 FTSE 100 had 1,094 board positions and female comprised 
only 249 seats. As statistics of 2014 female representation on FTSE 100 boards was 
22.8% compare to 12.5% in 2011. Female board members hold mostly non-executive 
(27.9%) directorship compare to executive (8.4%) directorship. There were no all-
male boards in the FTSE 100 compare to 21 in 2011. As per the Lord Davies report 
(2014), during the first 6 months of 2014, 12 companies in the FTSE 100 had four or 
more women on their boards, and 27 companies with more than two women on their 
boards.  In contrast, 31.8% of all new appointments went to women in the last 6 months 
of 2014 decreased from 35.5% in March 2014. 
FTSE 250 had 2,008 boards’ positions by the end of 2014 and female 
comprised 349 seats. Female representation on FTSE 250 boards increased to 17.4% 
compare to 7.8% in 2011. Female board members held 22% of non-executive 
directorships and 5.1% of executive directorships. There were 28 all-male boards in 
2014 compare to 131 in 2011. 64 companies had at least 25% women’s representation 
on their boards. As per the Lord Davies report (2014), during the first 6 months of 
2014, there were 18 companies with three or more women on their boards. In contrast,   
                                                          
22 The annual report should include a description of the board’s policy on diversity, including gender, any measurable objectives 
that it has set for implementing the policy, and progress on achieving the objectives; When undertaking its formal annual 
evaluation of the board, the board should consider the balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge of the 
company on the board, as well as its diversity, including gender (p. 12) 
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24.3% of all new appointments went to women in the last 6 months of 2014 decreased 
from 33.3% in the previous 6 months. 
Female representation on UK corporate boards 27.1% and percentage of 
female chair is 3.8%. The representation of female members on significant board 
committees are: audit committee: 23.6%, governance committee: 13.4%, nomination 
committee: 19% and compensation committee: 22.5%. Industry wise women 
representation on boards are: Consumer Business (18%), Manufacturing (15%), 
Technology, Media, & Tele-communications (14%), Energy and Resources (12%), 
and Financial Services (17%).23 
2.5.2.2b. Academic Research 
Significant number of UK based gender diversity studies have focused on 
“Glass Ceiling” issues and disadvantages that female directors face to reach to the very 
top. Li and Wearing (2004) argue that when it comes to promotions and appointment 
of important sub-committee positions, female non-executive directors face more 
obstacles compare to their male counterparts. Gregory‐Smith, Main, and O'Reilly 
(2014) shed light on gender biasness of director appointment process and gender pay 
gap. Martin et al. (2008) show that UK large listed corporate boards are still male 
dominated and female directors are mostly found in smaller business and service 
sectors.   
                                                          
23 Source: : https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gx-ccg-women-in-the-boardroom-a-
global-perspective4.pdf 
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Table 2.9: UK Academic Research on Gender Diversity 
Title Authors 
and Date 
Journal and 
Ranking 
Paper Type Before/After 
GQ 
implementation 
Sample 
And Period 
Key Findings 
Women 
Directors on 
Top UK 
Boards 
Singh, 
Vinnicombe, 
and Johnson 
(2001) 
 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
(A) 
Exploratory 
Analysis 
Before UK FTSE 
100 
(1999 and 
2000) 
The authors 
indicated: In 1999, 
almost two‐thirds 
of FTSE 100 
companies had at 
least one female 
director, but 
numbers had 
dropped by July 
2000 from 64 per 
cent to 58 per cent, 
paralleling the 
levelling‐off at top 
level reported in 
North America. 
More firms having 
female directors 
are to be found 
amongst those 
with the highest 
turnover, profit 
and number of 
employees in the 
FTSE 100, again 
paralleling the 
findings from the 
US. 
Why So Few 
Women 
Directors in 
Top UK 
Boardrooms? 
Evidence and 
Theoretical 
Explanations 
Singh and 
Vinnicombe 
(2004) 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
(Qualitative 
Study) 
Before FTSE 100 
companies 
 
(2002) 
The authors 
indicated: Despite 
advances 
supported by 
several waves of 
feminism, and 30 
years of equal 
opportunities and 
equal pay 
legislation, there is 
still clearly a long 
way to go before 
women make 
substantial inroads 
into UK top 
boardrooms. The 
change is very 
slow. 
Between Glass 
Ceilings: 
Female Non-
Executive 
Directors in 
UK Quoted 
Companies 
 
Li and 
Wearing 
(2004) 
 
International 
Journal of 
Disclosure 
and 
Governance 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Qualitative 
Study) 
 
Before The sample 
is based on 
the 350 
largest UK 
quoted 
companies 
as included 
in the FTSE 
100 index 
and FTSE  
250 index 
(12th 
February, 
2001) 
The authors 
indicated: When it 
comes to gaining 
promotions and 
appoint of 
important sub-
committee 
positions, female 
non-executive 
directors face 
more obstacles 
compare to their 
male counterparts. 
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Gender and 
Ethnic 
Diversity 
Among UK 
Corporate 
Boards 
Brammer, 
Millington, 
and Pavelin 
(2007) 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
(Qualitative 
Study) 
Before 543 UK 
PLCs. 
(2002) 
The authors 
indicated: There is 
a significant cross-
sector variation in 
gender diversity, 
with an above 
average 
prevalence of 
women in Retail, 
Utilities, Media 
and Banking. The 
evidence suggests 
that board 
diversity is 
influenced by a 
firm’s external 
business 
environment and 
particularly an 
imperative to 
reflect 
corresponding 
diversity among 
its customers. 
Newly 
Appointed 
Directors in the 
Boardroom: 
How Do 
Women and 
Men Differ? 
Singh, 
Terjesen, 
and 
Vinnicombe 
(2008) 
European 
Management 
Journal 
(B) 
Empirical 
Study 
(Qualitative 
Study) 
Before FTSE 100 
firms 
(2001-
2004) 
The authors 
indicated: Women 
are significantly 
more likely to 
bring international 
diversity to their 
boards and to 
possess an MBA 
degree. 
Boards of 
Directors and 
Gender 
Diversity in 
UK Companies 
Martin, 
Smith, 
Scott, and 
Roper 
(2008) 
Gender in 
Management: 
An 
International 
Journal 
Quantitative 
analysis 
Before All UK 
companies 
The authors 
indicated: The 
data supports 
earlier partial 
studies suggesting 
male dominance 
continues at senior 
levels. Although 
female directors 
represented one in 
four directors in 
UK firms, most 
companies remain 
male dominated. 
Women directors 
are generally 
found in smaller 
firms and only one 
in 226 of larger 
firms have a 
majority of female 
directors. The 
service sector 
remains the main 
focus for female 
firms, both 
business services 
and other services. 
Corporate 
Reputation and 
Women on the 
Board 
Brammer, 
Millington, 
and Pavelin 
(2009). 
 
British 
Journal of 
Management 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
Before 199 large 
UK PLCs 
chosen 
firms 
 
The authors 
indicated: Along 
with other firm 
attributes, a 
reputational effect 
associated with a 
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female presence at 
board level. This 
effect varies 
across sectors and 
demonstrates the 
influence of a 
firm's stakeholder 
environment in 
determining 
whether a female 
presence on the 
board enhances or 
harms the 
reputation of the 
firm. The pattern 
that emerges 
indicates that the 
presence of 
women on the 
board is 
favourably viewed 
in only those 
sectors that 
operate close to 
final consumers. 
Antecedents of 
Board 
Composition: 
The Role of 
Nomination 
Committee 
(NC) 
Kaczmarek, 
Kimino, and 
Pye (2012) 
 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
After Financial 
Times and 
London 
Stock 
Exchange 
(FTSE) 350 
Index 
(1999–
2008) 
The authors 
indicated: 
Increasing 
presence on the 
nomination 
committee (NC) of 
females or non-
British nationals is 
likely to have a 
positive impact on 
the level of board 
gender and 
nationality 
diversity, 
respectively. In 
addition, the 
presence of the 
chief executive 
officer (CEO) on 
the NC is found to 
interact with the 
NC independence, 
as a result of 
which a board 
demographic 
faultiness is likely 
to emerge. 
Does the Stock 
Market Gender 
Stereotype 
Corporate 
Boards? 
Evidence from 
the Market’s 
Reaction to 
Directors’ 
Trades 
Gregory, 
Jeanes, 
Tharyan, 
and Tonks. 
(2013) 
British 
Journal of 
Management 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
After UK 
companies 
listed on the 
London 
Stock 
Exchange 
(1 January 
1994 to 30 
September 
2006) 
The authors 
indicated: In the 
longer term, 
markets recognize 
that female 
executives’ trades 
are informative 
about future 
corporate 
performance, 
although initially 
markets 
underestimate 
these effects. 
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Female 
Directors and 
UK Company 
Acquisitiveness 
 
Dowling 
and Aribi 
(2013) 
 
International 
Review of 
Financial 
Analysis 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
After FTSE 100 
(2000 to 
2011) 
The authors 
indicated: The 
presence of female 
directors is related 
to reduce levels of 
large acquisitions 
in FTSE 100 
companies. 
The Impact of 
Voluntary 
Audit and 
Governance 
Characteristics 
on Accounting 
Errors in 
Private 
Companies 
 
Clatworthy 
and Peel 
(2013) 
 
Journal of 
Accounting 
and Public 
Policy 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitative 
Study) 
After All active 
and failed 
non-
dormant 
UK private 
Independent 
companies 
on FAME 
with total 
assets 
above £500. 
(Total 
sample 
1,067,577) 
The authors 
indicated: Gender 
diversity among 
board members is 
positively 
associated with the 
accuracy of 
accounting 
information. 
Females and 
Precarious 
Board 
Positions: 
Further 
Evidence of the 
Glass Cliff 
Mulcahy 
and Linehan 
(2014) 
 
British 
Journal of 
Management 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
After Companies 
listed on the 
UK stock 
exchange 
reporting an 
initial loss 
in the years 
2004–2006 
The authors 
indicated: Women 
are more likely to 
be over-
represented on 
boards of 
companies that are 
more precarious. 
Appointments, 
Pay and 
Performance in 
UK 
Boardrooms by 
Gender 
Gregory‐
Smith, 
Main, and 
O'Reilly 
(2014) 
The 
Economic 
Journal 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
After UK listed 
Companies 
(1996-
2011) 
The authors 
indicated: 
Evidence of 
gender-bias in the 
appointment of 
women as non-
executive directors 
found together 
with mixed 
evidence of 
discrimination in 
wages or fees 
paid. 
Brammer, Millington, and Pavelin (2007) demonstrate that gender diversity 
among UK boards is influenced by external business environment, like, industry 
sectors and final consumers. Mulcahy and Linehan (2014) argue that the appointment 
of female directors in UK corporations increases during a riskier situation and big loss. 
Further, Mulcahy and Linehan (2014) claim that female directors self-select 
themselves into riskier positions to prove their capabilities and Singh, Terjesen, and 
Vinnicombe (2008) claim that female directors possess adequate human capital to hold 
board positions. Dowling and Aribi (2013) argue that female directors are less   
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overconfident in decision-making than their male counterparts and thus gender 
diversity on boards leads to more accounting information accuracy (Clatworthy and 
Peel 2013). Gregory et al. (2013) demonstrate although initially market reacts 
negatively to the appointment of senior female executives but in long-run they value 
the presence of female members among top UK corporate positions. 
2.5.2.2c. Organisations Promoting Gender Equality  
One of the key groups that have been working with the UK government side 
by side for improving gender diversity is Lord Davies and his steering group. UK 
Government asked, former banker and UK government minister for trade, Lord 
Mervyn Davies of Abersoch to lead an independent review of how to improve gender 
diversity on UK corporate boards. Since the ground-breaking review by Lord Davies 
and his team and the launch of “Women on Boards” report in 2011, the FTSE 350 
Boards have seen real progress in the corporate boards. Since, 2011 Lord Davies report 
has been issuing several recommendations along with annual progress reports to fuel 
the corporate gender diversity move of UK government. Some of the key 
recommendation are; UK businesses need to set out real targets for board gender 
diversity; meaningful public disclosures and effective strategies need to be set to 
monitor progress; transparent nominations process; the key stakeholders and investors 
need to step forward and be vocal about the gender diversity on board; adoption of 
Voluntary Code of Conduct for executive search Firms; and training and development 
of potential female directors. 
Another UK organisation, UK 30% Club has been also playing remarkable role 
to promote and enhance gender diversity among UK boards. The 30% Club’s goal is 
to reach 30% of women on FTSE-100 boards by 2015. It helped to build momentum 
by mobilizing the UK business community to support Lord Davies’ recommendations.  
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 The founder of UK 30% Club, Helena Morrissey state, “Our belief is that, as more 
women join boards without the imposition of quotas, the more they can demonstrate 
the value they can add. By the time we get to 30%, the system will be self-
perpetuating”. They have been working on to strengthen eligible female candidates’ 
pipeline through working on earlier stages of female career and education. In order to 
broaden the pipeline of women this institute has taken number of initiatives: 
developing database for promoting potential female candidates’ profiles; running 
cross-company mentoring scheme for helping the mid-career women to make the next 
step; arranging workshops for early-career women; encouraging and supporting 
existing board chairs to appoint more women on boards. 
Cranfield University School of Management also working to promote gender 
diversity among UK corporate boards24. Their primary motive is to lead the national 
debate on gender diversity on corporate boards through sharing academic research 
findings through conferences, workshops, and academic articles.  
                                                          
24 See, http://www.som.cranfield.ac.uk/som/p1087/research/research-centres/cranfield-international-centre-for-women-leaders 
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2.5.2.3 U.S. 
In the past one decade or so U.S companies have seen significant voluntary 
increase of female participation on corporate boards. Particularly, this trend of adding 
more female directors on board has escalated after the big corporate collapse (e.g. 
WorldCom, Enron) and global financial crisis of 2008. Addressing the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers investment bank, questions were raised whether things would have 
been different if Lehman Brothers had been Lehman Sisters (CED 2012). U.S 
regulators realise the importance of demographic diversity at the decision-making 
level of U.S corporations. In February 2010, under the report of the New York Stock 
Exchange Commission on Corporate Governance, SEC (Securities and Exchange 
Commission) disclosed, “Whether diversity is a consideration when directors are 
named; if so, how the diversity policy is implemented and how effectiveness is 
evaluated”.  
2.5.2.3a. Facts and Statistics 
In 2013, more than 90 percent of the S&P 500 companies had at least one 
female director and over a quarter had at least three. However, Catalyst (2017) claim 
that women representation in the top level of S&P 500 corporations is not satisfactory. 
It presented a pyramid that show women comprised 5.8% of CEO position; 36.4% 
first/mid-level officials and managers; 25.1% executives/senior level officers; and 
44.3% total employees. This clearly shows as women climb up the corporate ladder 
the percentage shrinks. Further, 10 percent of S&P companies still do not have any 
women on their boards.  There is a serious gender gap when it comes to women in 
leadership.25 Despite 45% U.S labour force comprised of women, 60% female 
graduates and 70% female consumers, female presence on U.S corporate boards is not   
                                                          
25 See, http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-sp-500-companies 
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acceptable. CED (2012) state, “United States is not a global leader in creating 
opportunities for women; it has ample room for improvement”. The common issue 
raised by U.S corporations for this failure is scarcity of eligible female candidates for 
boards. However, several research and reports showed that the real issue lies with the 
recruiting process of U.S nomination committees, corporate culture and mindset, and 
the career path roots that women need to take to reach the top level. 
Female representation on overall U.S corporate boards 12.2% and S&P 500 
18.7%. Female board chair is 3.4%. The representation of female members on 
significant board committees are: audit committee: 14.8%, governance committee: 
15.1%, nomination committee: 14.8% and compensation committee: 13.8%.
 Industry wise women representation on boards is: Consumer Business (16%), 
Life Science & Health Care (12%), Technology, Media, & Tele-communications 
(11%), Energy and Resources (11%), and Financial Services (12%).26 
2.5.2.3b. Academic Research 
U.S. is the global leader in terms of academic research on corporate gender 
diversity. The primary focus of the older gender diversity studies was on female 
corporates’   characteristics, male vs female characteristics differences, and the 
corporate barriers against female corporates. For instance, Bilimoria and Piderit 
(1994) show that female directors are mostly appointed in public affairs committees 
and men mostly hold membership of executive, finance and compensation 
committees. Further, a study conducted by Hillman, Cannella, and Harris (2002) 
demonstrate that female directors are better qualified and gain multiple board   
                                                          
26 Source: : https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gx-ccg-women-in-the-boardroom-a-
global-perspective4.pdf 
123 
 
Table 2.10: U.S. Academic Research on Gender Diversity 
Title Authors and 
Date 
Journal 
 
Paper 
Type 
Before/After 
GQ 
Implementation 
Sample 
And Period 
Key Findings 
Directors' Characteristics and 
Committee Membership: An 
Investigation of Type, 
Occupation, Tenure, and 
Gender 
Kesner 
(1988) 
 
Academy of Management Journal 
 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
Before 250 of Fortune 
500 
 
(1983) 
The authors indicated: Women are 
proportionately represented in the audit and 
compensation committees. There is significant 
gender gap among members in the nominating 
and executive committees. 
Board Composition and 
Corporate Philanthropy 
 
Wang and 
Coffey (1992) 
Journal of Business Ethics 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
Before The sample used 
in this study 
consisted of 78 
Fortune 500 firms 
from the year 
1984. 
The authors indicated: The proportion of female 
and minority board members are positively and 
significantly associated with firms' charitable 
contributions. 
Board Committee 
Membership: Effects of Sex 
Based Bias 
 
Bilimoria and 
Piderit (1994) 
Academy of Management Journal 
 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
Before 300 companies of 
the 1984 Fortune 
500 
The authors indicated: Men are preferred for 
membership in compensation, executive, and 
finance committees, and women were preferred 
for membership in public affairs committees. 
The Relationship of Board 
Member Diversity to 
Organisational Performance 
 
Siciliano 
(1996) 
 
Journal of Business Ethics 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
(Qualitative) 
Before 240 YMCA 
organisations 
(1989) 
The authors indicated: Gender  diversity  
compared  favourably  to  the  organisation's  
level  of social  performance  but  a  negative 
association  surfaced for level of funds raised. 
A Decade of Corporate 
Women: Some Progress in 
the Boardroom, None in the 
Executive Suite 
Daily, Certo, 
and Dalton 
(1999) 
Strategic Management Journal 
 (A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
Before Fortune 500 
Firms 
(1987 to 1996) 
The authors indicated: Number of female 
members   greatly increased   on corporate 
boards.  There is, however, no evidence of 
progress in, or towards, the CEO suite. 
Women and Racial 
Minorities in the Boardroom: 
How Do Directors Differ? 
Hillman, 
Cannella, and 
Harris (2002) 
 
Journal of Management 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
Before Fortune 1000 
Boards 
(1993) 
The authors indicated: Female and African-
American directors are more likely to come from 
non-business backgrounds, are more likely to 
hold advanced degrees, and join multiple boards 
at a faster rate than white male directors. 
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Women on Corporate Boards 
of Directors and Their 
Influence on Corporate 
Philanthropy 
Williams 
(2003) 
Journal of Business Ethics 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
Before 185 Fortune 500 
(1991-1994) 
The authors indicated: Higher proportion of 
women serving on their boards do engage in 
charitable giving to a greater extent than firms 
having a lower proportion of women serving on 
their boards. 
Corporate Governance, 
Board Diversity, and Firm 
Value 
Carter, 
Simkins, and 
Simpson 
(2003) 
The Financial Review 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
Before Fortune 1000 
firms 
(1997) 
The authors indicated: There is a significant 
positive relationship between the fraction of 
women or minorities on the board and firm value. 
And proportion of women and minorities on 
boards increases with firm size and board size, 
but decreases as the number of insiders increases. 
Board of Director Diversity 
and Firm Financial 
Performance 
 
Erhardt, 
Werbel, and 
Shrader 
(2003) 
Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
Before 127 large U.S. 
companies from 
various 
industries. 
(1993,1997 and 
1998) 
The authors indicated: Executive board of 
directors’ diversity (gender and ethnic) was 
positively associated with both return on 
investment and return on assets. 
Characteristics of Women 
and Men Corporate Inside 
Directors in the US 
 
Zelechowski 
and Bilimoria 
(2004) 
 
Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
Before Fortune 1000 
corporations. 
 
(1998) 
The authors indicated: Women do not differ on 
the experience-based qualifications of board 
tenure or corporate tenure, women insiders hold 
fewer directorships of other corporations, hold 
less powerful corporate titles, occupy 
disproportionately more staff functions, are less 
likely to be top earners of the corporation, and 
earn considerably less than men inside directors. 
Implications are drawn for women executives’ 
underutilisation in the executive suite and 
corporate governance. 
The Ultimate Glass Ceiling 
Revisited: The Presence of 
Women on Corporate Boards 
Arfken, 
Bellar, and 
Helms (2004) 
 
Journal of Business Ethics 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
Before Publicly traded 
companies in 
Tennessee 
(1995) 
The authors indicated: Board gender diversity is 
not satisfactory and to enhance strategic 
decisions, board membership should reflect the 
corporation's consumer population. Thus, women 
are a critical but overlooked resource. 
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Additions to Corporate 
Boards: The Effect of Gender 
Farrell and 
Hersch 
(2005) 
 
Journal of Corporate Finance 
 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
Before The Fortune 500 
and Service 500 
lists in 1990 
(1990-1999) 
The authors indicated: Women tend to serve on 
better performing firms. One possibility is that 
firms may simply be responding to outside 
pressure to create greater diversity. 
Organisational Predictors of 
Women on Corporate Boards 
Hillman, 
Shropshire, 
and Cannella 
(2007) 
Academy of Management Journal 
 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
Before 1000 publicly 
traded U.S. firms 
(1990-2003) 
The authors indicated: Organisational size, 
industry type, firm diversification strategy, and 
network effects (linkages to other boards with 
women directors) significantly impact the 
likelihood of female representation on boards of 
directors. 
Women's Roles on U.S. 
Fortune 500 Boards: Director 
Expertise and Committee 
Memberships 
Peterson and 
Philpot 
(2007) 
Journal of Business Ethics 
(A) 
 
Empirical 
Study 
Before Fortune 500 list 
of top United 
States companies 
(2002) 
The authors indicated: Female directors are less 
likely than male directors to sit on executive 
committees and more likely than male directors 
to sit on public affairs committees. 
The Diversity of Corporate 
Board Committees and 
Financial Performance 
 
Carter, 
D'Souza, 
Simkins, and 
Simpson. 
(2007) 
Available at SSRN 972763 Empirical 
Study 
Before All firms listed 
on the Fortune 
500 over the 
period 1998-2002 
yielding a panel 
of data with 
approximately 
2,000 firm years. 
The authors indicated: Board diversity has a 
positive effect on financial performance. The 
direction of causation goes from board diversity 
to firm financial performance which supports the 
economic case for board diversity. However, the 
board committee evidence indicates that the 
process through which gender and ethnic 
diversity impacts financial performance is subtle 
and complex. 
Getting to the Bottom Line: 
An Exploration of Gender 
and Earnings Quality. 
 
Krishnan and 
Parsons 
(2008) 
Journal of Business 
 
(A) 
 
Empirical 
Study 
Before 353 of the 
Fortune 500 
companies during 
the period 
(1996-2000) 
The authors indicated: Inclusion of women in 
senior management positions within a company 
is positively associated with earnings quality. 
Ineffective Corporate 
Governance: Director 
Busyness and Board 
Committee Memberships 
 
Jiraporn, 
Singh, and 
Lee (2009) 
 
Journal of Banking and Finance 
 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
Before IRRC 1500 firms 
(1999 to 2003) 
The authors indicated: Additional analysis of 
committee memberships suggests that women 
and ethnic minorities are placed on more board 
committees. 
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Women in the Boardroom 
and Their Impact on 
Governance and Performance 
Adams and 
Ferreira 
(2009) 
Journal of Financial Economics 
 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
Before 86,714 director 
level observations 
from 1,939 firms 
for the period 
1996-2003 
The authors indicated: Female directors have a 
significant impact on board inputs and firm 
outcomes.  Overall female Directors have less 
attendance problem; gender diverse boards 
provide their directors with more pay- 
performance incentives, and have more board 
meetings. 
The Gender and Ethnic 
Diversity of US Boards and 
Board Committees and Firm 
Financial Performance. 
Carter, 
D'Souza, 
Simkins, and 
Simpson. 
(2010) 
Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
After S&P 500 index 
for the five-year 
period 1998–
2002. 
The authors indicated: There is no significant 
relationship between the gender or ethnic 
diversity of the board, or important board 
committees, and financial performance. 
The Impact of Board 
Diversity and Gender 
Composition on Corporate 
Social Responsibility and 
Firm Reputation 
 
Bear, 
Rahman, and 
Post (2010) 
 
Journal of Business Ethics 
 
 (A) 
Empirical 
Study 
After Fortune 2009 
World’s Most 
Admired 
Companies List 
based on a survey 
pub-lished in 
March 2009 and 
conducted by 
Fortune at the end 
of 2008. 
The authors indicated: Women play a role in 
enhancing corporate reputation by contributing to 
the firm’s Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR). CSR ratings has a positive impact on firm 
reputation and mediate the relationship between 
the number of women on the board and corporate 
reputation. 
CFO Gender and Accruals 
Quality 
 
Barua, 
Davidson, 
Rama, and 
Thiruvadi. 
(2010) 
Accounting Horizons 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
After A total of 1,559 
(1,222) US firms 
with fiscal year-
ends in 2005 
(2004). 
The authors indicated: Companies with female 
CFOs have lower performance-matched absolute 
discretionary accruals and lower absolute accrual 
estimation errors. 
Female Executives and 
Earnings Management 
 
Peni and 
Vähämaa 
(2010) 
Managerial Finance 
 
 (B)  
Empirical 
Study 
After S&P 500 firms 
(1955 firm-year 
observations) 
The authors indicated: Female chief financial 
officers (CFOs) are associated with income-
decreasing discretionary accruals. 
Do CFOs Have Style? An 
Empirical Investigation of 
the Effect of Individual CFOs 
on Accounting Practices 
Ge, 
Matsumoto, 
and Zhang 
(2011) 
Contemporary Accounting Research 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
After 1,500 publicly 
traded U.S. firms. 
(1993-2006) 
The authors indicated: CFO gender, age, and 
educational background capture only a small 
portion of CFO styles for accounting choices. 
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Female Directors and 
Earnings Quality 
 
Srinidhi, Gul, 
and Tsui 
(2011) 
Contemporary Accounting Research 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
After All S&P listed 
U.S. Firms 
(2001-2007) 
The authors indicated: Firms with greater female 
participation on their boards exhibit higher 
earnings quality. 
Does Female Directorship on 
Independent Audit 
Committees Constrain 
Earnings Management? 
Sun, Liu, and 
Lan (2011) 
Journal of Business Ethics 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
After S&P 500 firms 
 
(2003-2005) 
The authors indicated: There is no gender effect 
with respect to independent audit committees’ 
effectiveness in constraining earnings 
management. 
Men are from Mars, Women 
are from Venus: Gender and 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Levi, Li, and 
Zhang (2011) 
Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1785812 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1785812 
Empirical 
Study 
After S&P 1500 firms 
during 1997-2009 
The authors indicated: Each ten percent 
representation of female directors on a corporate 
board is associated with a reduction in the 
number of a company’s acquisition bids by 7.5 
percent: women are less acquisitive than men. 
Does Board Gender Diversity 
Improve the Informativeness 
of Stock Prices? 
Gul, Srinidhi, 
and Ng 
(2011) 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
After 7,597 firm-years 
over 2001-2006. 
The authors indicated: Board gender diversity 
improves informativeness by increasing public 
disclosure in large firms. 
Does Female Representation 
in Top Management Improve 
Firm Performance? A Panel 
Data Investigation 
 
Dezsö and 
Ross (2012) 
Strategic Management Journal 
 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
After 15 years of data 
on a large and 
comprehensive 
sample of S&P 
1,500 U.S. 
corporations 
The authors indicated: Female representation in 
top management improves firm performance but 
only to the extent that a firm’s strategy is focused 
on innovation. 
Board Demographic 
Diversity, Independence, and 
Corporate Social 
Performance 
Zhang (2012) 
 
Corporate Governance: The 
International Journal of Business in 
Society 
(C) 
Empirical 
Study 
After Fortune 500 
companies in 
2007. 
The authors indicated: It is found that board 
gender diversity is positively related to 
institutional and technical strength ratings. 
Female Board Presence and 
the Likelihood of Financial 
Restatement 
Abbott, 
Parker, and 
Presley 
(2012) 
 
Accounting Horizons 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
After U.S. firms with 
reporting 
restatements from 
January 1, 1997, 
through June 30, 
2002. 
(278 firms per 
year after 
exclusion) 
The authors indicated: There is a significant 
association between the presence of at least one 
woman on the board and a lower likelihood of 
restatement. 
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Gender-Diverse Boards and 
Properties of Analyst 
Earnings Forecasts 
Gul, 
Hutchinson, 
and Lai 
(2013) 
Accounting Horizons 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
After 2,200 U.S. listed 
firm-year 
observations 
(2001–2007) 
The authors indicated: Board gender diversity 
adds to the transparency and accuracy of 
financial reports such that earnings expectations 
are likely to be more accurate for these firms. 
Boardroom Diversity and its 
Effect on Social 
Performance: 
Conceptualization and 
Empirical Evidence 
Hafsi and 
Turgut (2013) 
 
Journal of Business Ethics 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
After 100 companies 
listed in the S&P 
500 Index. 
(2005) 
The authors indicated: Board diversity, 
particularly gender and age have a significant 
effect on corporate social performance. 
Board Composition and 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility: An Empirical 
Investigation in the Post 
Sarbanes-Oxley Era 
Zhang, Zhu, 
and Ding 
(2013) 
Journal of Business Ethics 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
After Over 500 of the 
largest companies 
listed on the U.S. 
stock exchanges 
and spanning 64 
different 
industries 
The authors indicated: Greater presence of 
outside and women directors is linked to better 
CSR performance and enhance a firm’s moral 
legitimacy. 
Hidden Connections: The 
Link Between Board Gender 
Diversity and Corporate 
Social Performance 
 
Boulouta 
(2013) 
 
Journal of Business Ethics 
(A) 
 
Empirical 
Study 
After 126 firms drawn 
from the S&P500 
group of 
companies over a 
5-year period 
(1999–2003) 
The authors indicated: Board gender diversity 
significantly affects corporate social 
performance. 
Does Board Structure in 
Banks Really Afect their 
Performance? 
Pathan and 
Faff (2013) 
 
Journal of Banking and Finance 
 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
After Using a panel of 
212 large U.S. 
bank holding 
companies over 
the period 1997-
2004 
The authors indicated: There is a positive 
association between gender diversity and bank 
performance. 
The Double-Edged Nature of 
Board Gender Diversity: 
Diversity, Firm Performance, 
and the Power of Women 
Directors as Predictors of 
Strategic Change 
Triana, 
Miller, and 
Trzebiatowski 
(2013) 
 
Organisation Science 
 
(A*) 
 
Empirical 
Study 
After Fortune 500 firms 
 
(2002-2004) 
The authors indicated: When the board is not 
experiencing a threat as a result of low firm 
performance and women directors have greater 
power, the relationship between board gender 
diversity and amount of strategic change is the 
most positive. However, when the board is 
threatened by low firm performance and women 
directors have greater power, the relationship 
between board gender diversity and amount of 
strategic change is the most negative. Results 
suggest that diversity is double-edged because it 
can propel or impede strategic change depending 
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on firm performance and the power of women 
directors. 
CEO Gender and Firm 
Performance 
Khan and 
Vieito (2013) 
 
Journal of Economics and Business 
 
(B) 
Empirical 
Study 
After Companies listed 
on the S&P 1500 
Indexes. 
1992 - 2004 
(11315 
observations) 
The authors indicated: On average, the gender of 
the CEO matters in terms of firm performance. 
When the CEO is a female, the firm risk level is 
smaller than when the CEO is a male and boards 
are not attending to the risk aversion differences 
between male and female CEOs when they 
design the compensation packages, especially 
equity-based compensation, which can be 
understood as an incentive to female CEOs to 
take risks. 
Director Gender and Mergers 
and Acquisitions 
Levi, Li, and 
Zhang (2014) 
Journal of Corporate Finance 
 
 (A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
After S&P 1500 
companies during 
(1997–2009) 
The authors indicated: Female directors’ help 
create shareholder value through their influence 
on acquisition decisions. 
Gender Differences in 
Financial Reporting Decision 
Making: Evidence From 
Accounting Conservatism 
 
Francis, 
Hasan, Park, 
and Wu 
(2015) 
Contemporary Accounting Research 
 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
After 92 S&P 1,500 
firms who 
changed their 
CFOs from males 
to females 
between 1988 and 
2007. 
The authors indicated: Female CFOs are more 
risk averse than male CFOs, which leads female 
CFOs to adopt more conservative financial 
reporting policies. 
Gender and Ethnic Diversity 
on Boards and Corporate 
Information Environment 
Upadhyay 
and Zeng 
(2014) 
Journal of Business Research 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
After S&P 1500 firms 
(2000 -2003) 
The authors indicated: Board diversity (gender, 
ethnic, age) among U.S firms is negatively 
associated with firm opacity. 
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directorship more rapidly compare to their male colleagues and Zelechowski and 
Bilimoria (2004) show despite owning same experience-based qualification females 
hold less corporate board positions and more lower management positions.  Significant 
number of studies has been conducted on the impact of female board members on 
diverse organisational outcomes in U.S context. Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader (2003) 
positively link board gender diversity with firm’s financial performance; Carter, 
Simkins, and Simpson (2003) show women on U.S boards positively impact firm 
value; Adams and Ferreira (2009) demonstrate female members’ presence on board 
ensure better board monitoring; Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui (2011) find board gender 
diversity can improve earnings quality; Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011) demonstrate 
board gender diversity enhance stock price informativeness; Gul, Hutchinson, and Lai 
(2013) associate board gender diversity with financial report transparency  and  
accuracy;  and Upadhyay and Zeng (2014) find board diversity (gender, ethnic, age) 
among U.S firms is negatively associated with firm opacity . In contrast, studies like 
Carter et al. (2010) cannot find any association between gender diverse boards and 
firm’s financial performance and further Adams and Ferreira (2009) show negative 
association between gender diverse board and firm value. However, the number of 
studies with positive results outweighs the one with the negative outcomes. 
2.5.2.3c Organisations Promoting Gender Equality 
The U.S. organisations, both government and private, that are advocating 
gender diverse boards through sponsoring research and dialogue are, SEC, Catalyst, 
Committee for Economic Development, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, CED: 
Subcommittee on Women’s Economic Empowerment, McKinsey and ION (the Inter-
organisation Network).27 Further, representatives of business, government and non-  
                                                          
27 See, http://secsearch.sec.gov/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&affiliate=secsearch&query=gender+diversity; 
           http://www.catalyst.org/search/node/gender ;   
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profits organisations have collectively formed group, “high-level national task force”, 
to support female representation at the decision making level of U.S corporations. 
Catalyst is one of the leading U.S organisations promoting women in the 
workplace since 1977. Catalyst (2004) report find group of companies with the highest 
percentage of female representation on boards outperformed (in terms of return to 
shareholders) the group with least female representation by 34%. The 2007 report 
“The Bottom Line: Corporate performance and women’s representation on boards” 
linked higher female representation on U.S corporate boards with higher financial 
performance with. They find that in terms of ROE the companies with highest 
proportion of women on board beat those with the least by 53%; in terms of ROS the 
companies with highest proportion of women on board beat those with the least by 
42%; and in terms of ROIC the companies with highest proportion of women on board 
beat those with the least by 66%. Catalyst (2011) report demonstrate that between 
2004 and 2008 Fortune 500 companies with 25% women on board outperformed 
companies with 4% women on board by 26 percent based on the return on invested 
capital. Companies with three or more women board members outperformed 
companies with zero no female member on board by 60%. ROS (return on sales) 16% 
and 84%; and in their 2013 report they show women comprised 16.2% of audit 
committee chair, 11.9% of compensation committee chair and 19.8% of nomination 
committee chair; 1.6% of Fortune 500 had 40% or more women on board; and 18.5% 
of Fortune 500 had 25% or more women on boards. 
The Credit Suisse Research Institute (2012) report that from 2005 to 2011 U.S 
companies with women on their boards had higher average returns on equity and 
higher net income growth. Earnest and Young (2014) shed light on the fact that U.S   
                                                          
           https://www.uschamber.com/search/site/gender%20diversity; 
           https://www.ced.org 
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investors used shareholder proposals seeking greater gender and/or ethnic diversity on 
boards to prompt change in board policies and composition. Of the 26 proposals 
tracked by Earnest and Young in 2013, nearly 75% of the companies took initiative to 
alter their board recruitment criteria to enhance diversity. CED (2012) recommended 
U.S business leaders must make it a priority to advance the careers of female staffs 
who have been identified as potential leaders. Further suggestion was given for the 
U.S nominating committees to work with executive search agencies (Women 
Corporate Directors (WCD) and Governance Metrics (GMI)) to create opportunity for 
potential talented female corporate leaders. 28 
2.5.2.4 Australia 
In 2010 ASX CGC (Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council) adopted gender diversity recommendations under principle 3 of Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations.29 These recommendations were 
implemented on the ASX listed companies from 1st Jan, 2011. Since 2011 Australia 
is under the “best practice” approach for gender equality like UK and many other 
countries (e.g. Denmark, Spain, Newzealand, Japan, Hong Kong). Under the “best 
practice” or “self-regulatory” approach ASX listed companies are obliged to provide 
explanation (“if not, why not”) for not following gender equality recommendations. 
As per KPMG (2014), under the 3rd edition of ASX CGC principle and 
recommendations, diversity recommendations have been relocated from principle 3 
(ethical and responsible decision-making) to principle 1 (lay solid foundations for 
management and oversight) and it was applied from 1st July, 2014. ASX chief 
compliance Officer, Mr Kevin Lewis claim, “The changes made to the diversity   
                                                          
28 U.S corporations may ask search firms to examine established lists of potential women directors from organisations such as 
WCD who have over 1350 members serving on over 1500 board.  
29  
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recommendations in the third edition of the Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations will clarify what is meant by “measurable objective” and improve 
the quality of disclosure around female participation in leadership roles. With 
supporting changes to the ASX Listing Rules, listed entities will now have much 
greater flexibility to make their governance disclosures on their website rather than in 
their annual report, which should also encourage greater not’ reporting remains for 
those entities choosing not to adopt the recommendations.” 
Australia has recently adopted self-regulatory gender quota regulation and 
corporate gender diversity research is limited compare to U.S, UK and other European 
countries. Despite recent adaptation of gender diversity regulation, a considerable 
number of Australian private and government organisations are working for the 
success of “self-regulatory” gender quota regulation in Australian listed firms. Since 
2011 the Australian listed firms have shown enhancement in female representation on 
boards. However, the percentage of Australian female corporates as directors, sub-
committee members, CEOs, and chairs are still quite below the satisfactory level. 
 
Figure 6: Discussion Outline for Australian Corporate Gender Diversity Research and 
Statistics 
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Figure 6 demonstrates the segregation of the following discussion. The 
following sections represents: (1) The synthesis and analysis of the Australian 
academic research conducted on corporate gender diversity (pre and post 
implementation of gender diversity recommendations); (2) The synthesis and analysis 
of Australian public and private organisations’ (involved in supporting and promoting 
gender diversity at the top) work and research; and (3) The facts and statistics of 
corporate female representation in Australian firms. This section is further segregated 
in three sections, Australian female corporate leadership, Australian female corporates 
and challenges, and potential Australian corporate females. A detailed discussion of 
the above-mentioned sections will provide an in-depth understanding of the current 
corporate gender diversity scenario in Australia. 
2.5.2.4.1 Research 
This section reports on the academic and non-academic gender diversity 
research conducted in Australian context. Academic research conducted by Australian 
researchers mostly focused on the link between corporate female representation at the 
top and firm outputs (mostly firm financial performance). The research conducted by 
public and private Australian organisations on corporate gender diversity mostly 
focused on facts and statistics of corporate gender diversity and its impact. 
2.5.2.4.1a. Academic Research 
This section segregates the Australian gender diversity research as pre 
(voluntary period) and post (self-regulatory period) implementation of gender diversity 
recommendation in 2011. Australian gender diversity studies conducted during the 
voluntary period are, Bonn (2004), Nguyen and Faff (2007), and Wang and Clift 
(2009) and self-regulatory period are, Chapple and Humphrey (2014), Adams, 
Gray, and Nowland (2011) and Galbreath (2011).   
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Table 2.11: A Synthesis of Australian Board Gender Diversity Studies during Voluntary and Self-Regulatory Period 
Title Author(s) 
and Date 
Journal and Ranking Paper 
Type 
Before/After 
Implementation of 
Self-regulatory 
Gender Quota 
Sample And Period Key Findings 
Board Structure and 
Firm Performance: 
Evidence from 
Australia 
Bonn (2004)  Journal of Management and Organisation 
 
(B) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
Before The original sample 
consisted of 104 
manufacturing firms 
from the top 500 
publicly listed 
companies in 
Australia. 
(1999 and 2003) 
The authors indicated: The results show that 
outsider ratio and female director ratio are 
positively associated with firm performance, 
whereas board size and directors' age have no 
influence on firm performance (Return on asset 
and Market to book ratio). 
Effects of Board 
Structure on Firm 
Performance: A 
Comparison Between 
Japan and Australia 
 
Bonn, 
Yoshikawa, 
and Phan 
(2004) 
Asian Business and Management 
 
(C) 
 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitativ
e Study) 
Before 104 manufacturing 
firms from the top 
500 companies in 
Australia. 
(1998 and 1999) 
The authors indicated: For Australian firms’ 
outsider and female director ratio are positively 
associated with firm performance (Return on 
asset and Market to book ratio). 
Accessing Board 
Positions: A 
Comparison of 
Female and Male 
Board Members’ 
Views 
Sheridan and 
Milgate 
(2005) 
Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Qualitative 
Study) 
Before Publicly listed 
companies in                     
Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX). 
 
(2000,2001) 
The authors indicated:  Both men and women 
identify the importance of a strong track record, 
a good understanding of business principles and 
business contacts in gaining board positions, 
*Women understand the importance of high 
visibility and family contacts to account for their 
nomination to boards. It seems that women’s 
competence has to be widely acknowledged in 
the public domain or through family connections 
before boards, or their nominating committees, 
will be prepared to “risk” having a woman on 
the board. Highly influential group of men 
currently gatekeeping the    board positions. 
Impact of Board Size 
and Board Diversity 
on Firm Value: 
Australian Evidence 
Nguyen and 
Faff (2007) 
 
Corporate Ownership and Control 
 
(B) 
Empirical 
Study 
(Quantitativ
e Study) 
Before 500 largest listed 
Companies in the 
Australian Stock 
Exchange 
The authors indicated: Gender diversity 
promotes shareholders’ value as the presence of 
women directors is associated with higher firm 
value (Tobin’Q). 
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 (2000-2001) 
Is there a “Business 
Case” for Board 
Diversity? 
 
Wang and 
Clift (2009) 
 
Pacific Accounting Review 
 
(A*) 
Empirical 
Study 
(Quantitativ
e Study) 
Before Top 500 Australian 
companies 
 
(2003) 
The authors indicated: The results indicate that 
gender and racial diversity do not have 
significant influence on performance (Return on 
asset and Return on equity). It is reported that 
larger firms tend to have relatively more female 
members, and smaller firms or firms with larger 
boards may have more minority directors. 
Gender Matter in the 
Boardroom? 
Evidence from the 
Market Reaction to 
Mandatory New 
Director 
Announcements 
Adams, 
Gray, and 
Nowland 
(2011) 
 
 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?a
bstract_id=1953152 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitativ
e Study) 
After ASX listed 
Companies 
 
(2004-2006) 
The authors indicated: Gender of directors 
appears to be value-relevant. On average, 
shareholders value (cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs)) additions of female directors more than 
they value additions of male directors. Firms 
with workplace practices in place to promote 
workplace equality appear to benefit the most 
from boardroom gender diversity.  This suggests 
that appointing female directors may help 
resolve value-decreasing stakeholder conflicts. 
Are there Gender-
Related Influences 
on Corporate 
Sustainability? A 
Study of Women on 
Boards of Directors 
Galbreath 
(2011) 
 
Journal of Management and Organisation 
 
(B) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitativ
e Study) 
After ASX 200 firms 
 
(2004) 
 
The authors indicated: There is a positive link 
between women on boards and economic growth 
(Return on asset, Return on equity and Market to 
book ratio). Because of women’s relational 
abilities, women on boards are more likely able 
to engage with multiple stakeholders and 
respond to their needs, resulting in an avenue for 
demonstrating social responsiveness, which is 
confirmed by the results. Due to women’s 
backgrounds and work experiences, sex-based 
biases and stereotyping might exist in 
boardrooms with men directors discounting 
input from women directors on issues relating to 
environmental quality. The results of this study 
find that women directors are not significantly 
associated with environmental quality. 
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Does Board Gender 
Diversity have a 
Financial Impact? 
Evidence Using 
Stock Portfolio 
Performance. 
 
Chapple and 
Humphrey 
(2014)  
Journal of Business Ethics 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitativ
e Study) 
After ASX 300 
 
(January 2004 to 
September 2011) 
The authors indicated: There is a weak evidence 
of negative correlation between having multiple 
women on the board and performance (returns 
on portfolio, market portfolio, and the risk-free 
asset), but in some industries diversity is 
positively correlated with performance. 
Who Selects the 
‘Right’ Directors? 
An Examination of 
the Association 
between Board 
Selection, Gender 
Diversity and 
Outcomes 
 
Hutchinson, 
Mack, and 
Plastow 
(2014) ) 
Accounting and Finance 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
 
(Quantitativ
e Study) 
After ASX Top 500 Firms 
 
(2007 and 2011) 
The authors indicated: Board gender diversity is 
significantly and positively associated with the 
presence of a designated nomination committee 
and that female representation on the nomination 
committee is a significant explanatory factor of 
increasing board gender diversity following the 
release of the 2010 Australian Securities 
Exchange Corporate Governance Council (ASX 
CGC) recommendations. Further, our results 
support the business case for board gender 
diversity as we find greater gender diversity 
moderates excessive firm risk which in turn 
improves firms’ financial performance. 
Women on the Board 
of Directors and 
Corporate Tax 
Aggressiveness in 
Australia: An 
empirical Analysis 
Richardson, 
Taylor, and 
Lanis. (2016) 
Accounting Research Journal 
 
(B) 
Empirical 
Study 
(Quantitativ
e Study) 
After Publicly listed 
Australian firms 
The authors indicated: Relative to there being 
one female board member, high (i.e. greater than 
one member) female presence on the board of 
directors reduces the likelihood of tax 
aggressiveness. 
Women in the 
Boardroom and 
Fraud: Evidence 
from Australia 
Capezio and 
Mavisakalya
n (2016) 
Australian Journal of Management 
 
(A) 
Empirical 
Study 
(Quantitativ
e Study) 
After 128 publicly listed 
companies in 
Australia 
The authors indicated: Increase in women’s 
representation on company boards is associated 
with a decreased probability of fraud. 
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Table 2.11 reports a synthesis of board gender diversity studies conducted in 
Australian context. An investigation of sample data and period of the documented 
studies in this table demonstrates that all the Australia based board gender diversity 
studies focus on top ASX listed firms (e.g. ASX 200, ASX 300 and ASX 500) and the 
sample period is minimal (maximum 2 to 3 years). Majority of these studies focuses 
on link between board gender diversity and firm outputs, like, financial performance 
and firm value. For instance, Bonn (2004) and Bonn, Yoshikawa, and Phan (2004) 
demonstrate positive link between board gender diversity and firm financial 
performance (return on asset and market to book ratio); Nguyen and Faff (2007) show 
positive link between board gender diversity and higher firm value (Tobin’Q); Renée 
Adams, Stephen Gray, and Nowland (2011) find positive association between board 
gender diversity and shareholders value (cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)); and 
Galbreath (2011) find positive association between board gender diversity and 
economic growth (return on asset, return on equity and market to book ratio). On the 
contrary, Wang and Clift (2009) find no significant relation between female presence 
on boards and firm performance (return on asset and return on equity). Further, 
Chapple and Humphrey (2014) demonstrate weak negative relation between multiple 
women on the board and portfolio performance (returns on portfolio, market portfolio, 
and the risk-free asset). Studies conducted by Sheridan and Milgate (2005) and 
Galbreath (2011) shed light on the corporate challenges and “Glass Ceiling” aspects 
faced by female directors. Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow (2014) find a positive 
association between nomination committee existence and female presence in 
nomination committees with board gender diversity. This is the only study in 
Australian context that exclusively focused on determining factor of female 
representation on boards.  
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 In the future, Australian researchers need to consider other firm outputs (e.g. 
financial reporting quality, corporate governance quality, corporate opacity, 
information asymmetry) of board gender diversity rather than just focusing on firm 
financial performance. Further, diverse determining factors (e.g. external regulatory 
factors, industry characteristics, firm characteristics, board characteristics, corporate 
culture and environment) of overall corporate gender diversity also require significant 
academic attention. Female representation in other corporate leadership positions (e.g. 
senior executives, managers, sub-committee members, CEOs, CFOs, and chairs) and 
their impact on diverse firm outputs need to explored as well.  
2.5.2.4.1b. Non-Academic Research 
 This section reports on the public and private Australian organisations 
supporting and promoting corporate gender diversity. The entities that have already 
step forward and contributing to the gender diversity movement are, ASX, AICD 
(Australian Institute of Company Directors), ARHC (Australian Human Rights 
Commission), WGEA (Work Gender Equality Agency), MCC (Male Champions of 
Change) , KPMG , CEW (Chief Executive Women), and Ribey Institute among others. 
The following discussion provides a synthesis and analysis of the significant studies 
and reports published by these organisations. These organisations have conducted 
comparatively more research than Australian academics.  
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Table 2.12: A Synthesis of Significant Research and Reports by Public and Private Organisations 
Organisation Report/Research Paper Title Author and 
Year 
Sample Data 
and Period 
Result 
AICD 
(Australian 
Institute of 
Company 
Directors 
30% by 2018: Gender diversity progress report 
 
http://aicd.companydirectors.com.au/~/media/cd2/resources/advocacy/boa
rd-diversity/pdf/gender-diversity-quarterly-report-march16.ashx 
AICD 
 
(2015) 
 
ASX 200 
 
(2015) 
 
AICD urged all ASX 200 firms to meet at least 30% female representation on 
boards by 2018 
ASX 200: 38 Firms reached 30% women on board target. 
ASX 100: 24 Firms reached 30% women on board target. 
ASX 50: 14 Firms reached 30% women on board target. 
ASX 20: 4 Firms reached 30% women on board target. 
ARHC 
(Australian 
Human Rights 
Commission) 
 
Gender Equality Blueprint 
 
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/education/face-facts/face-facts-gender-
equality 
Elizabeth 
Broderick 
 
(2010) 
Australian 
Firms 
 
(2008-2010) 
This report sets out recommendations in five priority areas which significantly 
affect both the public and private lives of women and men: 
*Balancing paid work and family and caring responsibilities 
*Ensuring women’s lifetime economic security 
*Promoting women in leadership 
*Preventing violence against women and sexual harassment 
*Strengthening national gender equality laws, agencies and monitoring. 
CEW (Chief 
Executive 
Women) 
Level the playing field: A call for action on gender parity in Australia 
 
https://cew.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2010-CEW-Bain-
report.pdf 
 
(2010) 1,000 
Australian 
executives 
 
(2010) 
Companies can take three measures to close the gap—and create a stronger talent 
pipeline. Three main factors are blocking the path to gender balance: 
*Not enough visible, committed leadership 
*Unintended cultural barriers 
*Under investment in sustained change management. 
 What stops women from reaching the top? Confronting the tough issues 
 
https://cew.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2011-CEW-Bain-
report.pdf 
 
 
Melanie 
Sanders, Jayne 
Hrdlicka, 
Meredith 
Hellicar, Dale 
Cottrell, and 
Joanna Knox. 
 
842 Australian 
business 
professionals 
 
(2011) 
 
Management style differences between women and men are far more damaging to 
women’s leadership prospects. The key findings are: 
*Senior leaders do not value the different perspectives that women bring to a team 
*They appoint executives with styles more like themselves 
*Men are viewed as better “promoters,” women as better “collaborators” – and 
whose style is more effective is crucial to the debate 
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 (2011) *Women and men are viewed as equally effective at making commercially-sound 
decisions, managing high-pressure situations and delivering transformative 
change. 
 Creating a Positive Cycle: Critical Steps to Achieving Gender Parity in 
Australia. 
(It is time to appoint women to top roles to make a difference in 
Australian organisations) 
 
https://www.wgea.gov.au/sites/default/files/2013-bain-cew-creating-a-
positive-cycle%5B1%5D.pdf 
 
(2013) 800 Australian 
business 
professionals 
from listed and 
non-listed 
companies 
 
(2013) 
 
The results discredit the notion that achieving equal representation of women in 
executive positions is simply a matter of time. They show that the biggest factor in 
enabling women to reach their full potential is the presence of women in 
leadership positions. As Melanie Sanders, Bain partner and co-author of the 
report, puts it: “The answer is less talk and more action: appoint more women.” 
The report highlights that women have been graduating from university at higher 
rates than men since 1985, yet men have a 9-times better chance of making it to 
senior executive ranks than women in large corporations. This is despite almost 
equal levels of ambition for senior leadership positions between women and men, 
according to the study. It found that women are half as likely as men to 
recommend their organisation as a place to work. And 53% women are detractors 
of their organisations as a place where women can progress to senior levels. 
 Action Speaks Louder Than Words: CEO Conduct That Counts 
 
https://cew.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Action-speaks-louder-
than-words-CEO-conduct-that-counts.pdf 
Melanie 
Sanders, 
Jennifer Zeng, 
Meredith 
Hellicar and 
Kathryn Fagg. 
 
(2014) 
 
1500 Senior 
executives 
 
(2014) 
 
There are critical leadership behaviours that can make major differences in 
employee perceptions of the organisation in general and as a place for women to 
progress. Importantly, these leadership behaviours affect engagement levels for 
both women and men, spurring higher performance (and productivity) across the 
board. 
The critical leadership behaviours of CEOs are, 
*The CEO is effective in delivering business performance outcomes. 
*The CEO seeks and accepts diverse ideas, opinions and leadership styles. 
*The CEO talks and acts in a way that is inclusive of both men and women. 
*The CEO does not tolerate behaviour which excludes either men or women. 
 The Power of Flexibility: A Key Enabler to Boost Gender Parity and 
Employee Engagement 
 
http://www.bain.com/Images/BAIN_REPORT_The_power_of_flexibility
_Boosting_gender_parity.pdf 
Melanie 
Sanders, 
Jennifer Zeng, 
Meredith 
Hellicar and 
Kathryn Fagg 
 
(2016) 
Over 1000 
members of the 
Australian 
business, 
government and 
not-for-profit 
community. 
 
(2015) 
 
*In order to advance gender equality in the workplace, flexible work arrangements 
must be available to and actively supported for both genders. Currently less than 
50% of Australian organisations have a workplace flexibility policy and even 
when such policies exist, there are barriers to effective utilisation. 
*Bain and CEW have identified several key actions to normalise and accelerate 
the success of flexible working. Organisations must: 
*Actively encourage and role model the uptake of flexible work arrangements 
* Ensure flexible arrangements are supported and working successfully for both 
genders 
*Create the right culture and support employee priorities of career progression, 
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visible support from the CEO, leadership team and colleagues, and respect of 
boundaries 
*Create clear policies around promotion and compensation when working flexibly 
* Ensure technology and an agile work environment are in place and working 
well. 
 Advancing Women in Australia: Eliminating Bias in Feedback and 
Promotions 
 
https://cew.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/FINAL_Advancing-
Women-in-Australia_ALL-PAGES-002.pdf 
Melanie 
Sanders, 
Jennifer Zeng, 
Meredith 
Hellicar and 
Kathryn Fagg 
(2017) 
4,500 
respondents 
from the 
Australian 
business, 
government and 
not-for-profit 
communities. 
(2016) 
60 per cent of men were promoted twice or more in the past five years compared 
with only 41 per cent of women. This gap in promotion rates only increases with 
seniority. 
Narrowing the gap in promotion rates demands that our Australian organisations 
be meritocratic. 
KPMG ASX Corporate Governance Council Principles and Recommendations on 
Diversity 
 
http://www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-compliance/kpmg-report-
diversity-2014.pdf 
 
 
 
Rosheen 
Garnon, Martin 
Morrow, Jodi 
Schmerl, and 
Giri Tenneti 
 
(2014) 
 
S&P/ASX200, 
ASX201 (500 
firms by market 
capitalisation), 
and ASX501 
and over by 
market 
capitalisation. 
 
(2011-2012) 
 
*Increased adoption of the Diversity Recommendations following the second full 
year (2012) of reporting. 
*Benefits being realised by the sample firms from Diversity Recommendations 
* Entity size (measured by market capitalisation) is a key indicator for 
establishing a diversity policy. 
*Entity sector did not generally determine the likelihood or otherwise of an entity 
establishing a diversity policy. 
*Sample firms show mixed results in terms of adopting measurable objectives to 
achieve gender diversity. 
*The most common reasons for not following the Diversity Recommendations 
were that an entity was in the process of adoption or, for smaller entities, the 
entity size or stage of development made adoption impractical. 
 Bringing the Future Forward: Diversity & Inclusion Report 2016 
 
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/au/pdf/2016/diversity-
inclusion-report-2016.pdf 
 
2016  *There was a very high of compliance, with 99 percent of the top 200 companies 
establishing a diversity policy. 
*For the top 200 companies, overall, 22 percent of board members were female. 
This encompasses executive directors and NEDs. 
*The ASX 201-500 companies saw a 50 percent rise in the proportion of women 
on boards in the past two years, up from 10 percent in 2013 to 15 percent in 2015, 
while ASX 500+ companies had just 6 percent women on boards in 2015. 
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*Among the top 100 companies, the percentage of women in CEO and 
COO/deputy CEO roles has not changed in the past 5 years, while female 
representation at CFO level reduced – in both 2011 and 2016, 5 percent of CEOs 
and 10 percent of COOs were women; the proportion of CFOs fell from 8 percent 
in 2011 to 6 percent in 2016, but female representation in HR (65 percent), 
General Counsel (39 percent) and Marketing (33 percent) roles has increased. 
There was also a notable improvement in women in senior IT roles, up from 19 
percent in 2011 to 29 percent in 2016. 
“Our studies have shown that those companies which disclosed clear quantifiable 
objectives like ‘achieving 35 percent of women at a senior management level by 
2015’ demonstrated a higher level of gender diversity than those which did not set 
quantitative targets. Publicly committing to quantifiable objectives really does 
drive good diversity outcomes.” 
Across the whole spectrum, the lowest level of disclosure was in respect of the 
proportion of women at the senior executive level. 
 ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations adoption 
 
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/05/asx-corporate-
governance-council-principles-recommendations-jan-dec-2015.pdf 
 
2016  A second report by KPMG for the ASX, also released today, covered listed 
companies’ compliance with the new recommendations in the third edition of the 
ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. The report 
revealed a high level of adoption and acceptance of the new recommendations. 
The report also identified room for improvement in the reporting of the board 
skills matrix, and on exposure to economic, environmental and social 
sustainability risks. 
Ben Travers said: “Most companies outlined a wide variety of board skills and 
capabilities in their board skills matrix. We were a little surprised that 
geographical, and technology or digital experience were not identified by more 
companies, particularly in the top 200. Companies tend to describe the current 
skills the board has, but few identify the gaps in the collective board skills or 
address what may be needed in the future, which is the purpose of the 
recommendation. 
“We would encourage companies to improve their disclosure on the diversity 
component of boards. A mix of skills, expertise, background, age, ethnicity and 
gender is important to enhancing decision-making capabilities, lessening the risk 
of group-think and to ensure stronger connection with customers, employees and 
other stakeholders.” 
On sustainability risks, Ben Travers added: “The report showed there was 
potential for improvement in reporting, especially outside the top 200. Firstly, 
there seems to be significant differences across the ASX companies on what 
constitutes a material sustainability risk. And secondly, a number of companies 
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provide little or no information to support the way in which they determined 
whether they had any material risks.” 
MCC (Male 
Champions of 
Change) 
 
Advancement of women in Leadership: 
Listening, Learning, Leading 
 
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/document/publication/
2013_AHRC_MCC_accelerating_advancement_women.pdf 
MCC Members 
 
(2013) 
 
Australian 
Listed Firms 
(Post 2011) 
 
Four themes for leaders wanting to attract and advance more women and 
capitalise on the advantages of a gender-balanced organisation. These themes are: 
1) stepping up as leaders; 2) creating accountability; 3) disrupting the status quo; 
and 4) dismantling barriers for carers. 
Ribey 
Institute 
 
ASX 500-Women Leaders 
 
http://www.reibeyinstitute.org.au/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/ASX500_Women-Leaders-2011.pdf 
Ribey Institute 
 
ASX 500 
 
(2011) 
* Larger firms have more women on boards. 
*Firms with women on boards have significantly high return on equity than firms 
without women on boards. 
WGEA 
(Workplace 
Gender 
Equality 
Agency) 
Determinants of Women in Leadership in Australia 
 
https://www.wgea.gov.au/sites/default/files/2015-
Determinants%20of%20Women%20in%20Leadership%20in%20Australi
a%20AOM2015_Final.pdf 
 
 
Sabina Nielsen 
and Bo B. 
Nielsen 
 
(2015) 
 
ASX500 (2012) 
and ASX200 
 
(2003-2012) 
 
*Service industries and firms with high levels of intellectual capital show higher 
gender diversity in their executive teams and boards. Australian firms strive to 
reflect the gender composition of their employee and customer base and values 
intangible assets and creativity offered by women. 
*Firms exposed to larger external pressures. Larger firms, and firms competing in 
highly internationalized industries are more likely to have women on their 
corporate boards. ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
introduced in 2010 had a significant impact on the gender composition of 
Australian boards. 
*External pressures (both domestic and international) appear to have a positive 
impact on the proportion of women on boards, this is not the case in the executive 
suite. Neither firm size nor industry internationalization seems to affect the 
number of women on executive teams. 
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Besides conducting research and surveys on Australian corporate gender 
diversity and female leaderships, the public and private organisations have also 
adopted diverse tools and strategies to support and promote more female 
representation in Australian corporations. ASX (2010) claim, the reason behind 
implementing diversity recommendations is to enhance the positive impact of board 
gender diversity on firm performance (Chapple and Humphrey 2014). Further, in 2010 
ARHC (Australian Human Rights Commission) declare that Australia might adopt 
mandatory quota system by 2015 if the self-regulatory approach cannot achieve the 
targeted goal. Ribey Institute (2011) demonstrate that companies with women 
directors deliver significantly higher return on equity (ROE) (6.7 per cent higher over 
a three-year period and 8.7 per cent higher over a five-year period) than 
those companies without any women on their boards.30 In 2013, MCC (Male 
Champions of change) develop a simple management model “The Leadership 
Shadow” to accelerate the advancement of women in leadership. Further, WGEA 
(Work Gender Equality Agency) develop a target-setting tool to support the Australian 
employers set voluntary targets within their organisation and improve their gender 
equality and CEW (Chief executive Women) offers scholarship for empowering 
women, women leadership program and free gender diversity kit for organisations to 
attract and retain talented women. AICD launched diverse programs (e.g. Chairmen’s 
Mentoring Program, Board Diversity Scholarship Programs, Victorian Women’s 
Governance Scholarship Program, Public Sector Mentoring Program, Board Ready 
Program) to achieve better gender diversity. 
  
                                                          
30 6.7 per cent higher over a three-year period and 8.7 per cent higher over a five-year period. 
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2.5.2.4.2 Facts and Statistics 
Since the introduction and implementation of the diversity recommendations 
noticeable change has been taken place in female representation on ASX listed 
corporate boards. In 2010, Australian government targeted to achieve 40% female 
representation on government boards by 2015 and they exceeded the targeted 
percentage of female representation in 2013.31 Australian Government is committed 
to fill up the business leadership positions with capable, qualified and talented female 
leaders. For instance, government has established partnership with AICD and 
Australian Mines and Metals Association to support the gender diversity movement.32 
As per AICD (2015), ASX 200 firms have seen considerable changes: female directors 
representation on boards in 2010 (8.3%) more than doubled in 2015 (20%); firms 
without any female directors has more than halved from 87 boards (in June 2010) to 
34 boards; new female director appointment date increased from 5 per cent in 2009 to 
30 per cent in 2014; in 2015 women made up to 25% of new appointments to the 
boards; and female chairs doubled  from 2.5% (2010) to 6% (2012). 
As per the current statistics of 2016 by AICD, ASX 200 firms have 23.4% of 
female directors, females account for 40.0% of new appointments, 10.0% of ASX 200 
companies do not have a woman on their board. WEGA (2016a) published a report on 
female representation at diverse corporate levels: Females’ workforce participation 
rate is 59.3%, they comprise 46.2% of all employees in Australia, 27.4% of key 
management personnel, 23.6% of directorships, 15.4% of CEOs, and 14.2% female 
chairs.  
                                                          
31 A report by the Australian government (2013-2014) showed that the women representation on Australian government boards 
reached 41.7%. 
32 The Government is partnering with the Australian Institute of Company Directors to deliver the Board Diversity Scholarship 
programme. The programme has been significantly expanded; contributing $650,000 over two years to deliver 140 
scholarships to targeted groups of women. 
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  The following sections further shed light on the latest facts and statistics of 
Australian corporate gender diversity. Section 2.5.2.4.2a represents the latest statistics 
of female representation at the top corporate positions, section 2.5.2.3.2b reports on 
the “Glass Ceiling” issues and other corporate challenges faced by prospective female 
corporate members, and 2.5.2.3.2c shed light on the quality of prospective corporate 
female members.  
2.5.2.4.2a. Australian Corporate Female Representation at the Top  
This section sheds light on the representation of corporate female members at 
the top management (e.g. chairperson, chief executive officer, director, and key 
management personnel) of Australian corporations. Proponents of corporate gender 
diversity claim that females have the essential traits to be effective corporate leaders. 
For instance, they are cautious (Gold, Hunton, and Gomaa 2009, Powell and Ansic 
1997); strong monitors (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009, Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui 
2008); have lower tolerance to opportunism (Krishnan and Parsons 2008, Thorne, 
Massey, and Magnan 2003, Ambrose and Schminke 1999, Bernardi and Arnold Sr 
1997, Schminke and Ambrose 1997); strong ethical values (Bilic and Sustic 2011, 
Bernardi and Arnold Sr 1997, Lampe 1996, Sweeney 1995, Shaub 1995); and have 
strong network (Singh and Vinnicombe 2004). Further, in the past two decades 
corporate females have gathered sufficient business knowledge to secure top positions 
in corporations (Peterson and Philpot 2007). Despite possessing essential leadership 
traits, skills, and experience the female representation at the decision-making level of 
Australian corporations is not satisfactory. The following discussion shed light on the 
current state (after the implementation of self-regulatory gender quota in 2011) of top 
Australian corporate females.   
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Table 2.13 represents the male and female percentage of top corporate 
members (e.g. chairperson, chief executive officer, director, and key management 
personnel) between 2013 and 2015. Overall Australian female representation at the 
top enhanced after the implementation of self-regulatory gender quota regulation, 
however does the ratio of top corporate females compare to their male peers are still 
satisfactory? Both 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 data demonstrate female representation 
gradually declines with the hierarchy of position. For instance, between 2013 and 2014 
females held 26.1% key management personnel position, 23.7% board membership, 
15.7% CEO position and 12% chair. 
Table 2.13:  Female Representation at the Top (2013-2015)  
Year 2013-2014 2014-2015 
 M (%) F (%) M (%) F (%) 
Key Management Personnel 73.9 26.1 72.6 27.4 
Director 76.3 23.7 76.4 23.6 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 82.7 15.7 84.6 15.4 
Chairperson 88.0 12.0 85.8 14.2 
Source:http://search.abs.gov.au/s/search.html?query=gender&collection=abs&form=simple&profile=_default 
 
Similar pattern can be observed between 2014 and 2015, female key 
management personnel 27.4%, director 23.6%, CEO 15.4%, and chairperson 14.2%). 
Even after the external regulatory pressure female corporates are struggling to secure 
significant percentage of these respective positions. The top corporate positions in all 
industries are still dominated by male corporate members. Between 2014 and 2015 
female key management personnel (27.4%) were approximately one third of their male 
peers (72.6%); female directors (23.6%) were approximately one third of their male 
peers (72.6%); female CEOs (15.4%) were approximately one sixth of their male peers 
(84.6%); and female chair persons (14.2%) were one sixth of their male peers (85.8%).  
Industry characteristic, in particular level of gender dominance in industries, 
is a significant determining factor of the representation of female corporates at the top.   
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“Occupational gender segregation has remained persistent over the last 20 years” 
(WEGA 2006a). WEGA (2016a) reports on the industry segregation in terms of gender 
dominance and document female employment rate as corporate leaders between 2013 
and 2015. In terms of gender dominance industries can be segregated into three 
segments, male dominated (40% or less women), mixed (e.g. 41% to 59% women), 
and female dominated (e.g. 60% or more women) industries. Over the last 20 years 
these industries demonstrated mixed results in terms of female representation. Half of 
the male dominated industries (e.g. Electricity, Gas, Water and Waste Services, and 
Transport, Postal and Warehousing) have seen enhancement in female employment 
rate while others (e.g. Construction and Wholesale Trade) have seen decline. The 
mixed industries (e.g. Public Administration and Safety, Rental, Hiring and Real 
Estate Services, and Information Media and Telecommunications) gradually become 
more balanced in terms of gender diversity.   
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Table 2.14: Female Representation at the Top by Industry (2013-2015) 
Positions Key Management Personnel Directors CEO Chair Person 
Year 2013-2014 2014-2015 2013-2014 2014-2015 2013-2014 2014-2015 2013-2014 2014-2015 
Male/Female (%) M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Accommodation & Food Services  70.0 30.0 71.1 28.9 87.7 12.3 83.5 16.5 85.9 14.1 91.1 8.9 93.0 7.0 87.7 12.3 
Administrative & Support Services  68.7 31.3 64.2 35.8 80.9 19.1 76.2 23.8 79.1 20.9 76.5 23.5 95.1 4.9 83.9 16.1 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing  84.9 15.1 85.1 14.9 94.5 5.5 91.7 8.3 97.5 2.5 97.7 2.3 100.0 — 95.9 4.1 
Arts & Recreation Services  77.5 22.5 72.5 27.5 76.7 23.3 77.1 22.9 95.1 4.9 94.1 5.9 90.7 9.3 84.3 15.7 
Construction  86.4 13.6 87.7 12.3 91.4 8.6 85.5 14.5 96.4 3.6 97.3 2.7 96.8 3.2 69.9 30.1 
Education & Training  58.6 41.4 57.9 42.1 64.3 35.7 64.0 36.0 64.2 35.8 65.8 34.2 74.9 25.1 73.4 26.6 
Electricity, Gas, Water & Waste Services 83.8 16.2 82.1 17.9 87.2 12.8 81.4 18.6 100.0 — 96.0 4.0 94.0 6.0 83.1 16.9 
Financial & Insurance Services 75.8 24.2 75.9 24.1 80.6 19.4 80.5 19.5 95.6 4.4 93.5 6.5 89.8 10.2 90.3 9.7 
Health Care & Social Assistance 50.4 49.6 48.2 51.8 65.8 34.2 64.8 35.2 63.5 36.5 64.9 35.1 81.3 18.8 79.9 20.1 
Information Media & Telecommunications 75.4 24.6 75.6 24.4 82.7 17.3 80.4 19.6 90.8 9.2 92.6 7.4 86.6 13.4 90.0 10.0 
Manufacturing 84.2 15.8 83.3 16.7 87.8 12.2 86.7 13.3 95.1 4.9 95.0 5.0 97.0 3.0 96.0 4.0 
Mining 87.8 12.2 87.7 12.3 90.3 9.7 88.4 11.6 97.3 2.7 97.4 2.6 95.9 4.1 95.7 4.3 
Other Services 67.7 32.3 67.0 33.0 69.5 30.5 68.5 31.5 79.6 20.4 77.2 22.8 76.6 23.4 76.8 23.2 
Professional, Scientific & Technical Services 78.6 21.4 78.5 21.5 83.4 16.6 85.2 14.8 90.3 9.7 90.1 9.9 93.1 6.9 93.0 7.0 
Public Administration & Safety 77.7 22.3 78.7 21.3 87.5 12.5 88.0 12.0 88.9 11.1 96.0 4.0 100.0 — 100.0 — 
Rental, Hiring & Real Estate Services 84.2 15.8 82.4 17.6 84.9 15.1 83.7 16.3 98.5 1.5 97.3 2.7 93.2 6.8 96.6 3.4 
Retail Trade 74.7 25.3 74.0 26.0 82.0 18.0 82.3 17.7 85.3 14.7 88.0 12.0 90.9 9.1 90.1 9.9 
Transport, Postal & Warehousing 82.5 17.5 79.7 20.3 88.0 12.0 86.9 13.1 93.3 6.7 92.9 7.1 91.8 8.2 91.6 8.4 
Wholesale Trade 82.0 18.0 78.0 22.0 87.4 12.6 84.1 15.9 94.4 5.6 96.2 3.8 95.2 4.8 91.3 8.7 
All Industries 73.9 26.1 72.6 27.4 76.3 23.7 76.4 23.6 82.7 17.3 84.6 15.4 88.0 12.0 85.8 14.2 
Source:http://search.abs.gov.au/s/search.html?query=gender&collection=abs&form=simple&profile=_default
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Table 2.14 represents industry-wise segregation of male vs female corporate 
leadership between 2013 and 2015. The most current (2014-2015) average corporate 
female leaders’ statistics of all industries are, female key management personnel 
27.4%, female director 23.6%, female CEO 15.4% and female chair 14.2%. This 
depicts the link between corporate hierarchy and female representation is negative. 
Service related industries (e.g.  Accommodation & Food Services, Administrative & 
Support Services, Health Care & Social Assistance, and Other Services) have more 
than 30% female key management personnel. Health Care & Social Assistance 
industry take the lead with approximately 50% female key management personnel 
representation between 2013 and 2015. In contrast, male dominated industries (e.g. 
Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, and Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing) have less 
than 16% representation of female key management personnel.  Health Care & Social 
Assistance, Education & Training, and other services have more than 30% female 
directors’ representation on boards. On a positive note several males dominated and 
mixed industries show gradual increase in percentage of female directors between 
2013 and 2015. For instance, Accommodation & Food Services (12.3% to 16.5%); 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing (5.5% to 8.3%); construction (8.6% to 14.5%); and 
Mining (9.7% to11.6%). Health Care & Social Assistance and Education & Training 
industries have the highest (more than 35% between 2013 and 2015) representation of 
female CEOs, followed by Administrative & Support Services (23.5%) and other 
services (22.8%). Some of the industries with the lowest (less than 5%) female CEO 
representation are Manufacturing, Mining, Construction, and Agriculture, Forestry & 
Fishing. Education & Training and other services industries are the leaders (20%-25%) 
of in female chair representation.  
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The above statistics of top corporate leadership positions demonstrate that 
female representation as corporate leaders vary significantly in terms of industry 
gender dominance. As expected, percentage of female key management personnel, 
directors, CEOs and chairs are considerable in female dominated and mixed industries, 
and negligible in male dominated industries. In the last 20 years overall percentage of 
female managers increased from 30.1% to 37.1%. However, on average male 
corporates still hold majority of the leadership positions in all the industries. Between 
2014 and 2015 average representation of male vs female corporate leaders for all 
industries are, key management personnel (male: 72.6% and female: 27.4%); director 
(male: 76.4% and female: 23.6%); CEO (male: 84.6% and female: 15.4%); and Chair 
(male: 85.8% and female: 14.2%). It shows that male dominance increases with the 
hierarchy of the corporate leadership positions for all industries.  
WEGA (2016d) conducted a comparison between ASX 200 and non ASX 200 
firms based on certain criteria (e.g. workforce composition, gender pay gap and 
employer action on pay equity, gender equality policies, and strategies, workplace 
flexibility, and support for caring and parental leave) for the reporting period of 2014-
2015. The percentage of ASX 200 firms’ female directors (19.5%) and managers 
(23.9%) are less than the percentage of non ASX 200 firms’ female directors (35.3%) 
and managers (37%). This implies, despite being top 200 Australian firms “Glass 
Ceiling” issues are quite evident among ASX 200 firms and females are facing less 
challenges in non ASX 200 firms.  
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Figure 7:  Corporate Hierarchy and Female Representation among ASX 200 (2014-2015)33 
 
Strategies and policies regarding gender equality and workplace flexibility are quite 
strong among top ASX 200 firms. Despite that as the female corporate members climb 
the corporate ladder their chances of securing top positions become thinner. Female 
employees occupy approximately half of the employee base of top ASX 200 firms, 
however at the top it’s a different scenario. The pyramid in Figure 5 reflects the 
declining trend of female participation with the hierarchy of positions among ASX 
200 firms between 2014 and 2015.  
WEGA (2016c) reports a comparison of female corporate representation 
among the OECD (The organisation for economic co-operation and development) 
countries.34 As per this report overall corporate female representation in Australia is 
70.5% which is higher than the average female participation (67.2%) of all OECD 
countries. Iceland (under mandatory gender quota since 2008) is the leader in overall   
                                                          
33 KMP: Key management personnel; GM: General Manager; SM: Senior manager.  
34 The OECD members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israël, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and 
United States. 
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female representation (84.2%). On a positive note, Australia has the highest 
representation of female managers (8.9%) among all the other OECD countries. 
In conclusion, representation of female employees and managers among 
Australian firms are quite promising. However, surprisingly female representation in 
top positions among ASX 200 firms is still not satisfactory and requires a generous 
effort to improve the situation. Further, male dominated industries need to adopt more 
female friendly corporate culture to enhance distressingly poor female representation 
at the top. In Australia women constitute almost half the labour force and significant 
portion of employee base. Hence, we need more female board members, subcommittee 
members, CEOs and chairs to reflect the gender balance within the employee base.  
2.5.2.4.2b. Corporate Females in Australia and Challenges  
 
This section focuses on the “Glass Ceiling” issues (e.g. gender pay gap, male 
dominated corporate culture, lack of opportunities) and other obstacles (e.g. domestic 
responsibilities) constraining prospective Australian corporate females from climbing 
the corporate ladder. Numerous studies (Nekhili and Gatfaoui 2013, Haslam et al. 
2010, Adams, Gupta, and Leeth 2009, Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009, Broadridge 
and Hearn 2008, Ryan and Haslam 2007, 2005, Marshall 1995) conducted on the 
“Glass Ceiling” phenomenon accuse the male dominated corporate culture, “Old boys’ 
network”, gender stereotype perspective, lack of corporate support for women, gender 
pay gap and overall gender discrimination (Sealy and Vinnicombe 2013, Sealy, Singh, 
and Vinnicombe 2007) for poor representation of female corporates at the top. Based 
on the sample of UK firms, Martin, Smith, Scott and Roper (2008) demonstrate female 
directors are scares in the large UK firms due to male dominated corporate 
environment of UK firms. The following discussion shed light on some of the common 
barriers (e.g. gender pay gap, lack of opportunity, domestic responsibilities)   
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restraining Australian female corporate members from securing top corporate 
positions. 
Table 2.15 reports the underutilization of female labours compare to their male 
peers and the starting salary of male vs female bachelor degree graduates. In the past 
one-decade (2005- 2015) females have been consistently underutilized compare to 
their male peers in the Australian labour force. For instance, in 2005 female labours 
(12.3%) were underutilized 4% more compare to male labours (8.3%). After 10 years 
in 2015 the scenario remains the same, female labours (14.7%) are underutilized 4% 
more compare to male labours (10.7%). 
Table 2.15: “Glass Ceiling” Factors and Prospective Australian Female Corporates 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
% M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Labour 
Force 
Under
utilisat
ion 
Rate 
8.
3 
1
2.
3 
7.
7 
1
1.
6 
7.
0 
1
1.
1 
8.
6 
1
2.
2 
9.
7 
1
3.
2 
8.
8 
1
2.
7 
9.
1 
1
3.
1 
9.
4 
1
3.
3 
1
0.
2 
1
4.
2 
1
1.
0 
1
5.
0 
1
0.
7 
1
4.
7 
Media
n 
Startin
g 
Salary 
– 
Bachel
or 
Degree 
Gradu
ates 
5
1.
4 
5
0.
1 
5
2.
3 
4
9.
8 
5
4.
4 
5
0.
8 
5
5.
0 
5
2.
6 
5
6.
7 
5
3.
3 
5
5.
4 
5
3.
2 
5
5.
9 
5
3.
7 
5
7.
8 
5
2.
5 
5
6.
5 
5
3.
0 
5
5.
0 
5
2.
0 
5
5.
0 
5
3.
0 
Source:http://search.abs.gov.au/s/search.html?query=gender&collection=abs&form=simple&profile=_d
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This shows that females face discrimination and lack of opportunity from the 
very initial stage of their professional career which prohibits them from gathering 
necessary experience and skills to break the “Glass Ceiling”. 
 Gender pay gap is one of the key demotivating factors constraining corporate 
females from succeeding as top corporate leaders. The above table summarizes the 
male Vs female starting salary of bachelor degree graduates in the last one decade   
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(2005-2015). Rationally the starting salary of equally qualified professionals should 
be same; however, the above table shows female graduates consistently being paid 
less compare to their male peers. Even after the implementation of gender diversity 
regulation in 2011 female corporate members starting salary emain 2% to 5% (e.g. 
2012: male (57.8%) Vs female (52.5%) and 2015: male (55%) Vs female (53%)) less 
compare to the male corporate members. 
 For centuries women are predominantly perceived as homemakers rather than 
prospective corporate professionals. This perception still persists and has not changed 
noticeably at present. Despite equally contributing to the household earnings 
professional women still contribute more time in domestic responsibilities, 
particularly in parenting. 
Table 2.16: Domestic Responsibilities 
Year 1997 2006 
 M (%) F (%) M (%) F (%) 
Total hours and minutes per day spent 
by parents taking care of children 
3:55 7:56 3:55 8:33 
Employed 3:45 7:08 3:47 7:55 
  Employed full-time 3:43 5:50 3:43 6:39 
  Employed part-time 4:17 8:00 4:44 8:34 
Unemployed 6:16 7:29 7:32 10:22 
Not in labour force 3:37 9:18 4:23 9:29 
Source:http://search.abs.gov.au/s/search.html?query=gender&collection=abs&form=simple&profile=
_default 
 
This in turn passively affects women’s professional careers by constraining 
them from acquiring necessary skills and experience to build a stronger career path. 
Table 2.16 represents total hours and minutes per day spent by parents taking care of 
children. Both in 1997 (Male: 3.55 and Female: 7.56) and 2006 (Male: 3.55 and 
Female: 8.33) men spend half the time of women in parenting task. The scenario 
remains the same even when both of the parents are employed, for instance, in 1997 
an employed female spends 7.08 hours in parenting compare to only 3.45 hours by an   
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employed male and in 2006 an employed female spends 7.55 hours in parenting 
compare to only 3.47 hours spend by an employed male. 
Some of the key factors imposing barriers for the potential corporate females 
are gender pay gap and work place discrimination (e.g. lack of opportunity to 
participate in skill building and experience enhancing trainings, poor evaluation, and 
biased promotions). According to WEGA (2016e) gender pay gap between male and 
female in Australia persists due to industrial and occupational discrimination, lack of 
women in senior positions, women’s riskier attachment to the workforce, differences 
in work experience, and both direct and indirect discrimination. 
WEGA (2016c) claim, gender pay gap persists among all OECD countries 
between 2013 and 2014. Some of the lowest (below 10%) gender pay gap countries 
are, Denmark; Norway; Belgium; New Zealand; and Hungary. In 2014 Australia was 
ranked 16th with a gender pay gap of 18% and in 2015 national gender pay gap was 
17.3%. Non-public sector firms have higher gender pay gap (24%) compare to public 
sector firms. The national gender pay gap is currently 16.2%1 and has drifted between 
15% and 19% for the past two decades. The key reasons for gender pay gap are average 
remuneration in female-dominated organisations is lower than in male-dominated 
organisations and female employees are paid less than male employees across all 
industries. Rationally women participation in labour force and their board 
participation rate is positively linked. For instance, Iceland has the highest female 
representation in labour force and highest participation rate on the board. Although 
Australia has 70.5% overall female representation rate in Australian corporations, 
female directors’ representation rate on boards is only 12.3%. “Women account for 
only one in five board members in Australia (19%). However, WGEA results show   
158 
 
that women hold nearly one in four (23.6%) board positions in non-public sector 
organisations with 100 or more employees” (WEGA 2016c, 6). 
“Glass Ceiling” issues are quite evident among ASX 200 firms as well. 
“Gender pay gap is greater for the ASX 200, but these companies are more likely to 
analyse and take action to address their gender pay gaps” (WEGA 2016d, 20). 
Approximately 60.8% of firms conducted gender pay gap analysis and 68.8% have 
acted. The largest gender pay gap persists for total remuneration for managers, where 
male managers on average earn 30.3% more than female managers. One of the key 
reasons is “The three highest proportions of ASX 200 organisations are in the male-
dominated industries Manufacturing and Mining, and the gender-balanced industry 
Financial and Insurance Services” (WEGA 2016d, 6). Despite being top 200 listed 
firms in Australia and getting significant regulatory attention the ASX 200 firms still 
have very few female members at the top (WEGA 2016d). This indicates majority of 
the ASX200 firms with female members on their boards have token female directors. 
Further, in ASX 200 firms’ women occupy approximately 50% of non-manager 
positions but only 35.3% of managerial positions (WEGA 2016e).  
2.5.2.4.2c. Australian Professional Females and Qualification  
 
 This section reports the qualification and skills of Australian female talent pool 
and analyses their eligibility to secure top corporate positions. The common argument 
against female representation at the top corporate positions is their lack of necessary 
business skills, experience and knowledge. On the contrary, proponents claim female 
director’s presence offer better educational qualification (Singh, Terjesen, and 
Vinnicombe 2008, Peterson and Philpot 2007, Hillman, Cannella, and Harris 2002), 
strong network and diverse international profiles to the board (Terjesen, Singh, and 
Vinnicombe 2008).  For instance, Lord Davies Report (2014, 3) claim, “Women make   
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up over half of the UK population, account for nearly half of the working population, 
outperform men educationally and are responsible for the majority of household 
purchasing decisions. Women are as successful as their male counterparts at university 
and in their early careers, but attrition rates increase significantly as they progress 
through an organisation”. The following discussion attempts to explore educational 
qualification, skills and experience of prospective Australian female professionals. 
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Table 2.17: Male Vs Female Educational Qualification 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
M/F (%) M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Education 
Participation 
56.2 58.1 56.1 57.5 56.5 57.9 59.7 58.1 57.8 58.3 58.1 59.6 58.4 60.3 59.7 61.9 58.7 60.9 59.2 62.6 60.3 64.0 
Year12 / 
Certificate II 
78.3 84.1 78.1 85.9 81.1 86.1 81.3 87.3 81.4 87.7 82.4 88.9 81.6 86.7 84.1 87.8 84.3 89.2 82.6 89.4 86.3 90.1 
Certificate II 
or above 
35.8 43.3 35.6 42.3 39.1 43.6 38.9 45.7 36.5 45.0 38.9 46.1 39.6 44.7 43.8 44.9 42.2 49.4 39.0 46.2 44.7 49.3 
Certificate III 
or above 
55.1 56.4 56.1 55.3 57.9 60.2 59.1 61.0 60.6 65.2 62.1 63.2 59.8 67.2 65.4 66.5 62.6 68.9 63.6 65.9 65.8 66.3 
Bachelor 
Degree 
26.5 33.0 26.0 32.7 27.7 35.7 28.5 36.0 30.3 40.5 29.9 38.1 29.8 41.0 31.8 39.2 28.4 41.0 30.5 41.5 30.4 39.6 
Attainment 
of Non-
School 
Qualification 
54.2 48.9 54.5 50.4 54.5 50.6 55.3 52.6 56.4 53.6 56.9 54.6 57.4 55.7 59.6 58.0 57.1 57.3 59.2 58.0 60.9 60.0 
Source:http://search.abs.gov.au/s/search.html?query=gender&collection=abs&form=simple&profile=_default 
 
161 
 
Table 2.17 summarizes the educational attainment of male vs female in the 
past one decade. Australian females consistently outperformed males in educational 
qualification between 2005 and 2015. In 2005, 84.1% females achieved Year12 / 
Certificate II compare to 78.3% males; 43.3% females achieved Certificate II or above 
compare to 35.8% males; 56.4% females achieved Certificate III or above compare to 
55.1% males; and 33% females achieved Bachelor Degree compare to 26.5% males. 
After one decade in 2015 overall educational attainment rate of both genders 
increased however scenario remained the same. For instance, 90.1% females achieved 
Year12 / Certificate II compare to 86.3% males; 49.3% females achieved Certificate 
II or above compare to 44.7% males; 66.3% females achieved Certificate III or above 
compare to 65.8% males; and 39.6% females achieved Bachelor Degree compare to 
30.4% males. In 2005 males outperformed females in non-school qualification (males: 
54.2% and females: 48.9%), however in 2015 female achieved approximately similar 
non-school qualification (males: 60.9% and females: 60%) as males.  
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Table 2.18: Male Vs Female Competency 
Year 2011-2012 
 M (%) F (%) 
Literacy 43.20 43.90 
Numeracy competency 49.00 59.20 
Problem solving 68.90 69.70 
Source:http://search.abs.gov.au/s/search.html?query=gender&collection=abs&form=simple&profile=
_default 
 Table 2.18 presents a glimpse of women competency level in terms of literacy, 
numeracy and problem-solving capability. In 2012 males (43.2%) and females 
(43.9%) acquired approximately similar level of literacy skills; females (59.2%) 
significantly outperformed males (49%) in numeracy skills; and in problem solving 
skill females (69.7%) excelled compare to males (68.9%). This shows Australian 
females have the much-required competency skills to be successful corporate leaders 
and secure top corporate positions. 
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Table 2.19: Australian Employed Females 
Panel A: Employment Rate by Industry 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
(%) M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Agriculture, 
forestry & fishing 
- - 68.3 31.7 69.2 30.8 68.4 31.6 68.2 31.8 67.6 32.4 69.1 30.9 68.9 31.2 71.5 28.5 67.9 32.2 69.1 30.9 
Mining - - 86.7 13.3 85.5 14.5 85.1 14.9 85.9 14.1 84.6 15.4 84.4 15.6 85.2 14.8 85.2 14.8 85.6 14.4 85.2 14.8 
Manufacturing - - 74.3 25.7 74.2 25.8 73.8 26.2 73.5 26.5 74.3 25.7 74.6 25.4 73.8 26.2 73.4 26.6 73.3 26.7 73.9 26.1 
Electricity, gas, 
water & waste 
services 
- - 79.0 21.0 80.4 19.6 78.5 21.5 78.6 21.4 77.3 22.7 75.6 24.4 76.9 23.1 77.9 22.1 80.1 19.9 77.5 22.6 
Construction - - 87.9 12.1 87.2 12.8 87.6 12.4 87.8 12.2 88.0 12.0 88.0 12.0 87.9 12.1 88.1 12.0 88.3 11.7 88.2 11.8 
Wholesale trade - - 67.6 32.4 66.7 33.3 66.8 33.2 68.3 31.7 66.9 33.1 66.7 33.3 65.7 34.3 66.2 33.8 67.8 32.2 68.4 31.6 
Retail trade - - 44.5 55.5 45.3 54.7 43.6 56.4 44.5 55.5 44.5 55.5 44.2 55.8 44.0 56.0 43.8 56.2 45.6 54.4 45.4 54.6 
Accommodation & 
food services 
- - 43.2 56.8 44.1 55.9 44.4 55.6 44.2 55.8 46.1 53.9 45.4 54.6 45.6 54.5 45.0 55.0 45.2 54.8 46.7 53.3 
Transport, postal & 
warehousing 
- - 76.6 23.4 77.5 22.5 76.7 23.3 77.2 22.8 77.7 22.3 78.9 21.2 78.3 21.7 78.1 21.9 77.0 23.0 77.3 22.7 
Information media 
& 
telecommunications 
- - 59.1 40.9 57.9 42.1 59.2 40.8 56.8 43.2 59.3 40.7 58.2 41.8 59.9 40.1 60.0 40.0 59.6 40.4 59.9 40.1 
Financial & 
insurance services 
- - 47.8 52.2 47.9 52.1 47.1 52.9 48.2 51.8 48.7 51.3 47.7 52.3 47.9 52.1 48.0 52.0 51.7 48.3 47.1 52.9 
Rental, hiring & 
real estate services 
- - 52.1 47.9 52.2 47.8 50.4 49.6 49.7 50.3 50.0 50.0 52.0 48.0 51.3 48.7 51.5 48.5 49.7 50.3 50.1 49.9 
Professional, 
scientific & 
technical services 
- - 56.2 43.8 56.3 43.7 55.9 44.1 57.7 42.3 57.7 42.3 56.9 43.1 56.3 43.7 57.6 42.4 57.7 42.3 58.9 41.2 
Administrative & 
support services 
- - 46.2 53.8 44.1 55.9 45.4 54.6 48.4 51.6 48.9 51.1 47.6 52.4 48.2 51.8 48.0 52.0 48.7 51.3 49.5 50.5 
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Public 
administration & 
safety 
- - 54.6 45.4 52.6 47.4 53.0 47.0 53.3 46.7 52.4 47.6 53.3 46.7 54.8 45.2 52.2 47.8 51.0 49.0 51.1 48.9 
Education & 
training 
- - 31.2 68.8 32.6 67.4 30.0 70.0 30.6 69.4 29.8 70.2 30.4 69.6 30.9 69.1 29.8 70.2 29.8 70.3 29.4 70.6 
Health care & 
social assistance 
- - 21.3 78.7 21.1 78.9 20.6 79.4 20.8 79.2 21.0 79.0 21.7 78.3 21.5 78.5 21.9 78.1 21.5 78.5 21.6 78.4 
Arts & recreation 
services 
- - 51.9 48.1 54.6 45.4 55.1 44.9 52.1 47.9 53.8 46.2 53.0 47.0 55.3 44.7 54.4 45.6 53.5 46.5 54.7 45.3 
Other services - - 59.3 40.7 56.5 43.5 57.8 42.2 57.4 42.6 60.3 39.7 57.5 42.5 57.4 42.6 57.2 42.8 57.4 42.7 56.3 43.7 
Total (all 
industries) 
- - 55.2 44.8 55.1 44.9 54.8 45.2 54.9 45.1 54.9 45.1 54.7 45.3 54.5 45.5 54.4 45.6 54.3 45.7 54.0 46.0 
Panel B: Labour Force 
Labour force 
participation rate 
78.7 63.0 79.1 63.7 79.3 64.4 79.3 65.0 79.2 64.7 79.5 65.1 79.1 65.2 78.8 65.1 78.4 65.0 78.3 65.1 78.3 65.8 
   Source:http://search.abs.gov.au/s/search.html?query=gender&collection=abs&form=simple&profile=_default
165 
 
Table 2.19 summarizes industry wise female employment rate (Panel A) and 
labour force participation rate (Panel B) in the last one decade (2006-2015). Female 
occupied considerable portion of employment base in majority of the industries. In the 
last one decade all the industries have 50%-60% male employees and 40%-50% 
female employees. Health Care & Social Assistance and Education & Training have 
the highest representation of female employees between 2006 and 2015. Followed by 
Retail trade (54.6%), Accommodation & food services (53.3%), Financial & insurance 
services (52.9%), and Administrative & support services (50.5%). Similar scenario 
can be observed in labour force participation rate, male and female participation rates 
are quite similar between 2005 and 2015. Male labour participation rate is between 
70%-80% and female participation rate 60%-70%. This depicts regardless of the 
gender dominance of different industries female participation as employees and 
labours are quite close to their male peers. 
Table 2.20: Enrolment 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Traineeship
s 
16.
1 
4.
0 
13.
6 
3.
7 
14.
1 
2.
9 
13.
7 
3.
3 
13.
6 
3.
8 
13.
6 
2.4 13.
4 
1.
9 
12.
4 
3.
6 
Participatio
n in formal 
or non-
formal 
work-
related 
learning 
(20–64 
years) 
- - - - - - - - - - 40.
7 
41.
4 
- - - - 
Source:http://search.abs.gov.au/s/search.html?query=gender&collection=abs&form=simple&profile=_default 
 
 Finally, a common argument of the opponents are potential female corporates 
are lack of necessary experience and skills to smoothly climb the corporate ladders. 
One key reason can be lower attainment of female corporates in work progress related 
trainings and workshops. Women traineeship enrolment rate is significantly low 
compare to their male peers in the past. For instance, female enrolment rates in the   
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traineeship programs between 2008 and 2015 are one fourth of their male peers or less. 
However female participation rate in formal or non-formal work-related learning is 
higher than their male peers (2013: male 40.7% Vs female 41.4%). 
 Overall synthesis of Australian academic and non-academic research and 
detailed investigation of current corporate gender diversity statistics of Australian 
firms demonstrate that: significant number of good corporate gender diversity research 
is required; female representation in Australian firms improved in self-regulatory 
period, however “Glass Ceiling” issues still persist and requires significant attention 
from regulators, corporations and investors; and potential Australian female 
corporates require more work related trainings, grooming and overall support from 
government and private organisations. 
2.5.2.5 Other Countries under Self-Regulatory Gender Regulation 
2.5.2.5a. Facts and Statistics 
Table 2.21: Fact-Sheet – Other Countries under Gender Diversity Recommendations 
  Country FD CHAIR SUB-COMMITTEE Industries 
New Zealand Overall:17.5% 
Percentage of 
women directors on 
NZX-listed 
companies 
(excluding 
overseas 
companies): 14% 
5.6% AC:20% 
GOV:15% 
NC:16.4% 
COM:14.9% 
Technology, Media, & 
Tele-communications 
(25%) 
Manufacturing (22%) 
Energy & Resources (21%), 
Life Sciences & Health 
Care (13%) 
Consumer Business (12%)   
Japan Overall:2.4% 0.8% AC:7.5% 
GOV: na 
NC:6.7% 
COM:6.2% 
Consumer Business (4%) 
Life Sciences & Health 
Care (3%) 
Energy & Resources (3%)  
Financial Services (2%) 
Technology Media, & 
Telecommunications (2%) 
Hong Kong Overall: 8.4% 
Hang Seng Index 
companies: 9.6% 
5.4% AC:7.1% 
GOV:5.8% 
NC:5.9% 
Technology, Media, & 
Telecommunications (10%) 
Consumer Business (9%) 
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COM:6.6% Financial Services (8%) 
Energy & Resources (8%) 
Manufacturing (6%) 
Taiwan Overall: 4.9% 
Public Companies: 
11.83% 
3.1% AC:4.9% 
GOV: NA 
NC:NA 
COM:2.7% 
Life Sciences & Health 
Care (6%) 
Financial Services (6%) 
Energy & Resources (6%) 
Manufacturing (6%) 
Consumer Business (5%) 
South Africa 17.5% 7.8% AC:22.1% 
GOV:19.1% 
NC:19.1% 
COM:16.5% 
Technology, Media, & 
Telecommunications (20%) 
 Manufacturing (19%) 
Consumer Business (18%) 
Energy & Resources (17%)  
Financial Services (16%) 
Chile Overall: 3.8% 0% AC:2.5% 
GOV: 
NC: 
COM:8.3% 
Energy & Resources (5%) 
Technology, Media, & 
Telecommunications (5%) 
Consumer Business (3%) 
Financial Services (0%) 
Manufacturing (0%) 
Source:https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gx-ccg-women-in-the-boardroom-a-global- 
perspective4.pdf 
New Zealand (17.5%) has the highest representation of female directors on 
boards followed by Hong Kong (8.4%). New Zealand has 5.6% and Hong Kong 5.4% 
female chair. New Zealand takes the lead in terms of female members’ representation 
in significant sub-committees followed by Hong Kong. Despite adopting board gender 
diversity recommendations Japan, Chile and Taiwan has significantly lower female 
representation at the board and sub-committees.  
2.5.2.5b. Academic Research 
There is a lack of significant corporate gender diversity research among above 
mentioned countries under self-regulatory gender quota regulation. Based on 79 New 
Zealand listed firms Fauzi and Locke (2012) find a negative relation between female 
representation on boards and firm performance. Multiple articles and reports (e.g. 
Hays (2016) and Catalyst (2014)) have been published on women corporate leadership   
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in Japan by different agencies but no significant academic research on corporate 
gender diversity.35 Booysen and Nkomo (2010) conducted a study on gender role 
stereotypes in South African firms. It shows male corporates in general do not think 
females can be successful managers. However, Willows and van der Linde (2016) find 
that female directors' presence on South African board can positively impact firms’ 
financial performance measured by accounting-based measures return on assets and 
return on equity. Yaroson and Giwa (2016) demonstrate that female directors on 
Nigerian corporations’ boards positively and significantly impact corporate social 
responsibility. A Nigerian study by Akinyomi and Olutoye (2014) and a Kenyan study 
by Wachudi and Mboya (2012) fail to establish any significant link between female 
directors’ representation on boards and bank performance. The authors argue the key 
reason behind these results is significantly lower representation of female board 
members. 
Table 2.22: Gender Diversity Studies of other Countries under Self-Regulatory Gender Quota 
Title Author(s) 
and Date 
Journal Sample And 
Period 
Key Findings 
Board Structure, 
Ownership 
Structure and Firm 
Performance: A 
Study of New 
Zealand Listed-
Firms. 
Fauzi and 
Locke  
 
(2012) 
Asian Academy of 
Management Journal 
of Accounting and 
Finance 
79 New Zealand 
listed firms 
 
(2007-2011) 
The authors indicated: Board of 
directors, board committees, and 
managerial ownership have a positive 
and significant impact on firm 
performance. Meanwhile, non- 
executive directors, female directors 
on the board and blockholder 
ownership lower New Zealand firm 
performance. 
Effect of Board 
Gender Diversity 
On the 
Performance of 
Commercial Banks 
in Kenya. 
Wachudi and 
Mboya  
 
(2012) 
European Scientific 
Journal 
Banks in Kenya 
 
(1998-2009) 
The authors indicated: Boards of 
commercial banks in Kenya are male-
dominated. On average, out of a 
typical board size of 8 members, only 
1 is a female director. Finally, board 
diversity has no effect on performance 
of banks in Kenya. 
                                                          
35 Please refer to the following links, 
https://www.ft.com/content/6b4460d0-1992-11e5-8201-cbdb03d71480;  
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/14/business/economy-business/japan-inc-s-lack-of-leadership-roles-for-
women-fuels-gender-imbalance-on-boards/#.WTDwXk2weUk; https://www.2020wob.com/labels/japan; 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/09/01/japanese-companies-need-to-get-women-on-board/; 
https://www.hays.co.jp/en/gender-diversity/index.htm; http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/gender-diversity-japan; 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/05/are-japanese-companies-with-female-board-members-more-innovative/; 
https://www.hays.co.jp/en/gender-diversity/index.htm; and http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/gender-diversity-japan 
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Gender Role 
Stereotypes and 
Requisite 
Management 
Characteristics: 
The Case of South 
Africa. 
Booysen and 
Nkomo  
 
(2010) 
Gender in 
Management: An 
International Journal 
592 black men, 
white men, 
black women, 
and white 
women 
managers. 
The authors indicated: Black and 
white men less likely to attribute 
successful managerial characteristics 
to women. For black women, the 
resemblance between the 
characteristics of women in general 
and successful managers is 
significantly higher than the 
resemblance of men in general and 
successful managers. White women 
perceive men and women to equally 
possess the requisite management 
characteristics. 
Effect of Board 
Gender Diversity 
on Banks’ 
Profitability in 
Nigeria. 
Akinyomi 
and Olutoye  
 
(2014) 
International Journal 
of Physical and Social 
Sciences 
Randomly 
selected ten 
money deposit 
banks in Nigeria 
(2003-2012) 
The authors indicated: Presence of 
female director on the board has a 
positive but insignificant relationship 
with banks‟ profitability. Similarly, 
the result shows that the Proportion of 
female in the board of directors has a 
positive but insignificant relationship 
with profitability in Nigeria. 
Women 
Representation on 
Boards: A South 
African 
Perspective. 
Gizelle 
Willows and 
Megan van 
der Linde  
 
(2016) 
Meditari Accountancy 
Research 
Johannesburg 
Securities 
Exchange Top 
40 companies 
 
(2013) 
The authors indicated: Majority of 
female directors hold non-executive 
positions. Women representation 
appears to influence company 
performance positively when using 
accounting-based measures of 
performance (such as return on assets 
and return on equity), but negatively 
when using market-based measures 
(such as Tobin’s Q). The critical mass 
concept has a positive effect. 
Women as 
Directors and 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility in 
Nigeria. 
Yaroson and 
Giwa  
(2016) 
International Review 
of Management and 
Business Research 
Nigerian firms The authors indicated: Female 
directors on Nigerian corporations’ 
boards positively impact firms’ 
corporate social responsibility. 
 
2.5.3 Countries under “No” Gender Diversity Regulatory Pressure 
This section briefly discusses the corporate gender diversity facts and statistics 
of few significant countries who have not adopted any gender diversity regulations, 
however have taken alternative steps to enhance female representation at upper 
corporate management level.36   
                                                          
36  Please refere to the following link for details on the alternative steps and projects taken by the respective countries to 
enhance corporate gender diversity.https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gx-ccg-
women-in-the-boardroom-a-global-perspective4.pdf 
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2.5.3.1 Facts and Statistics  
Few significant countries with no regulatory pressure but with alternative 
initiatives to enhance female at the leadership positions are, China, Indonesia, Korea,  
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brazil, and Ireland. 
Table 2.23: Fact-Sheet - Countries under “No” Gender Regulatory Pressure  
Country FD CHAIR SUB-COMMITTEE 
China 8.5% 3.5% AC:9.3% 
GOV:8.6% 
NC:8% 
COM:8.7% 
Indonesia 3.8% 2.9% AC:1.9% 
GOV:9.1% 
NC:4% 
COM:6.1% 
Korea 1.8% 3.9% AC:1% 
GOV:2.3% 
NC:2% 
COM:0.7% 
Philippines 7.4% 5.3% AC:9.3.5% 
GOV:6.9% 
NC:5.7% 
COM:7.2% 
Singapore 9% 7% AC:12.3% 
GOV:6.9% 
NC:6.7% 
COM:8.6% 
Thailand 9.7% 0% AC:12.1% 
GOV:13.2% 
NC:13.3% 
COM:7.8% 
Brazil  6.3% 1.1% AC:6% 
GOV:2.5% 
NC:5.4% 
COM:5.3% 
Ireland 14.4% 0% AC:22.5% 
GOV:18.5% 
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NC:16.4% 
COM:20.4% 
Source:https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gx-ccg-women-in-the-boardroom-a-global- 
perspective4.pdf 
As per the current statistics Thailand (14.4%) takes the lead in terms of female 
representation on boards followed by Thailand (9.7%), Singapore (9%), China (8.5%), 
and Philippines (7.4%). Singapore and Philippines have the highest representation of 
female board chair 7% and 5.3% respectively. Ireland, Thailand, Singapore, and china 
have the highest overall female member representation in significant board sub-
committees.  
Helen Xu, Manager of Enterprise Risk Services, Deloitte China, claim, with 
the economic advancement in China board diversity has become an integral part of 
good corporate governance. The former tourism minister of Indonesia stated in 2012, 
board gender diversity is essential for both good corporate governance and better firm 
performance. Eun-Hee Kwon, senator of the ruling Saenuri Party, is trying to promote 
gender quota regulation (large companies and public bodies to appoint women to a 
minimum of 30 percent of senior management (executive) positions) in Korea. The 
Brazilian senate is planning to implement mandatory gender quotas to eventually 
achieve a 40 percent representation of women on boards by 2022. Besides regulators 
and policy makers, diverse organisations are working to promote corporate gender 
diversity in these respective countries, for instance, Centre for Governance, 
Institutions, and Organisations (Indonesia); and Institute of Corporate Directors and 
the Institute of Solidarity for Asia (Philippines). 
As per the current statistics Thailand (14.4%) takes the lead in terms of female 
representation on boards followed by Thailand (9.7%), Singapore (9%), China (8.5%), 
and Philippines (7.4%). Singapore and Philippines have the highest representation of 
female board chair 7% and 5.3% respectively. Ireland, Thailand, Singapore, and China   
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have the highest overall female member representation in significant board sub-
committees. 
2.5.3.2 Academic Research 
Compare to countries under gender diversity regulation, the countries under no 
regulatory pressure have less significant academic research. Key reasons might be less 
regulatory and corporate attention and still lower representation of female corporates 
at the top. China has considerable number of academic researches on corporate gender 
diversity compare to other countries under voluntary condition. The following table 
document few recent Chinese corporate gender diversity studies. 
Table 2.24: A Synthesis of Chinese Corporate Gender Diversity Studies  
Title Author(s) and Date Journal Sample And Period Key Findings 
Do Women Directors 
Improve Firm 
Performance in China? 
Liu, Yu, Zuobao 
Wei, and Feixue Xie 
(2013) 
Journal of Corporate 
Finance 
China's listed firms 
from 1999 to 2011 
The authors indicated: 
There is a positive and 
significant relation 
between board gender 
diversity and firm 
performance. 
Family and State 
Ownership, 
Internationalization 
and Corporate Board-
Gender Diversity: 
Evidence from China 
and India. 
Saeed, Yousaf, , and 
Alharbi. (2017) 
Cross Cultural & 
Strategic 
Management 
A panel data set of 
Chinese and Indian 
firms for the period 
2004-2013 
The authors indicated: 
The results show a 
negative and 
significant impact of 
family and state 
ownership on the 
proportion of women 
directors. However, 
this relationship is seen 
to be reverse if the firm 
is operating in 
international markets. 
Notably, a negative 
relationship was seen 
to persist between 
ownership structure 
and board-gender 
diversity for both 
female executive and 
independent board 
members, whereas a 
positive impact of 
internationalization 
was observed only for 
independent female 
directors. 
Financial Performance 
and Risk Behaviour of 
Gender-Diversified 
Boards in the Chinese 
Automotive Industry: 
Initial Insights 
Horak and Cui 
(2017) 
Personnel Review Chinese automotive 
firms with and 
without women on 
their corporate board 
The authors indicated: 
Firms with women on 
the board perform 
better in terms of asset 
growth and sales 
growth. 
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CFO Gender and 
Earnings Management: 
Evidence from China 
Liu, Wei, and Xie 
(2016) 
Review of 
Quantitative Finance 
and Accounting 
China’s listed firms 
from 1999 to 2011 
The authors indicated: 
Female CFOs engage 
in less EM and are 
more conservative in 
financial reporting than 
their male 
counterparts. 
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CHAPTER 3: GENDER DIVERSE BOARDS AND NOMINATION 
COMMITTEE ATTRIBUTES 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Motivation, Objectives and Research Questions 
This study investigates the impact of nomination committee attributes on 
board gender diversity. From an economic perspective, underrepresentation of 
females at the board level is not only a waste of human capital but also a loss of talent 
and efficiency for firms. Fair representation of female members at the very top level 
can ensure better utilisation of female talent pool (CESifo DIC 2013)37 and lead to 
several firm benefits.38 Since 2000 onwards regulators worldwide started to realize 
the significance of demographically balanced corporate boards and adopted diverse 
mechanisms (e.g. mandatory gender quota and self-regulatory gender quota) to 
enhance corporate board gender diversity (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009). 
However, external regulatory pressure alone is not sufficient to achieve adequate 
representation of female members on boards. Corporations require significant and 
strong internal mechanisms to ensure fair recruitment process of female board 
members and break the “Glass Ceiling”.39 Nomination committee existence, 
composition and activities are considered as one of the key internal determining   
                                                          
37 Information and Forschung (research) Institute for Economic Research 2013 report.  
38 As per KPMG report (2014), in 2012, a majority of the S&P/ASX200 provided commentary in their annual report on the 
benefits that have arisen from the implementation of a diversity policy. In 2013, a significantly higher number of the 
ASX201-500 and ASX501+ samples have provided enhanced commentary from the prior year. Some of the key benefits of 
diversity disclosed by companies include: Enhanced corporate performance, reputation and shareholder value; Access to 
different perspectives, ideas and innovative approaches leading to better decision making and business outcomes; Creativity 
and innovation arising from diversity enables employees to share different experiences, perspectives and cultures, remain 
flexible and dynamic as well as reflective of, and responsive to, the communities they interact with; Delivery of quality 
outcomes for customers; Maximisation of the talent potential and career opportunities for employees; Attraction and retention 
of top talent by ensuring the workplace is supportive of women; Better business outcomes through leveraging the unique 
experiences of people with diverse backgrounds; Competitive advantage; Broadening of skills and experience in the 
workforce; Increased opportunities to understand and engage with the company’s stakeholders and the various communities 
in which it operates; Improvement in the quality of life for the workforce, their families, communities and society  at large; 
Increased morale, reduced bias and prejudice in the workplace and reduced absenteeism; Discourages inappropriate attitudes, 
behaviours and stereotypes and actively promotes equal opportunity and employment conditions. 
39 Glass Ceiling: An intangible barrier within a hierarchy that prevents women or minorities from obtaining upper-level 
positions. 
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factors of female representation on boards (Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow 2014, 
Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye 2012). Hence, the key inspiring factors of this study are 
as follows. 
 First, in the last 15 years several countries have adopted either mandatory or 
soft gender quotas to enhance female representation at the top.40 External regulatory 
pressure might rapidly accomplish overall board gender diversity to a certain level; 
however, it might result in token female members on boards.41 Representation of token 
females on boards cannot ensure the optimal board performance. Only a fair 
representation of both male and female members can bring diverse views, knowledge, 
perspectives, and skills to the boards (Hillman, Cannella, and Harris 2002). It is 
essential that both regulators and corporations work in collaboration to achieve board 
gender diversity. Hence, it has become essential to examine the key determining 
factors (particularly internal corporate factors) of board gender diversity. This study 
aims to investigate the contribution of nomination committee (existence and attributes) 
towards board gender diversity without the external regulatory pressure. 
Second, till date only a handful of studies investigate the factors that explain 
why some corporations hire women on their boards while others do not (Hillman, 
Shropshire, and Cannella 2007). Past empirical research mostly focuses on key 
determinants like, industry characteristics (Chapple and Humphrey 2014, Brammer, 
Millington, and Pavelin 2007), firm characteristics (Adams and Ferreira 2009, Carter, 
Simkins, and Simpson 2003) and board characteristics (Strøm, D’Espallier, and   
                                                          
40 A mandatory or ‘binding’ quota regulation is defined as a regulation where non-compliance implies more or less severe 
sanctions on the company and soft law regulations are guidelines for good corporate governance, ‘comply or explain’ rules 
etc. 
41 Stary (2014) state, “In a similar vein to the lack of meritocracy argument, is the contention that gender quotas could promulgate 
tokenism or stereotyping of female directors and as such be counter-productive to the ends quotas are trying to achieve. That 
is, female directors will be employed or promoted for political or legal reasons rather than based on true acceptance and embrace 
of gender diversity. Even if token directors have the same merit or qualifications of those who were appointed, they are 
scrutinised more closely as they are viewed as obtaining their position by representation not on individual merit”. 
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Mersland 2014, de Cabo, Gimeno, and Nieto 2012, Brammer, Millington, and Pavelin 
2007). However, despite being the primary board sub-committee for recruiting 
corporate board members, nomination committee is largely overlooked in the board 
gender diversity debate. Past empirical studies on nomination committee (Clune et al. 
2014, Ruigrok et al. 2006) claim that nomination committee can play a major role in 
determining board characteristics through ensuring a transparent and unbiased 
selection process. Therefore, it is vital to explore the impact of nomination committee 
existence and its attributes on fair representation of female members on board. 
Third, ASX CGC (Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council) has provided recommendations regarding both establishment and 
composition of nomination committee, and board gender diversity. ASX CGC 
recommendations on nomination committee first came into action in 2003 and revised 
in 2007. The recommendations not only require the ASX listed firms to establish a 
nomination committee but also specify its size, structure, and responsibilities.42 
Gender diversity recommendations and disclosure requirements have been 
implemented on ASX listed firms from 2011.43 ASX CGC (2010) claim that, the 
reason behind implementing diversity recommendations is to enhance the positive 
impact of board gender diversity on firm performance (Chapple and Humphrey 2014). 
Despite reasonable regulatory attention, nomination committee - board gender   
                                                          
42 ASXCGC Recommendation for nomination committee :Recommendation 2.4: The board should establish a nomination 
committee; Purpose of the nomination committee: A board nomination committee is an efficient mechanism for 
examination of the selection and appointment practices of the company; Charter: The nomination committee should have 
a charter that clearly sets out its roles and responsibilities, composition, structure, membership requirements and the 
procedures for inviting non-committee members to attend meetings; Composition of nomination committee: The 
nomination committee should be structured so that it: consists of a majority of independent directors, is chaired by an 
independent director, and has at least three members; Responsibilities: Responsibilities of the committee should include 
recommendations to the board about: the necessary and desirable competencies of directors, review of board succession 
plans, the development of a process for the evaluation of the performance of the board, its committees and directors, and 
the appointment and re-election of directors.  
43 ASXCGC Recommendations for GENDER DIVERSE BOARD: Recommendation 3.2: Companies should establish a 
policy concerning diversity and disclose the policy or a summary of that policy. The policy should include requirements 
for the board to establish measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity for the board to assess annually both the 
objectives and progress in achieving them; Recommendation 3.3: Companies should disclose in each annual report the 
measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity set by the board in accordance with the diversity policy and progress 
towards achieving them; Recommendation 3.4: Companies should disclose in each annual report the proportion of women 
employees in the whole organisation, women in senior executive positions and women on the board. 
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diversity studies in Australian context is scarce. Australian studies on gender diverse 
board during the voluntary period (Bonn 2004, Nguyen and Faff 2007, Wang and Clift 
2009) and self-regulatory period (Adams, Gray, and Nowland 2011, Galbreath 2011, 
Chapple and Humphrey 2014, Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow 2014), mostly shed 
light on the impact of board gender diversity on firm financial performances.44 Hence, 
investigating the impact of nomination committee existence and attributes on board 
gender diversity will shed light on the internal determining mechanism of board 
gender diversity. 
Fourth, the sole impact of nomination committee existence and attributes on 
board gender diversity have significantly overlooked in the past Australian research. 
Since the implementation of ASX CGC diversity recommendations, the ASX 200 
listed firms have achieved remarkable results in terms of the female representation on 
boards and the proportion of women comprising new appointments (AICD 2013).45 
Further, the Australian government boards exceeded the targeted percentage of female 
representation in 2013.46 This implies that after implementation of external regulatory 
pressure, board gender diversity in top ASX listed firms increased. But the question 
remains, being the key internal mechanism of director selection process, do 
nomination committees contribute towards unbiased selection process of female board 
members without regulatory pressure in firms of all sizes? Hutchinson, Mack, and 
Plastow (2014) investigate top 500 ASX listed firms in both 2007 (voluntary period) 
and 2011 (self-regulatory period), and show that female representation on boards   
                                                          
44 ASX CGC recommendations on gender diversity came into effect in 2011. Time period prior 2011 in considered as voluntary 
period  
and later as self-regulatory period. 
45 
 
As per Australian Institute of Company Directors the latest percentage of women on ASX 200 boards is 18.6% (31 August 
2014) compare to 8.30% (2008). The percentage of women on boards of ASX 200 companies and the proportion of women 
comprising new appointments increased significantly in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. 
46 A report by the Australian government (2012-2013) show that the women representation on Australian government boards was 
41 percent in 30 June 2013, this exceeded the target set by the government in 2010 of a minimum of 40 per cent women on 
Australian government boards by 2015.  
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increase at a higher rate in self- regulatory period for firms which have nomination 
committees and have female members in it. They claim that ASX CGC diversity 
recommendations are more successful with the firms with nomination committee 
compare to the firms without nomination committee. However, till date no study has 
explored nomination committee attributes as the sole determining factor of board 
gender diversity without considering the external regulatory pressure. 
Hence, the key objective of this study is to investigate the influence of 
nomination committee existence and its attributes (size, independence, gender 
diversity, and meeting frequency) on ASX listed companies’ board gender diversity 
during the voluntary period. This study analyses the impact of nomination committee 
existence, structure (size. independence, and gender diversity) and activity (meeting 
frequency) on board gender diversity of randomly selected ASX listed firms during 
the voluntary period. Rather than focusing on top Australian listed firms this study 
considers all ASX listed firms. Further, examination of nomination committee-gender 
diverse board relationship during the voluntary period demonstrates real impact 
(without the external regulatory pressure) of nomination committee existence and its 
attributes on board gender diversity. The key research questions of this study are as 
follows: 
RQ1: Is there any association between the existence of nomination committee and 
board gender diversity? 
RQ2: Is there any association between the nomination committee size and board 
gender diversity? 
RQ3: Is there any association between the nomination committee independence and 
board gender diversity? 
RQ4: Is there any association between the nomination committee gender diversity 
and board gender diversity? 
RQ5: Is there any association between the nomination committee meeting frequency 
and board gender diversity?  
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3.1.2 Past Academic Research and Theoretical Background 
 Gender based studies gradually evolved from sociology and psychology to 
business literature. The regulatory involvement to enhance board gender diversity in 
multiple countries led to a sudden increase of gender diversity studies in the business 
arena (management, finance/economics, marketing, and accounting). Board gender 
diversity studies are considered to be multidisciplinary and borrow theoretical 
perspectives from diverse fields (e.g. sociology, psychology, management). Burke 
and Mattis (2013) claim that gender diversity studies are in urgent need of building 
theory. Further, Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh (2009, 322) argue, “Academic literature 
on women on corporate board’s (WOCB) does not explicitly develop a theoretical 
framework. Indeed, the majority of WOCB literature is descriptive”. 
In business literature management has the largest collection of gender diversity 
literature. The frequently used theoretical paradigms of this area are agency theory, 
resource dependence theory, stakeholder theory, tokenism theory and critical mass 
theory. Accounting field is still short of significant number of gender diversity studies 
and the existing studies have utilised diverse theories or not ruled by few particular 
theories. For instance, Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011) utilise agency theory to support 
the relationship between gender diverse board and better stock price informativeness; 
Gul, Hutchinson, and Lai (2013) and Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui (2011) both utilise 
organisational theory to establish a positive relation of gender diverse board with 
analyst earning forecast and earnings quality ; Abbott, Parker, and Presley (2012) 
utilise group thinking theory to support the negative link between female 
representation on board and the likelihood of financial restatement; and Gavious, 
Segev, and Yosef (2012) utilise gender theory and demonstrate female directors’ 
presence on boards is negatively associated with earnings management and positively   
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associated with firm value. It is quite evident that majority of the gender studies in 
accounting have utilised theories to establish link between gender diverse board and 
firm outcomes. The determinants of female representation on board has not received 
noticeable attention in accounting. 
Managerial studies are the pioneers in investigating the determining factors of 
board gender diversity. Past managerial literature (Mulcahy and Linehan 2014, 
Nekhili and Gatfaoui 2013, de Cabo, Gimeno, and Nieto 2012, Geiger and Marlin 
2012, Skaggs, Stainback, and Duncan 2012, Mínguez-Vera and Martin 2011, Ryan et 
al. 2011, Ryan, Haslam, and Kulich 2010, Martin et al. 2008, Brammer, Millington, 
and Pavelin 2007, Ryan and Haslam 2007, Ryan, Haslam, and Postmes 2007, Ryan 
and Haslam 2005, Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003) have associated industry type, 
firm characteristics (e.g. size, growth strategy, and riskiness) and board characteristics 
(e.g. size and independence) with female representation on boards. Majority of these 
studies do not rely on theoretical paradigms or utilise interdisciplinary approach. For 
instance, de Cabo, Gimeno, and Nieto (2012) adopt an interdisciplinary approach and 
pull from four different theories, resource dependence theory, agency theory, human 
capital theory, and social psychology to establish link between firm riskiness, board 
size, and firm growth strategy, and board gender diversity of European banks. Further, 
Geiger and Marlin (2012) utilise resource dependence theory and institutional theory 
to associate firm and board characteristics with gender diverse board.  
Till date gender studies have utilised multiple theories to justify the 
significance of female presence at the top. For instance, some theories (e.g. human 
capital theory and social Capital theory) explain individual characteristics that female 
can bring to the board; some (e.g. social identity theory, social network theory, social 
Cohesion theory, tokenism theory, critical mass theory) justify female directors’   
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actions and performance as a group player; and some (e.g. resource dependency 
theory, institutional theory, agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, and 
organisational theory) support female contributions towards firm as a whole. 
As per the human capital theory appointing a female member on board can be 
advantageous from the human capital perspective. A female can bring diverse 
experiences; skills and Knowledge (Peterson and Philpot 2007, Singh, Terjesen, and 
Vinnicombe 2008), and views (Zelechowski and Bilimoria 2004) to the board. Social 
capital theory depicts a diverse board offers better linkages with the internal and 
external group of the business. A minority director with previous board experience 
might lessen out-group prejudices through their network ties (Westphal and Milton 
2000) and thus a board with proper gender mix is more enriched with social capital 
(Adams and Flynn 2005, Walt and Ingley 2003, Fondas 2000). Social Identity, Social 
Network, and Social Cohesion theories provide logical explanation for scarcity of 
female representation on board and strategic barriers they face to be appointed or 
promoted as board members. Kanter (1977) show that in a group minority are easily 
relegated by the majority and thus the former is addressed as token (tokenism theory). 
Institutional theory and resource dependency theory both have been utilised to 
associate female representation on board with firm legitimacy requirement. As per 
resource dependence theory a firm operates in an open system and in order to survive 
it requires resources from its external environment and according to institutional 
theory a firm recruits its potential employees to increase its legitimacy. Hence, 
institutional theory mirrors the resource dependency theory. Institutional theory 
suggests, a firm adopts strategies and policies to avoid challenges and questions from 
the society and to enhance its legitimacy perceived by the society (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983, Meyer and Rowan 1977). Board gender diversity can be a logical   
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solution to maintain both firm’s connection with external environment and its 
perceived legitimacy. Kang, Cheng, and Gray (2007, 198) suggest, “The emergence 
of stakeholder theory in board diversity was prompted by the growing recognition of 
the need to take account of the wider interests of society”. A gender diverse board 
reflects the stakeholders’ dynamics better than an all-male board. Thus, board gender 
diversity can enhance firm reputation by sending positive signal to the potential job 
applicants, employees, consumers, investors and other stakeholders (Rose 2007). 
According to Organisational theory the objective of management is to maintain 
balance and stability, and a fair representation of both male and female candidates at 
the top can ensure that stability.  
The handful of studies conducted on nomination committee-board gender 
diversity are: Ruigrok et al. (2006) observe 210 Swiss public companies (from January 
2001 to December 2003) and find firms with nomination committees are more likely 
to have higher number of independent and foreign directors, but not more likely to 
have higher number of female board members. They utilise multi-theoretical 
approach, like, agency theory, resource-dependence theory and group effectiveness 
theory to analyse the link between nomination committee structure and board 
composition. Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye (2012) analyse FTSE350 companies from 
1999 to 2008 demonstrate that board gender and nationality diversity are positively 
associate with higher percentage of females and non-British nationals in nomination 
committee. In order to develop their theoretical findation they bring together three 
concepts from social psychology research, similarity-attraction, homosocial 
reproduction, and social identity. Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow (2014) utilise top 
500 Australian listed firms data in 2007 and 2011and based on social  identity theory, 
similarity-attraction, and organisational demography theory demonstrate that, “Board   
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gender diversity is significantly and positively associated with the presence of a 
designated nomination committee and that female representation on the nomination 
committee is a significant explanatory factor of increasing board gender diversity 
following the release of the 2010 Australian Securities Exchange Corporate 
Governance Council (ASX CGC) recommendations” (Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow 
2014, 1). 
3.1.3 Significance of the Study  
The findings of this study will make a number of significant contributions. First, 
to date, only few international empirical studies have been conducted on this topic. 
Further, self-regulatory approach towards nomination committee and board gender 
diversity is fairly a new circumstance for Australian listed corporations. Hence, there 
is a vital requirement for good empirical research on the relationship of nomination 
committee attributes and board gender diversity. Second, unlike most prior research 
on this topic, this study looks at the association of nomination committee attributes 
with board gender diversity in voluntary period. This helps to detect the true impact 
of nomination committee on board gender diversity without external regulatory 
pressure. Third, this study will assist Australian regulators to ascertain whether ASX 
CGC recommendations on nomination committee structure and responsibilities 
sincerely contribute towards the unbiased selection process of female directors on 
board. Fourth, this study will encourage Australian regulators to consider nomination 
committee structure as one of the key internal determinant of board gender diversity 
and incorporate nomination committee structure related recommendations as part of 
board gender diversity recommendations. Lastly, despite being a possible key 
determinant of gender diverse board, very few past studies have explored the   
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nomination committee-gender diverse board relationship, thus this study will add to 
the scarce nomination committee-gender diverse board relationship literature. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses past literature on board 
gender diversity and nomination committee; Section 3 represents the applied theories 
followed by the development of the hypotheses; Section 4 discuss the research method. 
Section 5 represents all results, and section 6 provides the conclusion. 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Gender Diverse Board 
Male and female directors are quite different in terms of their basic traits. Female 
directors significantly differ from their male peers in terms of risk averseness and 
human values (Adams and Funk 2012). The uniqueness of female directors can 
enhance board deliberation and ensure better organisational outcomes (Liu, Wei, and 
Xie 2013, Carter et al. 2010). A gender diverse board is comprised of both male and 
female directors and thus enriched with its members’ diverse experience and skills. 
Hillman, Cannella, and Harris (2002) claim that gender diverse board compare to an 
all-male board, performs better due to its diverse managerial competencies, skills, 
professional experience and knowledge. The two key advantages of gender diverse 
board are, (1) it is more enriched in terms of human capital; (2) it can lead to better 
corporate governance (Carter et al. 2010).   
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3.2.1.1 Gender Diverse Board and “Glass Ceiling” Phenomenon 
Potential female corporates are struggling for ages to climb to the upper half 
of the corporate pyramid. The reasons behind their struggle have been collectively 
addressed as the “Glass Ceiling” phenomenon.  Several studies (Nekhili and Gatfaoui 
2013, Haslam et al. 2010, Adams, Gupta, and Leeth 2009, Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 
2009, Broadridge and Hearn 2008, Ryan and Haslam 2007, 2005, Arfken, Bellar, and 
Helms 2004) have been conducted so far on this issue. Some of the common reasons 
behind this phenomenon are male dominated corporate culture, “Old boys’ network”, 
gender stereotype, lack of corporate support for women, gender pay gap (Bertrand and 
Hallock 2001, Carter, Franco, and Gine 2013, Mohan 2014) and overall gender 
discrimination (Sealy and Vinnicombe 2013, Sealy, Singh, and Vinnicombe 2007). 
Due to lack of proper support and unfavourable corporate culture females often get 
demotivated and prefer to pursue alternative career paths. 
 Eagly, Makhijani, and Klonsky (1992) claim, despite performing at the same 
level as their male counterparts, female managers receive higher inspection, criticism 
and negative evaluation. Besides a negative corporate culture, a male dominated 
corporate authority also play a major role to hinder female progress at the top. Majority 
of the top management positions, recruitment and promotional decisional authority are 
still dominated by male authorities (Smith 2002). In a male dominated corporate 
environment current and potential female leaders get misjudged and receive 
detrimental evaluation (Eagly and Carli 2003). Even small repeated prejudices against 
female executives can be harmful for them. Over time this can lead to greater 
misjudgement and hinder their progress to the top (Martell and DeSmet 2001, Martell 
et al. 1998, Martell, Lane, and Emrich 1996). Daily, Certo, and Dalton (1999) and Lee 
and James (2007) argue female CEOs are under constant media attention due to their   
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lower representation. Further, female CEOs and executives face greater professional 
and personal scrutiny compare to their male counterparts. Discharge of one female 
CEO can be detrimental for other female CEOs due to gender-stereotype perception 
and negative media publicity (Dixon‐Fowler, Ellstrand, and Johnson 2013).  
Female directors are still seen more in small firms and service industries and 
are more likely to be appointed in more complex firms. Past studies have shown that 
female members are usually appointed in the boards of poor performing firms (Haslam 
et al. 2010) and riskier firms (Mulcahy and Linehan 2014, Terjesen and Singh 2008).  
Further, as the top management positions are mostly held by males, potential female 
board candidates often become victims of biased and opaque recruitment process 
(Mattis 2000, Burke 1996). Due unwillingness of male members to work with female 
peers in the top management position (Shrader, Blackburn, and Iles 1997, Fisher 
1992), potential female board members face higher scrutiny and stronger selection 
process (Singh, Terjesen, and Vinnicombe 2008, Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold 
2000).   
Terjesen and Singh (2008, 55) claim, “Countries with higher representation of 
women on boards are more likely to have women in senior management and more 
equal ratios of male to female pay”. The gender quota has already cracked the “Glass 
Ceiling” to some extent and women are finally securing some significant positions in 
the corporate boards. However, the corporate culture, environment and overall 
mindset still require a lot of work to finally break the “Glass Ceiling”. 
3.2.1.2 Key Determinants of Gender Diverse Board  
Despite gender equality regulation, equal pay legislation, mandatory and self-
regulatory gender quotas and large pool of qualified female candidates, the percentage 
of female members at the top is still not satisfactory. Further, this percentage deviates   
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significantly across countries, and industries. This in turn raises several questions: 
Why percentage of female members on board still not satisfactory? Why the 
percentage fluctuates and inconsistent across different context? What are the 
frequently focused external and internal determinants? Why these determinants got 
the most attention? Whether there are other key determinants of gender diversity that 
require academic attention? A comprehensive review of studies on key determinants 
of corporate gender diversity can provide suitable answers of these respective 
questions. 
The key motivating factors mostly highlighted in the past studies are, industry 
characteristics (Chapple and Humphrey 2014, Brammer, Millington, and Pavelin 
2007); firm characteristics (Adams and Ferreira 2009, Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 
2003); and board characteristics (Strøm, D’Espallier, and Mersland 2014, de Cabo, 
Gimeno, and Nieto 2012).  
Besides these key determinants of corporate gender diversity, there are other 
key factors that have been largely overlooked in the past for instance, corporate culture 
and environment, and board sub-committee requirements, composition and activities. 
First, past studies (Peterson and Philpot 2007, Bilimoria and Piderit 1994) have shown 
that some board committees (e.g. nomination, executive, finance, compensation) 
prefer male members more than female members, while other board committees 
(Audit, Public affair) prefer female members. Second, despite being the primary board 
sub-committee for recruiting corporate board members, nomination committee has 
been largely overlooked as a key determinant of corporate gender diversity in the past. 
Past empirical studies on nomination committee (Clune et al. 2014, Ruigrok et al. 
2006) argue that nomination committee can play a major role in determining the board 
characteristics through ensuring a transparent and unbiased selection process. Last, a   
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review of the key determinants of corporate gender diversity requires an adequate 
analysis of “Glass Ceiling” studies to provide a comprehensive view on the corporate 
culture, environment, and mindset towards female corporate leadership. 
The following section has been organised as follows: First the key 
determinants have been categorized into two groups: (1) External Determinants 
(External Environment and Industry Characteristics); and (2) Internal Determinants 
(Organisational Characteristics, Board Characteristics, Board Committee 
Characteristics, and Nomination Committee).  
3.2.1.2.1 External Determinants  
 
3.2.1.2.1a. External Pressure 
Organisational survival depends on the level of compliance with the social 
expectations (Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 2007). Appointing female members 
on board can be a good mechanism to enhance firm’s legitimacy. Farrell and Hersch 
(2005, 104) state, “Women tend to serve on better performing firms. One possibility 
is that firms may simply be responding to outside pressure to create greater diversity”. 
Past studies (Matsa and Miller 2012, Ahern and Dittmar 2012, Agrawal and Knoeber 
2000) have shed light on the fact that firms do face political and societal pressure for 
appointing women on board. Hillman (2005, 464) claim “Resource dependence theory 
emphasizes the importance of linking firms with external contingencies that create 
uncertainty and interdependence. A critical source of external interdependency and 
uncertainty for business is government”. The author show that highly regulated 
industries have more political directors compare to less regulated industry. 
 Further, Helland and Sykuta (2004) also demonstrate that political influence and 
regulation on industry increases the number of political directors on boards.  
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Bigger and more visible firms tend to maintain their legitimacy via conforming 
to the societal expectations (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Hence, more visible 
corporations promote board gender diversity more deliberately due to social and 
political pressure. Walt and Ingley (2003) argue Firms play the role of good corporate 
citizen through complying with the diversity norms and having women on boards. 
Firms may receive external pressure to enhance board gender diversity due to 
implemented general and corporate legislations; pressure from stakeholders, investors 
and proponents of gender diversity; or peer pressure (just to follow the footsteps of the 
fellow countries who already adopted gender diversity legislation).  For instance, 
Huang and Kisgen (2013) state that the number of female executives appointed in the 
firms of a state can be influenced by the equality status of women in the respective 
society. Further, Farrell and Hersch (2005) claim that external pressure like 
shareholder activism can be one of the key reasons behind appointing women on 
board. Furthermore, a study conducted by Chapple and Humphrey (2014) show that 
although Australian firms are not under mandatory gender quota system but the “self-
regulatory quota system” can impose strong external pressure on them. They further 
claim that society and stakeholders’ expectation can play a primary role behind 
recruiting female members on board. Appointing minorities on board committees can 
also be influenced by political and regulatory pressures (Jiraporn, Singh, and Lee 
2009). On the contrary, Agrawal and Knoeber (2000) argue bigger sales to the 
government, larger exports, environmental regulation and lobbying are not significant 
in explaining the number of women on the board. This implies female board members 
do not play a political role. Thus, it can be argued that appointing female members on 
board can also be a result of organisational necessity rather than just external demand.   
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The responsibility towards board diversity arises from social and moral 
obligation (Walt and Ingley 2003). External environment plays an important role to 
shape board structure of a firm (Pfeffer 1972). Terjesen and Singh (2008, 55) state, 
“Women’s representation on corporate boards may be shaped by the larger 
environment, including the social, political and economic structures of individual 
countries”. Family, education, economy, and government influence (Grosvold, 
Rayton, and Brammer 2016); societal influence (Gregorič et al. 2017); environmental 
requirements (Ben-Amar, Chang, and McIlkenny 2017); and shareholder activism 
(Marquardt and Wiedman 2016) are some key external elements to influence board 
gender diversity. Randøy, Thomsen, and Oxelheim (2006, III) argue, “High gender 
diversity in Norway and Sweden probably reflects political priorities (e.g. the 
Norwegian quota)”. Besides political influence social impact also plays a key role in 
determining board gender diversity. Bianco, Ciavarella, and Signoretti (2015) show in 
small Italian companies the female directors are mostly appointed due to their family 
connection with the key shareholder. Gender diversity regulation is vital for initially 
motivating firms to appoint female members on boards and enhance the opportunity 
for more female members to acquire CEO/ Chair positions (Wang and Kelan 2013).  
3.2.1.2.1b. Industry Characteristics 
An industry, within which a firm operates, might play a key role in determining 
the percentage of female representation in that firm’s management. Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) argue, a particular set of executive backgrounds in a firm is not a 
random process but may be affected by the industry within which the company 
operates. Further, Brammer, Millington, and Pavelin (2007) claim female board 
members’ attributes are considered to be more valuable in some industries than in 
others. Hence, industry type might act as an important factor in determining the   
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percentage of female members in top corporate positions. The two key industry 
characteristics that play significant role in determining corporate gender diversity are: 
(1) Industry labour pool and (2) Industry product and customer type. In particular, the 
probability of female representation in the top corporate positions significantly 
depends on the percentage of female representation in the labour pool; the type of 
product and service served by the industry; and the type of the end customer. These 
industry characteristics might play crucial role to decide the level of benefit a firm can 
achieve from having female board members. Singh and Vinnicombe (2004, 481) argue 
“Where companies use market segmentation approaches, women’s involvement in 
corporate strategy is key because of the potential to develop and tailor products to 
women (Daily, Certo, and Dalton 1999)”.  
The nature of the industry’s labour pool also plays an important role in 
deciding the level of top corporate gender diversity. Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 
(2007, 945) argue that “Being in an industry with a large female employment base 
should tend to increase the benefits of female representation on a firm’s board of 
directors”. A gender diverse labour pool does appreciate a board with both male and 
female members. Female director’s presence on board not only better represents the 
needs of the female employees but also motivate them to progress in their careers 
(Bilimoria 2000). Lückerath-Rovers (2013, 493) state, “Female directors on boards 
can provide a valuable form of legitimacy in the eyes of potential and current 
employees, and women directors also symbolise career possibilities to prospective 
recruits”. Further, based on Stakeholder theory it can be argue that if the industry has 
a large female employee base, the chances of appointing female directors on board get 
escalated. Generally, percentage of top corporate female members is high in-service 
focused industries (e.g. health, banking) and industries dealing with their final   
192 
 
customers (e.g. retail). Due to their better cooperative, networking, and service skills 
more female employees serve these industries and hence they have a higher chance of 
being appointed as executives, senior executives and ultimately board members. 
Whereas businesses like logistics, construction, material and engineering, mostly deals 
with business customers and thus less interested to employ female directors. Brammer, 
Millington, and Pavelin (2007) claim customer-focused trades are more persuaded to 
assign women on board. Industries that directly serve their final customers (e.g. retail, 
banking, utilities and the media) and particularly deal with female consumers have a 
tendency of appointing more female directors on board. Female presence on board can 
better ensure legitimacy for the aid of their gender diverse clients and can build better 
connection with them.  
Based on a sample of 1000 U.S. firms Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 
(2007) show that female representation on board is highly influenced by industry type 
and other firm characteristics. Further, based on a sample of ASX 300 listed firms 
Chapple and Humphrey (2014) demonstrate that basic materials industries have 
negligible number of female board members, whereas service-oriented industries (e.g. 
telecommunications, consumer services and financials) have significant number of 
female members on their boards.   It is not easy for female leaders to successfully 
execute their leadership role in male dominated industries (Gardiner and Tiggemann 
1999). Hence, Fielden et al. (2000) claim that male dominated construction industry 
has negligible female representation on board despite fair representation of female in 
the workforce. Interestingly females have started to secure their positions in the boards 
of the previously male dominated industries. For instance, Singh and Vinnicombe 
(2004) argue that the scope of more competent and experienced female directors being   
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recruited is escalating in the automobile industry with the increasing number of 
wealthy female customers in this industry.  
3.2.1.2.2 Internal Determinants 
  
 3.2.1.2.2a. Organisational Characteristics 
Compare to other determinants of corporate gender diversity organisational 
characteristics have been highly explored by the academics. Significant numbers of 
past studies have investigated the link between organisational characteristics (firm 
size, firm performance, firm risk, firm strategy, and firm ownership structure) and 
female representations in the top corporate positions (e.g. board member, board 
Committee member, CEO, CFO). Organisational size is considered to be one of the 
key motivators of gender diverse board. Bigger firms are highly noticeable to the 
outsiders (Suchman 1995, Salancik 1979) and can face greater force to comply with 
the external pressure. The Stakeholder theory depicts that a company needs to consider 
the interest of all the related stakeholders (e.g. political groups, employees, customers, 
investors and so on) to properly manage and run its operation. Hence, large and more 
visible organisations tend to have higher female representation on the board (Chapple 
and Humphrey 2014). For instance, Munk (2003) argue that the largest U.S. 
companies face the maximum pressure from their institutional investors and 
regulators. Several past studies (Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003, Agrawal and 
Knoeber 2000) have find a positive relation between organisational size and board 
diversity (Farrell and Hersh 2005).  
Besides size an organisation’s performance level is also a significant predictor 
of board gender diversity. For instance, Gary Simpson, Carter, and D'Souza (2010, 38) 
suggested that “50% of the larger capitalization S&P 500 companies have one or more 
women directors, but only about 25% of the 1,000 mid-cap and small-cap S&P   
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companies have at least one women director”. Further, based on Fortune 500 firms 
Farrell and Hersch (2005) show that profitable firms exhibit higher percentage of 
female members on their board.  Larger, more profitable, and thus visible companies 
are easy targets of the external groups. Thus, these firms need to oblige more with 
regulations and stakeholders demand in order to build proper network with its outside 
environment (Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 2007).  
Firm-level strategy, firm structure, and ownership style are also familiar factors in 
determining the gender diversity on board. A firm adopting and implementing growth 
or diversification strategy can stimulate gender diversity on board. As the firm grows 
their environmental dependencies escalates and so does the importance of dependency 
on female directors, given that females can bring diverse perspectives, knowledge, 
skills and links to the board (Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 2007). Terjesen, 
Couto, and Francisco (2016) demonstrate firms in more complex environments are 
more likely to have gender-balanced boards. Lastly, the importance attached to 
diversity can also vary based on firm’s ownership structure (Ben‐Amar et al. 2013). 
For instance, Sheridan and Milgate (2005) find that in Australia family contacts are 
important for the selection of female directors on boards and Saeed et al. (2017) show 
that Family and state ownership of firms in China and India impact firms’ board 
gender diversity.  
Diverse firm characteristics can both positively and negatively impact female 
presence on top corporate position. Based on 100 largest firms of UK and Norway 
Grosvold, Brammer, and Rayton (2007, 355) show, “Growth in board diversity is the 
result of changing firm behaviour rather than a sectoral shift in the United Kingdom 
or Norwegian economies”. Further, Sabatier (2015) claim that female directors’ 
recruitment is a result of a long-term corporate strategy. Past literature has positively   
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related board gender diversity with firm size (Sheridan and Milgate 2005, Carter, 
Simkins, and Simpson 2003); firm performance (Martín-Ugedo and Minguez-Vera 
2014, Farrell and Hersch 2005); firm risk (Mulcahy and Linehan 2014); firm growth 
strategy (Sabatier 2015, de Cabo, Gimeno, and Nieto 2012); firm ownership structure 
(Sheridan and Milgate 2005); and firm’s gender equality within the senior 
management (Terjesen and Singh 2008). On the contrary, based on a sample of 
nonfinancial Spanish small and medium-sized enterprises, Martín-Ugedo and 
Minguez-Vera (2014) show that firm with high risk and higher corporate ownership 
have fewer female members on their boards.  
3.2.1.2.2b. Board Characteristics 
Board size, independence, and gender diversity are some of the key 
determinants of female representation on board. Brammer, Millington, and Pavelin 
(2007) state that bigger boards consisting of higher percentage of non-executives are 
usually more diverse. A bigger board have more room to accommodate more diverse 
members. Hence, Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) and Farag and Mallin (2016) 
find positive relation between board size and percentage of female members on board. 
Jensen (1993), and Yermack (1996) claim that board size is crucial for advising and 
monitoring. Women are known for their better monitoring and advising capabilities 
and a bigger board can effort to accommodate gender diverse members and offer better 
corporate governance. Further, Conyon and Mallin (1997a) claim that women are 
predominantly employed as non-executive directors on boards. A possible reason 
behind this is it is easier to satisfy the equal opportunity requirement through 
appointing non-executive female directors (Powell 1990). Lastly, presence of female 
directors on board can enhance the possibility of appointing more female members on 
board.   
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The possibility of firm recruiting female members on board has been positively 
linked to board size in the past.  For instance, based on a sample of Fortune 1000 firms 
Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003); 543 UK companies Brammer, Millington, and 
Pavelin (2007); and 329 MFIs (Micro finance institutes) in 73 countries Strøm, 
D’Espallier, and Mersland (2014) show that female representation on board is 
positively associated with larger boards. Further, based on the sample of 412 European 
banks from 20 European countries, de Cabo, Gimeno, and Nieto (2012, 158) argue 
“Women are less likely to appear on boards of directors where there is evidence that 
monitoring plays a minor role, that is, small boards.” 
Brammer, Millington, and Pavelin (2007) show a positive link between board 
independence and number of female members on board. However, Nekhili and 
Gatfaoui (2013, 243) argue “Board independence does not favour women with unique 
demographic attributes”. Further, chance of a female member to be appointed in a 
male dominated board is less compare to a more gender-neutral board (Elkinawy and 
Stater 2011). On the contrary, Farrell and Hersch (2005) argue, presence of female 
directors on board negatively impact female member addition to board. They state, 
“Woman to its board in a given year is negatively affected by the number of women 
already on the board. The probability increased when a female director departs the 
board” (Farrell and Hersch 2005, 85). 
3.2.1.2.2c. Board Sub-Committees 
Besides key determinants of corporate gender diversity (e.g. industry, firm and 
board characteristics), board committee types and composition can also be considered 
as a determining factor of board gender diversity. Till date no significant study has 
directly observed the impact of the board sub-committee type and structure on board 
gender diversity. The gender preference of the members of different board committees   
197 
 
can be a potential influencing factor for board gender diversity. Hence, the existence 
of certain board committees (e.g. Audit Committee, Executive committee, Corporate 
Social committee, and Nomination committee) might impact the percentage of female 
directors on board. 
Jiraporn, Singh, and Lee (2009) show, through additional analysis of board 
committee memberships of 1500 IRRC firms between 1999 and 2003, board 
committees appoint more women and ethnic minorities. Based on this argument it can 
be state that the higher the number of board committees in a firm the greater the chance 
of female members to be appointed on board. However, past research has also 
demonstrated that gender preference of diverse board committees might differ based 
on their characteristics and tasks. The composition of important board committees 
(Audit, Nominating, Compensation, and Executive committees) differ significantly 
from the composition of corporate boards in general (Kesner 1988). The author show 
gender mix among the members of audit and compensation committees are balanced, 
however compensation and nominating committees prefer male than female members.  
Further, Bilimoria and Piderit (1994) investigate the committee membership of 300 
Fortune 500 companies in 1984 and find male membership is preferable in more 
important committees (e.g. Compensation, Executive, and Finance committees), 
where female membership is more preferable in public affairs committees.  Peterson 
and Philpot (2007, 177) support this argument through showing that, “Female 
directors are less likely than male directors to sit on executive committees and more 
likely than male directors to sit on public affairs committees”. Therefore, on one hand 
existence of certain type of committees (Executive and Finance) might lower the 
chances of female members’ appointment on board. On the other hand, existence of   
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public affair committees might increase the scope of recruiting female members on 
board.  
3.2.2 Nomination Committee 
Nomination committee is the foundational committee for determining the staffing 
and characteristics of the overall board and other board committees (Clune et al. 2014). 
A well-constructed and active nomination committee can be an efficient and effective 
mechanism to ensure the transparency, focus and independent judgement required to 
achieve proper composition of the board. Hence, an independent nomination 
committee can ensure better corporate governance and organisational outcomes 
(Brown and Caylor 2006).  
Nomination committee can reduce CEO power through defining the profile of 
prospective directors and recruiting the suitable directors who match the defined 
profile. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) show that greater CEO domination during the 
nomination process can lead to more ‘grey’ directors and insiders in the corporate 
board and board committees. This in turn can adversely impact the corporate 
governance and accounting outcomes (Clune et al. 2014). According to the regulatory 
requirement of nomination committee formation, the CEO is not allowed to actively 
participate during the director selection process. Hence, the existence of an 
independent nomination committee is crucial to achieve a well-structured and 
effective board (Ruigrok et al. 2006). Formation of nomination committee ensures a 
transparent recruiting process of directors and thus stock market reacts negatively to 
any director incentive plan without nomination committee (Gerety, Hoi, and Robin 
2001). Nomination committee can ensure appointment of active directors by departing 
the management and control in the firm (Shivdasani and Yermack 1999) and ensures 
necessary resources and legitimacy for independent board performance (Eminet and   
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Guedri 2010). Financial authorities require nomination committees to be transparent 
to the shareholders by reporting the recruiting and reviewing process in the annual 
report. Therefore, nomination committees have strong interest to maintain its 
reputation as effective monitors and hence implement a formal, rigorous and 
transparent process for the appointment and reappointment of directors to the board 
and ensure better board performance.  
Listed companies in Australia are required to establish a nomination committee. 
As per ASX CGC principles and recommendations the nomination committee should 
be comprised of at least three members, a majority of whom are independent directors, 
and is chaired by an independent director. A nomination committee should be of 
sufficient size, independence and have diversity in membership to discharge its 
mandate effectively and avoid entrenching insensible bias. 
Nomination committee is established last among all the other board committees 
(Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye 2012). Hence, its existence, structure, and impact are 
least explored (Ruigrok et al. 2006). Despite being the committee responsible for 
shaping the characteristics of the board and other sub-committees (Clune et al. 2014), 
only recently it has started to receive academic attention (Eminet and Guedri 2010). 
The proxies of an active and diligent nomination committee are its structure and 
activity level. Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye (2012, 474) state, “Nomination committee 
characteristics are significant antecedents of board diversity; hence composition of the 
nomination committee is an important step and pre-requisite for assembling a diverse 
board”. Hence, the following section aims to explore impact of several nomination 
committee attributes (Existence of Nomination Committee, Nomination Committee 
Size, Nomination Committee Independence, Nomination Committee Gender 
Diversity, and Nomination Committee Activities) on board gender diversity.  
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3.2.2.1 Existence of Nomination Committee 
Existence of nomination committee can ensure appointment of active directors 
by departing the management and control in the firm (Shivdasani and Yermack 1999) 
and ensures necessary resources and legitimacy for independent board performance 
(Eminet and Guedri 2010). Financial authorities require nomination committees to be 
transparent to the shareholders by reporting the recruiting and reviewing process in 
the annual report. Therefore, NCs have strong interest to maintain its reputation as 
effective monitors and hence implements a formal, rigorous and transparent process 
for the appointment and reappointment of directors to the board and ensures better 
board performance. Listed companies in Australia are required to have a nomination 
committee. As per ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations the 
nomination committee should be comprised of at least three members, a majority of 
whom are independent directors, and is chaired by an independent director. It should 
be of sufficient size, independence and have diversity in membership to discharge its 
mandate effectively and avoid entrenching insensible bias. Enhanced female 
representation on board can be achieved through change in corporate attitude towards 
the selection process and by having a transparent selection procedure.  
3.2.2.2 Nomination Committee Size and Independence  
ASX requires the listed Australian companies to have nomination committees 
comprised of at least three members and majority of them should be independent. 
Based on the agency theory it can be argue that the existence of bigger nomination 
committees comprised of more independent members can reduce agency conflict by 
diminishing CEO power over the selection process and selecting more 
demographically diverse board members with better monitoring capabilities. Conyon 
and Mallin (1997a) argue that establishment of nomination committees, consist of   
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mostly independent directors, can overcome current issues related to the selection 
process. An independent nomination committee can enhance gender diversity on 
board through formally accepting the guidelines of equal opportunity. And the gender 
diverse board   gender diverse board in turn can act as an active linking mechanism 
between the firm and its external environment (resource dependence theory). Ruigrok 
et al. (2006, 14) state, “Women directors are an important resource linking the firm to 
its external environment and nomination committees concerned with aligning board 
composition with the societal and investor expectations are more likely to nominate 
female board members”.  
3.2.2.3 Nomination Committee Gender Diversity 
Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow (2014) and Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye 
(2012) show that female representation on nomination committee positively impacts 
the gender diversity on corporate board. Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye (2012, 477) 
argue that, “The presence of females on the nomination committee is also likely to 
sensitize other committee members toward gender equality issues as well as the 
possibility of gaining new and different insights from further female board 
membership”. Frequent and open discussion among the nomination committee 
members can further enhance the possibility of a transparent selection of board 
members by nomination committee. An active and diligent nomination committee that 
meets more frequently can ensure unbiased selection of female board members 
without the influence of CEO. 
3.2.2.4 Nomination Committee Meeting Frequency 
The efficacy and activeness of a group are usually measured by a group’s 
diligence. And the number of group meetings is considered as the most utilised 
measure of group’s diligence. In the past literature (Raghunandan and Rama 2007,   
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Stewart and Munro 2007, Xie, Davidson III, and DaDalt 2003) board and audit 
committee meeting frequencies have been associated with better communication, 
coordination, and efficiency of those groups. However, too many meetings per year 
may also be perceived as a sign of organisational issues by the shareholders (Vafeas 
1999). Nomination committee recommendations are fairly new inclusion in ASX CGC 
principals. The recommendations demand for establishment of nomination committee 
of certain size and independence, however it does not specify the number of times the 
committee should meet per year. Similarly, UK corporate governance code does not 
specify any optimal number of meetings that the nomination committee should hold 
per year. ASCGC requires ASX listed firms to disclose the number of times they meet 
per year. One reason behind no regulatory requirement for nomination committee 
meeting frequency is, the optimal number of meeting frequency may differ in terms 
of an organisational characteristics and requirements.  
3.3 Theoretical Framework 
3.3.1 Theories Applied 
Nomination committee literature is mostly ruled by agency theory. Agency 
theory alone is insufficient to provide a full view of the impact of nomination 
committee existence and its composition towards board composition (Ruigrok et al. 
2006). Clune et al. (2014) claim that agency theory alone provides narrow perspective 
for subcommittee process. Further, Ruigrok et al. (2006, 4, 7) state, “Agency theory 
offers only a partial view (solution) to the board composition problem and fails to 
explain motives of human behaviour”. Hence, several recent nomination committee 
studies (Clune et al. 2014, Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow 2014, Kaczmarek, Kimino, 
and Pye 2012, Ruigrok et al. 2006) adopt multi-theoretical approach. For instance, 
Ruigrok et al. (2006) utilise agency theory, resource-dependence theory and group   
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effectiveness theory to investigate the determinants and consequences of nomination 
committee. Clune et al. (2014, 782) claim, “A one-dimensional, agency-only 
perspective is simply insufficient to describe board committee activities. In addition 
to agency-based monitoring, directors care about legitimacy and best practices 
(institutional theory), strive to hire and retain talented managers (resource dependence 
theory), sometimes are dominated by management (managerial hegemony/power), 
and may seek director candidates similar to themselves (similarity–attraction 
principle). There is much more happening in the boardroom than simply providing 
objective monitoring of management”. Besides well-known theories, like, resource 
dependence theory, agency theory and institutional theory; socio-psychological 
/behavioural theories (e.g. social-identity theory, similarity attraction theory, and 
groupthink theory) have been significantly applied in the past nomination committee 
and board composition studies. In particular, these behavioural theories have been 
utilised to understand the power struggle between management insiders and 
shareholders to appoint the right candidates for board; and to understand the 
nomination committee composition and its impact on board composition. 
This study investigates role of nomination committee existence and its four 
attributes (size, independence, gender diversity and meeting frequency) in determining 
female representation on board. Thus, applies multi-theoretical approach to develop 
the five testable hypotheses (HI-H5) of this study. The theories are agency theory, 
resource dependence theory, and behavioural theories (social identity theory, 
similarity attraction theory, and groupthink theory). These theories are not rivals in 
terms of their basics arguments and provide different viewpoints to look at the impact 
of nomination committee attributes on board gender diversity. The following section   
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defines and justifies the utilisation of these respective theories in order to develop HI-
H5. 
3.3.1.1 Agency Theory Underpinning H1, H2, H4 and H5 
Agency theory (Fama 1980, Jensen and Meckling 1976) depicts, management 
(agent) is responsible for ensuring stronger corporate governance on behalf of the 
shareholders (client), however the isolation of management from client can stimulate 
agent’s opportunistic behaviour and enhance agent-client conflict. Agency theory is 
primarily concerned with efficiency of resource management from shareholders’ 
perspective (Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003). Board members are primarily 
responsible for reducing managerial opportunism and protect shareholders’ wealth 
through stronger oversight. Hence, a well-constructed board composed of diverse and 
unbiased members is the key condition to mitigate agent-client conflict. Past empirical 
studies show that female directors are careful monitors (Adams and Ferreira 2009, 
Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 2007, Farrell and Hersch 2005); frequently demand 
for more audit efforts (Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui 2008); and managerial accountability 
(Adams and Ferreira 2009). Further, female directors are not part of the “Old boys’ 
network”, hence their presence on board can bring diverse views, arguments and 
different perception to risk, leading towards more independent decisions, stronger 
oversight of managers and legitimate organisational outcomes.  
Agency theory suggests that director recruitment decisions made by insiders 
are mostly in their self-interest rather than client’s interest (Hutchinson, Mack, and 
Plastow 2014). Hence, Eminet and Guedri (2010, 558) claim, “The need to create 
nominating committees is in line with the logic established by agency theory which 
underlines the need to separate the firm’s control and management functions.  From 
this perspective, nominating committees should be able to reduce the influence of firm   
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CEOs on the process of director selection”.  Osma and Noguer (2007) demonstrate 
nomination committee existence and its structure can passively mitigate earnings 
manipulation through appointing more independent and unbiased members on boards. 
Establishment of a well-constructed nomination committee, independent of 
management, can ensure fair and transparent recruitment process and can enhance the 
opportunity of more female members to be appointed on board and reduce agent-client 
conflict. 
Several past literatures (Cheng 2008, Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells 1998, 
Conyon and Peck 1998) associate larger groups (e.g. boards and subcommittees) with 
dysfunctionality, disruption of proper communication, coordination and control, and 
agency problems. Yermack (1996, 209) state, “Jensen (1993) have criticized the 
performance of large boards, stating that problems of poor communication and 
decision-making overwhelm the effectiveness of such groups”. From an agency 
perspective a nomination committee’s key role is to ensure effective control by the 
board through appointing the right directors (Ruigrok et al. 2006). However, a larger 
nomination committee with too many members might lead to disagreements and make 
it easier for the insiders to intervene the recruitment decisions. As a result, the 
nomination committee might fail to perform their duties independent of the 
management and end up with more insider directors on board. This in turn can lead to 
more homogeneous board, sacrifice effective monitoring and control by board, and 
lead to higher agent-client conflict. 
Based on agency theory perspective a group meeting frequency can be both 
positively and negatively associated with its outcomes. Several past board and audit 
committee diligence literature (Raghunandan and Rama 2007, Stewart and Munro 
2007, Xie, Davidson III, and DaDalt 2003) claim, higher number of meetings stands   
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for highly active group and can reduce agent-client conflict. Raghunandan and Rama 
(2007) argue that number of meetings is publicly measurable and best measaure for 
mitigating agency cost. Higher number of group’s meeting can ensure more frequent 
communication among members and lead to effective decisions. Based on agency 
perspective, Xie, Davidson III, and DaDalt (2003) demonstrate higher meeting 
frequency of board and audit committee, positively associate with lower earnings 
management. On the contrary, Vafeas (1999) argue a higher board meeting frequency 
can be a consequence of poor firm performance and declining share price. Hence, a 
higher number of board meetings can be a result of agent-client conflict. Based on 
agency perspective and above discussion, it can be argued that higher meeting 
frequency of nomination committee can ensure better communication among the 
members. A more frequent communication among members can successfully sort out 
recruitment related issues, constrain unwanted influence of management insiders over 
recruiting process and lead to a more effective, unbiased and transparent, recruiting 
decision by nomination committee. However too many nomination committee 
meetings can also be an outcome of internal managerial conflict and/or agent-client 
conflict regarding director selection process. 
3.3.1.2 Resource Dependence Theory Underpinning H1, H2 and H3 
Resource dependency theory focuses on firm’s legitimacy. Resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) addresses firm as an open system 
which depends on its environment for its survival. Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold 
(2000) board act as a linking mechanism between firm and its external environment. 
Board of directors can play resource dependence roles to help reduce organisational 
dependency on its external environment in two ways: firstly, by providing vital 
resources to the board and secondly, by securing resources for the firm through   
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linkages to the external environment (Hillman, Cannella, and Harris 2002). An 
effective and efficient board can aid the corporation by providing, (1) legitimacy, (2) 
advice and counsel, and (3) proper networking with inside and outside elements. 
External environmental elements (e.g. shareholders and other stakeholders) prefer to 
have a board that better represent them. A gender diverse board not only better reflects 
a firm’s diverse customer and employee base but also sends a positive signal to the 
diverse labour pool, investors, and product market (Carter et al. 2010). Based on 
resource dependence lens it can be argued that gender diversity on board better reflects 
the population served and reduces uncertainty through eliminating dependency on the 
external resources.  
3.3.1.3 Socio-Psychological Theories Underpinning H4 and H5 
Past literature has frequently used socio-psychological behavioural theories to 
understand sub-committee composition and its consequences. In nomination 
committee literature the most frequently used behavioural theories are, social-identity 
theory, similarity attraction theory, groupthink theory, and homosocial reproduction.  
According to Social identity theory (Hogg and Terry 2000, Ashforth and Mael 
1989, Turner and Oakes 1986) individuals tend to perceive themselves as members of 
certain social groups. A person categorizes himself/herself based on various social 
groups such as gender, nationality, education, or profession (Kaczmarek, Kimino, and 
Pye 2012). Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye (2012, 477) claim, “Each category is 
underpinned by norms and stereotypes of social group membership which will impact 
on behaviour. Hence, each social group to which an individual belongs influences his/ 
her definition of self, based on the attributes of the given social group (Tajfel and 
Turner 1986, Hogg and Terry 2000)”. As per this theory individual achieve a certain 
level of comfort and confidence while surrounded by the people of same   
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demographics.  According to this theory a firm appointing new board members 
without any clear selection measures and decision processes can end up 
demographically homogeneous board members due to behavioural limitations and 
bounded rationality explain in this theory (Ruigrok et al. 2006).  Kaczmarek, Kimino, 
and Pye (2012, 477) argue, “In line with social identity theory, the CEO may also 
prefer people who are demographically similar in order to enhance her/his feeling of 
security and self-esteem (Wagner, Pfeffer, and O'Reilly III 1984). When the influence 
of CEO presence on the nomination committee is successful, there will be a greater 
number of both non-executive and executive directors appointed who are 
demographically similar to the CEO in terms of age, gender, nationality, education 
degree, board tenure, and financial specialism.”. On a different note the presence of 
demographically diverse member(s) in the group (e.g. board, sub-committee) can 
motivate other members to be open-minded towards the inclusion of diverse members 
(social-identity perspective). “The presence of females on the nomination committee 
is also likely to sensitize other committee members toward gender equality issues as 
well as the possibility of gaining new and different insights from further female board 
membership” (Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye 2012).  
Similarity attraction theory (Byrne 1971, Byrne, Clore Jr, and Worchel 1966) 
depicts, generally demographically similar individuals share the same views, life 
experience and values, and thus find each other more attractive and desirable 
(Westphal and Zajac 1995). Hence, nomination committee members usually tend to 
recommend demographically similar individuals to the board (Kaczmarek, Kimino, 
and Pye 2012). If there is no nomination committee or nomination committee is 
occupied with insiders and controlled by CEO, the chances of less diverse board 
candidates being elected get higher (Zajac and Westphal 1996, Westphal and Zajac   
209 
 
1995). Board candidates sharing the same demographical and experiential background 
tend to support the decisions and actions of the current members. Kaczmarek, Kimino, 
and Pye (2012, 477) state, “When the influence of CEO presence on the nomination 
committee is successful, it likely to diminish the overall level of diversity on a board 
in terms of these attributes and the potential for a fault line in terms of the subgroup 
formation will be reduced”. 
Groupthink theory (Janis 1972) demands, the members of a closely interrelated 
(less diverse) group sacrifice their views and perspectives to maintain harmony and 
cohesion of the group. As a result, “An individual’s legitimate concerns are not 
actively voiced by the individual and optimal decisions are forgone” (Abbott, Parker, 
and Presley 2012, 611). Three indicators of groupthink: “(1) failure to initiate or 
maintain contact with an opposition group or idea, (2) lack of cooperation with a third-
party mediator, and (3) failure to extend the time period needed to make a decision” 
(Esser 1998, 124-125). Hence, a heterogeneous group can diminish the adverse effect 
of groupthink, by introducing diverse perspectives and solutions to the group.  Gender 
diversity within the group can improve decision-making efficacy (Lee and Farh 2004, 
Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin 1999, Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, and Bourgeois 1997).   Some 
of the key advantages of having a heterogeneous or more diverse group are: 
enhancement of group dynamics, processing advantage in group decision making, 
greater communication and consideration of diverse viewpoints, proactive discussion 
of various solutions to task, generation of more questioning of the status quo, reduction 
of groupthink, improvement of monitoring process, and higher quality decisions 
(Abbott, Parker, and Presley 2012). Thus, a nomination committee composed of 
diverse (independent and female) members can diminish the harmful effect of   
210 
 
groupthink and recruitment biasness by appointing more diverse members to the 
board. 
Based on social identity theory, similarity attraction theory and groupthink 
theory it can be argue that non-existence of nomination committee or a homogeneous 
nomination committee can lead to biased recruitment process of corporate directors 
and end up having a more homogeneous board. On the contrary, a nomination 
committee composed of mostly independent and demographically divers members 
(e.g. gender, age, education, background) can diminish the internal coalition and 
groupthink of insiders, constrain flawed selection process, and offer an unbiased 
selection process of female directors.47  
3.3.2 Hypotheses Development 
Compare to other board committees (audit and remuneration), only recently 
(2000 onwards) nomination committee has started to get attention from regulators.  
Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye (2012, 485) state, “The slower rate of adoption of 
nomination committees compared with audit and remuneration committees may 
suggest that economic rationale for nomination committee existence is not clear-cut”. 
However empirical research conducted on nomination committee so far strongly 
support establishment of nomination committee. The impact of nomination committee 
existence and its attributes on shaping board gender diversity is still significantly 
unexplored. The following section represents the hypotheses development of board 
gender diversity and nomination committee attributes based on prior literature and 
theoretical paradigms.   
                                                          
47 “The flawed selection process means that ‘a large pool of talent is ignored by a small pool of traditional talent perpetuating 
the status quo’ (Groysberg and Bell, 2012, p. 2). Consequently, the lack of gender diversity on boards can be attributed to the 
director selection process. A NC, separate from the board, can avoid the dominance of the CEO or other directors which 
augments the independence of the nominating process” Abbott (2012). 
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3.3.2.1 Nomination Committee Existence and Gender Diverse Board  
Existence of nomination committee can ensure appointment of active directors 
by departing the management and control in the firm (Shivdasani and Yermack 1999) 
and ensures necessary resources and legitimacy for independent board performance 
(Eminet and Guedri 2010). Gerety, Hoi, and Robin (2001) show that stock market 
reacts negatively to the fact that the firm has no nomination committee or the CEO is 
involved in the selection process of directors. Further, several corporate governances 
related reports express the need to improve the director recruiting process via 
establishment of independent nomination committee (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 
2004, d'entreprise and Viénot 1999). An independent nomination committee not only 
separates the nominating process from management (Shivdasani and Yermack 1999) 
but also provide required resources and legitimacy for independently operating the 
nomination process (Huse 2007).   
Agency theory (Fama 1980, Jensen and Meckling 1976) and resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Pfeffer 1972) support the 
establishment of a separate nomination committee. Independent nomination 
committee existence separates the director selection process from management and 
thus constrains CEO influence on directors nominating decision (agency theory). 
Nomination committee also acts as a linking mechanism between the firm and its 
external environment (stakeholders and shareholders) through ensuring a transparent 
and legitimate director section process (resource dependence theory). Financial 
authorities require nomination committees to be transparent to the shareholders by 
reporting the recruiting and reviewing process in the annual report. Therefore, 
nomination committees have strong interest to maintain its reputation as effective 
monitors and hence implement formal, rigorous and transparent process for the   
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appointment and reappointment of directors to the board and ensure better board 
performance. Ruigrok et al. (2006, 14) claim, “Women directors are an important 
resource linking the firm to its external environment and nomination committees 
concerned with aligning board composition with the societal and investor expectations 
are more likely to nominate female board members”. 
However, existence of separate nomination committee does not always ensure 
a legitimate and unbiased nominating process. If a separate nomination committee 
exists and the CEO is a member, or nomination committee is comprised of mostly 
executive directors, then CEO can influence the nomination process. Further, the 
nomination process approach is equally important for ensuring an unbiased selection 
process. Clune et al. (2014) introduce the mechanistic vs organic approach. A 
mechanistic approach of nominating process is more structured and formal, and thus 
can constrain CEO and management influence. Thus, the nomination committee 
establishment must be accompanied by a legitimate structure and strong strategic 
process. 
In summary, a mere existence of nomination committee alone, cannot always 
assure an unbiased nominating process of female directors. Clune et al. (2014, 778) 
quote, “We find that the reality of many director searches does not match the 
NYSE’s notion of independent nomination committees driving the director 
nomination process. In addition, it is unclear how complete and transparent the 
typical nomination committee is in communicating the nature of its processes to 
shareholders”. Hence, establishment of a separate nomination committee with a 
foundation of strong structural characteristics and legitimate nominating process 
can only ensure an unbiased selection of female directors on board. Based on 
above discussion this study hypothesized,   
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H1: There is an association between nomination committee existence and board 
gender diversity. 
 
3.3.2.2 Nomination Committee Size and Gender Diverse Board  
Common assumptions regarding bigger boards and subcommittees are, they 
have more room for independent and diverse members and therefore more effective. 
For instance, Abbott, Parker, and Peters (2004) claim that larger audit committees are 
better legitamised .  
On the contrary, several research (Yermack 1996, Bhagat and Black 1996, 
Jensen 1993) in the past negatively link firm value with board size. The arguments 
behind this negative correlation are, bigger groups can spoil effective communication, 
coordination, and decision-making task (Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells 1998); 
increase dysfunctionality (Lipton and Lorsch 1992); enhance loss of productivity 
(Jensen 1993). A possible explanation is a larger group requires more input time for 
decision making (Vafeas 1999) and might have higher disagreements. Thus, it is easier 
for the CEO to interfere and control board decisions when the board size is large 
(Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells 1998). Yermack (1996, 187) claim “Smaller boards 
are more likely to dismiss CEOs following periods of poor performance. Similarly, 
evidence shows that CEO compensation exhibits greater sensitivity to performance in 
companies with small boards.”  Further, bigger boards do not always ensure presence 
of higher percentage of independent members. Chen and Al-Najjar (2012) show that 
percentage of Chinese corporate board independence is driven by regulation and not 
by board size. 
Empirical research on the importance of nomination committee size is thin. 
Based on human capital perspective it can be expected that a larger nomination 
committee has more room for member with diverse skills, experiences, and 
knowledge. However, based on agency perspective it can be argue that larger   
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nomination committee does not always ensure presence of higher percentage of 
independent and diverse members, and can end up with dysfunctional and biased 
recruiting process. Therefore, this study hypothesizes that, 
H2: There is an association between the size of nomination Committee and board 
gender diversity. 
 
3.3.2.3 Nomination Committee Independence and Gender diverse board  
Presence of independent directors on board is associated with better firm 
performance (Baysinger and Butler 1985); better preservation of shareholders' interest 
(Brickley, Coles, and Terry 1994, Byrd and Hickman 1992, Weisbach 1988); positive 
investor reactions (Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990). Boone et al. (2007) claim, board 
independence can constrain CEO influence. Abbott, Parker, and Peters (2004) argue, 
independent audit committee members offer greater monitoring as they have no 
economic or psychological ties to management which may interfere with their ability 
to question management. 
Past studies negatively link presence of independent nomination committee 
members with reduced CEO influence over director nominating process (Higgs 2003, 
Dalton et al. 1998). Ruigrok et al. (2006) analyse the relation between nomination 
committee composition and board composition. They find a positive link between 
nomination committee independence and board independence. Based on Similarity 
attraction theory, Social identity theory, they argue that nomination committee 
executive members are more inclined to appoint insiders rather than independent 
directors for corporate boards. Hence, based on social identity and similarity attraction 
theory it can be argue that presence of independent member(s) in nomination 
committee can constrain group cohesion (groupthink theory) among nomination 
committee executive members and ensure fair recruitment of female directors who are   
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mostly outsiders (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011, Powell 1990, Conyon and Mallin 
1997a).  
ASX requires the listed Australian corporations to have nomination 
committees comprised of at least three members and majority of whom should be 
independent. Based on the agency theory it can be argue that the existence of 
nomination committees comprised of more independent members can reduce agency 
conflict by diminishing CEO power over the selection process and selecting more 
demographically diverse board members with better monitoring capabilities. Conyon 
and Mallin (1997a) argue that establishment of nomination committees, consist of 
mostly independent directors can overcome current issues related to the selection 
process. An independent nomination committee can enhance gender diversity on 
board through formally accepting the guidelines of equal opportunity. By appointing 
more independent and/or female corporate directors, nomination committee preserves 
shareholders interest and maintain its reputation and in turn the gender diverse board 
can act as an active linking mechanism between the firm and its external environment 
(resource dependence theory).  Therefore, this study hypothesizes that, 
H3: There is a positive association between the independence of nomination 
committee and board gender diversity. 
 
3.3.2.4 Nomination Committee Gender Diversity and Gender Diverse Board  
Nomination committee gender diversity got reasonable academic attention 
compare to other attributes of nomination committee. Based on Similarity-attraction 
theory (Walster, Walster, and Berscheid 1978, Byrne 1971) and Social identity theory, 
Ruigrok et al. (2006) attempt to establish a link between female presence on 
nomination committee and board gender diversity of 210 Swiss public firms (2001-
2003); Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye (2012) establish a positive relation between 
nomination committee gender diversity and board gender diversity of FTSE350   
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companies (1999-2008); and Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow (2014) show that 
nomination committee gender diversity significantly and positively associate with the 
increase (from 2008 to 2011) of female representation on board of top 500 ASX listed 
firms.  
According to the Similarity-attraction theory, “Nomination committee 
members may tend to recommend candidates to the board who share some 
demographic and/or experiential characteristics with them. This similarity is likely to 
enhance interpersonal attraction, mutual reinforcement, or consensual validation 
(Westphal and Zajac 1995)” (Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye 2012, 476). Social identity 
theory depicts a nomination committee executive member(s) will be more inclined to 
appoint demographically similar members in order to maintain their feelings of 
security and group cohesion (groupthink theory). On the contrary, presence of a female 
nomination committee member might positively alter the perception of other members 
towards gender equality (Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye 2012). Further, Hutchinson, 
Mack, and Plastow (2014, 7) claim, “A diverse nomination committee provides a 
wider knowledge base than homogeneous individuals and nominates directors from 
the whole talent pool thus diminishing individual biases. Research suggests that 
diversity brings with it an awareness of the detrimental effects of groupthink and 
individual biases on the decision-making process”. Based on above discussion this 
study hypothesizes,  
H4: There is a positive association between nomination committee gender diversity 
and board gender diversity. 
 
3.3.2.5 Nomination Committee Meeting Frequency and Gender Diverse Board  
Meeting frequency of a group is seen as a proxy for diligence (Davidson, 
Goodwin‐Stewart, and Kent 2005, Song and Windram 2004, Abbott et al. 2003, Xie, 
Davidson III, and DaDalt 2003). Abbott, Parker, and Peters (2004) argue that meeting   
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frequently is the only way of assessing the recent issues and development of an audit 
committee. Thus, in the past, audit committee meeting has been positively associated 
with higher financial reporting quality (Turley and Zaman 2004, Abbott, Park, and 
Parker 2000, Beasley et al. 2000). 
On the contrary, Vafeas (1999) claim that board meeting frequency is a by-
product of firm poor performance and it is positively related to the level of outside 
directors’ presence on board. Further, Stewart and Munro (2007) demonstrate audit 
committee meeting frequency neither positively impact audit quality nor resolve issues 
between audit team and management.  
A group’s effectiveness primarily depends on its level of activities; however, 
it should also have a strong structure and resources (DeZoort et al. 2002) to perform 
effectively. Stewart and Munro (2007, 54) state, “The effectiveness of the audit 
committee is dependent on its composition (the independence and expertise of its 
members), its authority (responsibilities and influence) and its resources (number of 
members and access to other governance parties) (DeZoort et al. 2002)”.  
The impact of nomination committee meeting frequency on the quality of 
recruiting decision has not been explored in the past. Based on the above discussion it 
is fair to argue, higher meeting frequency of nomination committee might be a by-
product of recruitment related issues and presence of higher percentage of nomination 
committee independent members. As a result, higher nomination committee meeting 
frequency might not always ensure better and unbiased nomination decision. On the 
contrary, frequent and open discussion among the nomination committee members 
might enhance the possibility of a transparent selection of board members. An active 
and diligent nomination committee that meets frequently is rationally expected to 
ensure an unbiased selection of female board members without the influence of CEO   
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(agency perspective). Hence, an optimal number of meeting frequency of a well 
composed and resourceful nomination committee can lead to unbiased nominating 
decision of female director(s). Therefore, this study hypothesizes that, 
H5: There is an association between the meeting frequency of nomination committee 
and board gender diversity. 
 
3.4 Research Methodology 
3.4.1 Sample and Data  
3.4.1.1 Data Collection 
The sample of this research consists of randomly selected firms listed on the 
ASX during the voluntary period of 2008-2010.48 The initial sample includes all 2028 
ASX listed firms between 2008 and 2010. As the sample firms include not just the top 
ASX listed firms but firms of all sizes, it helps to provide a better understanding of the 
nomination committee characteristics-board gender diversity relationship persisted in 
the ASX listed firms during the voluntary period. 
The sample firms’ data is extracted from 2008 to 2010. ASX CGC 
recommendations on nomination committee first came into action in 2003 and revised 
in 2007.  Hence, nomination committee existence in ASX listed firms further escalated 
after 2007. Therefore, the commencing sample period of this study is 2008. The ending 
sample period of this study is 2010, the last year prior to the implementation of ASX 
CGC gender diversity recommendations. According to Australian Institute of 
Company Directors (AICD) report in 2013, women started joining Australian boards 
at a higher rate after the introduction of ASX CGC gender diversity recommendations 
in 2010. Hence, the examination of nomination committee characteristics-board 
gender diversity relationship prior to the implementation of gender diversity   
                                                          
48 ASXCGC recommendations regarding female representation on board implemented from 2011. Hence, 2008-2010 is 
considered as voluntary period, when ASX listed firms were not under regulatory pressure to appoint female director(s) on 
board. 
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recommendations in 2011 or during the voluntary period (2008-2010) demonstrates 
the true impact of nomination committee attributes on board gender diversity in the 
absence of regulatory pressure.  
The final sample firms are pooled from 2028 ASX listed firms after several 
exclusions and through a stratified-random sampling approach.49 At first, the firms 
with missing market capitalisation between 2007 and 2010 are excluded.50 Followed 
by the exclusion of firms belong to specific GICs (Global Industry Classification 
Standard) code, due to their additional regulation requirements. Then the existing 
listed firms are ranked in terms of their market capitalisation and stratified into four 
quartiles (Q1-Q2). Subsequently, 150 random firms are pooled from each quartile. 
This results in an initial sample of 600 firms for each sample period and 1800 firm-
year observations for the whole sample period (2008-2010). This sample selection 
approach helped to avoid sample selection bias as equal amount of randomly selected 
firms is selected from each quartile. Then further exclusion is made based on missing 
annual reports and related data. 
Table 3.1: The Sample 
Panel A: Exclusion and Final Sample 
 Number of Observations (2008-2010) 
 Total 2008 2009 2010 
All Australian firms listed on Australian Securities Exchange (ASX)  2028 2028 2028 
Firms with missing Market Capital between 2007-2010  (683) (683) (683) 
Firms belong to Utility, Insurance, Diversified Financial, Real Estate, 
and Banking Industry 
 (217) (217) (217) 
Exclusion based on Research Randomizer Generated numbers51  (528) (528) (528) 
Missing Annual Reports and Corporate Governance variables  (29) (29) (29) 
Total number of firm-year observations (2008-2010) 1713 571 571 571 
Panel B: GICs Segregation of Final Sample  
                                                          
49 In stratified random sampling, the strata are formed based on members' shared attributes or characteristics. A random sample 
from each stratum is taken in a number proportional to the stratum's size when compared to the population. These subsets of 
the strata are then pooled to form a random sample. 
50 Although the sample period is 2008-2010, existence of the sample firms in 2007 is also taken into consideration 
in order to deal with certain variables, for instance, Sales Growth in 2008 requires sales revenues of both 2007 
and 2008. 
51 After the first and second exclusions due to missing market capital and GICs code, each stratified quartile (Q1-Q2) received 
282 sample firms.  With the help of Research Randomizer https://www.randomizer.org/  150 random numbers are generated 
for each quartile. The rest of the 132 (282-150) firms are excluded from each quartile, leading to a total of 528 exclusions. 
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GICs Sector Number of sample 
Firms 
Percentage 
    
Consumer Discretionary 
 
Automobiles & Components 2 .35% 
Consumer Durables & Apparel 9 1.6% 
Consumer Services 14 2.6% 
Media 11 1.9% 
Retailing 12 2.1% 
Consumer Staples 
 
Food & Staples Retailing 1 .18% 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 12 2.10% 
Energy Energy 90 15.8% 
Health Care 
 
Health Care Equipment & Services 23 4% 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 24 4.2% 
 
Industrials 
 
Capital Goods 32 5.6% 
Commercial Services & Supplies 23 4% 
Transportation 9 1.6% 
Information Technology 
 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor 
Equipment 
1 .18% 
Software & Services 36 6.3% 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 14 2.5% 
Materials Materials 250 43.8% 
Telecommunication 
Services 
Telecommunication Services 8 1.4% 
Total 571 100% 
Table 3.1 represents the exclusion details of the sample firms (Panel A) and 
the industry wise segregation of the final sample (Panel B). The exclusions of the 
sample firms are based on missing market capital between 2007 and 2010; firms 
belong to Utility, Insurance, Diversified Financial, Real Estate, and Banking industry; 
Research Randomizer generated numbers; and availability of annual reports and 
corporate governance variables. This exclusion process generated a final sample of 
571 sample firms per sample period, leading to a total of 1713 firm-year observations 
for the whole sample period. 
The industry wise breakdown of 571 sample firms/ sample period is 
demonstrate in Table 3.1 Panel B. It shows the majority of the sample firms belong to 
the Materials industry (43.8%). Followed by Energy (15.8%); Industrials (11.2%); 
Information Technology (8.98); Consumer Discretionary (8.55%); Health Care 
(8.2%); Consumer Staples (2.28%); and Telecommunication Services (1.4%).  
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3.4.1.2 Source Documentation  
This research is based on secondary data. Several secondary data sources have 
been used to collect the respective data of this study. The financial statement data of 
the sample firms is extracted from Connect 4 and DatAnalysis Premium. Data for the 
corporate governance components: board characteristics and nomination committee 
characteristics are extracted from SIRCA Database and further hand collected from 
the corporate governance disclosures contained in company annual reports. Board 
diversity information is collected from the company’s annual report under the “Board 
of Directors” and/or “Corporate Governance Report” sections. Further, “Boardroom” 
database within Connect 4 is utilised to get a comprehensive report on the board 
characteristics of the sample firms.  
3.4.2 Data Preparation 
3.4.2.1 Data Screening and Accuracy 
This study conduct data screening for all required variables through inspection 
of data entry accuracy, missing values, and normality test (section 3.4.2.2). First, the 
source documents are re-examined to check the data entry accuracy for approximately 
25% of the dataset and no errors detected. Second, the missing values are  f i l l ed 
up  with mean values of available observations and carrying forward/backward the 
last available value of a firm to next/prior years. Finally, in order to avoid 
heteroscedasticity issue and avoid undesirable influence of outliers the key variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
3.4.2.2 Normality Check 
A common assumption of parametric statistical methods (e.g. linear regression, 
Pearson correlation, f-test, t-test, discriminant analysis and ANOVA test) is the 
dependent variable is approximately normally distributed for each category of the   
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independent variable. Normality check has been performed to examine whether the 
dependent variable of this study, gender diverse board is (Num_FDirit and Per_FDirit), 
is approximately normally distributed for all five independent variables, nomination 
committee attributes (NC_Dumit, Log_NC_Sizeit, Per_NC_Indit, Per_NC_GDit, and 
Log_NC_MFit). In particular, to perform the normality check skewness and kurtosis (-
1.96=< z value=< +1.96), Shapiro-Wilk test p-value (p value>.05) and Histograms 
(Bell shaped) have been examined. The dependent variable meets the normality 
requirement (skewness and kurtosis: -1.96=< z value=< +1.96) for Log_NC_Sizeit and 
Log_NC_Sizeit. However, it is not normally distributed for NC_Dumit, Per_NC_Indit, 
and Per_NC_GDit, The continued inclusion of these variables is justified by prior 
research (Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow 2014, Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye 2012, 
Ruigrok et al. 2006).  
3.4.3 Variables Measurement 
3.4.3.1 Dependent Variable-Gender Diverse Board  
Gender diverse board is the dependent variable for hypotheses H1-H5. Several 
past researches have used the number of female directors on board (Hutchinson, Mack, 
and Plastow 2014, Ruigrok et al. 2006), percentage of female directors on board 
(Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow 2014), and dummy variable (Gul, Hutchinson, and 
Lai 2013, Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng 2011, Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011) as the measure of 
board gender diversity. In order to examine the impact of the existence of nomination 
committee and its characteristics (size, independence, gender diversity, and meeting 
frequency) on board gender diversity, this research implies four measures of gender 
diverse board, number of female director(s) on board (Num_FDirit), percentage of 
female director(s) on board (Per_FDirit), a dummy variable if there is at least one   
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female director on board (FDit), and a dummy variable if there is exactly two female 
directors on board (FD2it). 
3.4.3.2 Independent Variables-Nomination Committee Attributes 
Based on ASX CGC recommendations on nomination committee structure and 
following past empirical studies (Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow 2014, Kaczmarek, 
Kimino, and Pye 2012, Ruigrok et al. 2006) the existence of nomination committee 
and its four characteristics are considered as independent variables. NC_Dumit 
measures the existence of nomination committee; Log_NC_Sizeit denotes nomination 
committee size; Per_NC_Indit represents the independence level of nomination 
committee; Per_NC_GDit symbolizes the percentage of female members on 
nomination committee; and Log_NC_MFit denotes the meeting frequency of 
nomination committee. 
Ruigrok et al. (2006) used a dummy variable while measuring the existence of 
nomination committee in order to analyse the impact of nomination committee on 
board diversity. Past nomination committee- board gender diversity studies used 
number of nomination committee members to determine the size of nomination 
committee (Ruigrok et al. 2006); used dummy variable (Ruigrok et al. 2006) and 
percentage (Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye 2012) to measure nomination committee 
independence; dummy variable (Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow 2014, Kaczmarek, 
Kimino, and Pye 2012) and number of female members (Hutchinson, Mack, and 
Plastow 2014) to measure gender diversity of nomination committee. This empirical 
research used log measures for nomination committee size and meeting frequency, 
and percentage measures for nomination committee independence and gender 
diversity.  
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3.4.3.3 Control Variables  
Prior studies on the determinants of board gender diversity suggest, board 
gender diversity can be influenced by several board and firm related attributes. Hence, 
in order to counter other determining factors of board gender diversity besides 
nomination committee attributes, several firm and board related attributes have been 
controlled in the Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regressions.  
In previous empirical researches (Adams and Ferreira 2009, Terjesen and 
Singh 2008, Farrell and Hersch 2005, Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003) firm size 
has been positively linked to female directors’ presence on boards. Thus, Mkt_Capit is 
controlled as the measure of firm size. Better performing firms also prefer to have 
higher female participation on their boards (Adams and Ferreira 2009, Campbell and 
Mínguez-Vera 2008). Therefore, ROAit and OCFit are controlled to control for firm 
performance. Further, riskier firms (Mulcahy and Linehan 2014, Bruckmüller and 
Branscombe 2010, Ryan and Haslam 2007) tend to appoint female directors on their 
boards. Hence, LEVit is included to control for firm risk. Finally, firms adapting growth 
strategy may also incorporate more female directors on boards (de Cabo, Gimeno, and 
Nieto 2012, Klein and Saidenberg 2010). Thus, SalesGrthit is incorporated to control 
for firm growth strategy.  
Larger boards with high percentage of independent directors are more gender 
diverse (Brammer, Millington, and Pavelin 2007, Conyon and Mallin 1997b). Hence, 
board governance related control variables are Brd_Sizeit and Brd_Indit. The industry 
related control variable is ∑Ind_Dumit. Some industries might have more female 
participation on boards than others (Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng 2011, Brammer, Millington, 
and Pavelin 2007). Therefore, based on GICs code 8 dummy industry variables are   
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included to control for the industry sectors. To control for year effects ∑Year_Dumit is 
controlled. 
3.4.4 Regression Model 
This study conducts OLS regression analysis to test hypotheses H1-H5. This 
empirical research analyses whether the existence and certain attributes of nomination 
committee contribute towards board gender diversity.  
In the following regression model gender diverse board is modelled as a 
function of multiple variables representing nomination committee attributes and 
control variables.52 The OLS regression model is as followed:53 
GDBit =  + NC_Dumit +  Log_NC_Sizeit +   Per_NC_ Indit +  PerNC_GDit + 
 Log_NC_MFit +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +   
SalesGrthit +  Brd_Sizeit +  Brd_Indit + ∑Ind_Dumit +  ∑Year_Dumit 
+  it                      (1) 
 
Board gender diversity is the key dependent variable for the above regression 
model. Past empirical studies conducted on board gender diversity, used diverse 
measures to determine female representation on board.54 To get a better perspective of 
the contribution of nomination committee attributes towards board gender diversity, 
four measures of board gender diversity are used. Num_FDirit, Per_FDirit, FDit, and 
FD2it are regressed against the same variables representing nomination committee 
attributes and control variables.55 The key independent variables of interest are the five 
attributes of nomination committee, namely, NC_Dumit, Log_NC_ Sizeit, Per_NC_ 
Indit, Per_ NC_GDit, and Log_ NC_MFit.
56 Although nomination committee attributes   
                                                          
52 In section 3.2.1.3 I have shed light on several internal and external deteminants of board gender diversity to provide a 
comprehensive view of diffrerent industry, firm and board related contributing factors. However, it is not possible to 
incorporate all the contributing factors discussed in the regression model. Thus the above regression model has used the most 
appropriate and commonly utilised control variables in the past gender diversity literature. 
53 Please refer to Appendix 2 for definition of all variables. 
54 Please refer to section 3.4.3.1. 
55 Please refer to Appendix 3 for the 4 equations (1a-1d). 
56 Please refer to section 3.4.3.2. 
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might positively contribute to board gender diversity, other firm and board attributes 
can also impact female representation on board. The use of nomination committee 
attributes to explain board gender diversity is meaningful if the impact of nomination 
committee attributes is not already reflected in other firm and board attributes. Thus, 
in order to test the above regression models, five measures of firm attributes 
(Mkt_Capit, ROAit, OCFit, LEVit, and SalesGrthit) and two measures of board attributes 
(Brd_Sizeit and Brd_Indit) are controlled. Finally, in order to control for industry and 
year affect, industry dummy and year dummy are included.  
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3.5 Data Analysis and Results 
3.5.1 Univariate Analysis  
Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics of dependent, independent and control 
variables of this study. Panel A summarizes descriptive statistics for all variables used 
in regression model. The mean value of board size is 5.15 and the mean value for 
number of female director(s) is 0.21. Although percentage of female directors’ ranges 
from 0 to 56%, on average only 3% members of the sample firms’ boards are female.  
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics  
 Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (n = 1713) 
 Mean Median Std deviation Minimum Maximum 
Num_FDirit 0.21 0 0.51 0 5 
Per_FDirit 3.45% 0% 8.26% 0.00% 56% 
FDit 0.18     
FD2it 0.02     
NC_Dumit 0.30     
Log_NC_Sizeit 0.20 0 0.31 0 .90 
Per_NC_Indit 19.68% 0 34.25% 0 1.00 
Per_NC_GDit 1.43% 0 6.16% 0 33% 
Log_NC_MFit 0.13 0 0.23 0 .85 
Mkt_Capit 397635634.1 19664153.54 6191866209 997107.26 12078399235 
ROAit -0.31 -.07 23.39 -5.98 0.35 
OCFit 38120450.16 -546312 841913424.3 -55224000 1307000000 
LEVit 1.54 1.22 12.12 -2.77 7.95 
SalesGrthit 0.79 0 726.86926 -1.00 44.12 
Brd_Sizeit 5.15 5 2.048 3 12 
Brd_Indit 2.25 2 1.791 0 8 
 Panel B: Year-Wise Descriptive Statistics of GDB and NC (n = 571/Yr) 
             2008 2009          2010 
 Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min 
Num_FDirit 0.21 3 0 0.20 4 0 0.22 5 0 
Per_FDirit 3.41% 33% 0.00% 3.35% 50% 0.00% 3.59% 56% 0.00% 
NC_Sizeit 1.04 7 0 1.11 7 0 1.14 7 0 
NC_Indit 0.67 6 0 0.71 6 0 0.78 6 0 
NC_GDit 0.05 1 0 0.05 1 0 0.06 1 0 
NC_MFit 0.59 6 0 0.60 6 0   0.66 6 0 
 Panel C: Year-Wise Mean and Frequencies of GDB and NC- Dichotomous Variables (n = 
571/Yr) 
       2008 2009      2010 
 Mean Percentage Mean Percentage Mean Percentage 
FDit 0.18 17.9% 0.17 17.3% 0.18 18% 
FD2it 0.02 2.3% 0.02 2.1% 0.02 2.5% 
NC_Dumit 0.29 28.7% 0.30 29.8% 0.32 31.9% 
GDB= Gender Diverse Board; NC= Nomination Committee. Please refer to Appendix 2  
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During the whole sample period 18% of the sample firms have at least one 
female director on board and only 2% of firms have two female members on board. 
30% of the sample firms have nomination committee; 19.68% of the nomination 
committees have independent member(s) and 1.43% of the nomination committees 
have female members 
This shows there is a fair representation of independent members compare to 
female members on nomination committee during the sample period. Panel B and C 
present the year wise descriptive statistics and frequencies of gender diverse board 
measures and nomination committee attributes. Since this study is looking at the 
voluntary period (prior to the implementation of ASX CGC gender diversity 
recommendations), the means of Num_FDirit and Per_FDirit show very little 
improvement from 2008 to 2010. The existence of nomination committees 
(NC_Dumit) and presence of independent members (NC_Indit) demonstrate gradual 
increase from 2008 to 2010. However, the means of the NC_GDit remained fairly low 
and steady during the sample period. 
3.5.2 Bi-Variate Analysis  
Table 3.3 represents the result of Pearson correlation matrix.  Consistent with 
the expectation, measures of board gender diversity, Num_FDirit, Per_FDirit, and 
FDit, show significant positive correlation among themselves. This implies, number 
of female director(s) on board, percentage of female director(s) on board and presence 
of at least one female director on board are highly correlated. FD2it demonstrates a 
moderate positive correlation with number of female directors. This shows majority 
of the sample firms with female members on their boards have less than 2 or just one 
female director. As per the expectation, Log_C_Sizeit (.975), Per_NC_Indit (.875), and 
Log_NC_MFit (.823) are significantly and positively correlated with NC_Dumit.   
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Further, Per_NC_Indit (.856) and Log_NC_MFit (.838) are significantly and positively 
correlated with Log_NC_Sizeit. This implies a bigger nomination committee has higher 
number of independent members and they meet more frequently. Per_NC_GDit (.526) 
shows moderate correlation with Num_FDirit. As nomination is the subcommittee of 
board, it is logical to have a correlation between Num_FDirit and Per_NC_GDit. 
However, the correlation is moderate and not strong. Besides the above mentioned 
dependent and independent variables, there are no other variables in the same model 
with a magnitude above .50, which suggests multicollinearity is not a problem. 
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Table 3.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Please refer to Appendix 2 for definition of variables. 
 
 Num_FDirit Per_FDirit FDit FD2it NC_Dumit Log_NC_Sizeit Per_NC_Indit Per_NC_GDit Log_NC_MFit Mkt_Capit ROAit OCFit LEVit SalesGrthit Brd_Sizeit Brd_Indit 
Num_FDirit 1                
Per_FDirit .914** 1               
FDit .898** .900** 1              
FD2it .536** .427** .329** 1             
NC_Dumit .228** .148** .198** .147** 1            
Log_NC_Sizeit .275** .174** .234** .170** .975** 1           
Per_NC_Indit .276** .192** .240** .176** .875** .856** 1          
Per_NC_GDit .526** .451** .468** .270** .353** .388** .379** 1         
Log_NC_MFit .281** .180** .228** .187** .823** .838** .757** .372** 1        
Mkt_Capit .340** .169** .320** .266** .268** .363** .312** .232** .330** 1       
ROAit .089** .055* .093** .025** .155** .160** .157** .086** .170** .123** 1      
OCFit .362** .182** .327** .301** .250** .336** .293** .220** .325** .903** .117** 1     
LEVit .111** .072** .094** .054* .170** .175** .163** .056** .166** .129** .127** .161** 1    
SalesGrthit -.039 -.030 -.039 -.019 -.025 -.031 -.002 -.035 -.033 -.017 .010 -.024 -.011 1   
Brd_Sizeit .395** .206** .368** .242** .382** .446** .379** .232** .454** .522** .200** .489** .179** .024 1  
Brd_Indit .385** .225** .341** .247** .397** .460** .498** .271** .442** .524** .193** .505** .174** .003 .668** 1 
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3.5.3   Multivariate Analysis 
Table 3.4 reports the results of regression analyses that examine the 
relationship of five nomination committee attributes (NC_Dumit, Log_NC_Sizeit, 
Per_NC_Indit, Per_NC_GDit, and Log_NC_MFit) with four proxies of gender diverse 
board (Num_FDirit,  Per_FDirit,  FDit, and FD2it).
57  
There is no significant relationship between existence of nomination 
committee (NC_Dumit) and board gender diversity proxies (Num_FDirit; Per_FDirit; 
FDit; and FD2it). This implies that a mere existence of nomination committee is not 
good enough to enhance female representation on board. Hence, hypothesis 1 (H1) is 
rejected. 
Nomination committee size (Log_NC_Sizeit) shows insignificant negative 
relationship with board gender diversity proxies, Num_FDirit; Per_FDirit; and FDit. 
However, shows a significant negative relationship with FD2it (Wald= 3.831). This 
suggests a larger nomination committee with inappropriate structure (e.g. less diverse 
and mostly composed of insiders) can prohibit higher representation of female 
members on board. Hence, hypothesis 2 (H2) is partially accepted. 
Nomination committee independence (Per_NC_Indit) demonstrates a 
significant and positive relationship with Num_FDirit; Per_FDirit; and FDit. However, 
it fails to establish any significant relationship with FD2it. This infers that presence of 
outsiders or non-executive members in the nomination committee can ensure female 
representation on board. Conyon and Mallin (1997) claim that establishment of 
nomination committee mostly consists of independent members can overcome board 
diversity dilemma and this result supports this argument. However, independent 
members’ presence in nomination committees cannot ensure the representation of 2   
                                                          
57 Please refer to Appendix 2 
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female directors on board.  Overall, nomination committee independence positively 
influences female representation on board and thus hypothesis 3 (H3) is accepted. 
Nomination committee gender diversity (Per_NC_GDit) demonstrates highly 
significant and positive relationship with Num_FDirit (t statistic = 18.847); Per_FDirit 
(t statistic = 17.009); FDit (Wald= 60.063); and FD2it. (Wald= 16.874). 
This suggests that female representation on board is significantly associated 
with presence of female member(s) on nomination committee. Hence, hypothesis 4 
(H4) is accepted. This result is consistent with the findings of Kaczmarek, Kimino, 
and Pye (2012) and Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow (2014). 
Finally, nomination committee meeting frequency (Log_NC_MFit) fails to 
demonstrate any significant relationship with Num_FDirit; Per_FDirit; FDit; and 
FD2it. This implies nomination committee number of meetings does not significantly 
contribute to board gender diversity. Hence, hypothesis 5 (H5) is rejected. 
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Table 3.4: Gender Diverse Board and Nomination Committee Attributes 
 
VARIABLES 
 Num_FDirit Per_FDirit FDit FD2it 
 Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient Wald Coefficient Wald 
NC_Dumit  -.012 -.411 -.007 -.955 -.831 .581 1.632 .777 
Log_NC_Sizeit  -.045 -1.043 -.006 -.491 -.824 .332 -4.357 3.831** 
Per_NC_Indit  .031 1.909** .009 1.992** 1.251 4.218** .812 .437 
Per_NC_GDit  .848 18.847*** .201 17.009*** 17.271 60.063*** 7.270 16.874*** 
Log_NC_MFit  -.003 -.149 .002 .369 -.407 .396 1.790 2.674 
Mkt_Capit  -.000 -1.480 -.000 -1.829* .000 .243 .000 4.189** 
ROAit  -.000 -.024 .000 .233 .085 .475 -.378 2.216 
OCFit  .000 4.943*** .000 2.681*** .000 6.452** .000 7.441*** 
LEVit  .003 1.159 .001 1.188 .059 .768 .052 .122 
SalesGrthit  -.001 -1.332 .000 -.765 -.022 1.233 -.030 .071 
Brd_Sizeit  .014 7.826*** .002 3.325*** .353 44.603*** .356 9.060*** 
Brd_Indit  .004 1.784* .001 1.239 .059 .899 .282 3.674* 
Intercept  -.043 -.641*** -.001 -.341 -2.338 11.042*** -9.293 40.016*** 
N  1713 1713 1713 1713 
Adjusted R2  .381 .249 .422 .427 
F statistic (sig.)  51.276*** 28.053*** 507.051*** 149.074*** 
Industry and Year  Included Included Included Included 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1 
Please refer to Appendix 2 for definition of variables 
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3.5.4 Additional Analyses  
This study performs several additional tests to assess the robustness of the 
results. First, all five nomination committee variables have been (NC_Dumit, 
Log_NC_Sizeit, Per_NC_Indit, Per_NC_GDit and Log_NC_MFit) replaced by lagged 
variables (NC_Dumit-1, Log_NC_Sizeit-1, Per_NC_Indit-1, Per_NC_GDit-1, and 
Log_NC_MFit-1) and the impact of period t-1 nomination committee attributes on 
period t board gender diversity is assessed. This analysis aims to investigate whether 
nomination committee attributes of the last period can impact the board gender 
diversity of the current period.58 Second, the link between change in board gender 
diversity (GDBit) and change in nomination committee attributes (NC_Dumit,t-1, 
Log_NC_Sizeit,t-1, Per_NC_Indit,t-1, Per_NC_GD it,t-1, and  Log_NC_MF it,t-1) is 
analysed.59 Third, the impact of lagged nomination committee attributes on changing 
board gender diversity is assessed.60 In order to run these sensitivity tests, 30 sample 
firms have been further excluded from the final sample (571 firms) due to missing 
lagged nomination committee variables, corporate governance variables and other 
firm related variables. Consequently, the sample size is reduced to 1623 firm-year 
observations.  
                                                          
58 Please refer to section 3.5.4.1 for further explanation. 
59 Please refer to section 3.5.4.2 for further explanation. 
60 Please refer to section 3.5.4.3 for further explanation. 
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3.5.4.1 Lagged Nomination Committee Variables and Board Gender Diversity 
The first model to control for the endogeneity issue is,61 
GDBit =  + NC_Dumit-1 +  Log_NC_Sizeit-1 +  Per_NC_ Indit-1+  Per_NC_GDit-
1 +  Log_NC_MF it-1 +  Mkt_Cap it-1 +  ROA it-1 +  OCF it-1 +  LEV 
it-1 +  SalesGrth it-1 +  Brd_Size it-1 +  Brd_Ind it-1 +  ∑Ind_Dum + 
 ∑Year_Dum +  it                                    (2) 
The above model aims to analyse the relationship between board gender 
diversity and lagged nomination committee attributes. The rational for using lagged 
variables is to assess the influence of t-1 period nomination committee attributes on 
period t board gender diversity. Particularly, this model aims to verify the impact of 
Per_NC_GDit-1 (lagged nomination committee gender diversity) on GDBit (board 
gender diversity in period t). “Nomination committee is a subcommittee of the board; 
a female director must be a board member before she can be a member of the 
nomination committee” (Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow 2014, 7). Hence, the 
influence of female nomination committee member (s) on the selection process of 
female board member(s) in the same period can be highly endogenous. Therefore, the 
assessment of the relationship between lagged nomination committee gender diversity 
and board gender diversity in period t can overcome this endogeneity issue. 
Table 3.5 represents the estimation results of equation 2. Consistent with 
equation 1, four proxies is used to measure GDBit.
62 The five independent variables 
are, NC_Dumit-1 (lagged nomination committee existence), Log_NC_Sizeit-1 (lagged 
nomination committee size), Per_NC_ Indit-1 (lagged nomination committee 
independence), Per_NC_GDit-1 (lagged nomination committee gender diversity), and 
Log_NC_MF it-1 (lagged nomination committee meeting frequency).Further, lagged 
corporate governance variables (Brd_Size it-1 and Brd_Ind  
                                                          
61 Please refer to appendix 1 and 2. 
62 Please refer to Appendix 1 and 2. 
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Table 3.5: Gender Diverse Board and Lagged Nomination Committee Attributes 
 
VARIABLES 
 Num_FDirit Per_FDirit FDit FD2it 
 Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient Wald Coefficient Wald 
NC_Dumit-1  -.029 -.387 -.005 -.332 -.344 .240 .015 .000 
Log_NC_Sizeit-1  -.077 .638 -.015 -.643 -.518 .266 .093 .005 
Per_NC_Indit-1  .013 .191 .006 .488 .129 .052 .537 .327 
Per_NC_GDit-1  3.193 16.997*** .430 13.594*** 15.124 60.467*** 8.932 30.364*** 
Log_NC_MFit-1  .042 .578 .007 .486 .225 .172 .100 .015 
Mkt_Capit-1  .000 .311 .000 .235 .000 .118 .000 1.639 
ROAit-1  .001 .101 .001 .275 .074 .446 -.072 .053 
OCFit-1  .000 3.668*** .000 .753 .000 2.984* .000 2.001 
LEVit-1  .010 1.23 .000 .324 .040 .425 .231 3.281* 
SalesGrthit-1  -.001 -1.493 .000 -1.498 -.018 2.073 -.008 .072 
Brd_Sizeit-1  .028 4.217*** .003 2.124** .188 16.125*** .168 2.091 
Brd_Indit-1  .030 3.688*** .003 2.062** .171 8.395*** .332 5.844** 
Intercept  -.072 -2.087** .006 .888 -2.78 16.794*** -23.045 .000*** 
 N  1623 1623 1623 1623 
Adjusted R2  .322 .161 .326 .391 
F statistic (sig.)  37.690*** 15.841*** 361.064*** 153.212*** 
Industry and Year  Included Included Included Included 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1 
Please refer to Appendix 2 for definition of variables. 
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it-1) and other firm related lagged variables (Mkt_Cap it-1, ROA it-1, OCF it-1, LEV it-1, 
and SalesGrth it-1) have been controlled.  
Per_NC_GDit-1 shows highly significant and positive association with 
Num_FDirit, Per_FDirit, FDit, and FD2it, suggesting that presence of female 
member(s) in a nomination committee in prior year can significantly and positively 
influence the presence of female board member(s) in current year. There are no 
significant relationships between GDBit measures on nomination committee. Hence, 
hypothesis 4 (H4) is accepted. This result is consistent with the findings of Kaczmarek, 
Kimino, and Pye (2012) and Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow (2014). 
Finally, nomination committee meeting frequency (Log_NC_MFit) fails to 
demonstrate any significant relationship with Num_FDirit; Per_FDirit; FDit; and 
FD2it. This (Num_FDirit, Per_FDirit, FDit, and FD2it) and other lagged nomination 
committee variables (NC_Dumit-1, Log_NC_Sizeit-1, Per_NC_ Indit-1, and 
Log_NC_MF it-1). 
GDBit (Num_FDirit and FDit) is positively and significantly associated with 
OCFit-1, suggesting there is a positive association between a firm’s prior year’s firm 
size with number of female director(s) representation and at least one female director 
representation on corporate board in current year. Further, Brd_Size it-1 and Brd_Ind it-
1 also shows highly significant and positive association with GDBit proxy measures 
(Num_FDirit, Per_FDirit, FDit, and FD2it). This implies, a firm’s last year’s corporate 
board size and independence can significantly and positively impact current year’s 
board gender diversity. 
  All the four models are significant with a likelihood ratio of 37.690 (15.841, 
361.064, 153.212) and adjusted R2 .322 (.161, .326, .391).63 This is consistent with   
                                                          
63 Please refer to Appendix 3. 
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expectation of this sensitivity check, t-1 period nomination committee gender diversity 
can significantly and positively impact t period female representation on board. 
3.5.4.2 Change in Nomination Committee Attributes and Gender Diverse Board 
The second model to control for the endogeneity issue is, 
GDBit,t-1  =  + NC_Dum it,t-1 +   Log _NC_Size it,t-1 +  Per_NC_ Ind it,t-1 + 
  Per_NC_GD it,t-1 +   Log_NC_MF it,t-1+   Mkt_Cap it,t-1+  
ROA it,t-1+  OCF it,t-1+  LEV it,t-1+   SalesGrth it,t-1+  
Brd_Size it,t-1 +  Brd_Ind it,t-1+  ∑Ind_Dum it,t-1+   ∑Year_Dum 
it,t-1+   it,t-1                     (3) 
The above model aims to analyse the association between change in board 
gender diversity and change in nomination committee attributes. In particular, this 
model aims to depict whether a change in nomination committee gender diversity is 
positively associated with change in board gender diversity.  Hutchinson, Mack, and 
Plastow (2014) show that a positive change in board gender diversity from 2007 to 
2011 is positively and significantly associated with change in nomination committee 
gender diversity between those periods. Consistent with  
Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow (2014) study this model does not posit a 
particular directional relation. However, it aims to demonstrate a strong link between 
nomination committee gender diversity and board gender diversity in the voluntary 
period. Table 3.6 represents the estimation results of equation 3. Two proxies are used 
(Num_FDir it,t-1 and Per_FDir it,t-1) to measure change in board gender diversity.64 
The five independent variables are, NC_Dum it,t-1 (change in nomination committee 
existence between period t and t-1), Log _NC_Size it,t-1 (change in nomination 
committee size between period t and t-1), Per_NC_ Ind it,t-1 (change in nomination 
committee independence between period t and t-1),  Per_NC_GD it,t-1 (change in   
                                                          
64 Please refer to Appendix 2. 
239 
 
nomination committee gender diversity between period t and t-1), and Log_NC_MF 
it,t-1 (change in nomination committee meeting frequency between period t and t-1). 
 Table 3.6: Change in Gender Diverse Board and Nomination Committee Attributes 
 
VARIABLES 
 Num_FDirit Per_FDirit 
 Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
NC_Dumit,t-1  .103 1.621 .010 .943 
Log_NC_Sizeit,t-1  -.093 -.937 -.012 -.734 
Per_NC_Ind it,t-1  -.047 -.961 -.002 -.213 
Per_NC_GD it,t-1  1.110 5.833*** .213 6.681*** 
Log_NC_MF it,t-1  -.012 -.227 -.003 -.360 
Mkt_Capit,t-1  .000 1.024 .000 1.191 
ROAit,t-1  -.003 -.356 .000 -.095 
OCFit,t-1  .000 1.212 .000 801 
LEV it,t-1  .002 .464 .001 1.110 
SalesGrthi it,t-1  .000 .592 .000 .540 
Brd_Size it,t-1  .035 6.551*** .000 239 
Brd_Ind it,t-1  .016 2.381** .001 1.050 
Intercept  .003 .216 .000 -.076 
N  1623 1623 
Adjusted R2  .052 .024 
F statistic (sig.)  5.239*** 2.923*** 
Industry and Year   Included Included 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1 
Please refer to Appendix 2 for definition of variables. 
Further, change in corporate governance variables (Brd_Size it,t-1 and 
Brd_Ind it,t-1) and other firm related variables (Mkt_Cap it,t-1, ROA it,t-1, OCF it,t-
1, LEV it,t-1, and SalesGrth it,t-1) have been controlled.  Per_NC_GD it,t-1 demonstrate 
highly significant and positive association with , Num_FDir it,t-1 and Per_FDir it,t-1, 
suggesting that percentage change in the nomination committee gender diversity can 
significantly and positively influence change in board gender diversity. There are no 
significant relationships between GDBit,t-1 proxy measures (Num_FDir it,t-1 and   
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Per_FDir it,t-1) and other nomination committee variables (NC_Dum it,t-1, 
Log_NC_Size it,t-1, Per_NC_ Ind it,t-1, and Log_NC_MF it,t-1). 
Num_FDir it,t-1 is positively and significantly associated with Brd_Size it,t-1 
and Brd_Ind it,t-1, suggesting there is a positive association between change in 
corporate board size and the independence, and change in the number of female 
directors. However, Per_FDir it,t-1  is not significantly associated with Brd_Size it,t-1 
and Brd_Ind it,t-1. 
 Both models are significant with a likelihood ratio of 5.239 (2.923) and 
adjusted R2 .052 (.024). This is consistent with expectation of this sensitivity check; 
change in nomination committee gender diversity between period t and t-1 is 
significantly and positively associated with change in female representation on board 
between period t and t-1. 
3.5.4.3 Lagged Nomination Committee Variables and Change in Gender Diverse 
Board 
The third model to control for the endogeneity issue is,65 
GDBit,t-1  =  + NC_Dumit-1 +  Log_NC_Sizeit-1 +  Per_NC_ Indit-1+ 
 Per_NC_GDit-1 +  Log_NC_MF it-1 +  Mkt_Cap it-1 +  ROA it-1 + 
 OCF it-1 +  LEV it-1 +   SalesGrth it-1 +  Brd_Size it-1 +  
Brd_Ind it-1 +  ∑Ind_Dum +  ∑Year_Dum +  it,t-1                 (4) 
In order to examine the impact of nomination committee composition on board 
composition, Ruigrok et al. (2006) analysed the link between lagged nomination 
committee composition and change in the composition of board. This study examines 
the link between change in board gender diversity and lagged nomination committee 
attributes. Similar to the findings of Ruigrok et al. (2006), this study cannot find any 
significant association between lagged nomination committee attributes (particularly   
                                                          
65 Please refer to Appendix 1. 
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nomination committee gender diversity) and change in board gender diversity (from 
t-1 to t). 
In addition to the above-mentioned additional analyses the regression analysis 
is also ran with alternative measures of nomination committee attributes, alternative 
measures of firm and board related control variables, and all continuous variables 
winsored at different level. The result is robust for all these additional analyses. 
3.6 Conclusion 
3.6.1 Study Overview  
This study investigates the influence of nomination committee existence and 
its attributes (size, independence, gender diversity, and meeting frequency) on ASX 
listed companies’ board gender diversity during the voluntary period. Despite being 
the key internal determinant of board gender diversity, nomination committee 
remained least explored. In Australia, regulators have taken necessary steps to 
motivate proper nomination committee establishment and enhance board gender 
diversity among publicly listed firms. However, despite regulatory attention, 
nomination committee - board gender diversity studies in Australian context is scarce. 
Thus, a proper exploration of nomination committee structure and its impact on board 
gender diversity has become quite essential. Agency theory, Resource dependence 
theory, Similarity attraction theory, and Social identity theory paradigms are borrowed 
to build the testable hypotheses. 
The sample of this research consists of randomly selected ASX listed firms during 
the voluntary period of 2008-2010. The sample firms consist of ASX listed firms of 
all sizes and particularly focuses on the voluntary period. Hence, the results of this 
study encompass honest outcomes of nomination committee existence and attributes 
on board gender diversity.  
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3.6.2 Results and Conclusions  
There is no significant relationship between existence of nomination 
committee and board gender diversity. This implies that a mere existence of 
nomination committee is not good enough to enhance female representation on board. 
Consistent with the expectation nomination committee size shows a significant 
negative relationship with presence of two female members on board and insignificant 
negative relationship with other three board gender diversity proxies. This suggests a 
larger nomination committee comprised of too many members and without 
appropriate composition (e.g. mostly insiders with CEO involvement in recruiting 
process) can prohibit higher representation of female members on board. Consistent 
with the expectation nomination committee independence demonstrates a significant 
and positive relationship with board gender diversity. Nomination committee gender 
diversity demonstrates highly significant and positive relationship with board gender 
diversity. This suggests that female representation on board is significantly associated 
with presence of female member(s) in the nomination committee. This result is 
consistent with the findings of prior studies (Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow 2014, 
Kaczmarek, Kimino, and Pye 2012). Finally, nomination committee higher meeting 
frequency fails to demonstrate any significant relationship with board gender 
diversity, suggesting that higher number of meetings do not necessarily contribute to 
the unbiased selection process of female directors on boards.   
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3.6.3 Implications and Contributions 
The findings of this study have various implications. For example, this study 
demonstrates there is a significant relation between the percentage of independent 
nomination committee members and gender diverse board. Hence, ASX CGC might 
consider revising the nomination committee independence related recommendation 
and altering it to a ratio (nomination committee independent member / nomination 
committee size).66 Further, this study shows a highly significant association between 
the percentage of female members on nomination committee and gender diverse 
board. ASX CGC might consider recommending certain percentage of demographic 
diversity within the nomination committee composition recommendation. The results 
of this study help the Australian regulators to realize the importance of nomination 
committee composition as a key contributing internal factor for the unbiased selection 
process of female directors and this in turn will attract more regulatory attention 
towards the overall quality, composition, activities and strategic process of nomination 
committee.   
3.6.4 Limitations 
Some of the inherent limitations of this study are: First, A dummy variable is 
used to measure only the existence of nomination committees in the sample firms, 
hence this variable only captures the mere existence but not the quality of those 
nomination committees (e.g. CEO involvement). However, the other four nomination 
committee attributes’ measures (Log_NC_Sizeit,  Per_NC_ Indit, Per_NC_GDit, and 
Log_NC_MFit) provide better inside of nomination committee composition and 
activities. Second, in order to analyse the impact of nomination committee attributes   
                                                          
66 ASXCGC Recommendation for NC: The nomination committee should be structured so that it: consists of a majority of 
independent directors, is chaired by an independent director, and has at least three members. 
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on gender diverse board, based on prior related studies multiple firm and board related 
variable measures are controlled; however, there is a thin chance of excluding other 
variables that might impact board gender diversity. Third, the results might not be 
generalised outside the respective timeframe of this study (e.g. 2008-2010). Finally, 
this study is conducted in an Australian context and the results might not be 
generalizable to other countries. 
3.6.5 Future Research 
Future research can analyse the impact of nomination committee existence on 
gender diverse board by taking CEO involvement and nomination committee strategic 
process into consideration.  Further academic attention is required on the impact of the 
nomination committee attributes on gender diverse board for smaller and medium 
sized firms in both voluntary and self-regulatory period.  
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CHAPTER 4: GENDER DIVERSE BOARDS AND EARNINGS QUALITY-AN 
AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE 
4.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the motivations, key objective, and research question 
of this study (section 4.1.1), followed by the contributions of the study (section 
4.1.2) and structure of the rest of the paper (section 4.1.3). 
4.1.1 Motivation, Objective and Research Question 
This study investigates the impact of board gender diversity on earnings 
quality. Female representation in the top corporate positions is a significant topic 
among regulators, academics and many other related parties for approximately two 
decades. Particularly, after the recent global financial crisis of 2008 and collapse of 
well-known corporations (e.g. Enron (U.S.), WorldCom (U.S.), OneTel (Australia), 
HIH (Australia) and so on), questions have been raised regarding the demographic 
composition among corporate board members, sub-committee members and other top 
corporate positions (e.g. CEO, CFO, manager, and senior executives). In particular, 
lower female representation at the top and male dominated corporate culture is being 
considered as one of the key factors behind recent corporate collapse. Board gender 
diversity is a new and less explored contributing factor of earnings quality and good 
empirical evidence is required to support this argument. The key inspiring factors of 
this study are as follows. 
First, approximately in the last two decades female representation at the top 
corporate positions, particularly, at the board level has noticeably increased in several 
countries.67 Worldwide regulators and policymakers are encouraging a proper gender 
balance at the top to diminish all-male corporate culture. Males and females have  
                                                          
67 Please refer to chapter 2. 
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 different leadership style (section 4.2.2.2) and incorporating substantial number of 
both genders at the board level can be beneficial to firm performance. However, a 
common issue resulted due to the implementation of board gender diversity 
regulations (mandatory and self-regulatory) is representation of token female 
members on boards.68 Opponents of board gender diversity argue that mere 
representation of female board members does not bring anything to the table. Hence, 
it has become essential to investigate the real contributions of female board members 
towards diverse firm outputs. Till date significant number of studies have explored 
female board members’ contribution towards firm financial performance (section 
4.2.4.2 (c)) and corporate governance (section 4.2.4.2 (b)). However, only a handful 
studies investigated the link between female representation on boards and firms’ 
earnings quality. Specifically, after the recent corporate downfalls and regulatory 
pressure to enhance gender balance at the board level it has become vital to investigate 
female board members’ contribution level towards constraining earnings 
management.  
Second, the key internal elements to control earnings management and 
enhance earnings quality is strong corporate governance, internal control, audit 
committee, and external audit. Significant number of past studies (Jiang, Lee, and 
Anandarajan 2008, Klein 2002, Marrakchi Chtourou, Bedard, and Courteau 2001, 
Becker et al. 1998, McMullen 1996, Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996) have 
established positive link between these key elements and earnings quality. Board 
gender diversity is comparatively a new and much debated contributing element of   
                                                          
68 Stary (2014) state, “In a similar vein to the lack of meritocracy argument, is the contention that gender quotas could promulgate 
tokenism or stereotyping of female directors and as such be counter-productive to the ends quotas are trying to achieve. That 
is, female directors will be employed or promoted for political or legal reasons rather than based on true acceptance and embrace 
of gender diversity. Even if token directors have the same merit or qualifications of those who were appointed, they are 
scrutinised more closely as they are viewed as obtaining their position by representation not on individual merit”. 
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earnings quality. In the past female representation at the board level has been 
positively linked to better corporate governance (section 4.2.4.2 (b)), female 
representation at the audit committee positively linked to better audit quality 
(Thiruvadi and Huang 2011), and female auditors have positively associated with 
better audit quality (Ittonen, Vähämaa, and Vähämaa 2013, Breesch and Branson 
2009). Further significant number of studies (Liu, Wei, and Xie 2016, Barua et al. 
2010, Peni and Vähämaa 2010, Labelle, Gargouri, and Francoeur 2010, Krishnan and 
Parsons 2008) have also associated female CFOs, senior executives, and accountants 
with high financial reporting quality. Despite the above empirical evidence female 
board members’ contribution towards earnings quality is still a controversial concept 
and there is a vital need of good empirical evidence.  
Third, till date only a handful of studies have investigated the link between 
board gender diversity and earnings quality. For instance, Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 
(2011) report that U.S companies with higher female representation on boards have 
higher earnings quality. Accounting literature is still in short of significant corporate 
gender diversity studies.   Particularly, the existing accounting studies on gender 
contribution towards corporate accounting decision-making is scarce and demonstrate 
mixed results (Francis et al. 2015). Hence, Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui (2011) claim that 
more significant research is required to unveil the gender influence on accounting 
decisions. 
Fourth, ASX CGC (Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council) implemented gender diversity recommendations and disclosure requirements 
on ASX listed firms from 2011.69 ASX CGC (2010) claim that, the reason behind   
                                                          
69 ASXCGC Recommendations for gender diverse board: Recommendation 3.2: Companies should establish a policy 
concerning diversity and disclose the policy or a summary of that policy. The policy should include requirements for the 
board to establish measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity for the board to assess annually both the objectives 
and progress in achieving them; Recommendation 3.3: Companies should disclose in each annual report the measurable 
objectives for achieving gender diversity set by the board in accordance with the diversity policy and progress towards 
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implementing diversity recommendations is to enhance the positive impact of board 
gender diversity on firm performance (Chapple and Humphrey 2014). Despite 
reasonable regulatory attention, limited empirical evidence exists on board gender 
diversity contributions towards diverse firm performance. Further, the existing 
Australian studies on gender diverse board (Bonn 2004, Nguyen and Faff 2007, Wang 
and Clift 2009, Adams, Gray, and Nowland 2011, Galbreath 2011, Chapple and 
Humphrey 2014, Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow 2014) mostly shed light on the link 
between board gender diversity and firm financial performances.70 Australian 
regulators, investors and other users of accounting information requires strong 
empirical evidence to presume board gender diversity as a mitigating mechanism of 
earnings management. As to my best knowledge no previous study has been conducted 
on board gender diversity and earnings quality in Australian context. Hence, the key 
objective of this study is to examine the relationship between gender diverse board 
and earnings quality. The key research question of this study is, 
RQ1: Is there an association between board gender diversity and earnings quality? 
Using a sample of 600 ASX listed companies between 2008 and 2014 
(excluding 2011), this study examines whether, board gender diversity significantly 
and positively impacts earnings quality. Borrowing from the well-established theories, 
agency theory and organisational theory, this study bridge unique leadership traits, 
cautiousness, independence, strong monitoring capability, strong ethics, and moral maturity, 
of female corporate leaders with constrained earning management and better earnings 
quality. This study utilises accruals quality as the key proxy of earnings quality and utilise 
discretionary accrual measures to estimate accruals quality. Based on extant literature   
                                                          
achieving them; Recommendation 3.4: Companies should disclose in each annual report the proportion of women 
employees in the whole organisation, women in senior executive positions and women on the board. 
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(Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011, Barua et al. 2010) this study utilise two measures of 
accruals quality: (i) Absolute value of residual of modified Jones model; and (ii) 
Absolute value of residual of Kothari’s model.71 Based on past studies four measures 
of board gender diversity, percentage of female directors on boards and three dummy 
variables, are utilised.72 This study find that female member(s)’ representation on 
corporate boards of selected ASX listed firms positively and significantly contribute 
to earnings quality. This result holds for both measures of accruals quality and majority 
of the board gender diversity proxies after controlling for firm characteristics, corporate 
governance characteristics (board and audit committee), industry and year effects.  
4.1.2 Significance of the Study  
The findings of this study will make a number of significant contributions. First, 
to date, only few international empirical studies have been conducted on the 
relationship of board gender diversity and earnings quality. Further, these studies 
provide mixed results and female board members’ contribution towards financial 
reporting quality is still an open question. Second, ASX listed companies recently 
adopted board gender diversity recommendations and female board members’ 
contributions towards diverse firm outputs have not been explored at a large extent. In 
particular, the relationship between female member(s)’ representation on board and 
financial reporting quality in Australian context has not been investigated in the past. 
Hence, there is a vital requirement for good empirical research on this topic. Third, 
unlike previous board gender diversity and earnings quality studies this study 
examined ASX listed firms of all sizes. “Many restatement firms: (1) have traditionally 
been smaller firms (U.S. GAO 2002; Beasley et al. 2000; Beasley 1996), (2) are less 
likely to have a female board presence (Adams and Ferreira 2009), and (3) are less apt   
                                                          
71 Please refer to section 4.4.2.1 
72 Please refer to section 4.4.2.2 
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to feel public pressure to establish a female board presence due to their lack of 
visibility (Conley et al. 2009)” (Abbott, Parker, and Presley 2012, 609). Hence, the 
sample firms’ sizes of this study will significantly contribute to board gender diversity 
and earnings quality studies. Fourth, this study looks at the association of board gender 
diversity and earnings quality in both self-regulatory period and voluntary period.73 
This demonstrates the board gender diversity and earnings quality relationship with 
and without external regulatory pressure. This in turn will help the Australian 
regulators to identify whether gender diversity recommendations positively 
contributing towards enhancing earnings quality of ASX listed firms via increasing 
female representation on boards. Fifth, till date Australian academia and ASX 
primarily highlighted better firm financial performance as the key output of board 
gender diversity. This study will encourage Australian regulators and corporations to 
consider board gender diversity as a key contributing factor towards better financial 
reporting quality. Sixth, this study explicitly contributes to board governance, 
financial reporting quality and overall gender diversity in business literature by adding 
timely empirical evidence from Australia. Lastly, very few past studies have explored 
the relationship between board gender diversity and financial reporting quality, thus 
this study will add to the scarce gender diverse board- financial reporting quality 
literature. 
4.1.3 Structure  
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses past literature on 
female leadership traits and their contributions as corporate leaders; Section 3 
represents the applied theories followed by the development of the hypothesis; Section   
                                                          
73 Self-regulatory period: After the implementation of ASX CGC gender diversity recommendations Voluntary period: After 
the implementation of ASX CGC gender diversity recommendations. 
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4 discuss the research method. Section 5 represents all results, and section 6 provides 
the conclusion. 
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Women Leadership Traits 
The following section discusses the most common traits of female leaders 
highlighted repeatedly in the business literature. The key female corporate leader 
traits are: cautiousness; strong monitoring capability; independence, ethics, and 
morals; and communication and cooperation. 
4.2.1.1 Cautiousness 
Past studies (DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik 2004, Kaplan and Ravenscroft 
2004, Hunton, Libby, and Mazza 2006) have shown that there is an association 
between poor earnings quality with higher firm litigation risk and reputation loss. 
Board of directors, governing bodies for selecting and governing auditors, are at 
greater risk of frequent lawsuits due to poor earnings quality. The risk aversion attitude 
of female board members helps them to make cautious decision while choosing 
auditors and taking other financial reporting decisions (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011). 
Female board members’ higher risk avoiding nature (Sunden and Surette 1998, Powell 
and Ansic 1997, Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner 1997, Riley Jr and Chow 1992) and lack 
of overconfidence (Fehr-Duda, De Gennaro, and Schubert 2006, Barber and Odean 
2001, Lundeberg, Fox, and Punćcohaŕ 1994, Estes and Hosseini 1988) enhance their 
cautiousness regarding lawsuits and firm reputation loss. 
A review of 150 studies on gender differences in risk taking by Byrnes, Miller, 
and Schafer (1999) support the fact that women’s risk aversion trait helps them to 
make more thoughtful and less aggressive decision than their male counterparts. Peni 
and Vähämaa (2010) claim that significant number of economic psychology literature   
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(Schubert 2006, Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer 1999, Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998, 
Powell and Ansic 1997, Johnson and Powell 1994) have demonstrated women are 
more cautious and risk averse than men.  Hence, on average women are more cautious 
while taking both personal finance management decisions (Watson and McNaughton 
2007, Barber and Odean 2001, Bernasek and Shwiff 2001, Hinz, McCarthy, and 
Turner 1997, Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei 1997) and significant business decisions 
(Niessen and Ruenzi 2007, Hansemark 2003, Olsen and Cox 2001, Powell and Ansic 
1997, Riley Jr and Chow 1992, Sexton and Bowman-Upton 1990, Cohen and Bunker 
1975). “Women (1) weigh attributes, such as ambiguity, more heavily than their male 
colleagues, and (2) emphasize risk reduction more than men do in financial decisions” 
(Barua et al. 2010, 27). Their lack of overconfidence and excessive profit-oriented 
attitude impact their financial reporting approach (Krishnan and Parsons 2008). 
Abbott, Parker, and Presley (2012) claim that female board directors’ greater 
cautiousness in financial reporting decision leads to lower financial restatement.   
Psychology and sociology literature support the fact that males and females 
significantly differ in terms of making cautious decisions (Jianakoplos and Bernasek 
1998, Johnson and Powell 1994, Levin, Snyder, and Chapman 1988). Higher 
cautiousness helps female professionals to achieve better results. Francis et al. (2015) 
argue, females are more alarmed about downside risk, they more likely to reduce risk 
given a target return and provide more accurate forecasts.  
Women are under more peer pressure than men in terms of making wrong risky 
decisions. Gavious, Segev, and Yosef (2012, 9) claim, “Unique gender characteristics 
can be seen in decision-making and risk-taking. The literature indicates that women 
tend to take fewer risks than men (Barber and Odean 2001, Powell and Ansic 1997),   
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as women are given less room to error and express weakness”. Women are generally 
being expected to take more sensible and cautious decisions. 
4.2.1.2 Independence, Ethics, and Morals  
Past studies (O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005) have supported the fact that 
women have stronger ethical values and moral maturity. Moral maturity and strong 
ethical values help women to think, judge and make decisions independently.  “Ford 
and Richardson (1994) list thirteen studies that consider gender as a factor in ethical 
decision making. Eight of those studies find that women are more likely to behave 
ethically than men” (Krishnan and Parsons 2008, 66).  Hence, female feel more liable 
to raise their voice against unethical and illegal acts (Miethe and Rothschild 1994).   
Betz, O'Connell, and Shepard (1989) claim that men are more profit oriented 
and thus more prone to break regulations than women. Past studies have shown that 
men and women differ in terms of complying with accounting regulations and tax-
related situations. For instance, “Females are likely to be more compliant in tax-
reporting decisions than males (Baldry 1987) and men are likely to report significantly 
less income than women when the tax amount is framed as a loss (Cullis, Jones, and 
Lewis 2006)” (Barua et al. 2010, 27). Hence, corporate females have higher moral 
maturity (Bernardi and Arnold Sr 1997) and they are more trustworthy compare to 
their male counterparts (Heminway 2007). 
Past literature has shown that women tend to avoid success more compare to 
men (Gavious, Segev, and Yosef 2012). Women tend not to sacrifice their moral 
values in order to achieve success (Eccles 1994). Hence, women adopt more ethically 
correct approach than teleological or purpose-driven approach (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 
2011, Kohlberg 1981). “Bernardi and Arnold Sr (1997) find that women in public 
accounting firms score higher than their male colleagues on a moral development   
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measure. These studies suggest that women are less likely to engage in unethical 
behaviour in the workplace to gain financial rewards” (Krishnan and Parsons 2008, 
66).  
Women stronger moral maturity and ethical values contribute in their 
independent views, they are not concern about disrupting board cohesion in order to 
make independent and ethical decisions (Abbott, Parker, and Presley 2012). Inclusion 
of female members on boards can bring diverse views and experiences to the boards 
and this in turn can diminish “groupthink”.  “Esser (1998) describes groupthink as a 
condition in which optimal decisions are forgone as a means of preserving group 
cohesion. In particular, an individual’s legitimate concerns are not actively voiced by 
the individual or adequately considered by the group when they threaten the harmony 
of the group” (Abbott, Parker, and Presley 2012, 611). Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 
(2003) demonstrate that female board members provide more independent judgement 
compare to their male counterparts. Further, “Adams, Gray, and Nowland (2010) 
argue that female directors exhibit more independent thinking and improve the 
monitoring process” (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011, 1611). Hence female member(s)’ 
presence on board can bring much needed group heterogeneity by diminishing 
groupthink through injecting independent thinking, views and judgement. 
4.2.1.3 Strong Monitors 
Numerous past studies have claimed that female directors are strong monitors 
(Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009) and their presence on board can enhance board’s 
monitoring capability (Adams, Gray, and Nowland 2010, Thomas and Ely 1996). Prior 
literature (Krishnan and Parsons 2008, Thorne, Massey, and Magnan 2003, Ambrose 
and Schminke 1999, Bernardi and Arnold Sr 1997, Schminke and Ambrose 1997) has 
shown that women exhibit lower tolerance to opportunism. Further, they often ask for  
255 
 
 higher audit effort when the corporate opacity is high (Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui 2008) 
and asks for higher CEO accountability (Adams and Ferreira 2009). Hence, female 
directors often secure more positions in auditing and corporate governance committees 
(Adams and Ferreira 2009). Studies by Thorne, Massey, and Magnan (2003) and 
Kohlberg (1981) demonstrate that female auditors are less tolerant of unscrupulous 
behaviour than male auditors (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011). Majority of the female 
board members’ related studies have associated female representation on board with 
better corporate governance. The key reasons that contribute to their stronger 
monitoring capability are, higher cautiousness (see section 4.2.1.1), higher ethical 
values (see section 4.2.1.2), and independence (Adams, Gray, and Nowland 2010). 
There strong diligence towards governing managerial actions can ensure better overall 
corporate governance and financial reporting quality (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011, 
Adams and Ferreira 2009, Thomas and Ely 1996). Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui (2011, 1613) 
state, “A review of the literature reveals that boards with female directors exhibit 
greater board diligence and demand greater accountability for managers’ performance 
(Adams and Ferreira 2009)”. 
4.2.1.4 Communication and Cooperation 
Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui (2011, 1611) state, “Research in organisational 
theory reveals that gender-diverse boards have more informed deliberations and 
discuss tougher issues that are often considered unpalatable by all-male boards 
(McInerney-Lacombe, Bilimoria, and Salipante 2008, Huse and Solberg 
2006, Clarke 2005, Stephenson 2004)”. Female members’ presence on boards 
enhance communication level of board with the shareholders (Joy 2008). Female 
directors’ diverse perspective, knowledge and decision-making style (Peterson 
and Philpot 2007, Bilimoria and Wheeler 2000) challenge traditional board norms   
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and demand for more information symmetry (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011). 
Further, Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011) find that stock prices of firms with gender 
diverse boards have more firm specific information because gender diversity could 
improve transparency of disclosures and/or facilitate private information collection. 
Women are more cooperative compare to their male counterparts.  
Krishnan and Park (2005) argue, men are more inclined towards making money and 
women are thought to be more focused on helping people. 
Women cooperative nature does not imply that they agree with the majority 
of the board in order to maintain cohesion. They tend to make judgement based on 
their ethical values and moral consideration. Gavious, Segev, and Yosef (2012, 10) 
argue, “The presence of women on the board can create a conciliatory 
atmosphere and increase the sense for moral considerations and ethical 
standings; hence, female directors may influence – rather than be influenced by 
– their male counterparts, again consistent with the findings that demonstrate 
t ha t  wome n  complement their male counterparts and bring a healthy 
balance to business”. 
 4.2.2 Gender Based Characteristics Difference at the Top 
This section reports difference between male versus female general (4.2.2.1) 
and corporate leadership (4.2.2.2) traits. 
 4.2.2.1 General Characteristics Differences between Male and Female 
Numerous studies in the past have demonstrated that females are more risk 
averse compare to their male counterparts (Vandegrift and Brown 2005, Agnew, 
Balduzzi, and Sunden 2003, Barber and Odean 2001, Bernasek and Shwiff 2001). Due 
to the risk averseness attitude they are more cautious and less overconfident in terms 
of investing, acquisition and in making any other financial decision. Till date their risk  
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 averseness and more cautious nature have been highlighted in different business 
settings (See, (Niederle and Vesterlund 2008, Atkinson, Baird, and Frye 2003, Barber 
and Odean 2001). Men are generally overconfident when it comes to making corporate 
decisions (Huang and Kisgen 2013). They further added that female led firms might 
grow slowly due to their less confident and more cautious behaviour towards 
acquisition and debt decisions. However, the announcement returns and shareholders’ 
value are comparatively higher for firms with female executives. In contrast, 
overconfidence of male executives can lead to rapid firm growth and higher 
innovations. However, as they are more competitive and confident than their female 
counterparts, they might be less reluctant to break rules and adopt unethical behaviours 
to achieve success. Past studies (Schrand and Zechman 2012, Huang et al. 2011, 
Hribar and Yang 2010) have linked overconfident mangers and CEOs with higher 
earnings management, fraudulent activities and risky acquisitions. Malmendier and 
Tate (2005) depict that an overconfident executive fails to reduce the idiosyncratic 
risk. Overconfident male executives, in particular male CFOs, face frequent turnover 
due to taking risky decisions and decreasing shareholders’ value (Huang and Kisgen 
2013). Risk averseness attitude of female executives can lead to lower company profit 
and slower company growth. However, overconfidence of male executives can lead to 
investing in risky projects and diminishing shareholders value. Risk averse and more 
cautious female executives act more vigilantly while dealing with accounting 
regulations, tax regulations and accounting related estimations. Francis et al. (2015) 
and Francis, Hasan, and Wu (2013) argue risk averseness attitude of CFOs make them 
more conservative and cautious while making accounting information decision and 
this in turn reduce organisational information risk and improve earnings quality.  
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Male Vs Female ethical values and moral maturity received considerable 
attention among academics (Ford and Richardson 1994). Past studies (Nguyen et al. 
2008, Ruegger and King 1992, Whipple and Swords 1992, Betz, O'Connell, and 
Shepard 1989, Ferrell and Skinner 1988, Jones and Gautschi 1988, Kidwell, Stevens, 
and Bethke 1987, Chonko and Hunt 1985, Beltramini, Peterson, and Kozmetsky 1984) 
have highly supported the fact that women have high ethical values. In fact, Collins 
(2000) and Ford and Richardson (1994) did a synthesis of published articles on ethical 
behaviour and majority of the articles show that females behave more ethically than 
males. Further, Betz, O'Connell, and Shepard (1989) and Bernardi and Arnold Sr 
(1997) argue that females choose to act ethically even if they have to let go any 
personal benefit. Based on the evidence of 5 big accounting firms Bernardi and Arnold 
Sr (1997) claim that female manaagers’ average level of moral development is 
significantly higher than their male counterpaarts. Singh, Kumra, and Vinnicombe 
(2002) claim rather than adopting networking and self-promotion strategies they focus 
on commitment and high performance for visibility. They further stretched that despite 
being aware of the importance of “impression management” women do not prefer to 
use it. 
4.2.2.2 Male Vs Female Leadership Style 
Gender of the corporate leaders might impact their leadership style. Rosener 
(1990) categorized female leadership as collaborative, communicative, and 
empowerment of employees, and male leadership as command, control, 
authoritative, and the accretion of power. Gender-stereotype perception towards 
female leaders can impact the way female leadership style is perceived and affect the 
way they contribute to the organisational outcomes. Past literatures have shown that 
female corporate leaders are perceived pessimistically compare to their male   
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counterparts (Eagly, Makhijani, and Klonsky 1992) and their effectiveness can be 
significantly hampered by a masculine corporate setting (Eagly, Karau, and 
Makhijani 1995). Despite owing some commendable and unique leadership traits 
female managers, CEOs and CFOs face unjust evaluation and criticism. Eagly and 
Carli (2003, 807) state “Women suffer some disadvantages from prejudicial 
evaluations of their competence as leaders, especially in masculine organisational 
contexts”.  
Past studies have demonstrated different advantageous leadership quality of 
women. Compare to their male counterparts’ female leaders are more supportive, 
independent and interactive (Boulouta 2013, Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, and Van 
Engen 2003, Bear, Rahman, and Post 2010, Nielsen and Huse 2010a). Their 
comparatively softer and feminine leadership style can aid certain stakeholders (eg: 
co-workers, employees, labour force). Compare to their male colleagues they are 
more charitable, understanding and self-sacrificing (Larrieta‐Rubín de Celis et al. 
2015, Barber and Odean 2001). Zhang, Zhu, and Ding (2013) argue, female diectors 
tend to listen to the claims of certain stakeholders more. Further, they can play a 
significant role in motivating and encouraging gender equality within the 
organisation. Their sharing, incorporating and communicative nature can lead to 
better engagement with diverse stakeholders and cater to their requirements 
(Galbreath 2011). They are also known for their strong monitoring and advising 
capabilities (Adams and Ferreira 2007).  
Shrader, Blackburn, and Iles (1997) argue that organisational performance, 
knowhow and environment can be improved with the increased percentage of female 
representation in the managerial positions. By utilising their unique leadership traits, 
they can offer a new management style (Bertrand and Schoar 2003) and this in turn   
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can result in better governance and performance. Eagly and Carli (2003, 826) state, 
“At the organisational level, leadership roles have changed and practices that 
constituted barriers to promoting women into positions of authority have eroded. At 
the cultural level, appointments of female leaders have come to symbolize 
progressive organisational change. To the extent that organisations have become less 
hierarchical and more driven by results than ‘‘Old boys’ network”, they reward talent 
over gender and present a more level playing field than do traditional organisations”.  
In contrast, in many organisational studies (Twenge 2001, 1997, Konrad et al. 
2000) female managers are found to be quite similar to their male counterparts, in 
terms of their managerial attributes. Diekman and Eagly (2000) claim that the basic 
trait differences between male and female corporate leaders are decreasing without 
the compromise of unique feminine traits. Over the years’ female corporate leaders 
have adopted the risk-taking attitude (Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer 1999) and 
competitiveness of their male colleagues without sacrificing their cooperative, 
communicative, and cautious leadership style. Eagly and Johnson (1990, 237) state, 
“Gender-stereotypic sex differences in leadership behaviour were less common in 
organisational studies than in other types of studies because male and female 
managers were selected by similar criteria and subjected to similar organisational 
socialization—forces that tend to equalize the sexes”. 
4.2.3 Corporate Female Leadership and Consequences 
Empirical evidence on corporate female representation at the top and its 
consequences provide mixed results. For instance, few studies managed to establish 
positive link (Smith, Smith, and Verner 2006, Krishnan and Park 2005, Welbourne 
1999) and handful of studies failed to establish any significant connection (Wolfers 
2006, Mohan and Chen 2004, Moncrief et al. 2000) between female corporates and   
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corporate outcomes. Some scholars gave logical explanation of this phenomenon. 
Dwyer, Richard, and Chadwick (2003) showed female officers holding top management 
positions can positively impact firm performance if the firm can ensure a supportive 
corporate culture and environment for them. Firm’s external and internal governance, 
competition level and growth stage might also have influence on female corporate 
leaders’ contributions. For instance, Krishnan and Parsons (2008) and Dwyer, Gilkeson, 
and List (2002) argue female presence in top management can particularly enhance firm 
performance for firms in their growing stage.  
 The following sections (4.2.3.1 and 4.2.3.2) represent the contributions of 
female directors towards diverse firm outputs. Firm outputs are segregated in terms of 
market perspective and management perspective. Consequences of having female 
directors on board from market perspective: Corporate social responsibility, corporate 
transparency and stock price informativeness, and market responsiveness; and 
management perspective: board effectiveness, corporate governance effectiveness, 
firm financial performance, and financial reporting quality. 
4.2.3.1 Consequences from Market Perspective 
4.2.3.1a. Corporate Social Responsibility 
The economic growth of a company is associated with its social and 
environmental well-being. Any firm wants to survive in the long run, needs to consider 
its corporate social responsibility seriously. Hence, Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) has become a very protruding and persistent topic in the business literature. 
Numerous past studies have shown that females have high moral and ethics (Nguyen 
et al. 2008, Ruegger and King 1992, Whipple and Swords 1992) and they are more 
compassionate (Arlow 1991, Betz, O'Connell, and Shepard 1989) compare to their 
male peers. Hence, majority of the studies (Yasser, Al Mamun, and Ahmed 2017,   
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Ibrahim et al. 2016, Yaroson and Giwa 2016, Byron and Post 2016) conducted on 
female members’ presence on board and CSR found a positive link.  
Female presence in top and middle management has also been positively 
associated with better CSR performance (Boulouta 2013, Zhang, Zhu, and Ding 2013, 
Bear, Rahman, and Post 2010, Adams and Ferreira 2009). The demographic 
composition of management teams affects their strategic choices (Cannella, Park, and 
Lee 2008), and CSR is one of those choices. Female members’ presence in the 
management can provide diverse perspective and ensure better representation of the 
interest of diverse groups. Their empathetic and caring nature enables them to put 
higher value to community wellbeing. Betz, O'Connell, and Shepard (1989) and 
Bernardi and Arnold Sr (1997) argue that women are more comfortable with activities 
related to helping people, while men are more comfortable with money-making 
activities. Hence, having considerable proportion of women managers can enhance 
corporate sensibility towards environment and CSR related acts (Soares, Marquis, and 
Lee 2011). Other authors have demonstrated that having women officers decreases not 
only corporate philanthropy but also positively impact attention towards the 
environment (Ben-Amar, Chang, and McIlkenny 2017, Glass, Cook, and Ingersoll 
2016, Post, Rahman, and Rubow 2011, Williams 2003, Dietz, Kalof, and Stern 2002, 
Wang and Coffey 1992) and society (Alazzani, Hassanein, and Aljanadi 2017). 
 Zhang, Zhu, and Ding (2013) investigate 500 largest U.S. listed companies in 
64 different industries and find that higher percentage of female members on board is 
associated with better CSR. Based on large samples both Boulouta (2013) and Hafsi 
and Turgut (2013) find similar results. Wang and Coffey (1992, 771) show, “Female 
and minority board members are positively and significantly associated with firms' 
charitable contributions” and Williams (2003) findings supported this result. Hence,   
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female directors are more likely to sit on public affair committees than male directors 
(Peterson and Philpot 2007, Bilimoria and Piderit 1994). Bear, Rahman, and Post 
(2010) argue that CSR rating of a company act as mediator between percentage of 
female members on board and company reputation.   
4.2.3.1b. Corporate Transparency and Stock Price Informativeness 
Firm transparency reduces investors’ information acquisition cost (Durnev, 
Morck, and Yeung 2004) and increase informed trading by the investors (Grossman 
and Stiglitz 1980). Firm-specific voluntary disclosure is a key mechanism for 
transmitting firm specific information to outside investors and to enhance firm 
transparency. Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011) define firm transparency in terms of two 
channels: public disclosure of more firm-specific information by managers; and 
greater incentives for the collection of private firm-specific information by investors. 
A credible public disclosure policy can aid both uninformed and informed investors. 
Gul et al. (2011) state that enhanced firm-specific disclosure price-protects 
uninformed investors and inspire ownership. This in turn can benefit informed 
investors by enhancing the marginal benefit of accumulating and organizing private 
firm-specific information. Transparency within the organisation’s management can 
enhance Stock Price Informativeness (SPI) and benefit shareholders. Barua et al. 
(2010) argue that, the cautiousness and risk averseness nature of female directors make 
them to comply more with the accounting regulations compare to their male 
counterparts. Complying with accounting regulations can lead to a more accurate firm 
specific information disclosure. Female directors are known for their better 
networking capability (Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 2007) and compassionate 
leadership style. Their leadership style is based on faith and collaboration rather than 
command and compliance (Cohen, Pant, and Sharp 1998). A cooperative leadership   
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style can result in frequent board meetings, enhanced decision-making process 
(Anderson et al. 2011) and higher transparency of information within the management. 
Perrault (2015, 150) state that, “Women enhance boards’ legitimacy and 
trustworthiness, fostering shareholders’ trust in the firm and thus contributing to its 
market”.  
Based on a large sample of U.S. listed firms over the period of 2001 to 2007 
Gul, Hutchinson, and Lai (2013) show that a gender diverse board can ensure better 
transparency within the management and this in turn results in more accurate earning 
expectations by the market analysts. Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011) argue that, female 
directors can ensure better public disclosure by the firm through better oversight over 
management. They examine 7,597 firm-years observations over the period of 2001-
2006 and show that female directors can enhance Stock Price Informativeness through 
increasing public disclosures by managers and by influencing investors to collect more 
firm specific information.  
4.2.3.1c. Market Responsiveness 
Market perception and reaction towards incorporation of female corporate 
leaders play a vital role in influencing their contributions to the firm outputs. Past 
studies have demonstrated diverse results in terms of market responsiveness towards 
female representation in the top corporate positions (eg. senior executives, managers, 
directors and CEOs/CFOs). A possible explanation behind affirmative market reaction 
towards female presence in board and managerial positions is female members’ 
presence on board and in other top corporate positions better represents the market. 
Hence, shareholders and investors react positively when firm is led and operated by a 
gender diverse board and management. Mersland and Strøm (2009) claim that female 
CEOs better understand the market due to their strong female network and   
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incorporative leadership style. Therefore, a female CEO can better cater the needs of 
the female customers by producing and offering the perfect product. Based on the 
sample of MFI (Micro Finance Institutes) firms Strøm, D’Espallier, and Mersland 
(2014) depict that female managers and directors better understand the market 
condition. Investors also value the cautious nature of female corporates. Huang and 
Kisgen (2013) argue that investors more positively response to the corporate financial 
decisions taken by female executives. With the increasing number of female presences 
at the top they are not being seen as window dressing or “token” anymore and market 
have started to appreciate their appointments as directors, CEOs and managers. 
Academics have linked female presence in the top corporate positions with 
negative (Ahern and Dittmar 2012, Adams and Ferreira 2003), positive (Huang and 
Kisgen 2013) and neutral market reaction (Martin, Nishikawa, and Williams 2009, 
Mohan and Chen 2004). Based on a sample of 261 Singaporean listed firms Kang, 
Ding, and Charoenwong (2010) have document positive stock price reaction to the 
announcement of female directors. Krishnan and Parsons (2008) examine 353 of the 
Fortune 500 companies between 1996 and 2000, and find a positive link between 
women presence in the top management and higher stock returns after initial public 
offerings. Francoeur, Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagné (2008) demonstrate similar 
result when examined Toronto Stock Exchange firms from 1990 to 2004. Coxbill, 
Sanning, and Shaffer (2009) argue that market reacts more negatively to the 
appointment of male CEO than female CEO.  Further, Huang and Kisgen (2013, 821) 
demonstrate, “Acquisitions made by firms with male executives have announcement 
returns approximately 2% lower than those made by female executive firms, and debt 
issues also have lower announcement returns for firms with male executives”. Few 
studies also document neutral market reactions to the appointment and presence of   
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women in top management. Farrell and Hersch (2005) did not find any significant 
market reaction to the appointment of female directors. Cannella, Park, and Lee (2008) 
observe nonfinancial firms in Madrid for five years and discovered, investors in Spain 
do not negatively react to the firms with female directors on their boards. Further, 
Martin, Nishikawa, and Williams (2009) add, financial market does not show any 
gender bias regarding the appointment of female CEOs. Overall, market reacts more 
positively to the appointment and presence of female executives if they are insiders 
and appointed based on their own capabilities rather than just a mere window dressing 
(Lee and James 2007). 
4.2.3.2 Consequences from Management Perspective   
4.2.3.2a. Board Effectiveness 
The board plays a significant role of advising and monitoring the corporation 
(Fama and Jensen 1983b), and linking it with the external environment (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). A homogeneous board misses out on the opportunity of utilising 
human capital with diverse skills, knowledge, talents, views and experience. Anderson 
et al. (2011) addressed a homogeneous board as “Clubby Board” where all the 
members think alike. Teigen (2000) address this situation as the “under used resource 
effect”. Board heterogeneity or diversity is particularly important because it can be a 
valuable asset for company’s corporate governance, operation and success. Further, 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) argue that a diverse board is more efficient because it’s 
capable of making better strategic decision and solving critical issues. Hillman, 
Cannella, and Harris (2002) claim that a gender diverse board compare to an all-male 
board performs better due to its diverse managerial competencies, skills, professional 
experience and knowledge. Female board members are different from their male 
counterparts and hence contribute differently from their male colleagues (Zelechowski   
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and Bilimoria 2004, Adams and Ferreira 2009, Nielsen and Huse 2010a). Gary 
Simpson, Carter, and D'Souza (2010) claim that over the years, women have 
developed significant human capital and have become competent to be directors. 
Singh, Terjesen, and Vinnicombe (2008) show that newly appointed female directors 
possess similar and, in some cases, additional human capital compare to their male 
peers. Hence, compare to a homogeneous board a gender diverse board can result in 
better outcomes (Milliken and Martins 1996); higher number of board meetings 
(Adams and Ferreira 2009); better problem-solving ability (Robinson and Dechant 
1997); better risk management (Chen, Ni, and Tong 2016); stakeholder management 
(Ben-Amar, Chang, and McIlkenny 2017) and increased legitimacy (Carter et al. 
2007). Due to “Glass Ceiling” issue female directors need to put more effort and hard 
work to prove their capabilities and secure a position in the board (Eagly and Carli 
2003). Hence, they are more diligent (Eagly and Carli 2003) and hardworking 
(Robinson and Dechant 1997) compare to their male counterparts. Thus, their presence 
on board can surely enhance board effectiveness (Chen, Ni, and Tong 2016, Terjesen, 
Couto, and Francisco 2016). 
A frequently asked question regarding board gender diversity is, “Whether 
incorporation of female directors to the board bring real diversity and valuable human 
resources to the board or not?” Singh, Terjesen, and Vinnicombe (2008) find that 
female directors hold higher educational qualification and bring more international 
diversity to the board. Hillman, Cannella, and Harris (2002) support this view, they 
find female directors are highly qualified and hold multiple directorship. Further, 
Zelechowski and Bilimoria (2004) show that female board members hold equal 
“experience-based qualification” compare to their male peers. Adams and Funk (2012) 
examine 499 Swedish directors and find that female directors are generous, cautious   
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and risk loving. They further argue women are not always risk averse in their decision 
making.   Nielsen and Huse (2010a), based on a sample of Norwegian CEOs, show 
that incorporation of female directors can ensure better strategic control by the board, 
less conflict within the board and better board advancement actions. Further, based on 
a large firm-year observation between 1996 and 2003, Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
demonstrate that female board members significantly contribute to the board activities. 
They have less attendance issue and their presence on board lead to frequent board 
meetings and higher pay-performance incentives for the board members. However, 
few studies have highlighted the fact that female directors’ contribution to the board 
depends on several conditions. For instance, Huse, Nielsen, and Hagen (2009) argue 
that female board members can meaningfully contribute to board strategic and CSR 
(corporate social responsibility) controls if they can bring real diversity to the board 
rather just demographic diversity. Triana, Miller, and Trzebiatowski (2013) add that 
if the firm is a well performing firm and the female directors hold sufficient power 
then they can contribute to the strategic changes more successfully.  
4.2.3.2b. Corporate Governance Effectiveness  
Strong corporate governance mediates the relationship between a gender 
diverse board and better corporate outcomes. Female leadership style is different from 
their male colleagues. They are cooperative (Bernardi and Arnold Sr 1997, Betz, 
O'Connell, and Shepard 1989), communicative, cautious, and sharing. On the contrary, 
male leaders are rational, tough, self-interested, aggressive risk-taker and self-
achiever. Hence, a proper mix of male and female members on board and in top 
corporate positions can ensure improved corporate governance. Adams and Ferreira 
(2007) state that two primary duties of directors are advising and monitoring. Female 
directors are more effective monitors (Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng 2011, Srinidhi, Gul, and  
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 Tsui 2011, Adams and Ferreira 2009, Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui 2008). Besides their 
stronger monitoring capability, they are also known for their higher attendance in 
board meetings and active mentoring (Adams and Ferreira 2009). They are more 
supportive (Vieito 2012) and cautious (Huang and Kisgen 2013) compare to their male 
counterparts. Utilising their differential leadership style, they can offer new 
management style (Bertrand and Schoar 2003) and better corporate governance. 
Further, female board members are mostly outsiders and minorities in the board, hence 
they are neither obliged to the management nor part of the “Old boys’ network”. 
Therefore, it is more natural for them to be fair and independent leaders and ensure 
better corporate governance. Hence, numerous studies (Singh and Vinnicombe 2004, 
Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 2003, Singh, Vinnicombe, and Johnson 2001, Thomas 
2001, Conyon and Mallin 1997a, Bilimoria and Piderit 1994) have highlighted the fact 
that lack of board diversity can lead to poor corporate governance. 
 Carter et al. (2010) argue the two key advantages of gender diverse board are, 
first it is more enriched in terms of human capital and second it can lead to better 
corporate governance. Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh (2009) did a comprehensive review 
of almost 400 publications on female board members. Based on their wide-ranging 
review they argue that, “Women on corporate board improve corporate governance 
through better use of the whole talent pool’s capital, as well as about building more 
inclusive and fairer business institutions that better reflect their present generation 
stakeholders” (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009, 1). Hence, female board members are 
more likely to be allocated in corporate governance committees. Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) claim that female presence on board can offset poor corporate governance.   
They observed 1,939 firms’ directors for the period of 1996-2003 and demonstrate 
female directors are more likely to be appointed in audit, nominating, and corporate   
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governance committees. These committees respectively play important roles in 
maintaining firms audit quality, nomination process of directors, implementing 
policies and procedures and other governance activities. Further, Carter, Simkins, and 
Simpson (2003) find female board members enhance shareholders’ value through 
ensuring better corporate governance.  
4.2.3.2 c. Firm Financial Performance  
Till date several significant studies have been conducted on female presence 
in top corporate positions and their contribution towards firm financial performance. 
From past studies (Adams and Ferreira 2009, 2008, Krishnan and Parsons 2008, 
Farrell and Hersch 2005, Dwyer, Richard, and Chadwick 2003, Erhardt, Werbel, and 
Shrader 2003, Shrader, Blackburn, and Iles 1997) it can be observed that, the impact 
of top corporate women on the firm financial performance and firm value can be 
influenced by various organisational and external factors, for instance, industry 
settings, firm’s growth stage, shareholders right, corporate governance strength etc. 
Hence, past corporate gender diversity-firm performance studies conducted so far 
exhibits mixed results (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009).  
Till date several studies have shed light on the impact of corporate women on 
firm’s financial performance. Few studies found positive results. For instance, female 
presence in the top senior executive position has been positively associated with higher 
profitability (Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader 2003); female presence on board has been 
positively linked with firm financial performance (Reguera-Alvarado, de Fuentes, and 
Laffarga 2017, Horak and Cui 2017, Bo, Li, and Sun 2016, Eduardo and Poole 2016, 
Kılıç et al. 2016, Willows and van der Linde 2016, Liu, Wei, and Xie 2013, Pathan 
and Faff 2013, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 2008, Farrell and Hersch 2005, Carter, 
Simkins, and Simpson 2003) and female CEOs have been affirmatively linked with   
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firm performance (Khan and Vieito 2013). Using a panel of 212 large U.S. bank 
holding companies over the period of 1997-2004, Pathan and Faff (2013) show a 
positive link between board gender diversity and bank performance (measured by 
Return of Average Asset, Return on Average Equity, Pre-Tax Operating Income, Net 
Interest Margin, Tobin’s Q, and Stock Return). Based on the sample of 200 ASX listed 
firms Galbreath (2011) support this view. Both Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) 
and Carter et al. (2007) demonstrate a positive relation between board gender diversity 
and firm financial performance (measured by Tobin’s Q). Despite lower 
representation of females on the board Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, and Hanuman (2012) 
find a positive link between board gender diversity and firm financial performance 
(measured by Return on Assets). Not only academic empirical studies but also research 
conducted by different private organisations (McKinsey and Co., 2007, 2008, 2010; 
Catalyst 2007) have positively associated female presence on board with better 
corporate performance and productivity. The extent of women contribution to firm 
financial performance might be impacted by certain conditions. Liu, Wei, and Xie 
(2013, 1) find, “The impact of female directors on firm performance is significant in 
legal person-controlled firms but insignificant in state-controlled firms and boards 
with three or more female directors have a stronger impact on firm performance than 
boards with two or fewer female directors”. Further, Dezsö and Ross (2012) show that 
innovation-oriented firms can receive maximum benefits from female representation 
in top management. Few studies (Marinova, Plantenga, and Remery 2016, Carter et 
al. 2010, Wang and Clift 2009, Rose 2007) fail to establish any significant link 
between firm performance and board gender diversity. Bøhren and Strøm (2010) fail 
to establish any link between board gender diversity and firm value (measured by 
Tobin’s Q, Return on Asset, and Return on Sale). They argue that implementing   
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mandatory gender quota system might be costly for investors. Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) support this view; based on 1,939 firms for the period of 1996-2003 they show 
that mandatory incorporation of female directors, with strong monitoring power, in 
corporate boards can be an issue for well governed firms.  Further, investigating a 
sample 248 unique Norwegian firms (2001-2009), Ahern and Dittmar (2012) show, 
“The constraint imposed by the gender quota caused a significant drop in the stock 
price at the announcement of the law and a large decline in Tobin’s Q over the 
following years” (Ahern and Dittmar 2012, 137). Besides mandatory incorporation of 
female board members, pessimistic perception of the market towards female corporate 
leaders and insufficient number of female members on board also hinder their impact 
on firm performance. Kramer et al. (2006) argue mere representation of female 
members cannot significantly impact on firm performance and magic seems to happen 
when there are three or more female members. 
4.2.3.2d. Financial Reporting Quality 
Earnings Quality is the function of a firm’s fundamental performance. Past 
empirical research on earnings quality have used different earnings quality proxies 
like, earning smoothness, earning persistence, loss avoidance, asymmetric timeliness, 
investor responsiveness, external indicators and accruals quality (Dechow, Ge, and 
Schrand 2010). Till date several significant studies have attempted to demonstrate the 
positive impact of corporate female leaders on financial reporting quality.  
Past accounting literatures (Matsunaga and Yeung 2008, Cheng and Warfield 
2005) have argued that earnings management can be affected by the characteristics 
and incentives of the firms’ executives. Past studies (Jiang, Petroni, and Wang 2010, 
Matsunaga and Yeung 2008, Geiger and Marlin 2012) have shown that CFO’s can 
significantly impact the quality of accounting information and CEOs have also   
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incentive to put pressure on CFOs to manipulate earning report for their own financial 
benefit (Feng et al. 2011). Earnings management is associated with managers and 
accountants’ ethical sense (Bruns and Merchant 1990). Hence, ethical issue or lack of 
moral can lead to higher earnings management. Hence, gender of these top executives 
(CEO, CFO, mangers and other senior executives) might have impact on firm’s 
financial reporting quality as their basic characteristics might differentiate due to their 
gender. Past studies (Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata 2012, Arthaud-Day et al. 2006, 
Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins 2006) have demonstrated that majority of the CEO 
turnovers are related to aggressive accounting or accounting restatements. Aggressive 
accounting can be a result of lack of cautiousness, overconfidence and high risk-taking 
attitude. Huang et al. (2011) show that male executives make riskier financial 
decisions compare to their female counterparts. Jurkus, Park, and Woodard (2011) 
demonstrate that firms’ lack of strong external governance can reduce their agency 
cost by incorporating more female officers. Or in other words, as females are stronger 
monitors, their greater presence in the management can ensure lower agency cost for 
firms with weak corporate governance. Very few significant studies (Srinidhi, Gul, 
and Tsui 2011, Peni and Vähämaa 2010, Krishnan and Parsons 2008) have been 
conducted so far on the impact of gender effect on earnings quality. Peni and Vähämaa 
(2010, 629) state, “It is widely recognized that the quality of financial reporting   may   
depend   on   managerial   motives and characteristics, and moreover, that the 
opportunism of the firm’s executives tends to reduce earnings quality”. They provided 
significant evidence that female CFOs adopt more conservative approach when it 
comes to earnings management. Further, Liu, Wei, and Xie (2016) show female CFO 
helps to reduce earning management.  
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Females are finally climbing the corporate ladder to the top and recently have 
started to occupy top management positions. Hence, compare to their male counterpart 
female CFOs/CEOs are comparatively young. Davidson III et al. (2007) find older 
CEOs can be associated with more aggressive income-increasing earnings 
management. Further, Geiger and North (2006) demonstrate appointment of a new 
CFO can significantly reduce earnings management. Based on this it can be argued 
that young female CEOs/CFOs can ensure lower earnings management and higher 
earnings quality. The cautiousness, stronger monitoring capabilities and 
conservativeness of female CFOs aid them to ensure a higher quality accounting 
statement (Wu, Francis, and Hasan 2011). Further, Wu, Francis, and Hasan (2011) 
show female led firms enjoy lower bank price due to their cautiousness and 
conservative accounting approach.  Further, Barua et al. (2010) demonstrate that firms 
led by female CFOs have higher earnings quality. 
Proponents of corporate gender diversity have argued that female directors are 
careful monitors (Adams and Ferreira 2009, Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 2007, 
Farrell and Hersch 2005) and thus frequently ask for more audit efforts (Gul, Srinidhi, 
and Tsui 2008). As being tougher monitors, they have lower patience towards 
unscrupulous behaviour (Krishnan and Parsons 2008, Thorne, Massey, and Magnan 
2003, Bernardi and Arnold Sr 1997). This in turn can reduce agency conflict (agency 
theory) and earn investors’ appreciation (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009). Further, 
female directors are more risk averse compare to their male peers (Schubert et al. 1999, 
Sunden and Surette 1998, Powell and Ansic 1997). Due to this risk averseness attitude 
they are always cautious (Huang and Kisgen 2013) of any opportunism and make sure 
to avoid any type of risk, like, reputation loss, lower earnings quality risk, earnings 
management risk, and litigation risk against the firm. Hence, their presence in top   
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corporate positions, particularly on board, can ensure implementation of better 
strategic control (Nielsen and Huse 2010a) and reduce malpractices (Peterson and 
Philpot 2007). Hence, their better monitoring capability, moral maturity and 
impatience towards earnings management can affirmatively lead to better Earnings 
Quality (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011).  
Significant past empirical studies (Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2017, Khlif and 
Achek 2017, Pucheta‐Martínez, Bel‐Oms, and Olcina‐Sempere 2016, Clatworthy and 
Peel 2013, Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011, Peni and Vähämaa 2010, Krishnan and 
Parsons 2008) have positively associated female representation on top corporate 
positions and in audit committees with higher earnings quality and lower earnings 
management. Both, Francis et al. (2015) and Liu, Wei, and Xie (2016) support the fact 
that female CFOs more conservative in financial reporting and less involved in 
earnings management than their male counterparts.  Clatworthy and Peel (2013) find 
a positive link between board gender diversity of UK firms and accounting 
information accuracy. By examining all S&P listed U.S. firms Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 
(2011) demonstrate female members’ presence on board is associated with higher 
earnings quality. Further, Krishnan and Parsons (2008) link female presence in senior 
management with higher earnings quality. Abbott, Parker, and Presley (2012) find that 
a company’s financial restatement possibility gets lower even with only one female 
member presence on board. Barua et al. (2010) show the presence of female CFO is 
associated with lower performance-matched absolute discretionary accruals and lower 
absolute accrual estimation errors and Peni and Vähämaa (2010) support this view. 
Ittonen, Vähämaa, and Vähämaa (2013) observe Finish and Swedish firms between 
2005 and 2007, and show female auditors result in smaller abnormal accruals, thus 
implying that they may have a constraining effect on earnings management.  However,   
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few studies have failed to establish any significant link between female presence in 
top management and higher earnings quality or lower earnings management. Sun, Liu, 
and Lan (2011) cannot not find any gender effect on the effectiveness of independent 
audit committee in constraining earnings management. Further, Ge, Matsumoto, and 
Zhang (2011, 1176) argue “CFO gender, age, and educational background capture 
only a small portion of CFO styles for accounting choices”. As per the best knowledge 
of the author till date no study demonstrates negative relation between female 
corporate leaders and earnings quality. 
4.3 Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development 
4.3.1 Theoretical Background 
Agency theory is the predominant theory used in research of board of 
directors (Hillman, Withers, and Collins 2009). According to this theory board is 
responsible for monitoring managers on behalf of the shareholders and reducing 
agency cost (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). A firm can perform better and more 
efficiently if the board members can reduce managerial opportunism and protect 
shareholders’ wealth trough stronger monitoring. Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 
(2003) claimed that a diverse board is more independent and can ensure better 
oversight of management. Past empirical studies showed that female directors are 
careful monitors (Adams and Ferreira 2009, Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 
2007, Farrell and Hersch 2005); frequently demand for more audit efforts (Gul, 
Srinidhi, and Tsui 2008); and managerial accountability (Adams and Ferreira 2009). 
Further, female directors are not part of the “Old boys’ network”, their presence on 
board can bring diverse views, arguments and different perception to risk, leading 
towards more independent decisions and stronger oversight of managers. This in turn 
can lead to legitimate organisational outcomes.  
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According to Organisational theory the objective of management is to maintain 
balance and stability. This helps to control and manipulate workers and their 
environment. Research on organisational theory has shown that gender diversity is 
linked with better organisational outcomes (Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng 2011). As women 
are not part of the “Old boys’ network”, they can bring diverse views and opinions to 
the table. And this in turn can lead to a fruitful board decision and simplify tough 
decisions that are considered unpalatable by all-male boards (Huse and Solberg 2006). 
4.3.2 Gender Diverse Board and Earnings Quality 
A gender diverse board may perform better than an all-male board. It is 
enriched in diverse skills, views, knowledge, and overall governing capability 
(Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella 2007). Female board members have different 
leadership style compare to their male peers (section 4.2.2.2). Hence, a gender 
diverse board is enriched in managerial competencies which are simultaneously 
diverse and complementary (Clatworthy and Peel 2013, de Luis-Carnicer et al. 
2008).  
The key reasons behind improved board performance of a gender balance 
board are: Females are generally more cautious (section 4.2.1.1) and concern 
about negative outcomes (Croson and Gneezy 2009); they have strong morals, 
high ethical values and independence (section 4.2.1.2); they are strong monitors 
(section 4.2.1.3); and highly cooperative (section 4.2.1.4).  
Generally, female board members are more risk averse compare to their male 
peers (Sunden and Surette 1998, Powell and Ansic 1997). Due to this risk averseness 
attitude they are always cautious (Huang and Kisgen 2013) of any opportunism and 
make sure to avoid any type of risk, like, reputation loss, lower earnings quality risk, 
earnings management risk, and litigation risk against the firm. For instance, Barua et   
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al. (2010) argue that female CFOs are less aggressive and this in turn helps them to 
make more sensible and ethical discretionary accruals decisions. Hence, female(s) 
presence on board can ensure implementation of better strategic control (Nielsen and 
Huse 2010) and reduce malpractices (Peterson and Philpot 2007).  
As being tougher monitors females have lower patience towards unscrupulous 
behaviour (Krishnan and Parsons 2008, Thorne, Massey, and Magnan 2003, 
Bernardi and Arnold Sr 1997). Abbott, Parker, and Presley (2012) claim, female 
directors inject independent views, moral and ethical values, and strong monitoring 
in the board activity which can ensure stronger internal control and better monitoring 
of audit process. Hence, there presence on board can reduce agency conflict and earn 
investors’ appreciation (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh 2009).  
Krishnan and Parsons (2008) and Bruns and Merchant (1990) claim that earnings 
management is an ethical issue. Women choose ethical over unethical behaviour in the 
workplace, despite the opportunity of personal benefit from unethical act (Krishnan 
and Parsons 2008). Their strong ethical values and moral maturity make them more 
compliant with regulations (Clatworthy and Peel 2013, Gërxhani 2007). Hence, 
female representation on boards and audit committees may highly constrain fraudulent 
financial reporting (Gavious, Segev, and Yosef 2012).  
Female directors are careful monitors (Adams and Ferreira 2009, Hillman, 
Shropshire, and Cannella 2007, Farrell and Hersch 2005) (Adams and Ferreira 2009, 
Hillman et al. 2007, Farrell and Hersch 2005) and thus frequently ask for more audit 
efforts (Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui 2008). 2008). Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui (2011) claim, 
incorporation of females in both board and the audit committee improves 
financial statements’ quality through improving board monitoring and discipline.    
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Directors’ independence and communication skills play a major role in better 
audit effort (Carcello et al. 2002). And a stronger audit effort can lead to higher 
earnings quality (Gul, Jaggi, and Krishnan 2007). Abbott, Parker, and Presley 
(2012) and Adams and Ferreira (2009) both demonstrate that female board members 
are mostly independent. Further, female leaders are highly cooperative and have 
stronger communication skills (section 4.2.2.4). Female directors can ensure better 
audit process through greater interaction with auditors and also enhance both 
communication and cooperation within the board (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011).  
Female board members’ better monitoring capability, moral maturity and 
impatience towards fraudulent financial reporting can positively impact on better 
earnings quality (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011). Abbott, Parker, and Presley 
(2012, 613) claim “Gender diversity can potentially affect the outcome by 
generating more questioning of the status quo, greater acknowledgment and 
legitimization of opposition and third- party viewpoints (including those of the audit 
committee, auditor, or internal audit director), and a slower, more deliberative and 
collaborative decision-making process”. Based on the above discussion it can be 
argued that, a gender diverse board compare to an all-male board can result in higher 
earnings quality.  
H1: There is a positive association between a Gender Diverse Board and Earnings  
Quality. 
 
4.4 Research Methodology 
4.4.1 Sample and Data  
4.4.1.1 Data Collection 
The sample of this research consists of randomly selected firms listed on the 
ASX between 2008 and 2014 (excluding 2011). The initial sample includes all 2028 
ASX listed firms during sample period. As the sample firms include not just the top   
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ASX listed firms but firms of all sizes, it helps to provide a better understanding of the 
board gender diversity - earnings quality relationship persisted in the ASX listed firms 
during the sample period. 
According to Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) report in 
2013, women started joining Australian boards at a higher rate after the introduction 
of ASX CGC gender diversity recommendations in 2010. Hence, the relationship of 
board gender diversity and accruals quality of the sample firms is examined during 
2008-2010 (voluntary period: prior to the implementation of ASX CGC gender 
diversity recommendations) and 2012-2014 (self-regulatory period: after the 
implementation of ASX CGC gender diversity recommendations). The gender 
diversity recommendations took time to be reflected on Australian listed company 
boards; hence 2011 is excluded due to lagged effect. 
The final sample firms are pooled from 2028 ASX listed firms after several 
exclusions and through a stratified-random sampling approach.74 At first, the firms 
with missing market capitalisation between 2008 and 2014 are excluded.75 Followed 
by the exclusion of firms belong to specific Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICs) code, due to their additional regulation requirements. Then the existing listed 
firms are ranked in terms of their market capitalisation and stratified into four quartiles 
(Q1-Q4). Subsequently, 150 random firms are pooled from each quartile. This results 
in an initial sample of 600 firms for each sample period and 3600 firm-year 
observations for the whole sample period (2008-2014, excluding 2011). This sample 
selection approach aids to avoid sample selection bias as equal amount of randomly 
selected firms is selected from each quartile. Then further exclusion is made based on   
                                                          
74 In stratified random sampling, the strata are formed based on members' shared attributes or characteristics. A random sample 
from each stratum is taken in a number proportional to the stratum's size when compared to the population. These subsets of 
the strata are then pooled to form a random sample. 
75 Firms that ceased operation between 2008 and 2014 and firms with missing market capital in the respective database (Connect 
4 and DatAnalysis Premium). 
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missing annual reports and corporate governance related data. Table 4.1 represents the 
exclusion details of the sample firms (Panel A) and the industry wise segregation of 
the final sample firms (Panel B). The exclusions of the sample firms are based on 
missing market capital between 2007 and 2010; firms belong to Utility, Insurance, 
Diversified Financial, Real Estate, and Banking industry; Research Randomizer 
generated numbers; and availability of annual reports and corporate governance 
variables. This exclusion process generated a final sample of 553 sample firms per 
sample period, leading to a total of 3318 firm-year observations for the whole sample 
period. 
The industry wise breakdown of 553 sample firms/ sample period is demonstrated in 
Panel B. It shows the majority of the sample firms belong to the Materials industry 
(42.5%); followed by Energy (15.37%); Health Care (13.72%); Consumer 
Discretionary (8.67%); Information Technology (9.41%); Industrials (5.77%); 
Consumer Staples (3.07%); Health Care (8.2%); and Telecommunication Services 
(1.45%). This industry wise segregation demonstrates the majority percentage of 
sample firms belong to male dominated industries. Thus, the sample firms of this 
study genuinely reflect the real scenario persists among ASX listed firms in terms of 
board gender diversity and contribution of female board members towards earnings 
quality.  
4.4.1.2 Source Documentation  
This research is based on secondary data. Several secondary data sources have 
been used to collect the respective data of this study. The financial statement data of 
the sample firms is extracted from Connect 4 and DatAnalysis Premium. Data for the 
corporate governance components, board characteristics and audit committee 
characteristics, are disclosures contained in company annual reports. Board gender   
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diversity information is collected from the company’s annual report under the “Board 
of Directors” and/or “Corporate Governance Report” sections. Further, “Boardroom” 
database within Connect 4 is utilised to get a comprehensive report on the board 
characteristics of the sample firms. 
4.4.1.3 Data Preparation 
This study conduct data screening for all required variables through inspection 
of data entry accuracy, missing values, and normality test. First, the source documents 
are re-examined to check the data entry accuracy for approximately 25% of the dataset 
and no errors detected. Second, the missing values are  f i l l ed up  with mean value 
of available observations, carrying forward/backward the last available value of a 
firm to next/prior years.  Finally, in order to avoid heteroscedasticity issue and avoid 
undesirable influence of outliers the key variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% level. 
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Table 4.1: The Sample 
Panel A: Exclusion and Final Sample 
 Number of Observations (2008-2014, excluding 2011) 
 Total 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 
All Australian firms listed on Australian Securities Exchange (ASX)  2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 
Firms with missing Market Capital between 2007-2010  (683) (683) (683) (683) (683) (683) 
Firms belong to Utility, Insurance, Diversified Financial, Real Estate, and Banking Industry  (217) (217) (217) (217) (217) (217) 
Exclusion based on Research Randomizer Generated numbers76  (528) (528) (528) (528) (528) (528) 
Missing Annual Reports and Corporate Governance variables  (47) (47) (47) (47) (47) (47) 
Total number of firm-year observations (2008-2010) 3318 553 553 553 553 553 553 
Panel B: GICs Segregation of Final Sample  
GICs Sector Number of sample Firms Percentage 
    
Consumer Discretionary 
 
Automobiles & Components 2 0.36% 
Consumer Durables & Apparel 9 1.63% 
Consumer Services 14 2.53% 
Media 11 1.98% 
Retailing 12 2.17% 
Consumer Staples 
 
Food & Staples Retailing 2 0.36% 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 14 2.53% 
 Household & Personal Products 1 0.18% 
Energy Energy 85 15.37% 
Health Care 
 
Health Care Equipment & Services 21 3.79% 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 24 4.33% 
 
Industrials 
 
Capital Goods 31 5.60% 
Commercial Services & Supplies 22 3.97% 
Transportation 10 1.80% 
Information Technology 
 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 1 0.18% 
Software & Services 37 6.70% 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 14 2.53% 
Materials Materials 235 42.50% 
Telecommunication  Services Telecommunication Services 8 1.45% 
Total 553 100% 
                                                          
76 After the first and second exclusions due to missing market capital and GICs code, each stratified quartile (Q1-Q2) received 282 sample firms.  With the help of Research Randomizer 
https://www.randomizer.org/  150 random numbers are generated for each quartile. The rest of the 132 (282-150) firms are excluded from each quartile, leading to a total of 528 exclusions. 
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A common assumption of parametric statistical methods (e.g. linear regression, 
Pearson correlation, f-test, t-test, discriminant analysis and ANOVA test) is the 
dependent variable is approximately normally distributed for each category of the 
independent variable. Normality check has been performed to examine whether the 
dependent variable of this study accruals quality (ABS_ATAit  ABS_KOTit) is 
approximately normally distributed for independent variable, board gender diversity 
proxies (Per_FDirit, FDit, FD_1it, and FD_2it).
77 In particular, to perform the 
normality check skewness and kurtosis (-1.96=< z value=< +1.96), Shapiro-Wilk test 
p-value (p value>.05) and Histograms (Bell shaped) have been examined. While some 
of the variables did not result in normal distributions, the continued inclusion of the 
variables is justified by prior research (Barua et al. 2010, Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng. 2011, 
Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011).  
4.4.2 Variables Measurement 
4.4.2.1 Dependent Variable-Accruals Quality 
Accruals quality is the dependent variable for H2 (Hypothesis 2). Measures of 
discretionary accruals are frequently used in tests for earnings management 
(Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005). Past gender and earnings quality studies (Barua 
et al. 2010, Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011) have used discretionary accruals as measures 
of accruals quality. This study measures accruals quality by two alternative measures 
offered by two following models,  
Modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995) is a balance sheet-
based model, which reflects earnings management (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011). The 
first measure of accruals quality is the absolute value of the residual from the modified   
                                                          
77 Please refer to section 4.4.2 for further explanation of variable measures. 
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Jones model or absolute total abnormal accrual (ABS_ATAit). The model is as 
followed, 
TAit =  0 +  1(1Ait−1) +  2( REVit −  RECit)  +  3PPEit +  it 
 
Where, 
TA
it= Total accruals of firm i for year t, measured as the difference between income before 
extraordinary items and operating cash flows. 
A
it−1= Total assets of firm i for year t−1. 
REV
it= Change in revenues for firm ifrom year t−1 to year t. 
REC
it= Change in receivables for firm i from year t−1 to year t. 
PPE
it= Gross property, plant and equipment of firm i in year t. 
 
it = Error Term   
Kothari’s model proposed by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) is the 
augmented version of Modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995). 
This model modifies the Modified Jones model through performance matching on 
return on assets which controls for the effect of performance on measured 
discretionary accruals.  The absolute value of the residual (ABS_KOTit) of this 
performance matching augmented version of Jones type models is the second measure 
of accruals quality. The model is as followed, 
TA
it =  0 +  1(1Ait−1) + 2Salesit + 3PPEit + 4 ROAit +  it  
Where, 
TA
it= Total accruals of firm i for year t, measured as the difference between income before 
extraordinary items and operating cash flows. 
A
it−1= Total assets of firm i for year t−1. 
Sales
it= Change in sales revenue for firm I from year t−1 to year t. 
PPE
it= Gross property, plant and equipment of firm i in year t. 
ROA
it= Return on assets calculated as earnings before extraordinary items divided by 
total assets. 
 
it = Error Term   
  
286 
 
4.4.2.2 Independent Variable-Gender Diverse Board 
Gender diverse board is the independent variable for H2. Past research on 
board gender diversity and financial reporting quality used diverse proxies of gender 
diverse board. For instance, Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui (2011) and Abbott, Parker, and 
Presley (2012) utilised dummy variable (1 if there is at least 1 female on board or 0 
otherwise) to measure board gender diversity and Gavious, Segev, and Yosef (2012) 
utilised percentage of female director(s) as the measure of board gender diversity. In 
order to examine the impact of board gender diversity (female representation on 
boards) on accruals quality, this research utilise four measures of gender diverse board, 
Per_FDirit (percentage of female director(s) on board), FDit (a dummy variable if 
there is at least one female director on board), FDit_1 (a dummy variable if there is 
exactly one female director on board), and FD_2it (a dummy variable if there is exactly 
two female directors on board). Australian listed companies have recently adopted 
ASX CGC gender diversity recommendations in 2011 and female representation on 
listed companies’ boards is still not satisfactory. Majority of the sample company 
boards have either one or two female director(s). Therefore, besides FDit this study 
also utilises FD_1it and FD_2it (a dummy variable if there is exactly two female 
directors on board or 0 otherwise) to investigate the link between presence of exactly 
one or two female director(s) on board and accruals quality.   
4.4.2.3 Control Variables  
Prior studies on accruals quality suggest that a firm’s financial reporting 
quality can be influenced by several corporate governance and firm related attributes. 
Hence, in order to counter other determining factors of accruals quality besides board 
gender diversity, several firm, board and audit committee related attributes have been 
controlled in the OLS (Ordinary Least Squared) regressions. Following past empirical   
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studies (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011, Barua et al. 2010) significant firm characteristics 
and corporate governance related variables are controlled. Firm related control 
variables are Mkt_Capit, ROAit, OCFit, LEVit, and SalesGrthit.
78 Mkt_Capit is utilised 
in the OLS regression model to control for firm size. Past empirical studies (Dechow 
and Dichev 2002, Pincus and Rajgopal 2002) have positively associated firm size with 
accruals quality. ROAit and OCFit are incorporated to control for firm performance. 
Jones type accrual measures are sensitive to firm performance (Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney 1995, Kasznik 1999). Firms facing financial crisis are considered to be risky 
firms. And risky firms have higher incentive to manipulate earnings (Richardson 2000, 
Zmijewski and Hagerman 1981). Therefore, LEVit is utilised to control for firm 
financial crisis. Finally, high-growth firms are typically less transparent and may have 
greater opportunities for opportunistic earnings management (Meek, Rao, and 
Skousen 2007, Geiger and North 2006). Hence, SalesGrthit is controlled as the proxy 
of firm growth. 
Several board and audit committee variables are controlled to control for 
corporate governance attributes. The control variables are Board_Sizeit, 
Board_Indit, AC_Sizeit, AC_Indit, AC_Actit, and AC_BigNit. Bigger boards with 
more independent directors may contribute towards stronger monitoring over the 
management and can result in better earnings quality (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011). 
Past empirical studies (Baxter and Cotter 2009, Davidson, Goodwin ‐Stewart, 
and Kent 2005) have positively associated diverse audit committee 
characteristics with higher financial reporting quality, for instance, size and 
activities of audit committee (Choi, Jeon, and Park 2004); and independence of 
audit committee (Davidson, Goodwin‐Stewart, and Kent 2005, Vafeas 2005, Choi,   
                                                          
78 Please refer to Appendix 4 for variable descriptor. 
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Jeon, and Park 2004, Van Der Zahn and Tower 2004) have been positively associated 
with better earnings quality. Further, based on past literature Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 
(2011) claim audit by big 4/5 audit firms positively linked to better earnings 
quality. Ind_Dumit and Year_Dumit are controlled to control for industry sectors and 
year effects respectively.  
4.4.3 Regression Model 
This study conducts OLS regression analysis to test H2. This empirical 
research analyses whether female representation on boards or board gender diversity 
positively contributes towards better accruals quality.  
In the following regression model accruals quality is modelled as a function of 
multiple variables representing board gender diversity and control variables. The OLS 
regression model is as followed:79 
AQit =  + GDBit +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +  SalesGrth it +  
Brd_Sizeit +  Brd_Indit +  AC_Sizeit +  AC_Indit +  AC_Actit +  
Dum_AC_FinExpit +  ∑Ind_Dumit +   ∑Year_Dumit +  it     (1) 
   
Accruals quality is the key dependent variable for the above regression model 
(Eq. 1). The two measures of accruals quality used in this study, ABS_ATAit and 
ABS_KOTit, are regressed against four proxies of gender diverse board, Per_FDirit, 
FDit, FD_1it, and FD_2it, and same control variables.
80. This leads to a set of sixteen 
regression models.81Although board gender diversity might positively contribute to 
accruals quality, other firm and corporate governance attributes can also impact firm’s 
accruals quality. The use of gender diverse board proxies to explain firm’s accruals 
quality is meaningful if the impact of board gender diversity proxies is not already 
reflected in other firm and corporate governance attributes. Thus, in order to test the   
                                                          
79 Please refer to Appendix 4 for definition of all variables in the regression model. 
80 Please refer to section 4.4.2.1 and 4.4.2.2. 
81 Please refer to Appendix 5 for the equations. 
289 
 
regression models, five measures of firm attributes (Mkt_Capit, ROAit, OCFit, LEVit, 
and SalesGrthit), two measures of board attributes (Brd_Sizeit and Brd_Indit), and four 
measures of audit committee attributes (AC_Sizeit, AC_Indit, AC_Actit, and 
AC_BigNit) are controlled. Finally, in order to control for industry and year affect, 
industry dummy and year dummy are included.82 
4.5 Data Analysis and Results 
4.5.1 Univariate Analysis   
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics of dependent (ABS_ATAit and 
ABS_KOTit), independent (Per_FDirit, FDit, FD_1it, and FD_2it) and control variables 
(Mkt_Capit, ROAit, OCFit, LEVit, SalesGrthit, Brd_Sizeit, Brd_Indit, AC_Sizeit, 
AC_Indit, AC_Actit, and AC_BigNit) of this study. Panel A summarizes descriptive 
statistics of all variables used in main regression model (Eq.1) and Panel B 
summarizes descriptive statistics of all variables for firms with at least one female 
director on board in voluntary (2008-2010) and self-regulatory (2012-2014) period.  
Panel A shows, ABS_ATAit and ABS_KOTit have mean (standard deviation) 
values of .2165 (.9758) and .2170 (.9755) respectively. These values are significantly 
higher compare to previous U.S based studies conducted on the relation of gender and 
accruals quality. For instance, in studies conducted by Barua et al. (2010) and Srinidhi, 
Gul, and Tsui (2011) means of absolute values of discretionary accruals range 
between .0234 and .053. A key factor behind this significant difference can be the 
contextual difference of these studies with the current study. A study conducted by 
(Rusmin 2010) in the Singaporean context d em o n s t r a t e  the absolute value of 
discretionary accrual have a mean (standard deviation) of 0.634 (0.543). This is 
higher than the mean values of absolute values of discretionary accruals of this study.   
                                                          
82 Please refer to 4.4.2.3. 
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The previous Australian studies conducted on accruals quality, like, Davidson, 
Goodwin‐Stewart, and Kent (2005) and Baxter and Cotter (2009) find the means of 
absolute value of discretionary accruals are 0.156 and 0.18 respectively. The means 
of absolute value of discretionary accruals of this study is marginally higher to these 
past Australian studies. This study has utilised firms of all sizes and inclusion of 
significant number of small and medium firms may contribute to the higher means of 
ABS_ATAit and ABS_KOTit. Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2005) 
argue smaller size of firms may lead to poor accruals quality. 
Panel B shows during the voluntary period only 292 firm-year observations had 
female director(s) boards. Among which 82.88% had only 1 female member on board 
and only 14% had two female directors. During self-regulatory period 406 firm-year 
observations had female board members. Among which 72.66% had only 1 female 
member on board and 19% had two female directors. This infers the number of firms 
with female directors on boards increased in self-regulatory period and number of 
female director representation also increased from 1 token female director to 2 female 
directors. Means of absolute values of discretionary accruals for firms in both 
voluntary and self-regulatory period are significantly high compare to Panel A. A key 
contributing factor can be the sample size. The firm-year observation for firms with 
female directors on board (698) is significantly low compare to total firm-year 
observation (3318). Gray, Koh, and Tong (2009) argue that smaller sample size can 
lead to higher means of absolute values of discretionary accrual. However, the means 
of ABS_ATAit and ABS_KOTit in self-regulatory period (ABS_ATAit: .709 and 
ABS_KOTit: .710) is significantly lower compare to voluntary period (ABS_ATAit: .501 
and ABS_KOTit: .500).  
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of All Sample Firms between 2008 and 2014 (N = 3318) 
 Mean Median Std deviation Minimum Maximum 
ABS_ATAit   .2165515 .0542337 .97580063       .00015 10.02863 
ABS_KOTit .2170642 .0539575 .97553218       .00018 10.03333 
Per_FDirit .0434 0 .09381 .00 .60 
FDit .21 0 .408 0 1 
FD_1it .1618 0 .36836 0 1 
FD_2it .04 0 .186 0 1 
Mkt_Capit 534,127,541.6178 19,820,727.75 2,318,435,058.10860 633,980.07 19,983,174,569.00 
ROAit -.4042 -.07 1.31646 -10.46 .31 
OCFit 45,309,570.0859 -515840 194,588,525.57464 -46,430,715.00 1,444,636,118.00 
LEVit 1.5756 1.25 1.37681 -3.33 9.36 
SalesGrthit .5540 0 362302 -1.00 30.19 
Brd_Sizeit 5.18 5 2.033 3 12 
Brd_Indit 2.37 2 1.833 0 8 
AC_Sizeit 2.28 3 1.894 0 8 
AC_Indit 1.80 2 1.736 0 7 
AC_Actit 2.07 2 1.951 0 8 
AC_BigNit .43 0 .495 0 1 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Firms with at Least ‘1’ Female Member on Board in Voluntary 
and Self-Regulatory Period   
 Voluntary Period (2008-2010) Self-Regulatory Period (2012-2014) 
 N Mean N Mean 
ABS_ATAit   292 .7091452 406 .5013194 
ABS_KOTit 292 .7102061 406 .5009862 
Per_FDirit 292 .1977 406 .2127 
FDit 292 1 406 1 
FD_1it 292 .8288 406 .7266 
FD_2it 292 .14 406 .19 
Mkt_Capit 292 2,016,112,737.9097 406 1,912,960,592.9270 
ROAit 292 -.1535 406 -.1277 
OCFit 292 181,093,187.1884 406 167,201,872.3719 
LEVit 292 1.7486 406 1.7276 
SalesGrthit 292 .3401 406 .5672 
Brd_Sizeit 292 6.75 406 6.82 
Brd_Indit 292 3.60 406 3.94 
AC_Sizeit 292 3.14 406 3.51 
AC_Indit 292 2.73 406 3.03 
AC_Actit 292 3.00 406 3.52 
AC_BigNit 292 .66 406 .67 
Note: Please refer to Appendix4 for variable descriptor 
This infers, the value of discretionary accruals reduces with the increase of female 
members’ representation on boards. This result is similar to the previous studies which 
demonstrate the means of absolute values of discretionary accruals are less when the 
firm has female CFO Barua et al. (2010) and at least on female director on board 
Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui (2011).   
4.5.2 Bi-Variate Analysis  
Table 4.3 demonstrates results for the Pearson correlation matrix for the 
regression variables with significance level. A review of correlation coefficients in 
Table 4.3 highlights a number of observations. Majority of the variables are 
significantly correlated at the 1% level. The univariate correlation suggests that   
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both accruals quality measures (ABS_ATAit and ABS_KOTit) are significantly 
correlated with gender diverse board proxies at 1% level (Per_FDirit, FDit, FD_2it) 
and 5% level (FD_1it). Both the accrual measures are significantly correlated (p < 
0.01) with variables representing firm characteristics (Mkt_Capit, ROAit, OCFit, 
and LEVit) except for SalesGrthit; board characteristics (Brd_Sizeit and Brd_Indit); 
and audit committee characteristics (AC_Sizeit, AC_Indit, AC_Actit, and 
AC_BigNit). Gender diverse board proxies (Per_FDirit, FDit, FD_1it, and FD_2it) 
demonstrate significant positive correlation with all the control variables except for 
SalesGrthit. Mkt_Capit (representing firm size) and OCFit (representing firm 
performance) are highly correlated (.905**). OCFit is moderately correlated with 
Brd_Sizeit (.505**) and Brd_Indit (.517**). Audit committee is a sub-committee of 
board, hence as expected board characteristics and audit committee characteristics 
(except for AC_BigNit) are positively correlated at a magnitude level more than 0.5. 
Besides Mkt_Capit and OCFit no other variables have correlation magnitude above 
the critical multicollinearity limit of 0.9 (Hair Jr et al. 1995). Multivariate analysis 
is performed both including and excluding these variables and the results remained 
largely unchanged. Therefore, the multicollinearity issue between Mkt_Capit and 
OCFit is not of significant concern. 
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**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.  
Please refer to Appendix 4 for definition of variables. 
Table 4.3: Pearson / Correlation Matrix 
 ABS_ATAit ABS_KOTit Per_FDirit FDit FD_1it FD_2it Mkt_Capit ROAit OCFit LEVit SalesGrthit Brd_Sizeit Brd_Indit AC_Sizeit AC_Indit AC_Actit AC_BigNit 
ABS_ATAit   1                 
ABS_KOTit - 1                
Per_FDirit .148** .148** 1               
FDit .197** .197** - 1              
FD_1it .038* .038* - - 1             
FD_2it .167** .167** - - - 1            
Mkt_Capit .657** .657** .218** .317** .116** .301** 1           
ROAit .057** .055** .076** .104** .084** .040* .084** 1          
OCFit .719** .719** .238** .339** .110** .343** .905** .092** 1         
LEVit .089** .089** .040** .060** .025 .043* .096** .088** .134** 1        
SalesGrthit -.005 -.006 .001 -.012 -.011 -.008 -.017 .019 -.025 .015 1       
Brd_Sizeit .319** .319** .254** .409** .233** .294** .472** .149** .505** .150** .012 1      
Brd_Indit .303** .303** .283** .402** .224** .304** .479** .165** .517** .152** .002 .692** 1     
AC_Sizeit .231** .231** .197** .292** .185** .172** .332** .214** .348** .187** -.013 .558** .541** 1    
AC_Indit .254** .254** .227** .328** .208** .193** .356** .218** .377** .190** -.012 .619** .629** .897** 1   
AC_Actit .230** .231** .232** .325** .208** .207** .353** .215** .361** .210** -.005 .526** .549** .740** .727** 1  
AC_BigNit .132** .132** .169** .249** .160** .160** .225** .123** .248** .131** -.003 435** .408** .374** .432** .393** 1 
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4.5.3   Multivariate Analysis 
Table 4.4 reports the results of regression analyses that examine the impact of 
four board gender diversity proxies (Per_FDirit, FDit, FD_1it, and FD_2it)) on two 
accruals quality measures (ABS_ATAit and ABS_KOTit). Panel A summarizes the 
regression analyses results, where dependent variable is the absolute value of modified 
Jones model (ABS_ATAit) and panel B summarizes the regression analyses results, 
where dependent variable is the absolute value of Kothari’s model (ABS_KOTit). 
The 1st proxy for gender diverse board, Per_FDirit, has non-significant 
relationship with both ABS_ATAit (Coefficient =-.043 and t statistics = - .310) and 
ABS_KOTit (Coefficient =-.044 and t statistics = -.318). This implies percentage of 
female representation on board compare to male members may reduce earnings 
management but the impact is not significant. A key factor behind this result can be 
the still very lower percentage of female members compare to their male peers on ASX 
listed firms’ boards. 
The 2nd proxy for gender diverse board, FDit, shows significant negative 
relationship with both ABS_ATAit (Coefficient =-.069 and t statistics = - 2.121**) and 
ABS_KOTit (Coefficient =-.069 and t statistics = -2.166**). This suggests that 
representation of at least one female member on board can prohibit earnings 
management and ensure better accruals quality. Hence, H2 is accepted. 
The 3rd proxy for gender diverse board, FD_1it, demonstrates significant 
negative relationship with both ABS_ATAit (Coefficient =-.082 and t statistics = - 
2.484**) and ABS_KOTit (Coefficient =-.081 and t statistics = -2.483**).  This infers 
that presence of one female member on board can also prohibit earnings management 
and ensure better accruals quality. Hence, H2 is accepted. 
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Table 4.4: Gender Diver Board and Accruals Quality (Dependent Variable- ABS_ATAit) 
 
VARIABLES 
Per_FDirit FDit FD_1it FD_2it 
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
Panel A: Modified Jones Model    
ABS_ATAit   -.043 -.310 -.069 -2.121** -.082 2.484** -.342 -5.073*** 
Mkt_Capit .000 1.021 .000 1.034 .000 1.090 .000 .823 
ROAit .005         .549 .006 .608 .006 .638 .004 .477 
OCFit .000 24.495*** .000 24.624*** .000 24.419*** .000 25.094*** 
LEVit .004 .485 .004 .406 .004 .414 .003 .385 
SalesGrthit .004 1.116 .004 1.107 .003 1.090 .004 1.124 
Brd_Sizeit -.009 -1.056 -.007 -.746 -.007 -.838 -.006 -.649 
Brd_Indit -.049 -4.969*** -.047 -4.792*** -.048 -4.874*** -.046 -4.620*** 
AC_Sizeit -.019 -1.289 -.019 -1.329 -.019 -1.326 -.019 -1.328 
AC_Indit .051 3.055*** .051 3.054*** .052 3.081*** .048 2.886*** 
AC_Actit .000 -.016 .001 .097 .001 .096 .002 .163 
AC_BigNit -.053 -1.971** -.051 -1.896* -.051 -1.900* -.051 -1.902* 
Intercept .181 3.826*** .171 3.598*** .177 3.745*** .159 3.366*** 
N 3318 3318 3318 3318 
Adjusted R2 .539 .540 .540 .543 
F statistic (sig.) 162.873*** 163.274*** 163.426*** 165.209*** 
Industry and Year Included Included Included Included 
Panel B: Kothari’s Model     
ABS_KOTit   -.044 -.318 -.069 -2.116** -.081 -2.483**  -.341 -5.060*** 
Mkt_Capit .000 1.022 .000 1.035 .000 1.092  .000 .825 
ROAit .004 .389 .004 .447 .004 .478  .003 .316 
OCFit .000 24.482*** .000 24.611*** .000 24.406***  .000 25.079*** 
LEVit .004 .491 .004 .413 .004 .420  .003 .391 
SalesGrthit .003 1.048 .003 1.039 .003 1.021  .003 1.055 
Brd_Sizeit -.009 -1.074 -.007 -.766 -.008 -.857  -.006 -.669 
Brd_Indit -.049 -4.965*** -.047 -4.789*** -.048 -4.871***  -.046 -4.618*** 
AC_Sizeit -.019 -1.299 -.020 -1.338 -.019 -1.335  -.019 -1.337 
AC_Indit .052 3.077*** .052 3.076*** .052 3.104***  .049 2.909*** 
AC_Actit .000 .002 .001 .115 .001 .113  .002 .180 
AC_BigNit -.053 -1.962** -.051 -1.887* -.051 -1.891*  -.051 -1.893* 
Intercept .180 3.807*** .170 3.580*** .176 3.727***  .159 3.349*** 
N 3318 3318 3318  3318 
Adjusted R2 .539 .540 .540  .543 
F statistic (sig.) 162.764*** 163.163*** 163.317***  165.088*** 
Industry and Year Included Included Included  Included 
     
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1 
Please refer to Appendix 4 for definition of variables  
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Finally, the 4th proxy for gender diverse board, FD_2it, demonstrates highly significant 
negative relationship with both ABS_ATAit (Coefficient =-.342 and t statistics = - 5.073***) 
and ABS_KOTit (Coefficient =-.341 and t statistics = -2.060***).  This infers that presence of 
two female members on board can significantly and strongly constrain earnings management 
and ensure higher accruals quality. Hence, H2 is accepted. 
All the proxies of gender diverse board (Per_FDirit, FDit, FD_1it, and FD_2it) show 
negative impact on both earnings management measures (ABS_ATAit and ABS_KOTit).   
However, Per_FDirit   fails to demonstrate significant negative impact on earnings 
management. Representation of two female members on board shows the highest significant 
negative impact on earnings management. 
All the four models with ABS_ATAit as the dependent variable, are significant with a 
likelihood ratio of 162.873***, 163.274***, 163.426***, 165.209*** and adjusted R2 .539, 
.540, .540, and .543. All the four models with ABS_KOTit the dependent variable, are 
significant with a likelihood ratio of 162.764***, 163.163***, 163.317***, and 165.088*** 
and adjusted R2 .539, .540, .540, and .543. This result is consistent with expectation of this 
study, board gender diversity can significantly and positively impact firm’s accruals quality. 
4.5.4 Additional Analyses  
This study performs several additional tests to assess the robustness of the results. The 
1st analysis investigates the impact of four proxies of gender diverse board (Per_FDirit, FDit, 
FD_1it, and FD_2it) on signed measures of accruals quality (SIGNED_ATAit and 
SIGNED_KOTit). The key objective of this analysis is to examine the link between female 
representation on board and income increasing/decreasing earnings management.83 The 2nd   
                                                          
83 Please refer to section 4.5.4.1 for further explanation. 
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analysis investigates the impact of four proxies of gender diverse board (Per_FDirit, FDit, 
FD_1it, and FD_2it) on signed extreme measures of accruals quality (EXT_SIGNED_ATAit and 
EXT_SIGNED_KOTit). The key objective of this analysis is to examine the link between female 
representation on board and extreme income increasing (>=75%)/decreasing (=<25%) earnings 
management.84. The 3rd analysis augments the main regression model by adding few more 
significant firm and corporate governance related variables.85 
4.5.4.1 Income Increasing/ Deceasing Earnings Management and Gender Diverse Board 
 
This additional test aims to analyse the impact of female representation on board on 
income increasing/ decreasing earnings management. The rational for using signed accruals 
quality measures (SIGNED_ATAit and SIGNED_KOTit) is to further assess the relationship of 
female representation on board with income increasing (positive accruals quality measures) 
and decreasing (negative accruals quality measures) earnings management. The main 
regression analysis examined the impact of board gender diversity on absolute value of 
earnings management measures (ABS_ATAit and ABS_KOTit). A separate assessment of female 
members’ impact on income increasing and decreasing earnings management will provide 
additional support to H2. 
Table 4.5 reports the results of regression analyses that examine the impact of four 
board gender diversity proxies (Per_FDirit, FDit, FD_1it, and FD_2it) on two signed accruals 
quality measures (SIGNED_ATAit and SIGNED_KOTit). Panel A summarizes the regression 
analysis results, where dependent variables are the signed (+ and -) residual values of modified 
Jones model (SIGNED_ATAit) and Kothari’s model (SIGNED_KOTit) and key independent 
variable is Per_FDirit; Panel B summarizes the regression analysis results, where dependent   
                                                          
84 Please refer to section 4.5.4.2 for further explanation. 
85 Please refer to section 4.5.4.3 for further explanation. 
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variables are the signed (+ and -) residual values of modified Jones model (SIGNED_ATAit) 
and Kothari’s model (SIGNED_KOTit) and key independent variable is FDit; Panel C 
summarizes the regression analysis results, where dependent variables are the signed (+ and -) 
residual values of modified Jones model (SIGNED_ATAit)and Kothari’s model 
(SIGNED_KOTit) and key independent variable is FD_1it; and Panel D summarizes the 
regression analysis  results, where dependent variables are the signed (+ and -) residual values 
of modified Jones model (SIGNED_ATAit) and Kothari’s model (SIGNED_KOTit) and key 
independent variable is FD_2it.
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Table 4.5: Gender Diverse Board and Income Increasing / Decreasing Earnings Management 
 
VARIABLES 
SIGNED_ATAit   SIGNED_KOTit   
Income increasing EM Income Decreasing EM Income increasing EM Income Decreasing EM 
 Coefficient t-statistics/Wald Coefficient t-statistics/Wald Coefficient t-statistics/Wald Coefficient t-statistics/Wald 
Panel A: Percentage of Female Director(s) on Board 
Per_FDirit  -.084 -2.904*** .789 .626 -.081 -2.805*** .618 .488 
Mkt_Capit .000 1.919* -.000 -1.183 .000 1.870* .000 -1.299 
ROAit .015 6.252*** .002 .045 .008 4.279*** .003 .047 
OCFit .000 -2.747*** -.000 -8.204*** -.000 -2.664*** .000 -8.462*** 
LEVit .008 4.219*** .043 .741 .007 3.724*** .035 .590 
SalesGrthit .002 3.073*** -.021 -.595 .002 3.077*** .013 -.504 
Brd_Sizeit .009 4.819*** .048 .656 .009 4.776*** .056 .789 
Brd_Indit .001 .484 .161 1.894* .001 .465 .160 1.939* 
AC_Sizeit -.010 -3.322*** .091 .710 -.011 -3.531*** .085 .702 
AC_Indit .020 5.742*** -.207 -1.277 .021 5.964*** -.186 -1.212 
AC_Actit .004 2.198** .069 .837 .005 2.282** .068 .881 
AC_BigNit -.009 -1.579 .122 .413 -.009 -1.609 .088 .314 
Intercept .041 4.119*** -.279 -.720 .049 4.877*** -.268 -.699 
 N 2999 319 2988 330 
Adjusted R2 .117 .656 .111 .655 
F statistic (sig.) 17.513*** 26.141*** 16.609*** 26.916 
Industry and Year Included Included Included Included 
Panel B: At Least One Female Director on Board    
FDit  -.015 -2.266** .501 1.591 -.015 -2.145** .434 1.407 
Mkt_Capit .000 1.937* -.000 -1.172 .000 1.890* .000 -1.296 
ROAit .015 6.217*** .001 .023 .008 4.270*** .004 .061 
OCFit -.000 -2.720*** -.000 -8.375*** -.000 -2.643*** .000 -8.631*** 
LEVit .008 4.226*** .047 .811 .007 3.741*** .037 .624 
SalesGrthit .002 3.035*** -.023 -.650 .002 3.037*** -.013 -.524 
Brd_Sizeit .009 4.944*** .032 .430 .009 4.887*** .042 .583 
Brd_Indit .001 .458 .152 1.789** .001 .436 .154 1.870* 
AC_Sizeit -.010 -3.284*** .080 .625 -.011 -3.490*** .076 .625 
AC_Indit .020 5.725*** -.192 -1.188 .021 5.944*** -.171 -1.116 
AC_Actit .004 2.165** .056 .681 .005 2.244** .056 .731 
AC_BigNit -.009 -1.571 .120 .409 -.009 -1.596 .067 .240 
Intercept .039 3.935*** -.234 -.605 .048 4.710*** -.224 -.584 
 N 2999 319 2988 330 
Adjusted R2 .116 .658 .110 .657 
F statistic (sig.) 17.357*** 26.424*** 16.455*** 27.142*** 
Industry and Year Included Included Included Included 
Panel C: One Female Director on Board    
FD_1it  -.004 -.579 .575 1.996** -.003 -.479 .483 1.739* 
Mkt_Capit .000 1.915* -.000 -1.253 .000 1.870* -.000 -1.368 
ROAit .015 6.156*** -.002 -.054 .008 4.215*** .003 .049 
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OCFit -.000 -2.801*** -.000 -8.000*** -.000 -2.722*** -.000 -8.304*** 
LEVit .008 4.296*** .049 .853 .007 3.819*** .038 .654 
SalesGrthit .002 3.036*** -.026 -.732 .002 3.035*** -.014 -.547 
Brd_Sizeit .009 4.693*** .030 .414 .009 4.644*** .040 .565 
Brd_Indit .001 .294 .168 1.999** .001 .272 .167 2.036** 
AC_Sizeit -.010 -3.219*** .093 .733 -.011 -3.427*** .083 .684 
AC_Indit .020 5.712*** -.182 -1.127 .021 5.930*** -.159 -1.036 
AC_Actit .004 2.054** .030 .351 .004 2.139** .036 .462 
AC_BigNit -.009 -1.646* .103 .350 -.009 -1.659** .049 .175 
Intercept .041 4.159*** -.253 -.658 .050 4.923*** -.236 -.618 
 N 2999 319 2988 330 
Adjusted R2 .114 .660 .109 .658 
F statistic (sig.) 17.129*** 26.610*** 16.249*** 27.278*** 
Industry and Year Included Included Included Included 
Panel D: Two Female Directorsg on Board    
FD_2it  -.024 -1.560 1.029 2.589*** -.023 -1.513 1.136 2.818*** 
Mkt_Capit .000 1.844* -.000 -1.027 .000 1.798** -.000 -1.124 
ROAit .014 6.136*** .010 .227 .008 4.180*** .006 .093 
OCFit .000 -2.618*** -.000 -8.668*** -.000 -2.539** -.000 -9.027*** 
LEVit .008 4.277*** .043 .755 .007 3.797*** .036 .625 
SalesGrthit .002 3.047*** -.019 -.537 .002 3.045*** -.013 -.521 
Brd_Sizeit .009 4.813*** .060 .826 .009 4.765*** .069 .983 
Brd_Indit .001 .372 .137 1.626 .001 .355 .136 1.654* 
AC_Sizeit -.010 -3.254*** .065 .512 -.011 -3.463*** .061 .511 
AC_Indit .020 5.627*** -.201 -1.256 .021 5.851*** -.188 -1.242 
AC_Actit .004 2.134** .087 1.053 .004 2.219** .086 1.127 
AC_BigNit -.009 -1.637 .140 .479 -.009 -1.648** .119 .429 
Intercept .040 4.005*** -.296 -.771 .048 4.764*** -.300 -.793 
 N 2999 319 2988 330 
Adjusted R2 .115 .663 .110 .663 
F statistic (sig.) 17.229*** 26.965*** 16.346*** 27.917*** 
Industry and Year Included Included Included Included 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1 
Please refer to Appendix 4 for definition of variables. 
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The 1st proxy for gender diverse board, Per_FDirit, has highly significant 
(p<.01) negative relationship with both positively signed SIGNED_ATAit (t statistics 
= -2.904***) and SIGNED_KOTit (t statistics = -2.805***). On the contrary, 
Per_FDirit has non-significant relationship with negatively signed SIGNED_ATAit (t 
statistics = .626) and SIGNED_KOTit (t statistics = .488). This implies female 
members on boards can significantly reduce income increasing earnings management, 
however they do not have any significant impact on income decreasing earnings 
management. 
The 2nd proxy for gender diverse board, FDit, has significant (p<.05) negative 
relationship with both positively signed SIGNED_ATAit (t statistics = -2.266**) and 
SIGNED_KOTit (t statistics = -2.145**). On the contrary, FDit has non-significant 
relationship with negatively signed SIGNED_ATAit (t statistics = 1.591) and 
SIGNED_KOTit (t statistics = 1.407). This suggests representation of at least one female 
member on boards significantly reduce income increasing earnings management, 
however they do not have any significant impact on income decreasing earnings 
management. 
The 3rd proxy for gender diverse board, FD_1it, has non-significant 
relationship with both positively signed SIGNED_ATAit (t statistics = -.579) and 
SIGNED_KOTit (t statistics = -.479). On the contrary, FD_1it has significant positive 
relationship with negatively signed SIGNED_ATAit (t statistics = 1.996**) and 
SIGNED_KOTit (t statistics = 1.739*). This suggests representation of one female 
member on board does not significantly contribute to reduce income increasing 
earnings management, however it might positively contribute to income decreasing 
earnings management due to female board members risk averseness and cautious 
nature.  
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Finally, the 4th proxy for gender diverse board, FD_2it, has non-significant 
relationship with both positively signed SIGNED_ATAit (t statistics = -1.560) and 
SIGNED_KOTit (t statistics = -1.513). On the contrary, FD_2it has significant positive 
relationship with negatively signed SIGNED_ATAit (t statistics = 2.589***) and 
SIGNED_KOTit (t statistics = 2.818***). This infers representation of two female 
members on boards does not significantly contribute to reduce income increasing 
earnings management, however it might positively contribute to income decreasing 
earnings management due to female board members risk averseness and cautious 
nature. 
Overall all the proxies of gender diverse board (Per_FDirit, FDit, FD_1it, and 
FD_2it) show significant/ non-significant impact on income increasing earnings 
management and significant/ non-significant impact on income decreasing earnings 
management. 
4.5.4.2 Extreme Earnings Management and Gender Diverse Board  
This additional test aims to analyse the impact of female representation on 
board on extreme (=< 25% and >=75%) earnings management. The rational for using 
extreme (=< 25% and >=75%) signed values of accruals quality measures is to further 
assess the relationship of female representation on board with extreme income 
decreasing (negatively signed accruals quality measures less than 25 percentile) and 
increasing (positively signed accruals quality measures more than 75percentile) 
earnings management. The main regression analysis examined the impact of female 
member representation on board with absolute value of earnings management 
measures (ABS_ATAit and ABS_KOTit) and the previous additional test examined the 
impact of female member representation on income increasing/decreasing earnings 
management (SIGNED_ATAit and SIGNED_KOTit). A separate assessment of female   
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members’ impact on extreme income increasing and decreasing earnings management 
will provide further additional support to H2. 
Table 4.5 reports the results of regression analyses that examine the impact of 
four board gender diversity proxies (Per_FDirit, FDit, FD_1it, and FD_2it)) on two 
extreme signed accruals quality measures (EXT_SIGNED_ATAit and 
EXT_SIGNED_KOTit). Panel A summarizes the regression analysis results, where 
dependent variables are extreme percentiles (=< 25% and >=75%) of  signed (+ and -
) residual values of modified Jones model (EXT_SIGNED_ATAit) and Kothari’s model 
(EXT_SIGNED_KOTit) and key independent variable is Per_FDirit; Panel B 
summarizes the regression analysis results, where dependent variables are extreme 
percentiles (=< 25% and >=75%) of  signed (+ and -) residual values of modified Jones 
model (EXT_SIGNED_ATAit) and Kothari’s model (EXT_SIGNED_KOTit) and key 
independent variable is FDit; Panel C summarizes the regression analysis results, 
where dependent variables are extreme percentiles (=< 25% and >=75%) of  signed (+ 
and -) residual values of modified Jones model (EXT_SIGNED_ATAit) and Kothari’s 
model (EXT_SIGNED_KOTit) and key independent variable is FD_1it; and Panel D 
summarizes the regression analysis results, where dependent variables are extreme 
percentiles (=< 25% and >=75%) of  signed (+ and -) residual values of modified Jones 
model (EXT_SIGNED_ATAit) and Kothari’s model (EXT_SIGNED_KOTit)  and key 
independent variable is FD_2it. 
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Table 4.6: Gender Diverse Board and Extreme Earnings Management  
 
VARIABLES 
EXT_SIGNED_ATAit   EXT_SIGNED_KOTit   
EM=<25% EM=>75% EM=<25% I EM=>75% 
 Coefficient t-statistics/Wald Coefficient t-statistics/Wald Coefficient t-statistics/Wald Coefficient t-statistics/Wald 
Panel A: Percentage of Female Director(s) on Board  
Per_FDirit  .387 .837 -.027 -.408 .423 .887 -.018 -.264 
Mkt_Capit -.000 -.727 -.000 -.001 -.000 -.779 .000 .091 
ROAit .009 .491 .039 1.987** .008 .258 .014 2.130** 
OCFit -.000 -13.926*** -.000 -1.557 -.000 -13.977*** -.000 -1.663* 
LEVit .015 .559 .005 1.319 .012 .461 .004 1.188 
SalesGrthit -.006 -.519 .003 1.969** -.005 -.469 .003 2.337** 
Brd_Sizeit .050 1.540 .007 1.940* .047 1.453 .008 2.258** 
Brd_Indit .110 3.124*** .001 .305 .108 3.036*** .001 .128 
AC_Sizeit .048 .917 -.012 -1.808* .047 .903 -.014 -2.083** 
AC_Indit -.114 -1.749** .010 -1.379 -.118 -1.827* .013 1.795* 
AC_Actit .012 .337 -.002 -.583 .018 .477 -.002 -.520 
AC_BigNit .092 .907 -.035 -3.084*** .097 .946 -.034 -3.042*** 
Intercept -.273 -1.727 .309 14.146*** -.264 -1.668* .301 14.076*** 
 N 830 830 830 830 
Adjusted R2 .661 .073 .659 .080 
F statistic (sig.) 68.336*** 3.703*** 67.640*** 3.991*** 
Industry and Year Included Included Included Included 
Panel B: At Least One Female Director on Board  
FDit  .263 2.180** -.004 -.298 .256 2.090** -.004 -.003 
Mkt_Capit -.000 -.744 -.000 .000 -.000 -.791 .000 .095 
ROAit .007 .377 .039 1.978** .005 .178 .014 2.127** 
OCFit -.000 -14.126*** -.000 -1.558 -.000 14.180*** -.000 -1.661* 
LEVit .016 .602 .005 1.323 .014 .527 .005 1.190 
SalesGrthit -.006 -.497 .003 1.963** -.005 -.455 .003 2.332** 
Brd_Sizeit .042 1.298 .007 1.931* .040 1.211 .008 2.258** 
Brd_Indit .109 3.109*** .001 .292 .107 3.037*** .001 .130 
AC_Sizeit .048 .929 -.012 -1.818* .048 .936 -.014 -2.089** 
AC_Indit -.117 -1.796** .011 1.396 -.120 -1.867* .013 1.801* 
AC_Actit .009 .241 -.002 -.584 .013 .361 -.002 -.509 
AC_BigNit .084 .832 -.035 -3.089*** .087 .854 -.034 -3.046*** 
Intercept -.265 -1.687 .309 14.033*** -.253 -1.605 .301 13.951*** 
 N 830 830 830 830 
Adjusted R2 .663 .072 .660 .080 
F statistic (sig.) 68.848*** 3.699*** 68.090*** 3.992*** 
Industry and Year Included Included Included Included 
Panel C: One Female Director on Board  
FD_1it  .272 2.336** .004 .313 .247 2.101** .003 .213 
Mkt_Capit -.000 -.846 -.000 -.027 -.000 -.884 .000 .078 
ROAit .007 .342 .039 1.966** .006 .188 .014 2.113** 
OCFit -.000 -13.753*** -.000 -1.546 -.000 -13.853*** -.000 -1.660* 
LEVit .016 .611 .005 1.331 .014 .531 .005 1.197 
SalesGrthit -.006 -.517 .003 1.973** -.005 -.469 .003 2.346** 
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Brd_Sizeit .043 1.327 .006 1.872* .041 1.246 .008 2.214** 
Brd_Indit .114 3.234*** .001 .237 .111 3.141*** .000 .084 
AC_Sizeit .050 .959 -.012 -1.805* .050 .968 -.014 -2.082** 
AC_Indit -.115 -1.759* .011 1.410 -.117 -1.828* .014 1.818* 
AC_Actit .003 .096 -.002 -.642 .008 .224 -.002 -.561 
AC_BigNit .077 .763 -.035 -3.077*** .083 .813 -.034 -3.035*** 
Intercept -.271 -1.727 .310 14.168*** -.256 -1.624 .302 14.091*** 
 N 830 830 830 830 
Adjusted R2 .663 .072 .660 .080 
F statistic (sig.) 68.937*** 3.699*** 68.096*** 3.990*** 
Industry and Year Included Included Included Included 
Panel D: Two Female Director on Board  
FD_2it  1.108 4.898*** -.029 -.997 1.185 5.137*** .029 -1.013 
Mkt_Capit -.000 -.456 -.000 -.050 -.000 -.507 .000 .049 
ROAit .014 .753 .039 1.964** .011 .373 .014 2.115** 
OCFit -.000 -14.907*** -.000 -1.421 -.000 -15.061*** -.000 -1.529 
LEVit .016 .611 .005 1.282 .013 .475 .004 1.151 
SalesGrthit -.006 -.488 .003 1.988** -.005 -.468 .003 2.365** 
Brd_Sizeit .053 1.671* .007 2.083** .052 1.633 .009 2.414** 
Brd_Indit .095 2.717*** .001 .270 .093 2.652*** .000 .113 
AC_Sizeit .037 .712 -.012 -1.750* .034 .671 -.014 -2.019** 
AC_Indit -.114 -1.778* .010 1.262 -.120 -1.889* .012 1.658* 
AC_Actit .024 .665 -.002 -.570 .031 .852 -.002 -.503 
AC_BigNit .104 1.038 -.035 -3.034*** .107 1.064 -.034 -2.992*** 
Intercept -.261 -1.681* .306 13.891*** -.264 -1.700* .298 13.803*** 
 N 830 830 830 830 
Adjusted R2 .670 .074 .669 .081 
F statistic (sig.) 71.281*** 3.741*** 70.854*** 4.036*** 
Industry and Year Included Included Included Included 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1 
Please refer to Appendix 4 for definition of variables. 
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The 1st proxy for gender diverse board, Per_FDirit, has non-significant 
relationship with less than 25 percentile EXT_SIGNED_ATAit (t statistics = .837) and 
EXT_SIGNED_KOTit (t statistics = .887). Further, Per_FDirit has non-significant 
relationship with more than 75 percentile EXT_SIGNED_ATAit (t statistics = -.408) 
and EXT_SIGNED_KOTit (t statistics = -.264).  
The 2nd proxy for gender diverse board, FDit, has significant positive 
relationship with less than 25 percentile EXT_SIGNED_ATAit (t statistics = 2.180**) and 
EXT_SIGNED_KOTit (t statistics = 2.090**). On the contrary, FDit has non-significant 
relationship with more than 75 percentile EXT_SIGNED_ATAit (t statistics = -.298) and 
EXT_SIGNED_KOTit (t statistics = -.003). This implies at least one female member 
representation on board has significant positive link with extreme income decreasing 
(=<25%) and non-significant link with extreme income increasing (>=75%) earnings 
management. 
The 3rd proxy for gender diverse board, FD_1it, has significant positive 
relationship with less than 25 percentile EXT_SIGNED_ATAit (t statistics = 2.336**) and 
EXT_SIGNED_KOTit (t statistics = 2.101**). On the contrary, FD_1it has non-
significant relationship with more than 75 percentile EXT_SIGNED_ATAit (t statistics 
= .313) and EXT_SIGNED_KOTit (t statistics = .213). This implies the impact of one 
female representation on board has significant positive link with extreme income 
decreasing (=<25%) and non-significant link with extreme income increasing 
(>=75%) earnings management. 
Finally, the 4th proxy for gender diverse board, FD_2it, has significant positive 
relationship with less than 25 percentile EXT_SIGNED_ATAit (t statistics = 4.898***) 
and EXT_SIGNED_KOTit (t statistics = 5.137***). On the contrary, FD_2it has non-
significant relationship with more than 75 percentile EXT_SIGNED_ATAit (t statistics 
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= -.997) and EXT_SIGNED_KOTit (t statistics = -1.013). This implies two female 
members’ representation on board has significant positive link with extreme income 
decreasing (=<25%) and non-significant link with extreme income increasing 
(>=75%) earnings management. 
Per_FDirit, FDit, FD_1it, and FD_2it show significant positive link with 
extreme income decreasing (=<25%) earnings management and Per_FDirit, FDit, and 
FD_2it show non-significant link with extreme income increasing (>=75%) earnings 
management. FD_1it show non-significant link with extreme income increasing 
earnings management. A possible explanation can be the representation of only one or 
token female member on board might fails to constrain extreme income increasing 
earnings management. 
4.5.4.3 Added Control Variables  
The regression model for this additional analysis is as follows, 
 
AQit =  + GDBit +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +  SalesGrth it +  
Brd_Sizeit +  Brd_Indit +  AC_Sizeit +  AC_Indit +  AC_Actit +  AC_FinExpit 
+  AC_BigNit +  Int_ACit +  MERGERit +  Diverit + INSTit +  
∑Ind_Dumit +   ∑Year_Dumit +  it     (2) 
 The above regression model augments the main regression model (Eq1) with 
additional control variables, AC_FinExpit, Int_ACit, MERGERit, Diverit, and INSTit. 
The internal audit committee is responsible for monitoring financial reporting process 
and overall internal control (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011). Absence of internal audit 
committee can lead to poor internal control and increase earnings management (Doyle, 
Ge, and McVay 2007). Hence, based on this argument and following Srinidhi, Gul, 
and Tsui (2011) internal audit committee existence (Int_ACit) and financial expertise 
(AC_FinExpit) are controlled. Further, following Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui (2011) 
MERGERit is controlled in order to control for firms involved in merger and   
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acquisition. Diversified firms are at higher risk of earnings management by manager 
(Healy and Palepu 2001, Fields, Lys, and Vincent 2001). Demirkan, Radhakrishnan, 
and Urcan (2012) claim that diversified firms have higher information asymmetry and 
internal agency issue and this in turn can lead to higher earnings management. Hence, 
Diverit is controlled in order to control for firms with multiple segments or diversified. 
Finally, Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011) argue, “Institutional investors have greater 
resources than individual investors to collect and trade on private firm-specific 
information (Hartzell and Starks 2003) that is incorporated into stock prices through 
trading”. Hence, managers of the firms with more institutional investors may involve 
in less opportunistic behaviour due to more informed involvement of the shareholders. 
Based on this argument INSTit is controlled in order to control for firms with 
institutional investors.  
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Table 4.7: Added Control Variables  
 
VARIABLES 
Per_FDirit FDit FDit_1 FDit_2 
    
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
Panel A: Modified Jones Model 
ABS_ATAit 
-.035 -.253 -.062 -1.912* -.068 -2.079** -.356 -5.290*** 
Mkt_Capit 
.000 .917 .000 .924 .000 .969 .000 .742 
ROAit 
.007 .789 .008 .848 .008 .864 .007 .736 
OCFit 
.000 25.037*** .000 25.156*** .000 24.975*** .000 25.676*** 
LEVit 
.005 .589 .005 .515 .005 .528 .004 .480 
SalesGrthit 
.003 1.064 .003 1.059 .003 1.040 .003 1.088 
Brd_Sizeit 
-.009 -.989 -.006 -.705 -.007 -.805 -.005 -.536 
Brd_Indit 
-.046 -4.647*** -.044 -4.494*** -.045 -4.583*** -.042 -4.269*** 
AC_Sizeit 
-.016 -1.087 -.017 -1.109 -.017 -1.128 -.016 -1.061 
AC_Indit 
.051 3.032*** .051 3.028*** .051 3.059*** .047 2.843*** 
AC_Actit 
.007 .777 .008 .886 .008 .858 .010 1.031 
AC_FinExpit 
-.072 -2.586*** -.072 -2.602*** -.069 -2.494** -.080 -2.890*** 
AC_BigNit 
-.049 -1.821 -.047 -1.751* -.047 -1.760* -.046 -1.745* 
Int_ACit 
-.382 -6.766*** -.377 -6.674*** -.375 -6.632*** -.390 -6.932*** 
MERGERit 
.048 1.079 .045 1.011 .046 1.029 .037 .829 
Diverit 
-.002 -.085 -.004 -.172 -.003 -.122 -.008 -.323 
INSTit 
-.087 -2.377** -.090 -2.452** -.090 -2.469** -.078 -2.132** 
Intercept .260 4.532*** .254 4.416*** .260 4.529*** .023 4.005*** 
N 3318 3318 3318 3318 
Adjusted R2 .547 .547 .547 .551 
F statistic (sig.) 138.986 139.262*** 139.313*** 141.129*** 
Industry and Year Included Included Included Included 
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Panel B: Kothari’s Model 
ABS_KOTit   -.036 -.259 -.062 -1.905* -.068 -2.079** -.355 -5.275*** 
Mkt_Capit .000 .920 .000 .927 .000- .971 .000 .746 
ROAit .006 .627 .006 .685 .006 .701 .005 .573 
OCFit .000 25.019*** .000 25.138*** .000 24.957*** .000 25.656*** 
LEVit .005 .595 .005 .521 .005 .534 .004 .486 
SalesGrthit .003 .995 .003 .989 .003 .971 .003 1.018 
Brd_Sizeit -.009 -1.009 -.006 -.726 -.007 -.825 -.005 -.558 
Brd_Indit -.046 -4.644*** -.044 -4.491*** -.045 -4.580*** -.042 -4.267*** 
AC_Sizeit -.016 -1.099 -.017 -1.121 -.017 -1.141 -.016 -1.073 
AC_Indit .051 3.056*** .051 3.052*** .052 3.082*** .048 2.868*** 
AC_Actit .007 .790 .009 .898 .008 .872 .010 1.043 
AC_FinExpit -.072 -2.574*** -.072 -2.590*** -.069 -2.482** -.080 -2.877*** 
AC_BigNit -.048 -1.811* -.047 -1.741* -.047 -1.750* -.046 -1.736* 
Int_ACit -.381 -6.753*** -.376 -6.662*** -.374 -6.619*** -.389 -6.918*** 
MERGERit .048 1.066 .045 .998 .046 1.016 .037 .817 
Diverit -.001 -.057 -.004 -.144 -.002 -.094 -.008 -.294 
INSTit -.087 -2.370** -.089 -2.444** -.090 -2.461** -.077 -2.125** 
Intercept .259 4.510*** .253 4.395*** .259 4.507*** .229 3.985*** 
N 3318 3318 3318 3318 
Adjusted R2 .547 .547 .547 .550 
F statistic (sig.) 138.871*** 139.144*** 139.197*** 141.000*** 
Industry and Year Included Included Included Included 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1 
Please refer to Appendix 4 for definition of variables 
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Table 4.7 reports the results of regression analyses that examine the impact of 
four board gender diversity proxies (Per_FDirit, FDit, FD_1it, and FD_2it)) on two 
accruals quality measures (ABS_ATAit and ABS_KOTit) with added control variables. 
Panel A summarizes the regression analyses results, where dependent variable is the 
absolute value of modified Jones model (ABS_ATAit) and panel B summarizes the 
regression analyses results, where dependent variable is the absolute value of 
Kothari’s model (ABS_KOTit). 
The 1st proxy for gender diverse board, Per_FDirit, has non-significant 
relationship with both ABS_ATAit (t statistics = - .253) and ABS_KOTit (t statistics = 
-.259). This implies percentage of female member(s) representation compare to male 
members on board may reduce earnings management but the impact is not significant. 
This result is similar as main regression analysis. 
The 2nd proxy for gender diverse board, FDit, shows significant negative 
relationship with both ABS_ATAit (t statistics = - 1.912*) and ABS_KOTit (t statistics 
= -1.905*). This suggests that representation of at least one female member on board 
can prohibit earnings management. This result is similar as main regression analysis 
and supports H2. 
The 3rd proxy for gender diverse board, FD_1it, demonstrates significant 
negative relationship with both ABS_ATAit (t statistics = - 2.079**) and ABS_KOTit (t 
statistics = -2.079**).  This infers that presence of one female member on board can 
also prohibit earnings management. This result is similar as main regression analysis 
and supports H2. 
Finally, the 4th proxy for gender diverse board, FD_2it, demonstrates highly 
significant negative relationship with both ABS_ATAit (t statistics = - 5.290***) and 
ABS_KOTit (t statistics = -5.275***).  This infers that presence of two female   
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members on board can significantly and strongly constrain earnings management. This 
result is similar as main regression analysis and supports H2. 
Despite the addition of five additional control variables, AC_FinExpit, Int_ACit, 
MERGERit, Diverit, and INSTit, Eq.2 demonstrate similar results as the main study and 
support H2. All the proxies of gender diverse board (Per_FDirit, FDit, FD_1it, and 
FD_2it) show negative impact on both earnings management measures (ABS_ATAit 
and ABS_KOTit).   However, Per_FDirit   fails to demonstrate significant negative 
impact on earnings management. Representation of two female members on board 
shows the highest significant negative impact   on earnings management. 
4.6 Conclusion 
4.6.1 Study Overview  
This study investigates the influence of board gender diversity on accruals 
quality of randomly selected ASX listed companies’ in both voluntary and self-
regulatory periods. Despite regulatory attention to enhance board gender diversity and 
recent corporate collapse of big Australian corporations (), earnings quality - board 
gender diversity studies in Australian context is scarce. Thus, a proper investigation 
of board gender diversity impact on earnings quality (accruals quality) has become 
essential. Agency theory and organisational theory have been utilised to build the 
testable hypothesis. 
The sample of this research consists of randomly selected ASX listed firms 
during both voluntary period (2008-2010) and self-regulatory period (2012-2012). 
The sample firms consist of ASX listed firms of all sizes. Hence, the results of this 
study encompass robust outcomes of board gender diversity impact on accruals 
quality.  
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4.6.2 Results and Conclusions  
Percentage of female director(s)’ representation on board show negative but 
insignificant relationship with both measures of accruals quality. Representation of at 
least one female director and exactly one female director on board demonstrate 
significant negative relation with ABS_ATAit and ABS_KOTit. This suggests even 
presence of at least one female director on board can contribute to the reduction of 
earnings quality and improve accruals quality. Representation exactly two female 
directors on board is negatively linked to ABS_ATAit and ABS_KOTit at a higher 
coefficient and significant level. Consistent with the expectation representation of 
higher number of female members on boards can better constrain earnings 
management compare to one female member on board. Although two female directors 
can better contribute to accruals quality, representation of one female director on board 
can contribute in restraining earnings management. From the above discussion it can 
be inferred that compare to an all-male board a gender diverse board can better 
constrain earnings management and positively contribute to earnings quality. This 
result is consistent with the findings of prior studies (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011, 
Barua et al. 2010, Peni and Vahaama 2010, Krishnan and Parson 2008) that 
demonstrate that female corporate leaders and executives can constrain earnings 
management and improve earnings quality.  
4.6.3 Implications and Contributions 
The findings of this study have various implications. For example, this study 
demonstrates there is a significant relation between the representation of at least one 
female on board and better accruals quality. Hence, this result supports ASX CGC 
cause behind implementing gender board diversity recommendation. Further, this 
result might motivate ASX CGC to switch to mandatory representation of at least one   
314 
 
female on ASX listed firms’ boards from the self-regulatory approach (comply or 
explain). This study shows a strong and positive association between representations 
of two female members on ASX listed firm’ boards and earnings quality. ASX CGC 
might consider altering the current gender diversity recommendation to encourage 
more than one female director representation in companies of feasible size. Finally, 
after the recent corporate collapse and global financial crisis corporations, regulators 
and investors have focused on internal constraining mechanism of fraudulent financial 
reporting. The results of this study will help the Australian corporations and 
shareholders to consider gender diverse board as one of significant constraining 
mechanism of earnings management. This in turn might motivate Australian 
corporations to appoint more female members on boards without external regulatory 
pressure.   
4.6.4 Limitations 
Some of the inherent limitations of this study are: First, this study utilised only 
two measures of accruals quality (absolute values of residuals of modified jones model 
and kothari’s model). Second, in order to analyse the impact of gender diverse board 
on accruals quality, based on prior related studies multiple firm, board, audit 
committee related variable measures are controlled; however, there is a thin chance of 
excluding other variables that might impact accruals quality. Third, the results might 
not be generalised outside the respective timeframe of this study (e.g. 2008-2014). 
Finally, this study is conducted in an Australian context and the results might not be 
generalizable to other countries. 
4.6.5 Future Research 
Future research can analyse the impact of gender diverse board on accruals 
quality by utilising other cash-based models, like, DD (2002) and MDD (2002).   
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 Further, other proxies of earnings quality suggested by Dechow and Dichev (2002), 
like, timely loss recognition, smoothness, benchmark, earning surprise, and target 
beating, can also be utilised to investigate the relationship between earnings quality 
and gender diverse board. Finally, more academic attention is required on the impact 
of overall corporate gender diversity (e.g. female CFO, female senior executive, 
female audit committee members) on earnings quality among Australian firms in the 
future.  
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CHAPTER 5 
OVERALL CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
This thesis investigates three significant aspects of corporate gender diversity. 
The 1st essay provide a comprehensive assessment of corporate gender diversity, 2nd 
essay focuses on the link between board gender diversity and one of its key internal 
determining factor nomination committee, and 3rd essay investigates impact of board 
gender diversity on earnings quality. Chapter 2 or 1st essay provides a 
comprehensive review of global gender regulation and its impact on international 
corporate gender diversity along with some other significant supporting elements of 
corporate gender diversity (see section 5.2). The 3rd chapter or 2nd essay 
demonstrates the positive influence of nomination committee existence and its 
attributes (size, independence, gender diversity, and meeting frequency) on ASX 
listed companies’ board gender diversity during the voluntary period. The 4th 
c h a p t e r  or 3rd essay provides empirical evidence of the influence of board gender 
diversity on accruals quality of randomly selected ASX listed companies’ in both 
voluntary and self-regulatory periods. 
5.2 Summary of Major Findings  
The 2nd chapter provides a complete review of five significant elements of 
corporate gender diversity: (1) The evolution of gender diversity studies since 1950 
onwards; (2) Theories utilised in gender diversity studies; (3) A synthesis of women 
in business studies; (4) An overview of worldwide gender regulation; and (5) A 
comprehensive exploration of corporate gender diversity condition in Australia.  
The contributions made by this essay are: (1) The review of the past 60 years’ 
(1950 onwards) gender literature not only represent a comprehensive view of   
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corporate females’ positions and their struggle in the last 60 years, but also provide 
rationale behind their still very insignificant representation at the top. (2) A concise 
but comprehensive review of underlying theories of gender studies justify the 
contributions of corporate female members and provides reasons behind “why” they 
are usually being treated and perceived differently from their male peers. (3) An 
exploration of “women in business” studies strengthen the logic behind incorporating 
more female corporates at the top. And (4) A complete review of current global 
corporate gender diversity (regulations, facts and statistics, academic research and 
organisations promoting corporate gender diversity) provide the regulators, 
academics, opponents/proponents of corporate gender diversity a comprehensive view 
of the most current corporate gender diversity situation in the world. It sheds light on 
the causes and motivation behind the mandatory and self- regulatory gender 
regulations adopted by different countries, provide  guidelines to the regulators and 
proponents of corporate gender diversity for future adaptation of gender regulation 
and strategies, and also persuade them to come up with more innovative and effective 
strategies to motivate top corporate gender diversity, and finally encourage gender 
researchers to adopt innovative research path to further explore the causes and 
outcomes of corporate gender diversity.  
The 3rd chapter analyses the impact of nomination committee existence, 
structure (size. independence, and gender diversity) and activity (meeting frequency) 
on board gender diversity of randomly selected ASX listed firms during the voluntary 
period. Rather than focusing on top Australian listed firms this study considers all 
ASX listed firms. Further, examination of nomination committee-gender diverse 
board relationship during the voluntary period demonstrates real impact (without the 
external regulatory pressure) of nomination committee existence and its attributes on   
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board gender diversity. The findings of this chapter suggest that there is no significant 
relationship between existence of nomination committee and board gender diversity. 
This implies that a mere existence of nomination committee is not good enough to 
enhance female representation on board. Consistent with the expectation nomination 
committee size shows a significant negative relationship with presence of two female 
members on board and insignificant negative relationship with other three board 
gender diversity proxies. This suggests a larger nomination committee comprised of 
too many members and without appropriate composition (e.g. mostly insiders with 
CEO involvement in recruiting process) can prohibit higher representation of female 
members on boards. Consistent with the expectation nomination committee 
independence and gender diversity demonstrates highly significant and positive 
relationship with board gender diversity. This suggests that female directors’ 
representation on boards is significantly associated with presence of independent and 
female member(s) in nomination committees. This result is consistent with the 
findings of prior studies (Hutchinson, Mack, and Plastow 2014, Kaczmarek, Kimino, 
and Pye 2012). Finally, higher meeting frequency of nomination committees fails to 
demonstrate any significant relationship with board gender diversity, suggesting that 
higher number of meetings do not necessarily contribute to the unbiased selection 
process of female directors on boards. Further, additional analyses results 
demonstrate: (1) nomination committee gender diversity in lagged (t-1) period can 
significantly and positively impact female representation on boards in current (t) 
period; and (2) change in nomination committee gender diversity between period t and 
t-1 is significantly and positively associated with change in female representation on 
boards between period t and t-1.  
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The findings of this essay have various implications. (1) It demonstrates there 
is a significant relation between the percentage of independent nomination committee 
members and gender diverse board. Hence, ASX CGC might consider revising the 
nomination committee independence related recommendations and altering it to a ratio 
(nomination committee independent member / nomination committee size).86 (2) It 
shows a highly significant association between the percentage of female members on 
nomination committees and gender diverse board. ASX CGC might consider 
recommending certain percentage of demographic diversity within the nomination 
committee composition recommendations. (3) The results of this essay help the 
Australian regulators to realize the importance of nomination committee composition 
as a key contributing internal factor for the unbiased selection process of female 
directors and this in turn will attract more regulatory attention towards the overall 
quality, composition, activities and strategic process of nomination committees.   
The 4th chapter investigates the link between diverse measures of board gender 
diversity (number, percentage, and dummy variables) and two measures of accruals 
quality (residuals of Modified Jones model and Kothari’s model) The Percentage of 
female director(s)’ representation on boards show negative but insignificant 
relationship with both measures of accruals quality. Representation of at least one 
female director and exactly one female director on board demonstrate significant 
negative relation with ABS_ATAit and ABS_KOTit. Representation of exactly two 
female directors on board is negatively linked to ABS_ATAit and ABS_KOTit at a 
higher coefficient and significant level. Consistent with the expectation representation 
of higher number of female members on boards can better constrain earnings   
                                                          
86 ASXCGC Recommendation for NC: The nomination committee should be structured so that it: consists of a majority of 
independent directors, is chaired by an independent director, and has at least three members. 
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management compare to one female member on board. Although two female directors 
can better contribute to accruals quality, representation of one female director on board 
may also contribute in restraining earnings management. From the above discussion it 
can be inferred that compare to an all-male board a gender diverse board can better 
constrain earnings management and positively contribute to earnings quality. This 
result is consistent with the findings of prior studies (Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui 2011, 
Barua et al. 2010, Peni and Vahaama 2010, Krishnan and Parson 2008) that 
demonstrate that female corporate leaders and executives can constrain earnings 
management and improve earnings quality. The additional analyses demonstrate: (1) 
All the proxies of gender diverse board (Per_FDirit, FDit, FD_1it, and FD_2it) show 
significant/ non-significant link with income increasing earnings management and 
significant/ non-significant link with income decreasing earnings management. (2) 
Per_FDirit, FDit, FD_1it, and FD_2it show significant positive link with extreme 
income decreasing (=<25%) earnings management and Per_FDirit, FDit, and FD_2it 
show non-significant link with extreme income increasing (>=75%) earnings 
management. And (3) Despite the addition of five additional control variables, 
AC_FinExpit, Int_ACit, MERGERit, Diverit, and INSTit in the main regression analysis, 
the result demonstrates the proxies of gender diverse board (FDit, FD_1it, and FD_2it) 
except for Per_FDirit have significant negative link with earnings management 
measures (ABS_ATAit and ABS_KOTit).    
The findings of this essay have various implications. (1) This study 
demonstrates there is a significant relation between the representation of at least one 
female on board and better accruals quality. Hence, this result supports ASX CGC 
cause behind implementing gender board diversity recommendation. (2) The result of 
this study might motivate ASX CGC to switch to mandatory representation of at least   
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one female on ASX listed firms’ boards from the self-regulatory approach (comply or 
explain). (3) It shows strong and positive association between representations of two 
female members on ASX listed firms’ boards and earnings quality. ASX CGC might 
consider altering the current gender diversity recommendations to encourage more 
than one female director’s representation in companies of feasible sizes. And (4) After 
the recent corporate collapse and global financial crisis corporations, regulators and 
investors have focused on internal constraining mechanisms of fraudulent financial 
reporting. The results of this study help the Australian corporations and shareholders 
to consider gender diverse board as one of significant constraining mechanism of 
earnings management. This in turn might motivate Australian corporations to appoint 
more female members on boards without external regulatory pressure.   
5.3 Directions for Future Research 
 
The findings of the thesis add to our understanding of the global gender 
diversity regulation, one of the key internal motivating factors (nomination 
committee) and one of the key consequences (accruals quality) of gender diverse 
board. It also provides a good framework for future research. More research is 
required to gain a better understanding of the key determining factors and outputs 
of female representation at the top corporate positions. 
This thesis provides a good framework for future research in the area of 
global corporate gender diversity review.  It provides evidence that a comprehensive 
evalution of gender diversity studies, theories, and gender diversity regulation and 
its impact can provide proper rationale behind current global corporate gender 
diversity condition. Further reviews and syntheses may be done on determinants 
and consequences of corporate gender diversity.  
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Future research can analyse the impact of nomination committee existence on 
gender diverse board by taking CEO involvement and nomination committee strategic 
process into onsideration.  Further academic attention is required on the impact of the 
nomination committee attributes on gender diverse board for smaller and medium 
sized firms in both voluntary and self-regulatory periods. 
Future research can analyse the impact of gender diverse board on accruals 
quality by utilising other cash-based models, like, DD (2002) and MDD (2002).  
Further, other proxies of earnings quality suggested by Dechow and Dichev (2002), 
like, timely loss recognition, smoothness, benchmark, earning surprise, and target 
beating, can also be utilised to investigate the relationship between earnings quality 
and gender diverse board. Finally, enhanced academic attention is required on the 
impact of overall corporate gender diversity (e.g. female CFO, female senior 
executive, female audit committee members) on earnings quality among Australian 
firms.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
As per KPMG report (2014), in 2012, a majority of the S&P/ASX200 provided 
commentary in their annual report on the benefits that have arisen from the 
implementation of a diversity policy. In 2013, a significantly higher number of the 
ASX201-500 and ASX501+ samples have provided enhanced commentary from the 
prior year. Some of the key benefits of diversity disclosed by companies include: 
1. Enhanced corporate performance, reputation and shareholder value. 
2. Access to different perspectives, ideas and innovative approaches leading 
to better decision making and business outcomes. 
3. Creativity and innovation arising from diversity enables employees to 
share different experiences, perspectives and cultures, remain flexible 
and dynamic as well as reflective of, and responsive to, the communities 
they interact with. 
4. Delivery of quality outcomes for customers. 
5. Maximisation of the talent potential and career opportunities for employees. 
6. Attraction and retention of top talent by ensuring the workplace is supportive 
of women. 
7. Better business outcomes through leveraging the unique 
experiences of people with diverse backgrounds. 
8. Competitive advantage. 
9. Broadening of skills and experience in the workforce. 
10. Increased opportunities to understand and engage with the company’s 
stakeholders and the various communities in which it operates. 
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11. Improvement in the quality of life for the workforce, their 
families, communities and society at large. 
12. Increased morale, reduced bias and prejudice in the workplace and reduced 
absenteeism. 
13. Discourages inappropriate attitudes, behaviours and stereotypes and actively 
promotes equal opportunity and employment conditions. 
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Appendix 2 
Variable Descriptor 
GDBit Board gender diversity of firm i in year t. 
GDB it,t-1 Change in board gender diversity of firm i from year t-1 to t. 
Num_FDirit Total number of female directors on board of firm i  in year t. 
Num_FDir it,t-1   Change in the number of female director(s) of firm i from year t-1 to t. 
Per_FDirit Percentage of female directors compare to total number board members of firm 
i  in year t. 
Per_FDir it,t-1 Change in the percentage of female director(s) of firm i from year t-1 to t. 
FDit A dummy variable: 1 if the firm has at least 1female director on board or 0 
otherwise of firm i  in year t. 
FD2it A dummy variable: 1 if the firm has 2 female directors on board or 0 otherwise 
of firm i  in year t. 
NC_Dumit A dummy variable, it is equal to 1 if company has a Nomination Committee 
or 0 otherwise of firm i  in year t. 
NC_Dumit-1 A dummy variable, it is equal to 1 if company has a Nomination Committee 
or 0 otherwise of firm i in year t-1. 
NC_Dum it,t-1 Change in the existence of Nomination Committee of  firm i from year t-1 to 
t. 
NC_Sizeit The number of Nomination Committee members of firm i  in year t. 
Log_NC_Sizeit Log of the number of Nomination Committee members of firm i  in year t. 
Log_NC_Sizeit-1 Log of the number of Nomination Committee members of firm i in year t-1. 
Log_NC_Sizeit,t-1  Change in the logarithm of size of Nomination Committee of  firm i from year 
t-1 to t. 
NC_Indit The number of Nomination Committee independent members of firm i  in year 
t. 
Per_NC_Indit Percentage of Nomination Committee independent members of firm i  in year 
t. 
Per_NC_Indit-1 Percentage of Nomination Committee independent members of firm i in year 
t-1. 
Per_NC_Ind it,t-1  Change in the percentage of independence of Nomination Committee of  firm 
i from year t-1 to t. 
NC_GDit The number of Nomination Committee female members of firm i  in year t. 
Per_ NC_GDit Percentage of Nomination Committee female members of firm i  in year t. 
Per_NC_GDit-1 Percentage of Nomination Committee female members of firm i in year t-1. 
Per_NC_GDit,t-1  Change in the percentage of female representation of Nomination Committee 
of  firm i from year t-1 to t. 
NC_MFit Number of Nomination Committee meetings held each year of firm i  in year 
t. 
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Log_ NC_MFit Log of the number of Nomination Committee meetings held each year of firm 
i  in year t. 
Log_NC_MFit-1 Log of the number of Nomination Committee meetings held each year of firm 
i in year t-1. 
Log_NC_MFit,t-1  Change in the logarithm of meeting frequency of NC of  firm i from year t-1 
to t. 
Mkt_Capit Annual market capitalization of firm i  in year t. 
Mkt_Cap it-1 Annual market capitalization of firm i in year t-1. 
Mkt_Cap it,t-1  Change in the annual market capital of  firm i from year t-1 to t. 
ROAit Return on assets calculated as earnings before extraordinary items divided 
by total assets of firm i  in year t. 
ROA it-1 Return on assets calculated as earnings before extraordinary items divided 
by total assets of firm i in year t-1. 
ROA it,t-1  Change in the return on asset of  firm i from year t-1 to t. 
OCF
it
 Cash flows of firm i from operations in year t. 
OCF it-1 Cash flows firm i from operations in year t-1. 
OCF it,t-1  Change in the operating cash flow of  firm i from year t-1 to t. 
LEVit The ratio of long-term debt to total assets of firm i  in year t. 
LEV it-1 The ratio of long-term debt to total assets of firm i in year t-1. 
LEV it,t-1  Change in the leverage of  firm i from year t-1 to t. 
SalesGrthit Change in current year’s sales divided by lagged sales of firm i  in year t. 
SalesGrth it-1 Change in current year’s sales divided by lagged sales of firm i in year t-1. 
SalesGrth it,t-1  Change in the sales growth of  firm i from year t-1 to t. 
Brd_Sizeit Total number of directors on board of firm i  in year t. 
Brd_Size it-1 Total number of directors on board of firm i in year t-1. 
Brd_Size it,t-1  Change in the board size of  firm i from year t-1 to t. 
Brd_Indit Total number of independent directors of the board of firm i  in year t. 
Brd_Ind it-1 Total number of independent directors of the board of firm i in year t-1. 
Brd_Ind it,t-1  Change in the board independence of  firm i from year t-1 to t. 
∑Ind_Dumit Based on the GICs code the Ind_Dum is segmented as follows, 
ConsumerDiscretionary_Ind_Dumit = A dummy variable: 1 if the firm i 
belongs to Consumer discretionary industry in year t or 0 otherwise. 
ConsumerStaples_Ind_Dumit = A dummy variable: 1 if the firm i belongs to 
Consumer Staples industry in year t or 0 otherwise. 
Energy_Ind_Dumit                 = A dummy variable: 1 if the firm i belongs to 
Energy industry in year t or 0 otherwise. 
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Health_Ind_Dumit                           = A dummy variable: 1 if the firm i belongs to 
Health Care industry in year t or 0 otherwise. 
Industrials_Ind_Dumit           = A dummy variable: 1 if the firm i belongs to 
Industrials product industry in year t or 0 otherwise. 
IT_Ind_Dumit                         = A dummy variable: 1 if the firm i belongs to 
IT industry in year t or 0 otherwise. 
Materials _Ind_Dumit            = A dummy variable: 1 if the firm i belongs to 
Materials industry in year t or 0 otherwise. 
Telecom_Ind_Dumit            = A dummy variable: 1 if the firm i belongs to 
telecommunication industry in year t or 0 otherwise. 
∑Yr_Dumit 2008_Yr_Dumit                                  = A dummy variable: 1 if the year is 2008 or 0 
otherwise. 
2009_Yr _Dumit                                 = A dummy variable: 1 if the year is 2009 or 0 
otherwise. 
2010_Yr _Dumit                     = A dummy variable: 1 if the year is 2010 or 0 
otherwise. 
 
it 
 Error term 
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Appendix 3 
Regression Models 
GDBit =  + NC_Dumit +  Log_NC_Sizeit +   Per_NC_ Indit +  PerNC_GDit +  
Log_NC_MFit +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +   SalesGrthit +   
Brd_Sizeit +  Brd_Indit + ∑Ind_Dumit +  ∑Year_Dumit +  it                                
(1) 
1 (a) Num_FDirit=  + NC_Dumit +  Log_NC_Sizeit +   Per_NC_ Indit +  PerNC_GDit  
+  Log_NC_MFit +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +     
SalesGrthit +  Brd_Sizeit +  Brd_Indit + ∑Ind_Dumit + 
 ∑Year_Dumit  +  it   
 
1 (b) Per_FDirit=  + NC_Dumit +  Log_NC_Sizeit +   Per_NC_ Indit +  PerNC_GDit  
 +  Log_NC_MFit +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +     
SalesGrthit +  Brd_Sizeit +  Brd_Indit + ∑Ind_Dumit + 
 ∑Year_Dumit  
+  
it   
 
1 (c) FDit=  + NC_Dumit +  Log_NC_Sizeit +   Per_NC_ Indit +  PerNC_GDit  
+  Log_NC_MFit +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +     
SalesGrthit +  Brd_Sizeit +  Brd_Indit + ∑Ind_Dumit +  ∑Year_Dumit  
+  
it   
 
1 (d) FD2it=  + NC_Dumit +  Log_NC_Sizeit +   Per_NC_ Indit +  PerNC_GDit  
+  Log_NC_MFit +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +     
SalesGrthit +  Brd_Sizeit +  Brd_Indit + ∑Ind_Dumit +  ∑Year_Dumit  
+  
it   
 
GDBit =  + NC_Dumit-1 +  Log_NC_Sizeit-1 +  Per_NC_ Indit-1+  Per_NC_GDit-1 +  
Log_NC_MF it-1 +  Mkt_Cap it-1 +  ROA it-1 +  OCF it-1 +  LEV it-1 +  SalesGrth it-1 
+  Brd_Size it-1 +  Brd_Ind it-1 +  ∑Ind_Dum +  ∑Year_Dum +  it                                          (2) 
2 (a) Num_FDirit=  + NC_Dumit-1 +  Log_NC_Sizeit-1 +  Per_NC_ Indit-1+  
 Per_NC_GDit-1 + Log_NC_MF it-1 +  Mkt_Cap it-1 +  ROA it-1 +  
OCF it-1 +  LEV it-1 +  SalesGrth it-1 +  Brd_Size it-1 +  Brd_Ind it-
1 +  ∑Ind_Dum +  ∑Year_Dum +  it 
2 (b) Per_FDirit =  + NC_Dumit-1 +  Log_NC_Sizeit-1 +  Per_NC_ Indit-
1+ Per_NC_GDit-1 + Log_NC_MF it-1 +  Mkt_Cap it-1 +  ROA it-1 +  
OCF it-1 +  LEV it-1 +  SalesGrth it-1 +  Brd_Size it-1 +  Brd_Ind it-1 
+  ∑Ind_Dum +  ∑Year_Dum +  it 
2 (c) FDit=  + NC_Dumit-1 +  Log_NC_Sizeit-1 +  Per_NC_ Indit-1+ Per_NC_GDit-1 + 
Log_NC_MF it-1 +  Mkt_Cap it-1 +  ROA it-1 +  OCF it-1 +  LEV it-1 + 
 SalesGrth it-1 +  Brd_Size it-1 +  Brd_Ind it-1 +  ∑Ind_Dum + 
 ∑Year_Dum +  it 
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2 (d) FD2it=  + NC_Dumit-1 +  Log_NC_Sizeit-1 +  Per_NC_ Indit-1+  Per_NC_GDit-1 
+Log_NC_MF it-1 +  Mkt_Cap it-1 +  ROA it-1 +  OCF it-1 +  LEV it-1 + 
 SalesGrth it-1 +  Brd_Size it-1 +  Brd_Ind it-1 +  ∑Ind_Dum + 
 ∑Year_Dum +  it 
GDB it,t-1  =  + NC_Dum it,t-1 +   Log _NC_Size it,t-1 +  Per_NC_ Ind it,t-1 +   Per_NC_GD 
it,t-1 +   Log_NC_MF it,t-1+   Mkt_Cap it,t-1+  ROA it,t-1+  OCF it,t-1+  LEV 
it,t-1+   SalesGrth it,t-1+  Brd_Size it,t-1 +  Brd_Ind it,t-1+  ∑Ind_Dum it,t-1+   
∑Year_Dum it,t-1+   it,t-1                                                                                                                                                     (3) 
 
3 (a)  Num_FDir it,t-1  =  + NC_Dum it,t-1 +   Log _NC_Size it,t-1 +  Per_NC_ Ind 
it,t-1 +  Per_NC_GD it,t-1 +   Log_NC_MF it,t-1+  Mkt_Cap it,t-
1+  ROA it,t-1+ OCF it,t-1+  LEV it,t-1+  SalesGrth it,t-1+  
Brd_Size it,t-1 +  Brd_Ind it,t-1+ ∑Ind_Dum it,t-1+ 
 ∑Year_Dum it,t-1+   it,t-1      
3 (b)  Per_FDir it,t-1  =  + NC_Dum it,t-1 +   Log _NC_Size it,t-1 +  Per_NC_Ind it,t-
1 +   Per_NC_GD it,t-1 +   Log_NC_MF it,t-1+   Mkt_Cap it,t-
1+  ROA it,t-1+ OCF it,t-1+  LEV it,t-1+  SalesGrth it,t-1+ 
 Brd_Size it,t-1 +  Brd_Ind it,t-1+  ∑Ind_Dum it,t-1+   
∑Year_Dum it,t-1 +   it,t-1    
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Appendix 4 
Variable Descriptor 
TA
it 
 Total accruals of firm i for year t, measured as the difference between income 
before extraordinary items and operating cash flows. 
A
it−1 Total assets of firm i for year t−1. 
REV
it
 Change in revenues for firm ifrom year t−1 to year t. 
REC
it
 Change in receivables for firm i from year t−1 to year t. 
PPE
it
 Gross property, plant and equipment of firm i in year t. 
CA
it       Change in current assets for firm i from year t-1 to year t.     
CL
it       Change in current liabilities for firm i from year t-1 to year t. 
Cash
it
  Change in cash and short-term investment for firm i from year t-1 to year t.      
STDEBTit  Change in current portion of long-term liablities for firm i from year t-1 to 
year t. 
OCF
it−1  Cash flows of firm i from operations in year t – 1. 
OCF
it
 Cash flows firm i from operations in year t. 
OCF
it+1
 Cash flows firm i from operations year in year t + 1. 
Mkt_Capit Annual Market capitalization of firm  i  in year t. 
ROAit Return on assets calculated as earnings before extraordinary items divided 
by total assets. 
LEVit The ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
SalesGrthit Change in current year’s sales divided by lagged sales. 
Log_TAit Log of total assets. 
ROEit Return on assets calculated as earnings before extraordinary items divided 
by total equity. 
Tobin’s Q Ratio of market value of asset to book value. 
Dlossit A dummy variable that equals to 1 if firm I incur loss in year t or 0 otherwise. 
BMit Ratio of book value of equity to market value. 
Brd_Sizeit Total number of directors on board. 
Log_Brd_Sizeit Log of board size. 
Brd_Indit Total number of independent directors of the board. 
Per_Brd_Indit The percentage of independent directors compare to total members of the 
board. 
Num_FDirit Total number of female directors on board. 
Per_FDirit Percentage of female directors compare to total number board members. 
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FDit A dummy variable: 1 if the firm has at least one female director on board or 0 
otherwise. 
FD_1it A dummy variable: 1 if the firm has one female director on board or 0 
otherwise. 
FD2it A dummy variable: 1 if the firm has at least two female directors on board or 0 
otherwise. 
FD_2it A dummy variable: 1 if the firm has two female directors on board or 0 
otherwise. 
FD3it A dummy variable: 1 if the firm has three or more female directors on board or 
0 otherwise. 
FCEOit A dummy variable: 1 if CEO is a female or 0 otherwise. 
FCHAIRit A dummy variable: 1 if chairman is a female or 0 otherwise. 
FCEODUALit A dummy variable: 1 if CEO and chairman of the board are the same person 
and that person is female or 0 otherwise. 
INSTit Dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm has at least 1 institutional 
investor or 0 otherwise. 
AC_Actit Number of Audit Committee activity/meeting. 
Log_AC_Actit Log of Audit Committee activity/meeting. 
Dum_AC_Actit A dummy variable that equals to 1 if Audit Committee deals with more than 
one activity/meeting or 0 otherwise. 
AC_Sizeit Total number of Audit Committee members. 
Dum_AC_Sizeit A dummy variable that equals to 1 if Audit Committee has at least three 
members or 0 otherwise. 
Log_ AC_Sizeit Log of Audit Committee size. 
AC_Indit Number of Audit Committee independent members. 
Per_AC_Indit Percentage of Audit Committee independent members. 
Dum_AC_Indit A dummy variable that equals to 1 if Audit Committee has at least one 
independent member or 0 otherwise. 
Dum_AC_FinExpit A dummy variable that equals to 1 if Audit Committee has at least one 
accounting expert or 0 otherwise. 
Dum_AC_BigNit A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 
auditors or 0 otherwise. 
Dum_Int_ACit A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm has an internal Audit Committee 
or 0 otherwise. 
Dum_MERGERit Dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm is engaged in a 
merger/acquisition/joint venture or 0 otherwise. 
Dum_Diverit Dummy variable that equals to 1 when the firm operates in multiple 
segments or 0 otherwise. 
ABS_ATA
it
 Absolute value of abnormal total accruals measure estimated by using the 
Modified jones Model. 
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ABS_DDit Absolute value of accrual estimation errors using the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model. 
ABS_MDDit Absolute value of accrual estimation error using the extended version of Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) as suggested by McNichols (2002). 
Ind_Dumit Based on the GICs code the Ind_Dum segmented as follows, 
ConsumerDiscretionary_Ind_Dumit = A dummy variable: 1 if the firm i 
belongs to Consumer discretionary industry in year t or 0 otherwise. 
ConsumerStaples_Ind_Dumit = A dummy variable: 1 if the firm i belongs to 
Consumer Staples industry in year t or 0 otherwise. 
Energy_Ind_Dumit                 = A dummy variable: 1 if the firm i belongs to 
Energy industry in year t or 0 otherwise. 
Health_Ind_Dumit                           = A dummy variable: 1 if the firm i belongs to 
Health Care industry in year t or 0 otherwise. 
Industrials_Ind_Dumit           = A dummy variable: 1 if the firm i belongs to 
Industrials product industry in year t or 0 otherwise. 
IT_Ind_Dumit                         = A dummy variable: 1 if the firm i belongs to IT 
industry in year t or 0 otherwise. 
Materials _Ind_Dumit            = A dummy variable: 1 if the firm i belongs to 
Materials industry in year t or 0 otherwise. 
Telecom_Ind_Dumit            = A dummy variable: 1 if the firm i belongs to 
Telecommunication industry in year t or 0 otherwise. 
Yr_Dumit 2008_Yr_Dumit                                  = A dummy variable: 1 if the year is 2008 or 0 
otherwise. 
2009_Yr _Dumit                                 = A dummy variable: 1 if the year is 2009 or 0 
otherwise. 
2010_Yr _Dumit                     = A dummy variable: 1 if the year is 2010 or 0 
otherwise. 
2012_Yr _Dumit                                  = A dummy variable: 1 if the year is 2012 or 0 
otherwise. 
2013_Yr _Dumit                      = A dummy variable: 1 if the year is 2013 or 0 
otherwise. 
2014_Yr _Dumit                      = A dummy variable: 1 if the year is 2014 or 0 
otherwise.. 
 
it    Error term 
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Appendix 5 
 
Regression Models 
Main Regression Analysis 
AQit =  + GDBit +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +   SalesGrth it +  Brd_Sizeit + 
 Brd_Indit +  AC_Sizeit +  AC_Indit  +  AC_Actit +  Dum_AC_FinExpit +  
Ind_Dumit +   Year_Dumit +  it          (1) 
1 (a) ABS_ATAit =  + Per_FDirit +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +   
SalesGrth it +  Brd_Sizeit +  Brd_Indit +  AC_Sizeit +  AC_Indit  + 
 AC_Actit +  Dum_AC_FinExpit +  ∑Ind_Dumit +   ∑Year_Dumit 
+  
it 
   
1 (b) ABS_ATAit =  + FDit +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +   SalesGrth 
it +  Brd_Sizeit +  Brd_Indit +  AC_Sizeit +  AC_Indit  +  AC_Actit + 
 Dum_AC_FinExpit +  ∑Ind_Dumit +   ∑Year_Dumit +  it 
 
1 (c) ABS_ATAit =  + FD_1it +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +   SalesGrth 
it +  Brd_Sizeit +  Brd_Indit +  AC_Sizeit +  AC_Indit  +  AC_Actit + 
 Dum_AC_FinExpit +  ∑Ind_Dumit +   ∑Year_Dumit +  it 
  
1 (d) ABS_ATAit =  + FD_2it +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +   SalesGrth 
it +  Brd_Sizeit +  Brd_Indit +  AC_Sizeit +  AC_Indit  +  AC_Actit + 
 Dum_AC_FinExpit +  ∑Ind_Dumit +   ∑Year_Dumit +  it 
1 (e) ABS_KOTit =  + Per_FDirit +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +   
SalesGrth it +  Brd_Sizeit +  Brd_Indit +  AC_Sizeit +  AC_Indit  + 
 AC_Actit +  Dum_AC_FinExpit +  ∑Ind_Dumit +   ∑Year_Dumit 
+  
it 
 
1 (f) ABS_KOTit =  + FDit +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +   SalesGrth 
it +  Brd_Sizeit +  Brd_Indit +  AC_Sizeit +  AC_Indit  +  AC_Actit + 
 Dum_AC_FinExpit +  ∑Ind_Dumit +   ∑Year_Dumit +  it 
 
1 (g) ABS_KOTit =  + FD_1it +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +   
SalesGrth it +  Brd_Sizeit +  Brd_Indit +  AC_Sizeit +  AC_Indit  + 
 AC_Actit +  Dum_AC_FinExpit +  ∑Ind_Dumit +   ∑Year_Dumit 
+  
it 
 
1 (h) ABS_KOTit =  + FD_2it +  Mkt_Capit +  ROAit +  OCFit +  LEVit +   
SalesGrth it +  Brd_Sizeit +  Brd_Indit +  AC_Sizeit +  AC_Indit  + 
 AC_Actit +  Dum_AC_FinExpit +  ∑Ind_Dumit +   ∑Year_Dumit 
+  
it
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